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CIS

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S.J. RES. 163, 171, 177, 191; S. RES. 242, 323, 343, 370, 391; S. EX. RES. 5, 6; AND S. CON. RES. 81

APRIL 29, 30, MAY 11, 12, AND 13, 1982

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NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room 1202, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Zorinsky, Tsongas, and Dodd.

The Chairman. I believe both Senator Pell and I have opening statements, so we will ask you to bear with us, because this will be the opening statement for the whole series of hearings, hearings that I think will cover the most important subject for humankind ever to come before the Foreign Relations Committee in our history, the question of what can be done to control the nuclear arms race and prevent a nuclear war.

This morning, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins a landmark series of hearings on the crucial issue of how to achieve mutual reductions in United States and Soviet nuclear inventories. The hearings that we will hold over the next 3 weeks in the most classic sense will represent the response of a democratic government to the demands and interests of the people themselves.

The American people are speaking now on the subject of nuclear war and nuclear arms control, and the message they are sending is being heard in Washington loud and clear. All across America, a grassroots movement is organizing in support of prompt and dramatic action on arms control. Citizens from all walks of life and all parts of the political spectrum are speaking virtually with one voice, demanding that the Government move at once to halt the deadly and destabilizing competition in nuclear arms.

In large measure, this movement is the product of both anxiety and frustration, anxiety that we may well witness the horror of nuclear war in our own lifetime, anxiety over plans to add thousands of new warheads to our nuclear inventories, anxiety that some leaders in both governments may believe that nuclear war might somehow be winnable or survivable, and frustration over delays in resuming strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

A society that has traditionally regarded war as too important to be left to generals now seems to be saying that arms control is too important to be left to government, but government must, of course, take the lead in preparing for and conducting arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Congress has responded to this public demand with the extraordinary number of arms reduction resolutions that have been introduced in recent weeks. All of these resolutions have one thing in common, a call for a negotiated halt to the nuclear arms race, but each of the resolutions differs in the means by which this end might be achieved.

One resolution proposes a mutual freeze on further testing and deployment, in a word, that both sides simply stop. After a freeze in place is attained, this resolution advocates a second phase of negotiations to agree on significant reductions below current levels of deployed weaponry. A second resolution proposes that the two sides proceed directly to an agreement mandating deep and equitable reductions, and then lock that equity into place with a freeze at this reduced level. Other resolutions recommend that new arms control negotiations encompass the problem of nuclear nonproliferation and focus on the most destabilizing weapons in each side's strategic inventory.

I myself have introduced a resolution which calls on the President to begin the new strategic arms reduction talks [START] immediately. My resolution also proposes that both sides continue to respect SALT II [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] while START is conducted.

As the committee vested with jurisdiction over the ratification of treaties, the Foreign Relations Committee has a special responsibility to examine carefully the political, strategic, and technical practicality of each resolution. However fervently one resolution or the other may be supported, any treaty that eventually incorporated this particular approach would have to receive two-thirds approval of the Senate to enter into force.

For this reason, it is imperative that the committee mark up and report out a single resolution on nuclear arms control policy that can command overwhelming support in the Senate and be supported by the American people as an effective and appropriate articulation of their expressed concern.

The task before the committee then is to examine each resolution to determine whether that resolution or combination of resolutions can meet this test. To accomplish this objective, the committee intends to hear from an extremely diverse and well-informed number of witnesses, including the principal Senate and House sponsors of the various resolutions, administration officials, past leaders of American foreign and defense policy, and representatives of organizations reflecting a variety of viewpoints.

Following this series of hearings, the committee will proceed to final debate and will vote on this vital issue. At this stage, it would obviously be premature to suggest what the final outcome of a committee resolution may look like. However, I do believe that the limitations that were defined during the 7 years of SALT II negotiations must continue to play a central role in our overall arms control approach.

The United States and the Soviet Union have respected SALT II in a de facto manner since the treaty was signed in 1979. As a result, the prospects are quite good that START can begin in the context of stability and continuity in our arms control relationship. In recent weeks, a growing number of voices have called for the ratification of

SALT II. Indeed, two members of this committee, Senators Glenn and Biden, have formally proposed that the committee proceed at once with hearings leading to a markup and vote.

At our business meeting on Tuesday, I advised the committee that in my opinion there are difficult questions that would have to be addressed before the committee should decide whether to proceed with ratification. It may be that a less formal and possibly less politically divisive mechanism for keeping the current de facto restrictions in place would be advised.

At our meeting Tuesday, the committee agreed to defer for the time being a final decision on this question. Instead, we agreed that the question of SALT II's role in our overall arms control policy would be an important point of discussion in the hearings that begin today.

This morning's hearing is intended to establish the context for the hearings to follow. We are extremely pleased to have with us Secretary of Defense Weinberger and General Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have asked Secretary Weinberger to direct his opening remarks to two crucial issues, first, U.S. foreign and defense policies and the extent to which they are mutually consistent and supportive, and second, the current state of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and its implications for arms control and future weapons requirements.

[The resolutions referred to follows:]

X

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 163

On nuclear weapons freeze and reductions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 10 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1982

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. PELL, Mr. TSONGAS, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. DODD, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. MATSUNAGA, and Mr. SARBANES) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

On nuclear weapons freeze and reductions.

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war; and

Whereas a freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems is needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (1) as an immediate strategic arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should—

(a) pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race;

(b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and

(c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(2) Proceeding from this freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual, and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

II

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 171

With respect to nuclear arms reductions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 18 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1982

Mr. PERCY introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

With respect to nuclear arms reductions.

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occurence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems threaten peace and security and divert resources needed for the betterment of mankind;

Whereas President Reagan, on November 18, 1981, stated that the United States "will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms", and Congress has also urged the President to seek reductions in strategic arms;

Whereas mutual reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems are essential to reducing the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately begin the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and that those talks should have the following objectives:

(1) Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(2) Achieving substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions on nuclear weapons through numerical ceilings, annual percentage cuts, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(3) Seeking negotiated limitations on the testing and deployment of new and destabilizing nuclear weapons which complicate further progress in preserving deterrence and encouraging strategic arms reduction.

(4) Eventually linking ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles with the START negotiations.

II

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 177

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 30 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1982

Mr. JACKSON (for himself Mr. WARNER, Mr. BAKER, Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. NUNN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. BOREN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Mr. CANNON, Mr. CHILES, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. EXON, Mr. FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HAYAKAWA, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. LONG, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. TOWER, Ms. HAWKINS, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. MCCLURE, and Mr. ARMSTRONG) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

Whereas a nuclear war would kill or injure millions and millions of people and threaten the survival of the human race;

Whereas there can be no assurance that a nuclear war, once initiated, would remain limited in scope;

Whereas there exists the ever-present risk that nuclear weapons might be employed through accident or miscalculation;

Whereas the American people who are a people of peace, maintain nuclear armaments only in the defense of freedom and yearn for world conditions in which they could do far more to lift the burdens of human privation and despair;

Whereas the current nuclear force imbalance is destabilizing and could increase the likelihood of nuclear war;

Whereas sizeable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far-lower level would enhance stability and the maintenance of peace; and

Whereas President Reagan, on November 18, 1981, stated that the United States "will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That—

(1) the United States should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term, mutual, and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces;

(2) the United States should propose to the Soviet Union practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation and to

prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists;

(3) the United States should challenge the Soviet Union to join in this historic effort to channel the genius of our two peoples away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus the energy and resources of both nations on attacking the ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, hunger, and disease; and

(4) the United States should continue to press month after month, year after year, to achieve balanced, stablizing arms reductions, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals.

II

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. J. RES. 191

To achieve a nuclear freeze and reductions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 22 (legislative day, APRIL 13), 1982

Mr. CRANSTON introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

To achieve a nuclear freeze and reductions.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States should initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms race by the following means:

(1) To freeze the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union: The President should propose to the Soviet Union immediate commencement of negotiations designed to achieve a mutual prohibition on the further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes to be verified by International Atomic Energy Agency inspection and

to place all nonmilitary stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

(2) To reduce the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union: The President should propose to the Soviet Union immediate commencement of negotiations designed to achieve phased dismantling of substantial numbers of nuclear warheads and placement of the reclaimed weapons-usable material under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(3) To slow the process of weapons modernization: The President should propose to the Soviet Union prompt completion of a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

III

97TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 242

Regarding SALT II.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 10 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 2), 1981

Mr. HART submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Regarding SALT II.

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to limit the size of the Soviet nuclear threat through arms control agreements; and

Whereas both the United States and the Soviet Union have adhered to the provisions of SALT II since it was negotiated and signed; and

Whereas General Rowny, chief arms control negotiator for the United States, testifed before the Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of the administration that "we ought to take no steps inconsistent with the terms of the treaty so long as the Soviets take no steps and so long as our national security does not require that we take such other steps": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States shall continue to take no steps inconsistent with the terms of the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union also continues to take no steps inconsistent with the treaty.

III

97th CONGRESS
2d Session

S. RES. 323

Concerning STOP talks.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 24 (legislative day, February 22), 1982

Mr. Hart submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Concerning STOP talks.

Whereas a nuclear war would kill or injure millions of Americans, destroy most of our population centers, devastate our industrial and technological base, and threaten the survival of the Republic; and

Whereas there can be no assurance that a nuclear war, once initiated would remain limited in scope; and

Whereas there have been no negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union since June 1979 to prevent the use of strategic nuclear weapons and to limit their numbers; and

Whereas there exists the ever-present risk that nuclear weapons might be employed through accident or miscalculation; and

Whereas the unregulated spread of nuclear technology increases the number of countries or terrorist groups which can detonate a nuclear bomb: Now, Therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States and the Soviet Union enter into negotiations without delay on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation; to agree on steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists; to reduce the vulnerability of the two sides' nuclear retaliatory forces to preemptive attack; and to achieve sizable, mutual, and verifiable reductions in the number of strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, consistent with the requirements for national security and international stability.

III

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. RES. 343

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to beginning strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 17 (legislative day, February 22), 1982

Mr. Mathias (for himself, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Eagleton, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Durenberger, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Chafee, and Mrs. Kassebaum) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to beginning strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Whereas the number of nations possessing nuclear arms or the capacity to produce nuclear arms is proliferating;

Whereas the sophistication of nuclear weapons technology is advancing so rapidly that verification of the numbers and capabilities of weapons is becoming increasingly difficult;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union each maintain arsenals of nuclear weapons in a volume exceeding any comprehensible need;

Whereas the production and maintenance of these nuclear arsenals is destructive to the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union and increasingly of other nations;

Whereas the mere existence of these arsenals is a danger to the health and lives of the people of the world and a burden to their spirit;

Whereas nuclear war would be an unprecedented catastrophe for the participants in the conflict;

Whereas the likelihood of nuclear war may be increasing with expanding and proliferating nuclear arsenals; and

Whereas strategic arms negotiations have not been conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union since June 1979: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should immediately invite the Soviet Union to begin nuclear arms negotiations with respect to—

(1) strategic arms held by or proposed to be developed by either superpower; and

(2) control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.

III

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. RES. 370

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to a halt by the United States and the Soviet Union of further production and deployment of nuclear warheads while beginning strategic arms negotiations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 21 (legislative day, APRIL 13), 1982

Mr. GLENN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to a halt by the United States and the Soviet Union of further production and deployment of nuclear warheads while beginning strategic arms negotiations.

Whereas the number of nations possessing nuclear arms or the capacity to produce nuclear arms is growing;

Whereas the sophistication of nuclear weapons technology is advancing so rapidly that verification of the numbers and capabilities of weapons is becoming increasingly difficult;

Whereas nuclear war would be an unprecedented catastrophe;

Whereas the likelihood of accidental nuclear war is increasing with expanding and proliferating nuclear arsenals;

Whereas it is in the interest of the United States, the Soviet Union, and all the peoples of the world for the nuclear arms race to be halted in a verifiable manner which builds confidence that additional steps can and will be taken;

Whereas the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should be strengthened and universally adhered to;

Whereas article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty calls upon the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union should provide the example and the leadership for other nations to follow;

Whereas strategic arms negotiations have not been conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union since June 1979; and

Whereas a verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems is needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the President should adopt a serious and comprehensive arms control package that includes the following goals and means to those goals:

(1) To limit strategic weapons—a negotiated freeze through 1985 of testing, production and deployment of strategic weapons to within the SALT II limitations, with attainment of those levels to occur within one year of agreement;

(2) To reduce existing weapons stockpiles—agreements on balanced, incremental reductions in nuclear weaponry. Such reductions should both preserve deterrence and be adequately verifiable;

(3) To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—the establishment of additional measures by nuclear supplier nations designed to halt the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(4) To involve all nuclear weapons states in the arms control process—a commitment to bring all nations possessing nuclear weapons into the negotiations and related activities at the earliest appropriate time; and

(5) To address the question of arms control in its totality by—

(A) a continuation of good-faith negotiations to reduce intermediate range and other nuclear weapons deployed on the European continent;

(B) an emphasis on expanded United States-Soviet negotiations to reduce conventional armaments in Europe; and

(C) by adopting a sensible policy of restraining conventional arms transfers to the Third World.

III

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. RES. 391

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the policy of the United States Government during the period of negotiations for a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 11, 1982

Mr. MATHIAS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the policy of the United States Government during the period of negotiations for a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty.

Whereas the President has proposed a schedule of reductions in the numbers of nuclear missiles and launchers now in the arsenals of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Whereas the President has invited the Government of the Soviet Union to join in negotiations for the purpose of achieving such reductions;

Whereas since 1979, both the United States and the Soviet Union have refrained from any action that is inconsistent with the terms of the SALT I Treaty, and the SALT II

Treaty, which has been signed by both Governments, but not ratified; and

Whereas this policy of restraint has contributed to a climate of nuclear stability: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that, throughout the period of negotiations with respect to a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States Government should not act in any way that contravenes the terms of SALT I and SALT II provided that the Government of the Soviet Union follows a similar policy.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. EXECUTIVE RES. 5

Directing the Committee on Foreign Relations to report to the Senate the SALT II Treaty.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 21 (legislative day, APRIL 13), 1982

Mr. BIDEN submitted the following executive resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Directing the Committee on Foreign Relations to report to the Senate the SALT II Treaty.

Resolved, by the United States Senate that:

SEC. (a) The Committee on Foreign Relations shall, not later than July 1, 1982, report to the Senate the SALT II Treaty, together with any recommendations with respect to whether the Senate should give its advice and consent to the ratification of such treaty.

SEC. (b) For purposes of this section, the term "SALT II Treaty" means the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and the protocol relating thereto, both signed at Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979, and related documents (Ninety-sixth Congress, first session; Executive Y).

97th CONGRESS
2d Session

S. EXECUTIVE RES. 6

Concerning the consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

April 21 (legislative day, April 13), 1982

Mr. Hart submitted the following executive resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Concerning the consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

Whereas it is essential that the United States and the Soviet Union actively cooperate to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and the outbreak of nuclear war; and

Whereas it is in the national security interest of the United States to limit the size and capabilities of Soviet strategic nuclear forces; and

Whereas the SALT II Treaty is the result of careful negotiations by three administrations, Democratic and Republican; and

Whereas the SALT II Treaty is a balanced, well-crafted, and verifiable agreement which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined would enhance strategic stability and mutual security; and

Whereas the SALT II Treaty permits the necessary modernization of United States Strategic Nuclear Forces to ensure an adequate deterrent; and

Whereas our national security has been enhanced because of American and Soviet adherence to the provisions of the SALT II Treaty since it was negotiated and signed: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the SALT II Treaty should be reported to the full Senate by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee within thirty days for amendment and disposition and that it shall become the pending business at that time.

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

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To express the sense of the Congress that the President should promptly hold a summit meeting with leaders of the Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to seek control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 19 (legislative day, APRIL 13), 1982

Mr. SPECTER submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Congress that the President should promptly hold a summit meeting with leaders of the Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to seek control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

Whereas a general nuclear war could cause the death or mutilation of hundreds of millions of people;

Whereas a general nuclear war would cause damage to the environment of an unknown, unimaginable, and unprecedented kind and degree;

Whereas many survivors would later, after suffering extraordinary agony, die of radiation poisoning, disease, overexposure to the elements, starvation, or such causes;

Whereas the odds of general nuclear war breaking out increase vastly, and perhaps uncontrollably, upon initiation of major hostilities or use, under almost any circumstances, of nuclear weapons;

Whereas recent development of nuclear arms that are capable of destroying such arms in the possession of rival nations increases the likelihood of a preemptive nuclear strike;

Whereas numerous nations already possess nuclear arms and many others may soon get them;

Whereas even local or regional conflicts or terrorist incidents could escalate, involving the superpowers and leading to general nuclear war; and

Whereas once launched, even if by error or accident, strategic nuclear missiles cannot be recalled but proceed to preassigned targets and explode: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should act at the earliest possible time to convene a summit meeting with leaders of the Soviet Union to reduce the risk of nuclear war from any cause and establish ways and means for better controlling and reducing nuclear arms.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We join our chairman in welcoming you here, Mr. Weinberger and General Jones. I am sure that we all agree that the mood in our Nation is clearly for an end to the present state of unrelenting superpower nuclear competition. The people both in our continent and on the European continent want the two superpowers to negotiate seriously and energetically to reduce the risk that nuclear arms will ever be used anywhere for any purpose.

In cities and towns throughout our Nation, people are registering their demand that the threat of nuclear war be averted. In this regard, I think the citizens are perhaps ahead of the Government. It reminds me a little of the recognition of China, where the citizenry was far ahead of the Congress, and in that case the administration was ahead of the Congress.

To my mind, there are three specific steps or goals that we should attain. They remind me of the prongs of a Trident. First is a freeze. Second is the thought of a substantial reduction, as George Kennan has suggested, 50 percent. And third would be the thought of no first use as set forth in an article in Foreign Affairs magazine by a variety of officials who have held jobs similar to yours, Mr. Secretary.

The important thing is to get moving, and in order to attain these goals that I have set forth, I have concluded that we and the Soviet Union should as a first step limit strategic weapons by placing both sides formally under the SALT II regime. The administration should then work in consultation with Congress to develop a serious proposal for mutual and verifiable reductions, and get to the negotiating table promptly to start START.

I would hope the administration would seek ratification of the languishing Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties. This step would remove the possibility that either side would resume high-yield nuclear testing and would preserve a solid achievement until agreement on a comprehensive test ban is reached.

These are steps which should be taken. There are others which I will not detail here. I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will offer us your own suggestions and comments on these. I think we would fail ourselves and our fellow Americans and future generations if we continue to place our priorities on matching weapon with weapon and developing schemes to survive nuclear war.

General Jones, you will recall you told me last November in testimony in this room that an all-out nuclear war would be the greatest catastrophe in history by many orders of magnitude. I think it would be a catastrophe of a different kind if we, having received the wise counsel of senior military people, failed in our responsibility to take urgent steps to avoid the possibility of the ultimate human folly, nuclear war.

In that regard, Mr. Secretary, I would hope that you would set the stage by setting forth your views with regard to what nuclear war is, what its results and effects would be, whether you believe a nuclear war is winnable, and whether there is such a thing that can exist as a limited nuclear war. To my mind, one should first have those views laid forth in the record, and then we can move on to the specifics after that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Secretary Weinberger, we are happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senators. I welcome and appreciate very much the opportunity and honor of appearing before you this morning to discuss these critical issues. I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. What I would like to do would be to summarize it, go into a couple of things that I think are highlights, and put the entire statement in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The full text of your statement will be incorporated into the record. We would appreciate your summary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. General Jones has a short statement that he advises me he would wish to make following mine. Then we would be glad to try to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, Senators, the President, as is the case with many other Presidents before him, seeks only to insure that we and our allies can pursue our goals in peace, free from intimidation, coercion, and aggression. We perhaps have somewhat different views than some as to how best to achieve those goals, but the goals remain fixed and immutable.

We found when we came in that as a result of a decade of declining defense budgets our conventional forces in Western Europe and Northeast Asia were increasingly falling behind the strength of the Soviet forces, due to the unrelenting and unremitting Soviet buildup. This has occurred over the past 21 years. We also found that the nuclear balance was beginning to tip to the advantage of the Soviet Union, and that diminished the deterrent value of our strategic nuclear forces.

When we examined our military resources, we found we lacked the requisite military capability for adequate nuclear deterrence as well as conventional defense of our vital objectives and commitments. We recognized that we had to take a more realistic view, both of the military threat confronting us, which is growing and growing every day, and of our own capability. We modified our defense policy to fit today's realities, to make it less dangerous, and to gain flexibility and to cope with the threatening and uncertain future.

For example, we abandoned reliance on the dangerous fallacy, as we saw it, of the short war, that any conventional war would necessarily be short because the aggressor would either retreat or the war would quickly escalate to nuclear level, and we tried to adopt safer policies for responding to what we felt might well be ambiguous warnings.

Apart from rectifying deficiencies in strategy, we had to face the fact that our military capabilities would become increasingly inadequate to deter aggression, and so we requested a 5-year increase in defense spending, a substantial increase, Mr. Chairman, one that we recognize as substantial, and at the same time we encouraged our allies to increase their contributions to our common defense. We feel that the security assistance programs and the network of alliances and strengthened friends is one of the best ways of providing a forward defense for ourselves and for all of our friends. In particular the collective security provided by NATO to our North Atlantic allies and to ourselves remains the centerpiece of our national security policy.

I want to emphasize that we continue to attach the greatest importance to NATO and, contrary to some totally erroneous reports that keep recurring and being published, there has been absolutely no diminution in our concern for or our interest in NATO or our feeling that it is and has to remain a critically important part of our entire defense concept.

Our administration is not placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, Mr. Chairman. We are in fact increasing the revitalization of our conventional capabilities. Only 15 percent of our budget is devoted to nuclear forces, and even with the strategic rearmament that we feel is essential, that percentage will actually decline. It will never be more than 15 percent.

Our conventional forces must meet both near term and future threats. For the near term we have attached very high budgetary priority to increased readiness and sustainability of what we have. We are continuing prepositioning and prestocking programs that would enhance the timeliness of any military response that we might have to make. We have also a substantial naval force expansion centered around aircraft carrier battle groups and refurbished battleships that we believe will sustain our worldwide presence while reducing the strain on deployed forces and personnel.

We have found that these things must be done, because our allies, and strategic minerals and metals that we must have, are thousands of miles from our shores.

For many years, U.S. conventional force planning and investment was directed primarily toward fighting the war in central Europe, but in light of the strength of the NATO deterrent and our answering devotion to it, we think now it would be important to assume that that might be the only place that the Soviet leaders would choose. We think that they might not choose central Europe necessarily as their primary or only battlefield. We have recognized this in recent years because the Soviet Union has been greatly increasing its ability to project its very considerable and growing military power into the Mediterranean and other vital areas such as the Persian Gulf.

So, without in any way weakening our resolve to defend the central European front, we must be prepared to meet this new dimension of the Soviet threat.

We have supported and will continue to support the NATO Alliance unswervingly. Our own salvation and that of the free world depends on it. The military threat to the alliance is greater today than at any point in its history, and so it needs more support than ever. Unfortunately, the growing nature, the growing diversity, the growing offensive character of the Soviet threat makes it essential that we also look to a number of other areas in the world. We are determined to increase our effort and to encourage our allies to increase their efforts, in NATO, in Japan, and in other parts of the world where we feel the threats may come.

We devote now a little over 5 percent of our gross national product to defense. The rest of NATO averages about 3½ percent, but we have to remember that for many years, when we are not increasing our military spending, other members of the NATO Alliance were. We also have to remember the substantial additional contributions that the NATO allies make. They maintain active forces of about 3 million in their countries, whereas our total worldwide force is about 2 million. They also contribute important infrastructure, and they have contributed a very large amount to the support of Berlin.

Lately we have heard a number of demands, Mr. Chairman, for withdrawal of our forces from Europe or elsewhere, based on some feeling that our allies are not doing enough to share the burden. We have to look at the results of such withdrawals. They would be very serious for us and very serious for the cause of freedom.

Regarding the Pacific, we have a number of fine contributions made by our ANZUS partners. The Philippines provide unhampered use of vital bases, and certainly no one could ever fault the Koreans for not doing enough in their own self-defense. Japan remains the cornerstone of our Asian security policy. They contribute about $1 billion to the cost of U.S. forces annually, and for 4 straight years they have spent over $100 million for new construction for U.S. forces.

Their self-defense forces, though deficient in sustainability, are significant in numbers, and they have adopted for themselves a policy of self-defense and a sharing of the burden with which we concur and which, of course, they will need significantly greater defense assets to realize.

Much has been said recently in public about our nuclear strategy, Mr. Chairman, and much has been said here this morning about it. I think we should again have the record clear. We have taken steps to deemphasize our reliance on nuclear weapons. We are not seeking to restore the U.S. nuclear superiority that we had in the fifties. We are not, over the years, and have not, increased the number of our nuclear weapons. In fact, we have thousands fewer nuclear weapons than we had in 1967. Deterrence remains the fundamental cornerstone of our strategic and indeed our entire national security as it has for the past 30 years.

We entertain, Mr. Chairman and Senators, no illusions about nuclear conflict. Everyone would lose in such an event. It is not a winnable war. Our purpose is to insure that the Soviets understand this point also. We have considerable worries that they are showing a number of signs that indicate they think it could be won. Our purpose is to insure, too, that we have strategic force programs that will survive, give greater stability, and provide incentives for genuine progress in arms control.

The Soviets will continue to have a substantial lead in most of the customary measures of strategic forces, total numbers of systems, total numbers of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential, but the one area in which we still retain some advantage is total numbers of deliverable warheads, largely due to decisions made many years ago to deploy a large number of small SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] warheads and bomber weapons.

The Soviets may equal or surpass us in these areas, too, because they are continuing a very rapid expansion of their strategic nuclear arsenal. The fact is that while we have virtually stood still over the years, the Soviet Union has pursued a dramatic and an unprecedented expansion of their strategic forces beyond any legitimate security needs, and these forces all primarily offensive in character. If this trend is not reversed, it will lead to a marked Soviet strategic advantage that will seriously undermine the credibility of our deterrence in the mideighties.

With respect to arms control, as you all know, President Reagan wants genuine arms reductions, that is to say, real reductions in armaments to equal levels that will provide for greater security and are fully verifiable. Concern has been expressed that our administration has not moved rapidly enough in arms-reductions negotiations, that we have been wasting time. Actually, Mr. Chairman, we have gained time. We have gained time by initiating a coherent, long-term program to improve the stability and the security of our nuclear deterrent force, and this will provide the only basis for negotiations that can lead to real reductions, and the incentives for the Soviet leaders to take our proposals seriously.

We have gained time by preparing sound proposals that can lead to long-lasting and solid arms reductions agreements, and that can be supported through the prolonged hard bargaining that unfortunately seems to be necessary to reach any agreement with the Soviet Union. Last November, the President proposed to the Soviet Union an agreement that would eliminate completely intermediate range nuclear missile forces which are so threatening to both sides in Europe. In the near future, the President will make similarly far-reaching proposals for intercontinental arms reductions, and he will invite the Soviet Union to commence START.

In the field of conventional arms reductions, we are participating with our NATO allies in the mutual balanced force-reduction negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. These have been going on 9 years, and we are still participating. Our objective in these talks is to achieve significant mutual reductions of conventional forces in central Europe. We are also participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in negotiations whose aim is to decrease the likelihood of surprise attack there.

Just a word as I close, Mr. Chairman, about the freeze. Our administration very much shares the desire of Members of the Senate and House and others to reduce the risk of nuclear war. I have not encountered anyone who wants a nuclear war or who indeed wants a war of any kind. The way to do this, we think, is, of course, to bring about major equitable and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The best way to achieve that end is to move directly to negotiations aimed at achieving substantial and verifiable and stabilizing reductions.

It is not to freeze forces at the current unequal levels. An unequal freeze would only perpetuate and exacerbate existing military imbalances, decrease our deterrent capability, and eliminate any incentive for the Soviets to agree to real reductions. Only by demonstrating a commitment to maintain our deterrent capability, with or without arms control, will we convince the Soviets that it is in their best interests to join us at the negotiating table to seek agreements on real arms reductions.

If we can achieve them, if we can pursue a policy such as we are now pursuing at Geneva on intermediate range weapons, we can enormously increase the hopes and the aspirations of the world for a very real and lasting peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Secretary Weinberger's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the Reagan Administration, like others before it, seeks only to ensure that we and our allies can pursue our goals in peace; free from intimidation, coercion and aggression. To do so we and our allies must be able to deter aggression by maintaining the capability to respond effectively to any aggression launched against us at the lowest possible level of violence.

Our basic national objectives and goals have remained constant during the postwar period: to survive as a nation, to be free to pursue our way of life, to preserve the democratic community of nations, and to live in a stable and peaceful world.

Although these objectives have remained constant, the most likely threat to them has grown over time. Successive Administrations and Congresses have developed somewhat different defense policies and military strategies to deal with this evolving threat. While most Presidents have built upon the policies of their predecessors, President Reagan had two unenviable but vital tasks. First he had to reassure our friends that America was indeed going to be a strong, constant, reliable ally. Second, he had to let our opponents know, in unmistakable terms, that we were going to regain the military strength necessary to deter attacks upon us. Both assurances had to be given after a decade or more of neglect of our armed forces.

As a result of that decade of declining defense budgets, our conventional forces in Western Europe and Northeast Asia increasingly fell behind the strength of the Soviet forces. And the strategic nuclear balance was beginning to tip to the advantage of the Soviet Union, thus diminishing the deterrent value of our strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediate range missiles aimed at Europe exacerbated this shift in the nuclear balance. In the midst of this, President Carter announced his decision to prevent any outside force from gaining control of the Persian Gulf Region, but he neither sought nor was given the resources to back up that decision. Finally, the introduction of Soviet military presence and proxy forces into many regions of the world threatened to outflank the defenses of our allies.

When this Administration examined our military resources, we found we lacked the requisite military capability for adequate nuclear deterrence as well as conventional defense of our vital objectives and commitments.

We recognized we had to take a more realistic view, both of the military threat confronting us and of our capabilities. We modified our defense policy to fit today's realities, to make it less dangerous, and to gain flexibility—to cope with a threatening and uncertain future. For example, we abandoned reliance on the dangerous fallacy of a "short war"—that any conventional war would necessarily be short because the aggressor would retreat or the war would quickly escalate to the nuclear level. Also, we adopted a safer policy for responding to warnings—recognizing that warnings are likely to be ambiguous, and that we cannot count on an all-or-none signal telling us when we must prepare to deter an imminent attack.

Apart from rectifying deficiencies in strategy, we had to face the fact that our military capabilities would become increasingly inadequate to deter aggression. Therefore, we are requesting a 5-year increase in defense spending. At the same time, we are encouraging our Allies to increase their contribution to our common defense, and we are also increasing our economic and security assistance programs so that our friends can improve their own security. A network of alliances and strengthened friends is one of the best ways of providing a forward defense for ourselves, and for our friends. In particular, the collective security provided by NATO to our North Atlantic allies—and ourselves—remains the centerpiece of our national security policy. I want to make clear that we continue to attach greatest importance to NATO. Contrary to some reports, there has been no diminution in our concern for and interest in NATO.

Mr. Chairman, let me dispel another misconception. The Reagan Administration is not placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons. We are, in fact, stressing the revitalization of our conventional capabilities. Only 15 percent of our budget is devoted to nuclear forces. The remaining 85 percent is devoted to non-nuclear forces.

Our conventional forces must meet both near-term and future threats. For the near-term, we have attached high budgetary priority to increased readiness and sustainability, especially for those forces that would likely be employed early in a conflict. In addition, we are continuing prepositioning, and prestocking programs that would enhance the timeliness of our military responses to crises overseas. Finally, mobility is the key to flexibility. Therefore we have redesigned our longer term airlift and sealift programs to have more immediate impact upon our capability than did those that they have replaced.

Over the longer term, we are modernizing our ground and air forces to enable them to provide a credible defense together with our NATO allies in Europe, as well as elsewhere. Our attack helicopter program, light armored vehicle program, utility helicopter program and air cushioned landing craft program are only four of many efforts that will provide improved conventional capability not only for Europe but also for the hot, arid environments of Southwest Asia.

Our naval force expansion, centered around aircraft carrier battle groups and refurbished battleships, will sustain our worldwide presence while reducing the strain on deployed forces and personnel, and will enhance our ability both to defend critical lines of communications and to project power ashore.

The nuclear aircraft carrier with seaborne tactical air power continues to be the single greatest advantage we enjoy over comparable Soviet forces. This versatile ship, with its mix of offensive and defensive aircraft, provides the United States with power projection and sea control capability unmatched by any potential adversary. However, our carrier force is rapidly aging and seriously overcommitted. We must continue to replace some of these assets, if we are at all serious about maintaining a credible Navy.

No program in recent memory has attracted more interest and controversy than the reactivation of the four *Iowa* class battleships. They are described as too old, too vulnerable, and too obsolescent. In fact, when recommissioned with their original 16-inch guns with Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles added, they will be the most powerful and survivable surface combatants afloat. We are strongly convinced that the reactivation of these ships provides the U.S. Navy more offensive firepower per dollar expended than any other item in the shipbuilding program.

Another modification in defense policy is the increased recognition that our conventional forces must be designed for a wider range of contingencies. It is our aim to design force improvements with a view toward creating a better balance in meeting different threats.

For many years, U.S. conventional force planning and investment was directed almost solely toward fighting a war in Central Europe. In light of the NATO deterrent, it would be imprudent to assume Soviet leaders would choose Central Europe as the primary or first battlefield. Furthermore, we have recognized that in recent years the Soviet Union has been greatly increasing its ability to project military power into the Mediterranean and other vital areas such as the Persian Gulf. Without in any way weakening our resolve to defend the Central European front, we must be prepared to meet this new dimension of the Soviet threat.

For the region of the Persian Gulf, in particular, we must have a capability to deploy rapidly enough force to hold key positions, and we must be able to interdict and blunt a Soviet attack. Hence, we have proposed improvements in the Rapid Deployment Force and in related mobility.

Mr. Chairman, you are aware of the importance of our security assistance program. Cooperation with our friends and allies, backed up by security assistance, enhances the effectiveness of our own defense programs and provides a visible commitment to regional stability.

We must recognize that without the complementary development of allied and friendly forces, and the availability of overseas facilities, we could deal with new Soviet threats only at much greater cost, if at all. However, some of our allies and friends cannot fund the desired force improvements on their own. Our security assistance to many of these countries is much smaller today than in the past. As you know the President has sought to strengthen the Security Assistance program.

Specifically, President Reagan has requested a supplemental appropriation for the Caribbean basin to include economic and military assistance.

We are encouraged by the security assistance program levels which Congress authorized for fiscal year 1982 and by the easing of certain country specific restrictions. However, if funding for fiscal year 1983 remained fixed at fiscal year 1982 levels, we would suffer a serious setback in our ability to work for peace in vital areas.

We are working closely with our Allies to increase their cooperation and support. For example:

> We are arranging greatly increased programs of host nation support, where our Allies provide the logistical and service units to support our forces during wartime.
>
> We have signed an agreement providing for 93,000 German Reservists to give combat service support for our wartime forces, and the German Government will pay over 50 percent of the costs involved.
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> We are also discussing with the Bonn authorities a long-term plan for restationing three U.S. brigades in new facilities closer to their battle positions.
>
> We are discussing a comprehensive plan with our Allies based on the possible contingency that U.S. forces might be engaged outside the Treaty area, which would necessitate our Allies taking compensatory measures in Europe and assist in the transit of our forces. We have supported and will continue to support the NATO alliance unswervingly. Our own salvation and that of the free world depend on it. The military threat to the Alliance is greater today than at any point in its history and so it needs more support than ever.

It would be dangerously naive to expect the Soviet Union, if it achieves military superiority, not to exploit that advantage. Clearly, the NATO Allies and the United States have the material resources to meet the Soviet threat. This Administration is determined to increase its effort and to encourage our Allies to follow our lead. In attempting to evaluate burden sharing, however, we must keep in mind that no single measure of performance provides an accurate yardstick of national contributions.

For example, the United States devotes 5.5 percent of its GNP for defense while the rest of NATO averages 3.5 percent; however, our NATO allies maintain more active forces, about 3 million, compared to about 2 million for the United States.

The Allies also contribute extensive infrastructure. Germany, for one, provides real estate worth more than $80 billion for NATO forces, including their own. Germany also provides about $6 billion for support of Berlin, including the cost of the three Allied brigades.

Our Pacific allies also contribute significantly to the common defense burden. In South Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, our ANZUS partners, focus their efforts on helping the Southwest Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian nations maintain political and military security. Australia has increased its military presence in the Indian Ocean and is providing essential support to U.S. forces in transit to and from that region. The Philippines provide unhampered use of bases which aid immeasurably our power-projection capabilities in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans. Our Thai and Korean treaty partners are investing heavily in increasing their own self-defense capabilities against the direct threats of Vietnam and North Korea.

Japan, of course, remains the cornerstone of our Asian security policy. Our bases there are essential to our forward defense strategy. Japan contributes annually about $1 billion to the costs of U.S. forces in Japan and for 4 straight years has spent over $100 million for new construction for U.S. forces. Japanese Self-Defense Forces, though deficient in sustainability, are significant in numbers.

The sustainability of all three Japanese Armed Forces and the capabilities of its Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, in particular, are insufficient if Japan is to have a meaningful ability to defend its territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and its sealanes out to 1,000 miles. These are responsibilities which Prime

Minister Suzuki stated in May 1981, represent Japan's national policy. The Reagan Administration would like to see Japan achieve those capabilities within this decade. We estimate this would require real increases in defense spending in this decade which are significantly greater than the increases the Japanese achieved in the decade of the 1970's.

Mr. Chairman, much has been said recently in public about shifts in our nuclear strategy. Let me set the record straight:

We have taken steps to deemphasize our reliance on nuclear weapons;

We are not seeking to restore U.S. nuclear superiority;

We have not, over the years, increased the number of our nuclear weapons—in fact, we have thousands fewer nuclear weapons than we had in 1967;

Deterrence remains the fundamental cornerstone of our strategic and indeed our entire national security posture—as it has for the past 30 years.

We entertain no illusions about nuclear conflict: Everyone would lose in such an event. Our purpose is to ensure that the Soviets, too, understand this point. We have designed our strategic forces program to ensure survivability and greater stability and to permit progress in arms control.

The Soviets will continue to have a substantial lead in most of the customary measures of strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, and total destructive potential. The one area in which the United States still retains some advantages is in total numbers of deliverable warheads, largely due to decisions made a number of years ago to deploy a large number of small SLBM warheads and bomber weapons. But, the Soviets may equal or surpass us in the total number of warheads during the 1980's as they continue the rapid expansion of their strategic nuclear arsenal. This does not mean that we have lost our ability to deter a Soviet attack on the United States and on our Allies. The simple fact, however, is that while we have stood still, the Soviet Union has pursued a dramatic and unprecedented expansion of its strategic forces beyond any legitimate security needs. If this trend is not reversed, it will lead to a marked Soviet strategic advantage which will seriously undermine the credibility of our deterrence in the mid-1980's.

Let me add a few words about arms control. As you all know, President Reagan wants genuine arms reductions, that is to say, real reductions in armaments to equal levels that will provide for greater security and are fully verifiable.

Concern has been expressed that the Reagan Administration has not moved fast enough on arms reductions negotiations, that we have been wasting time. Actually we have gained time, Mr. Chairman. We have gained time by initiating a coherent, long-term program to improve the stability and security of our nuclear deterrent force, thus providing the only basis for negotiations that can lead to real reductions, and the incentive for the Soviet leaders to take our proposals seriously. And we have gained time by preparing sound proposals that can lead to long lasting and solid arms reduction agreements and be supported through the prolonged hard bargaining that—unfortunately—is necessary to reach agreements with the Soviet Union.

Last November, the President proposed to the Soviet Union an agreement that would eliminate the intermediate range nuclear missile forces, which are so threatening to both sides in Europe. In the near future, the President will make similarly far reaching proposals for intercontinental arms and invite the Soviet Union to commence START.

In the field of conventional arms reductions, we are participating with our NATO Allies in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. Our objective in these talks is to achieve significant mutual reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe. We are also participating within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in security negotiations whose aim is to decrease the likelihood of surprise attack in Europe.

Before I close, let me address the issue of a nuclear freeze. Our Administration very much shares the desire of members of the Senate, House and others to reduce the risk of nuclear war by bringing about major, equitable and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. But, the best way to achieve that end is to move directly to negotiations aimed at achieving substantial, verifiable and stabilizing reductions, but not to freeze forces at the current unequal levels. An unequal "freeze" would only perpetuate and exacerbate existing military imbalances, decrease our deterrent capability, and eliminate any incentive for the Soviets to agree to real reductions. Only by demonstrating a commitment to maintain our deterrent capability, with or without

arms control, will we convince the Soviets that it is in their best interests to join us at the negotiating table to seek agreement on real arms reductions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Weinberger. General Jones.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General JONES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be back with you to talk about what is probably the most important subject facing not only this committee but this Nation of ours. As you know, I have been and continue to be a strong advocate of arms control. I do not believe that once you get into nuclear war, that it is very likely that it could be controllable. There would be massive damage in many parts of the world that would change the basic nature of this planet. So arms control is a very important subject that needs to be addressed and addressed very promptly.

I share the worries of many throughout the country expressing concerns of living with nuclear arms and the lack of progress in arms control. I am pleased that the national policy is that we will not do anything inconsistent with SALT II while we move toward further negotiations and reductions.

For 30 years, I have been involved with nuclear weapons; I have conducted many analyses. The last 4 years have been particularly sobering, since I am the person who would normally implement a Presidential decision to use any nuclear weapons. The main question is, how do we stabilize, how do we prevent war, how do we reduce the risks, how do we make major reductions in the nuclear weapons on both sides. I think there are ways we can do it.

I have serious reservations with two current, popular proposals: the first, a declaratory policy on no first use, and the second, a total freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. I would like to just state my reasons for having serious reservations.

Both have seductive appeal. On the surface, they are very attractive. With regard to no first use, it tends to ignore the conventional imbalance in Europe. You can debate as to how much of an imbalance there is; I believe that the imbalance is often overstated. There is one but it is not as great as a lot of people think. If the Soviets ever become convinced that there would never be escalation in Europe to the use of nuclear weapons, that could make conventional conflict more likely, particularly in a crisis.

When we have new leadership in the Soviet Union, it is likely to be more aggressive. To draw attention away from internal problems in the Soviet Union, the leadership may try to externalize—whether by moving against Berlin or whatever else in Europe.

Now, it is easy in a peacetime environment, in a cool and reasoned way, for both countries to say no first use. Perhaps both countries would be totally sincere in no first use, but it is a different situation when you are in the middle of a war and you are being defeated, and vital interests are at risk. There would be a great temptation at that time to escalate, whatever you said in peacetime—whether to prevent defeat or for preemption to knock out the nuclear capability of the other side.

So, a no-first-use policy could actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Now, I am not saying it would make it likely, but we are trying to stay as close to a zero probability as possible. And once you start a conflict escalation is possible. So exactly the opposite of what you are trying to achieve with a non-first-use policy may happen—you may end up actually more likely to use nuclear weapons.

Regarding no first use, I am a strong advocate of no first use of force, no use of force to initiate a war. I would hope that the Soviet Union would have this policy. President Reagan said on November 18 that no NATO forces, conventional or nuclear, would ever be used except in response to an attack. The important threshold not to breach is the threshold of conflict, of combat between the East and the West, because if you start combat in Europe, there is nobody who can predict what could happen.

Now, with regard to the freeze, a total freeze on the development and deployment of weapons, I have three concerns. First, in the overall strategic equation, honest, well-informed people can differ as to whether we have parity today or the Soviets have some margin of superiority. There are good arguments on both sides of this issue, but there is no question but that the Soviets have great momentum. They are now completing a massive modernization program, and their forces are substantially less vulnerable than ours.

Even with a freeze, this margin in vulnerability will increase. For example, we depend on our bomber force far more than the Soviets depend on theirs. As Soviet air defenses are improved, our B-52 penetration will deteriorate.

A second concern is this: The Soviets currently have a monopoly on intermediate-range systems in Europe. They have deployed hundreds of SS-20's with three warheads each, with a refire capability, and with great survivability, and we are yet to deploy the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II.

I believe it was a very courageous decision on the part of the alliance in December 1979. I was there at the NATO meeting where the decision was made to go on a two-track approach, a plan for deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II, coupled with negotiations that hopefully might make it unnecessary for us to have to deploy those weapons.

I find it very interesting that in Germany last week the Social Democratic Party of Chancellor Schmidt—in a country that is under the gun, a country very concerned about nuclear weapons, and a party very concerned about nuclear weapons—backed up Chancellor Schmidt by a vote of more than 2 to 1 against a freeze.

There is a third concern. A freeze would undermine our INF negotiations in Geneva. It would really terminate those negotiations that are underway which Ambassador Nitze is heading. It would undermine our proposal to go to zero, and would permit the current imbalance to continue.

Finally, there is the issue of verification. We found in SALT II that verification was one of the most perplexing problems, incredibly complex, and the Soviets are not very forthcoming. Neither have they been very forthcoming on the limited test ban treaty, where we are trying to get some information to verify whether or not they have exceeded the TTBT limit. We only addressed a limited number of items in SALT II that had to be verified. If we achieved a total freeze, there would be many, many items to verify. You would end up with one of two things: Either the folly of trusting the Soviets and not having good verification, or having to sit down and negotiate dozens and dozens of individual verification items. This could result in interminable delays, and rather than a proposal that is designed to get things moving right now, it could drag on and on and on as we try to come up with reasonable verification provisions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are working with the administration. I am fully participating in the National Security Council discussions on what should be the U.S. position. We are advocating a significant reduction in nuclear arms. In my mind this would be more meaningful, more stabilizing, more achievable than a total freeze on the development and procurement of weapons and would provide greater assurance to this world that we will not have to use these very deadly systems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Jones.

Let me say that the Senators are not walking out on you. There is a vote on the floor, unfortunately. We are close to the floor in this end of the building, so why don't we recess for 5 minutes, and then resume the hearing immediately after that.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Weinberger, I want to thank you for a very fine statement. Also, General Jones, I know how deeply you feel about this matter. I want to compliment you on your statement.

We will observe the 10-minute rule this morning.

Secretary Weinberger, I understand you have a similar luncheon to the one that we had yesterday with the Prime Minister of Tunisia, and you must be there at 12 o'clock. We will see that you are able to leave promptly at 11:45.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On March 31, President Reagan stated that the Soviet Union had achieved a definite margin of superiority in strategic and nuclear capabilities. Following the President's statement, a number of distinguished experts disagreed with his assessment, and expressed their view that a state of parity still exists. There has been some confusion about what the President really did mean. I know that you yourself have subsequently stated that the Soviets have only begun to build an edge of superiority.

I wonder if you could clarify the administration's position on this crucial question. Also, would you answer this question? Would you rather have at your disposal the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Mr. Chairman, there is not, unfortunately, any confusion or any difference within the administration on this. It is quite simply the fact that they do have that superior nuclear edge that the President referred to, and they have, as General Jones said a moment ago, a substantial amount of momentum on their side, because they are taking delivery of a lot of things that they ordered in the seventies.

They have been absolutely unremitting in the increases they have made every year for 21 years. They are now in the fifth generation of missiles, and we are only in the third. They are achieving a greater degree of accuracy, and of yield, and in a number of ways they are acquiring an edge in superiority. This is not to say that we don't have substantial strengths. Of course, we do.

I would not for a moment exchange anything, because we have an immense edge in technology, and would have a far greater edge if we had not transferred so much of it to the Soviets, both illegally—technology they stole from us—and legally—technology gained through trading agreements or straight commercial sales, sales under the guise of commercial sales, which really had a great military capability.

The simple fact is that you cannot measure this sort of thing by adding up numbers of warheads on each side or by using the old cliche that each side can blow up the other. You have to look at such things as accuracy, yield, range, whether there is or is not a refiring capability, how well protected their silos are as compared to ours, and things of that kind. On a number of those categories, they are in a situation where it is vitally necessary for us to adopt the President's strategic rearmament program that he presented last October which will, if we are given the time to build it and deploy it, get us back the degree of nuclear strength that we need to continue to have an effective deterrent.

The whole question here is how effective is your deterrent. It is not how many warheads you have. If we have a system which needs the amount of additions and modernizations that we think ours now does, and that is not surprising because practically speaking it has not been added to or modernized for many years, then, if we can regain that, we will continue to have the ability to deter. We do not seek nuclear superiority, and do not think a nuclear war is winnable, but we do think that, unless we can get a sufficient degree of strength to deter the use of their ever growing nuclear arsenal, we will have a most serious situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Just assuming we would not want to use either one of them, and we hope we never have to, but as a deterrent, as you say, if you had a choice between the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which is the better deterrent? Which would you sooner have at your command if you had to have one?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, I am really not going to get into that kind of game. We have an ability to acquire the degree of nuclear strength that we need to continue deterring attack. I would not want to take over the Soviet arsenal, with all the Soviet manpower and everything else that goes with it, because I do not have any confidence that that would ever be superior on the human side or anything else than ours.

The simple fact of the matter is, however, that they now have an edge, and a momentum, and unless we do something about it, and do something about it in whatever time we may have left, and I do not know how much time that may be, then we will be in a situation where we cannot confidently advise the President that we have the forces necessary to deter an attack.

As I mentioned in my statement, they are taking a number of steps which indicate they believe a nuclear war is winnable. They have hardened their silos to the point where we need much more accurate missiles to destroy those silos. They have an ability because of the yield and accuracy of their missiles to take out a very large percentage of our Minuteman system, which is over 20 years old, on a first strike. They have an ability to disrupt our communications, our command, and control.

We have obsolete bombers that have to be replaced, which can no longer in a few years confidently penetrate the Soviet air defenses, and may indeed have trouble getting off our own air fields because of the length of time those obsolete, aging bombers take to get off. We have submarines again with missiles that will not have the yield or the accuracy that the D–5 will have when we get that deployed.

So, without getting into any kind of semantic exercise as to whether I want to take over a large group of Soviet missilemen, the simple fact of the matter is, we have to do a great deal more, and we have to do it just as soon as we can to be able to continue to assure that we have the ability to deter a Soviet first strike.

The CHAIRMAN. I have looked at this myself for a number of years now, and have looked at the balance and the accuracy that we have. If you have to have a deterrent, I would much rather stick with the United States than swap sides.

General Jones, have you formulated any judgment on that? If you had command of either one or the other, and wanted a really credible deterrent, the most credible deterrent, would you rather have the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, as it stands today, I would be willing to swap ICBM's but not the bombers and submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. On balance, then, how do you come out?

General JONES. Well, I think for a lot of reasons which the Secretary indicated, such as manpower issues and others, that is a hypothetical question, and I would not propose a swap, but it is clear that their ICBM's are much more capable than ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Weinberger, General Jones referred to the position taken by Chancellor Schmidt last week in Germany. He warned there that enactment of a nuclear freeze would institutionalize the current asymmetry in United States and Soviet nuclear forces deployed in Europe, and be tantamount to Western acceptance of what Schmidt termed the unbelievable Soviet armada aimed at Western Europe.

What, in your opinion, would be the effect on NATO were the United States to propose a total nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union, and how would it affect the upcoming START negotiations?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think it would be a great mistake, Mr. Chairman. I think you would be freezing in the kind of imbalances that we talked about, and you would at the very least always have worries about verifiability. You would have a situation in which the Soviet superiority that we have just been discussing would be frozen into position. You would remove the incentive for any kind of Soviet entry into meaningful negotiations. They would probably go to the table, but they would not have the slightest interest in reducing anything that they had, because they would know that behind all of this was a freeze which left them with the advantage they had managed to build up when we were in our long, 10-year period of neglect.

So, I think it would be very bad in every point of view. As far as the effect on the other members of NATO, it would be another signal to them that there was no real reliance to be placed on the United States as a credible and reliable ally. Now, this may sound a bit paradoxical, because a great deal of support for the freeze comes from people within the NATO region, but the governments in those regions are well aware of the points that Chancellor Schmidt made that there is a huge Soviet arsenal facing Europe, and that the strength of the United States deterrent is one of the things that has maintained the balance of peace all of these years since the formation of NATO.

So, I think from every point of view the freeze would be a dangerously serious policy error.

The Chairman. When you appeared before this committee on November 3, you announced that there was no near-term conflict between the President's strategic modernization program and continued U.S. restraint on existing SALT agreements. You also indicated that there was no evidence that the Soviet Union was not continuing to live within the terms of these agreements. Are both of these statements still true today?

Secretary Weinberger. So far as I know, and, Mr. Chairman, they underline more completely than anything else the reason why SALT II is totally ineffective. SALT II did not reduce arms. SALT II permitted the kind of Soviet expansion we have seen. The reason the President does not even talk about arms limitation is, he wants arms reduction. That is why it is absolutely essential not to get into the kind of trap or whatever it was that produced SALT II. What we need is something that reduces arms on both sides, so that the balance of deterrence can be maintained at far lower levels, but SALT II permits the kind of expansion we have seen and even more.

The Chairman. I think I can certainly certify to the accuracy of that statement. The President a year and a half ago took the position that he felt SALT II needed some real reductions, that it did not go far enough and deep enough. That is what I hope we are working toward.

Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to return to the point I raised earlier, and have a better understanding of the Secretary's views with regard to nuclear war and the global strategy that this hearing is all about. I guess what I am driving at here is this. Do you think that in the event of a full nuclear exchange, either country would come out better than the other? Or do you believe that there would be no winners and no losers? That they would come out about even?

Secretary Weinberger. I think that is very likely true. We do not have any very real disagreement with that, but we have to point out the disturbing evidence that we have seen that the Soviets are beginning to think that they could prevail, and that is just as dangerous a concept as one can imagine. They are hardening their silos. They are investing enormous amounts in civil defense in attempts to protect their population. They know that what they face are missiles that do not have the degree of yield that theirs do, and cannot break through some of their hardened targets.

They also have a refiring capability which, of course, means that after a silo has been used once, it can be used again, which is not true of ours. All of these indicate to us that the Soviets are beginning to believe they could win a nuclear exchange and emerge from it with what they might call manageable losses, or some ghastly term such as that.

The important thing is not whether it is or is not winnable. It is what they are beginning to think. If they think it is, then I think you have to realize that the risk is increasing, that they may try to make a first strike under perhaps some different kinds of leadership or something of the kind. That is why it is so essential to build up our nuclear strength, so that we can deter that and disabuse them of any such idea.

I understand it is paradoxical and all of that, that we build up in order to go to the negotiating table in order to give them an incentive to make a reduction, but I do not know of any other way to give them that kind of incentive. If they are allowed unconstrained to move in this direction, and if they think they are not facing an opponent with the ability to deter an attack because they do not think the cost of a first strike to them would bring retaliatory force with a cost they would not be able to bear, then I think the danger increases.

Senator PELL. In other words, if both nations believed that there would be no winners in a nuclear war, there would be no nuclear war. Is that your statement?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I think that is correct. That is the essence of deterrence, and we believe that, but we see disturbing evidence that they may no longer believe that, indeed, if they ever did.

Senator PELL. Do you believe, Mr. Secretary, that there can be such a thing as a limited nuclear war?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not think so. I do not really know. No one can say. There have been a lot of theories that there could be a brief single exchange, and that that would convince people that it was a very dangerous and deadly thing to do, but I think people are already convinced of that. I do not really think there could be.

As General Jones said a few moments ago, no one knows what happens when you get into a conflict or when things start to go badly on one side. It is almost impossible to predict, but certainly, as far as anyone can guess, it would seem improbable.

Senator PELL. Do you think the description of what the world would be like after an exchange which Jonathan Schell set forth in his New Yorker series, or in his book—I am sure you are familiar with his thesis—do you think that is overdrawn or reasonably accurate?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, certainly, there is nothing new whatever in Mr. Schell's book. It is a little surprising that it received so much attention, because it states things that have been stated for 20 years. Again, these are projections of what might happen based on what happened when atomic weapons were used. I do not know of any disagreement with respect to it.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

General Jones, in 1979, the JCS position with regard to SALT II was that it could serve, I think the phrase was, a modest but useful purpose in promoting national security. What would be your view now, in 1982, with regard to SALT II? Do you think that its approval would be one step down the road along our Nation's interest?

General JONES. Senator Pell, I think that is a hypothetical question, because it is not being addressed, and I do not think it will be addressed by the whole Senate. I would just like to stand on the statement I made earlier that I am pleased that the current policy is to do nothing inconsistent with SALT II as long as the Soviets do not do anything inconsistent. I think that is the best move for now.

Senator PELL. But if we moved ahead on SALT II, and there is an increasing sentiment to make that one of the bricks, the building bricks in the movement that we see in connection with arms control, it would be to our advantage, and not to our disadvantage if it were ratified, would it not?

General JONES. I am not sure whether reopening the issue of ratifying now would be to our advantage or not. I think our attention should be focused on new negotiations. We must put all our effort on it and try to get some very substantial reductions. So I would put our energies into going beyond that, because we are already staying consistent with SALT II.

We would gain very little, if anything. So let us put our energies into reductions.

Senator PELL. Speaking of reductions, would not a Soviet reduction of 250 launchers to the SALT II limit of 2,250 be in our national interest?

General JONES We said that it would be helpful, but it is a very modest reduction of a very old system. We did not claim that it was a major reduction. They are still continuing to build their total number of warheads.

So we would like to see bigger action and a move toward substantial reductions, particularly in the number of warheads that the Soviet Union has.

Senator PELL. Just going down that path for a moment, what is your reaction to the George Kennan deep cut approach, the 50-percent cut?

General JONES. I am not sure about 50 percent, but I would advocate a major reduction. It is a very complicated subject as to what do you reduce. But a major reduction of many percent, yes, I would support that, but not other aspects of the George Kennan approach.

I support substantial reductions in ballistic missile warheads, which are the most threatening aspect of the strategic thrust.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I see that my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let us talk for the moment about the possibility of ending all of this arms race. Why are we, if indeed we are, dragging our feet on space deterrence of missiles? I am talking about the high frontier, with which I am sure you are familiar.

Gen. Dan Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency

[DIA] is going around the country making clear his view that we can use satellites to shoot down, not using nuclear weapons in space, but using conventional weapons to shoot down any Soviet satellite aimed at us. Is he wrong about that?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think he may be right by the year 2000. I hope he will be. But he is not now, Senator.

We are not dragging our feet in any way. We are doing a great deal of exploration in space-based weapons and lasers and all of the other things out toward the frontier of science. But we do not have any indication at this point that it is anything on which we could put our reliance. If we did, we would be dangerously misleading the President and the country, because we think it is essential that we proceed with the technologies that are developed. They are plenty horrible enough.

But we need to have an ability to deter a Soviet attack, and I do not think we are going to get that by thinking that that is the only way we can proceed to do that. We certainly are pursuing that. We are not dragging our feet in that respect in any way. We have substantial resources devoted to it, but we cannot rely on anything like that because it is not tested, developed, designed, proven, nor deployed, and would not be for a very long time.

Senator **Helms**. What sort of priority are you giving it? And by the way, if any question I ask you would prefer not to discuss in public, that would be fine.

Secretary **Weinberger**. The priority we are giving it is set forth in our budget, in the requests for research of that kind. The results of some of the research clearly is classified and some of it is highly classified, because it is out on the frontiers.

There are some promising aspects to it and we certainly pursue it. We also pursue it from a defensive point of view. We would not be in any kind of credible position if our own satellites or our own weapons were destroyable. So we have to keep up with what the other side is doing, and we also have to try to develop as much as we can ourselves. We are doing that.

I think a high priority is assigned to it, but with all of the talk floating around about making reductions in the requests that we have made, we have to feel that we cannot devote too much of the available resources to things other than getting ourselves strong and ready with what we have and adding to the forces that we know can produce a deterrent right now.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Secretary, I am not debating with you, but would you say that your experts upon whom you rely are unanimous that it is 18 years away in terms of development?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think they would think I was being quite generous with the estimate that it could be done even by that time. I have high hopes that we can do a great deal more than we are now doing in space and with conventional weapons in space or with laser weapons in space. I have high hopes of it. I think it is a promising field and we are devoting a lot of research to it.

But I think that most people who look at it feel that it is considerably farther off than I have indicated. But that does not deter us from exploring this. It does mean that we cannot drop everything else we are doing until we get something far more likely to produce results within a foreseeable time.

Senator HELMS. But of course, nobody would suggest that you drop everything else.

Secretary WEINBERGER. But the problem is, Senator, there has been so much talk about not having priorities and about having too big a budget that we have to make sure that we do what we can do now at the same time that we look at what we hope we can do in the future.

Senator HELMS. What do you have in the budget for R. & D. on this question?

Secretary WEINBERGER. I can get the exact amount for you. I do not have it with me today.

Senator HELMS. A ballpark figure.

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is in the hundreds of millions. We will get the exact sum for you.

[The material referred to follows:]

SPACE-BASED LASER BUDGET

[SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE]

The fiscal year 1983 budget request for the DOD High Energy Laser Program is $433 million. Of this, $156 million is requested for the space-based laser programs in the Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The remainder of the program, while focused on tactical applications of the high energy laser, is developing technology which frequently has broad, general applicability, including space.

Senator HELMS. General Jones, do you have any comment about that? I know I am putting you on the spot.

General JONES. The Soviets are doing a lot in the high energy field and in use of lasers and other methods. They might be able to get a demonstration capability earlier than that, but a real operational capability that may take considerably longer. On some of these claims that the Soviets are about to make a breakthrough in charged particles in space, claims that have been going on for the last 4, 5, or 6 years, I am reminded of the hypochondriac who kept telling all of her friends that she was sick and 20 years later, when she died, on her tombstone was written: "I told you I was sick." So some day they will be right. [Laughter.]

But we do need to pursue this area and we have considerable effort devoted to it in the budget.

Senator HELMS. Now that is the most assuring thing that has been said. Can you assure us, Mr. Secretary and General Jones, that adequate priority will be given to this or is being given to this?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes, sir. It is a subject of great interest to me. Obviously, if we could destroy Soviet missiles in their atmosphere before they get into our atmosphere, if we could destroy them up there as they are coming in, that by far would be the best deterrent of all. Some people say it is destabilizing, but I am not one of those.

But we are such a long way from that that we cannot rely on it. We certainly are attaching a high priority to it. We are certainly going to continue to do that, and we have to do it for both defensive purposes, because the Soviets are doing it, and also because it offers, if it should work out, a very real possibility. We certainly are going to pursue everything that looks hopeful.

Senator **Helms**. I have one final question, and this may be an unfair one. Have you talked to General Jones about this?

Secretary **Weinberger**. To General Jones?

Senator **Helms**. Yes.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. I see him quite regularly and we discuss these matters.

Senator **Helms**. Excuse me. I mean General Graham.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, General Graham has come in.

Senator **Helms**. I could not imagine the hesitation or levity, but I am sure General Jones speaks to you on occasion.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes, he does. I have spoken with General Graham less frequently, but I have spoken with him.

Senator **Helms** [presiding]. The chairman had to take a telephone call.

Senator Dodd?

Senator **Dodd**. Mr. Chairman, I will pass to Senator Hayakawa.

Senator **Hayakawa**. I have to preside at 11 and I appreciate your yielding to me, Senator Dodd. I am very grateful.

I would like to address a question to Secretary Weinberger, who recently returned from a 10-day trip to Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Of course, things are likely to bust loose between North and South Korea at any time. We understand this is always a very great danger.

To what extent does the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat differ from that of the United States? Do they take it as seriously as we do?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Idid not find any significant difference in the government, Senator Hayakawa. I think they have a clear perception of it. As you know, the occupancy of the northern territories southwest of the Kurile Islands has been a source of great concern and unhappiness for many years, and I think they are aware of the growth of the Soviet threat.

They were very interested in the book that we published, "Soviet Military Power." They had it translated and rather widely distributed. I think they just do not have any illusions in the government as to the risks and the dangers of the position which they are in.

I think there may be some elements of public opinion, again because unpleasant facts exist and people do not like to face them and are looking for some rationalization that the Soviets would not bother with them or something of that sort, but I think the Government and most responsible public opinion is very clearly aware of the nature of the threat.

Senator **Hayakawa**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I understand that Prime Minister Suzuki has said that Japan would be willing to take responsibility for defending the sea lanes within 1,000 miles. This is a serious commitment on the part of Japan, then, I take it?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I think it is a serious goal. They identified, when the Prime Minister was here last year meeting with the President, a set of appropriate self-defense goals, that is, the defense of the home islands, the defense of the sea and air space around them, and the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles, as you have said.

I did not sense any diminution in that intention or the acceptance of that as an appropriate goal. We advised that, while we thought the increase in the Japanese defense budget was very commendable, particularly so in a year when they were making reductions in other parts of their government, that it still would not be a sufficient amount to achieve the capabilities to fulfill these self-defense goals.

I think that is generally well understood. But I think these goals are appropriate and I think they feel so. So far as I know, they are defense goals which they accept.

Senator **Hayakawa**. Is Japan sufficiently equipped with ships, destroyers, planes, submarines, whatever is necessary, to police those sea lanes?

Secretary **Weinberger**. No, sir, not now. I think they are aware of that. We supplement their efforts to a very substantial extent. We pointed out that as they continue to acquire, which we hope they will, the additional assets needed to do this, to take care of their own self-defense goals, that will free some of our forces to help protect sea lanes further to the south which, because of Japan's heavy dependence on Mideast oil, are very vital to them also.

It is a shared burden. I think they understand that the share of the burden which they have identified is a proper one for them to carry. I think it is also understood that they will need substantially increased military expenditures to achieve that.

Senator **Hayakawa**. That is very gratifying. I do understand, too, that Japan, through budgetary sleight of hand, is helping American defenses in the Pacific by supporting our troops in Japan and in other ways helping out in the defense of the Pacific area.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Yes. They are making a contribution of approximately a billion dollars a year for the support of U.S. forces there which are dedicated to Japanese defense. They are also expending about $100 million a year in military construction for necessary buildings to maintain that force.

Senator **Hayakawa**. I have one last question and then must leave to vote.

On the threat that North Korea always poses against South Korea, so that when you are on the DMZ you feel that war can break out any second, to what degree does China or the Soviet Union do anything to keep that going? Is it China, the Soviet Union, or both?

Secretary **Weinberger**. The North Koreans have very substantial forces there along that whole DMZ and behind it, very substantial military capabilities. There is also a strong defense in place, made up both of South Koreans, who contribute very substantial to their own self-defense, and very strong U.S. forces.

I do not have any evidence to discuss or to share with the committee this morning with respect to Soviet or Chinese involvement. I think it is unquestionably true that the Soviets, who fish in troubled waters all over the world, would be very pleased at whatever additional tensions could be injected into that situation.

Senator **Hayakawa**. But is there any direct Soviet support for the North Koreans?

Secretary **Weinberger**. I have not seen any direct Soviet support.

Senator **Hayakawa**. Or Chinese?

Secretary Weinberger. No, not directly.

Perhaps General Jones may wish to add to that.

General Jones. There has been some assistance from both. I believe the Chinese are a moderating influence on the North Koreans, and therefore it is important that we maintain good relationships with the PRC, because I think it helps stabilize the Korean peninsula.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I see that the chairman has returned. I was about to declare a 5-minute recess and do not need to do so.

The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Tsongas.

Senator Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say, General Jones, that I for one regret your retirement. I think this country is not going to be better off with you retired. I just want to state that for the record.

General Jones. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Tsongas. Mr. Secretary, let me indicate where I am coming from on the issue. I think the administration came to power riding a wave and mandate for more defense spending. Not only was it a position that you took, but I think that was where the country was very strongly.

I think now that that mandate and that wave have virtually vanished, and for three reasons:

No. 1, the loose talk about nuclear war, not necessarily by yourself but by some of the people in the administration. It has forced people to contemplate the reality of nuclear war, which is what Ground Zero Week was about last week.

No. 2, I think the reaction of Senator Mathias at our briefing with Eugene Rostow to the fact that, having participated in the demise of SALT II, the administration does, in fact, have no arms control proposal ready after a year and a half.

No. 3 is, I think, a general understanding that the arms race has had a devastating impact on our domestic economy (A) because of the deficit issue and its linkage to interest rates; and (B) because of draining resources, both human and capital, from the nonmilitary sector and increasing inability to compete in the international trade markets. That at least is where I think we are.

Now, if I may quote three people who are subordinates of yours and ask you whether you would subscribe to their comments: One, Adm. Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, who said as follows:

> I would not trade the U.S. Navy for the Soviet Navy under any circumstances. Our forces today are modern and sophisticated and embody some of the most advanced technology American industry can produce. Our capabilities are improving across the full spectrum of naval warfare, with the addition of new ships, submarines and aircraft to the fleet. Sea-based tactical air, anti-submarine warfare and fleet support are particular strengths of the United States Navy as it operates at great distances from the United States in overseas ports.

Would you subscribe to that?

Secretary Weinberger. Yes, I think that is right. I think you should emphasize, with the addition of new ships and planes and base support, because that is what is essential. But I would have no disagreement with that statement at all.

We do have a great technological advantage still, despite the fact that we transferred far too much to the Soviets. I would like at some point, Senator, also to comment on the three points you made earlier.

Senator Tsongas. The second statement is that of Gen. Lou Allen, who is the Air Force Chief of Staff, who said:

> I would not trade the United States Air Force for its Soviet counterpart. Our people are better motivated, trained and educated than their Soviet counterparts, and in most areas the quality of our weaponry is unsurpassed. There is no question that the United States Air Force is the finest in the world.

Secretary Weinberger. I think that is essentially correct, Senator, certainly the emphasis on the manpower. What does not appear from those statements is the fact that, in response to questions, that old cliche, would you trade the Soviets' for ours, nobody in his right mind is going to say yes to that, because the biggest element of any of these things is manpower—training, native intelligence, and all the rest. So you are not going to have anybody saying yes to that kind of question who has thought it through at all.

What also should appear is the fact that the Soviets have outinvested us by about $350 billion in the last few years and that they have necessarily produced, as a result of the technological advantages that they have taken from the West, some very good and very sophisticated weapons in very great numbers, vastly greater numbers than ours in many areas.

So what we are looking at is a country that has spent unlimited amounts for many years and has a great deal of momentum in the sense that they are taking deliveries of things that were ordered some years ago, when we were running at level or minus level appropriations from year to year. They have started to achieve edges in numbers and edges in some degrees of forms of superiority in some of their weapons systems—some of their planes, some of their submarines.

But this is not to say anybody would exchange it. What we need to do is strengthen and build on what we have.

Senator Tsongas. I think the concern is when the President said they enjoyed a definite margin of superiority. That may wash in the countryside, but it does not wash with people who have had some experience.

Secretary Weinberger. Well, it should wash with them, Senator, because it is true. It is unfortunately true, and it is the logical end result of the policies we have pursued as opposed to the policies the Soviets have pursued with respect to necessary military deterrent strength.

Senator Tsongas. If I said to you that you had more money than I did but I would not switch bank accounts, would you find that somewhat inconsistent?

Secretary Weinberger. Not at all, because I would put it on the basis of the ultimate earning ability.

Senator Tsongas. Well, if you would care to switch today I will meet you outside and would be glad to do it.

Secretary Weinberger. I have no desire to, Senator, despite the financial disclosure laws. [Laughter.]

Senator Tsongas. I thought I had a good offer there that I would take advantage of. [Laughter.]

Secretary **Weinberger.** In all seriousness, Senator, this is much too serious a matter to joke about. The point of it is that we have enormous advantages in manpower, in the quality of the people and in the basic structures. We have neglected it.

What we should do is build on the advantages we have and the structure that we have, and not engage in idle hypothetical questions about whether we would trade or not as a means of proving whether one is better than the other now.

These are fixed points in time and you cannot just take a snapshot here and say that is it. You have to look at trends and what the future will bring and what will happen if we do not continue the kind of rearmament that we started last year.

Senator **Tsongas.** Let me ask you a nonhypothetical question. When you say that the Soviets have outspent us in 10 years to the tune of $355 billion, does that include calculations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations?

Secretary **Weinberger.** Yes, inclusion of allied investment on both sides would narrow the gap somewhat. What we are really talking about here is the amount of the spending, the military spending in the United States that is attributed to investment. Personnel and operating spending runs about 60 percent of our total budget, and in the Soviets' it is less. That means, when you talk about outinvested—the Soviets are able to acquire more military strength, firepower if you like, than we are by their expenditures, because they spend proportionally less on personnel and operations.

What we have to bear in mind is that they are able to get more military strength with the spending that they do than we do. We have to do very much more than they do to start gaining the kind of additional actual firepower, actual military strength, that comes from investment, which is the term we use for weapons systems and ammunition and things of that kind, as opposed to personnel and operating costs.

The **Chairman.** Thank you very much, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Mathias.

Senator **Mathias.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, from your statement this morning and from my observation of events, I think it is clear that the administration has both a strategy and a tactic. The strategy as I see it is to bring the Soviet Union to the conference table in a mood to negotiate by convincing them of our resolve to enhance the military strength of the United States. The tactic, on the other hand, seems to be to accord, at least in speeches, a perceived superiority to the Soviet Union and to discourage, at least for the time being, any dialogue with the Soviet Union.

I think it would be helpful to the committee to have your observations, your thoughts, on the compatibility of the tactic and the strategy. It seems to me that the tactic is targeted on the Appropriations Committees of the Congress and perhaps on the American taxpayer, but the strategy seems to be targeted on the Kremlin.

So the question arises as to whether or not the tactic may not really put in jeopardy the strategy. The tactic, the statements, the rhetoric, may in the long run discourage our allies and create a food of disagreement in the general public which will make it impossible to achieve the strategic objective.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, without agreeing that the tactic is as you defined it——

Senator **Mathias**. I do not ask you to accept the premise of my question.

Secretary **Weinberger**. All right. The strategy is as you define it. It is to gain a sufficient degree of strength so that the Soviets will have some incentive to come to the table, so that we can emerge from negotiations which we urgently want to start with a drastic and a very real reduction in strategic arms and ultimately, through other negotiations, in conventional arms.

We believe that we are not going to be able to achieve that unless they do indeed have some kind of incentive, something to give up. If we go to the conference table with the inferiority that we believe exists in a number of areas, we think that there is no incentive for the Soviets to come to the table or to agree to anything.

We also have to look beyond that. We have to look at the possibility that even during discussions, even during negotiations, a surprise attack cannot be totally ruled out. We cannot allow our strength to deteriorate to the point where we become a tempting target or where the whole policy of deterrence fails because we are not doing enough to deter attack.

We have to acquire that strength both against the possibility of failure of negotiations and in order to make the negotiations succeed. I am not really aware of anything that has been done that would make that more difficult.

It is true that, as the size of the deficits rise and people get more and more concerned about some of the factors Senator Tsongas mentioned a moment ago, there seems to be some perception that somehow that makes the threat lessen. And I do not think it makes the threat lessen at all. It makes the urgency of what we are trying to do more necessary.

All this last year, for example, on the intermediate range nuclear forces side, the Soviets deployed an increasing number, one every 5 days, of the SS-20's, and they are now up to 300. The only zero option that we have is that it is 300 to zero. That is the zero option we have right now.

What we want to do is to get into negotiations with them to bring theirs down to zero. We do that because we have a NATO resolution to deploy a form of missiles which the Soviets are very much worried about.

We feel it essential, therefore, to pursue that and we are pursuing it. We are engaged in the manufacturing and the deployment preparations to bring those missiles online in 1983. If the Soviets agree to the proposals now on the table at Geneva, no one would be happier than I and certainly no one would be happier than the President. But in the absence of their agreement, we have to be ready.

The other thing we have to bear in mind is the length of time it takes to do any of these things; 1979 was the date of the NATO resolution and the earliest time then for deployment was 1983. Now, by substantial exertions we will be able to meet that deadline, provided we can still base the missiles.

But you do not have very much time. You have very little margin for error, and you have consequences that are too disastrous to contemplate if you are wrong. So we do need to keep up both sides of it. It is not necessarily a tactic or a strategy; it is a goal and it is the only method that I can think of for reaching the goal we all want.

Senator MATHIAS. Accepting for the moment your statement, I would say that it does outline the strategy—what I have observed to be the strategy. But I do not know that you have yet addressed yourself to this tactical question: How does it promote the strategy, on the one hand, to advertise to the world that we think the Soviet Union is superior when our effort is to bring them to the table in a mood believing that we mean what we say about our own military strength; and on the other hand, how does it help the situation any when the rhetoric creates a political climate in Europe in which deployment of the Pershing missile becomes more difficult. How does it help when the rhetoric is beginning to create a political movement in the United States which is going to make it more difficult to achieve the kind of defense expenditure which the strategy demands?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Senator, there has been an awful lot of rhetoric floating around and I do not know which particular set you were referring to. But the only rhetoric that I am familiar with or that I have committed has been rhetoric that has been designed to state the facts as we see them. The facts as we see them are that we did neglect the kind of strengthening that we should have been doing during those years and allowed ourselves to get in the situation where there is now a clear edge of superiority, as the President puts it.

There is no point in trying to conceal that fact. The Soviets know it, we know it, there is nothing new in any of those statements. What is important is for everyone, Europe and the Soviets and ourselves, to realize that we are resolved and determined and have the necessary national will and resolution to regain the kind of strength—not a superiority—but the kind of strength that can continue to deter attack. We have been able to do that since the end of World War II one way or another, and I hope very much that we can continue to do it.

We need public support to do it. We need to have the world realize that the United States is resolved to do it and it is a sacrificial course that is required. It will take many years, but that is all that I am aware of that has been said, and that is not a tactic or a strategy or anything else; that is a fact. It seems to me that it is essential to have that correctly understood before the public.

I think that others in Europe are seeing the same thing. I do not see very much difference between what Chancellor Schmidt said before his party congress and what we have been saying about the size and strength of the Soviet forces and the need to do something about it.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I think we could all take realistic views of the strength of Soviet forces. They are sobering, and they concern us. I am not sure that extolling Soviet strength does help us achieve that goal of bringing them to the table in a mood to negotiate.

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, I do not know who is extolling it, Senator. I am deploring it. But I think it is there, and what we have to do is deal with it. The only way I know of to deal with it is to acquire sufficient strength to deter it.

Senator **Mathias**. I see my time is up. I hope we will have another round in which to complete this exchange.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Mathias. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator **Zorinsky**. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and General Jones. Mr. Secretary, this is an election year, and you hear a lot of rhetorical comments being made. I am not one of those that makes this particular comment, but every time I open up the paper or go to a budget meeting, I hear people saying we can cut $10 billion out of the Defense budget, we can cut $20 billion out of the Defense budget, we can cut $30 billion out of the Defense budget.

If we can cut the Defense budget, do you have any contingency plans? Nobody seems to be asking the question: If, indeed, that were to become a reality, what do you give up with respect to our ability to do or not to do, or to program the manufacture of some equipment that may be necessary. Is there any priority list with regard to what we will do without if the budget, indeed, is cut in the Defense Department?

Secretary **Weinberger**. Senator, those are very good questions. There are a lot of figures being tossed about. I think it should be recognized that what are being talked about are outlay reductions to do something about the deficit.

When you get up to $30 billion you are talking about $120 billion obligational authority, which reaches the very point that you have made, which is you then have to stop doing a great deal of what has been started to try to regain the strength that is necessary. It takes a long time to do it. It will be well up to the end of the decade before we are able to do the things the President sought and which the Congress authorized last year.

If they are stopped on any kind of scale of that kind, why then, indeed, you are going to have all of the savings that come from multiyear procurement and advanced ordering and so on lost.

More important than that, you are not only going to make these things much more expensive, but you are going to delay yourself dangerously beyond the point where we should have regained a sufficient degree of strength to continue deterrence.

The budget we submitted, Senator, was a budget that we felt not only honestly stated the proper second-year increment of the rearmament program, but it was a budget in which we tried honestly to price what things actually are going to cost, and in which we tried to incorporate all of the management improvements and the savings that we think we have been able to make and will be able to make. We drove into that budget additional savings, as a means of forcing ourselves to make additional internal savings.

So we do not feel that there is room in that budget for substantial cuts of the kind that are talked about without seriously impeding and seriously endangering the security of the United States. It is not an opening-offer budget, by any means. Maybe that was a mistake. Maybe we should have put in $10 or $20 billion that we did not need, so somebody could cut it out and everybody would feel better. We did not do that.

As a result, we do not have plans for reductions of the magnitude you have been talking about and others have been talking about. I do not mean that which you have been advocating, but I mean that which you mentioned this morning. We think that would seriously weaken the United States and send a signal to the world that we had no resolve, national will or strength necessary to rearm the country in time. I think it would be a rather clear signal to the negotiators that the Soviets have very little reason or incentive to withdraw or reduce any of their armament.

Senator Zorinsky. I agree with you. We should not approach this on an option-type basis, because I am sure all of the projections are interwoven with one another, and it certainly would distort the formula and the end result would be to reduce our ability to deter aggression from our shores.

General Jones, I would like to ask you a question with respect to the rapid deployment force. It is quite apparent that had the British had the capability of a rapid deployment force, we would not have been afforded the luxury of continuing to attempt to mediate as we currently are with Argentina and the British.

As I understand it, they are still attempting to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner. I would imagine that a serious military confrontation has not begun as of this particular moment, due to the lack of a rapid deployment force.

In light of that, is there any reevaluation or reassessment based on this particular situation with regard to our plans for a rapid deployment force? As a matter of fact, it has even given those people who make bumper stickers the opportunity to do so. I see bumper stickers appearing which read, "Don't give up the sheep." [General laughter.]

I think this situation provides the disputing parties the luxury of time, and it is, of course, because of the absence of an RDF force.

General Jones. Senator Zorinsky, I think the only thing it demonstrates to us is an increasing need for a rapid deployment force that can move very rapidly, because we will not always have a situation that is similar to what happened in the south Atlantic, where having some negotiating time is advantageous.

If we are faced with a confrontation with the Soviet Union, for example, in Southwest Asia, the best way to stabilize it is to show that we have a very substantial force that can get there very rapidly and stabilize the situation, or at least demonstrate to the Soviets that they would have a confrontation. If they thought that we were impotent or could not get there for weeks and weeks, they could have a fait accompli in that region, and it would take much more effort for us to try to overcome that than if we could get there rapidly.

If the British were able to get to the Falkland Islands within hours and the Argentines had known that, I think it would have been less likely that they would have made the move into the islands. But they knew that it would take weeks for the British to get down into the area, and they thought they could take over and then gain world support for their action.

So, time is not necessarily advantageous even in that condition, and it would not be advantageous in most other conditions in the world.

Senator Zorinsky. With the huge numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact and the resulting inequity that we currently face with regard to conventional weapons like tanks in the NATO alliance, how strongly do you feel the neutron weapon is a neutralizing factor able to offset this differential without building tanks so that numerically we would have equity in that area?

General JONES. First of all, we should not be looking at this tank to tank. We are not trying to match them in tanks. We want to have a better antitank capability than they have.

A neuron bomb can be helpful in that regard, but it is much different than any other antitank weapon because you are then escalating to nuclear weapons, and you have a whole new situation and a continuing escalation. So we need to work very hard on non-nuclear antitank weapons and try to establish a closer conventional balance in the tank versus antitank area, as we continue here in the United States with the work on the neutron bomb.

I do not advocate it as the solution to the tank problem in Europe. I advocate improving our antitank conventional capability. That is a very high priority for units deploying to Europe.

Senator ZORINSKY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Zorinsky. Senator Kassebaum?

Senator KASSEBRAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, I would like to talk for just a minute about our foreign policy commitments versus our military capabilities. In your remarks you implied that we are moving forward in our military capabilities in order to meet those far-flung commitments that we have. But there are certainly some who believe that there is a mismatch, and there was even the report some months ago that was quickly denied that we would really need $750 billion more if we were going to have the type of force necessary to meet those commitments.

Do you really believe that we do have such disparities? Are we being misled on the budget request? As you know from my questioning you in the Budget Committee, I feel that we really must address ourselves to a sensible defense request in the light of what the public perceives as our greatest needs. This is really very troubling to me because I think it is important for us to have all of the facts before the public if we can make the rational judgments necessary.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I certainly agree with a lot of parts of what you have said without any question. The Defense Department exists and only exists to carry out the foreign policy of the United States and to protect the continental United States and our interests abroad, as determined by the foreign policy of the country.

To say that there is a mismatch between the foreign policy objectives and our military capabilities is simply to confirm what the President said starting in the campaign 1½ or 2 years ago. We do need to have more. The other alternative to that is to give up some of these various commitments.

We then have to ask what it is we are going to give up. Should we give up the central front in Europe? Should we withdraw from NATO? I do not think so. I think that would be the most fatal thing we could do because I do not think we could live in a world in which Europe was overrun by Soviet forces. That might happen if we pulled our forces out of central Europe.

Should we give up Japan? Should we give up Korea? Should we give up the defense of the oil fields? Should we announce, as was done many years ago, that certain places were not worth fighting for, only to see them overrun in a very short time? Korea?

The standard inquiry before World War II is that Danzig is not worth a war. When you announce that certain things are not worth fighting for, when you say that your objectives no longer include the protection of this interest or that interest, you create a vacuum. In the present state of the world's condition, the Soviets are going to rush in to fill that vacuum pretty quickly. They have done it in a number of places. We have seen it in Angola and Ethiopa and various other parts of the world in earlier years.

We do exist to fulfill the foreign policy commitments of the Government. We do need more to do that. But to say there is a mismatch at the moment is simply to confirm that we have to proceed with the President's plan. To say there is a mismatch and, therefore, we should not do it strikes me as not only self-defeating but inviting aggression in various parts of the world, once it is concluded that we have to give up something.

Senator **Kassebaum.** I am not saying there is a mismatch; I am just saying there is that speculation.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Oh yes, that has been said many times. I am glad you are not saying it.

Senator **Kassebaum.** Then, is there any truth to the belief of some that the budget request was far short?

Secretary **Weinberger.** Far too modest? Well, sometimes I have stood amazed at my own moderation, Senator. [General laughter.]

But I think we have to do these things realistically. We have to realize that unlike the Soviet Union, there are fiscal and other constraints upon us, and we have to do the very best we can. But to do less than that is very dangerous.

That is why I think it is essential that we proceed on this second-year increment of this 6-year plan that the President presented last year. The curious thing is that as was said a moment ago by Senator Tsongas, I believe, some of this national consensus for increased defense strength seems to have been lost. That would be very unfortunate if true.

I do not think it is true, but it would be very unfortunate because the threat has done nothing but increase.

Senator **Kassebaum.** Mr. Secretary, I think it is true to a certain extent because I think there is a backlash of feeling in the public now. I heard over and over again during the Easter recess, "Who can we believe?" This is why it seems to me it is very important that we do have a clear understanding whether we are second best to the Soviets, and must have clear superiority. I believe we must try not to either exaggerate or diminish what is actually the true state of our defense posture.

Secretary **Weinberger.** That is exactly what we are trying to do.

Senator **Kassebaum.** Yes, but you can see there have obviously been different statements. The public is confused.

Secretary **Weinberger.** I think you have to bear in mind, Senator, that there are a number of people who have never really believed in increasing military strength. There are a number of people who quite honestly feel that unilateral activities are the ones most likely to produce peace. I disagree with them strongly but I understand their sincerity.

There are a lot of people who do not like even to consider these subjects. They are basically very unpleasant truths, and a lot of people prefer to rationalize them away. A lot of people prefer domestic expenditures. They are much more popular. They have bigger constituencies. So you run into a great deal of the idea that we would like to have a reason for not doing a hard and difficult and sacrificial course of action.

As I say, I think it is very dangerous. I think the risk has not diminished at all. Some of the arguments that were being made last week and in previous weeks about various compromises on the budget, that we had to make reductions in defense because it was not fair to any other appropriation, is not the way to budget.

I do not think that you can construct your defense budget on the basis of what is fair to highways or food stamps or whatever. You have to do it on the basis of the need, and the need is expressed in terms of the threat, and the threat is growing. I have no doubt about it myself, whatever.

I think that anybody who rationally examines the evidence would reach the same conclusion. The worst way to deal with a growing threat is to turn your back on it. That is what worries me.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But I think the poll, for instance, that was reported in this morning's paper shows the almost Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde attitude that is in the public mind. There is acknowledgement that the Soviets have a momentum and dedication to a military buildup, and yet, on the other hand, a great desire in the public to see us bring some sort of degree of control to what is perceived as a heightened militarism.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We want desperately to do that. The only way that I think we can do it is to be strong enough to bring that conclusion out of a negotiating session.

Senator KASSEBAUM. My time is up, but I would like to follow on with just one more question because you said the threat was growing. Specifically, where is the threat growing? As far as you see it as a top priority, the No. 1 threat?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Well, the threat is growing in a number of different areas. The Soviet strategic forces are growing all the time, both in strength and capability and numbers. We have seen it in the intermediate range weapons, and we have seen it in the fact that they have spent a large part of the 1970's developing new and better systems which they are now bringing online, and they are going to the drawing boards for more capable and more accurate systems.

So, on the strategic nuclear side, it is growing very visibly. They are adding to their conventional forces, their tank deployments, their plane deployments. They have built something like 4- or 5-to-1 more tanks and planes than we did in the last year, 1981 alone. They have shown no signs whatever of any slackening or any reductions of the allocations to the military, despite the fact that they have now had

3 years of terrible harvests and that they have an economy which can only be described as wretched as far as the consumer is concerned.

So you do not see any slackening. You see a steady growth in conventional; in nuclear; in air, land, and sea; and mostly in offensive weapons, mostly in weapons designed to aid the offense, and a clear willingness to use them. So I think the threat is growing, and it is growing in almost all ways in which military strength can be added.

I think in the face of that if we want to get, as we do urgently, a genuine, a real and a sharp reduction in strategic and ultimately conventional arms out of negotiation, we ourselves have to add strength to do that, both in case the negotiations fail to be ready, and to secure the kind of result the President wants and that I think we all want out of those negotiations.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think that the danger that we all worry about is the enormous buildup between us in this mad race. We are going to lose some of the support that is very necessary for a sound defense system.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We certainly agree that we should not lose and cannot lose that support if we are to continue to regain our strength. It is not a mad race. The President properly described it as a one-nation arms race. We are not seeking to get just as many tanks or bullets or planes that they have. All we are seeking is to regain enough strength to deter an attack on us or on our friends.

That requires a substantial additional amount of strength, but it does not mean that we have to outnumber them in everything or engage in an arms race. Indeed, the purpose of regaining the strength is to try to get a good result out of the negotiations, which can then mean reductions. That is what we would most hope.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you very much. I apologize if I took too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary and General Jones, thank you for appearing before us this morning.

I wonder if I might try to synthesize here for a moment. There have been various statements this morning about the whole question of the President's March 31 press conference that has evoked a great interest and concern in the country. As you know, Mr. Secretary, as of today, there are some 24 or 25 different resolutions pending in the Senate and the House that deal with a freeze of one kind of another, for lack of a better description. The administration has endorsed one of those which includes the word "freeze" in it. So, there seems to be at least consensus on all sides that moving toward a freeze or arms reduction is obviously something on which there is unanimity of thought.

What is central to the issue for those of us trying to decide which of these approaches makes the best sense is the very question that was addressed to the President on March 31, and which you have responded to and General Jones has in a brief way this morning. I would like to try to get some sense of that. We know that on March 31 the President said: "The Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority." The following day, on April 1, if my memory serves me well, there were a number of press reports which had various spokesmen from the Defense Department modifying that statement somewhat.

I see you shaking your head no.

Secretary **Weinberger.** They were certainly not intending to modify it one bit, Senator. Someone may have used the term "edge" instead of margin, or something of that kind, but there was no slight question as to the total correctness of the President's statements, because they were based upon recommendations, briefings, and information that the Department of Defense had furnished to him, so there is no distance, no room, no daylight, whatever the expression is.

I know that columns have to be written every day, and everybody hunts for whatever a semicolon means, and all of that, but in this situation the President's statements and the statements that followed were entirely in my mind consistent and intended to be consistent. Now, you have some people who were no longer connected or not connected with the Department who had differing views they wished to present to the public, but there is no slight difference between the President's statements and our feeling with respect to the superiority, the edge, the degree, or whatever word you want to use. His statements, as I say, were based upon various briefings and information that we had been able to furnish to him.

Senator **Dodd.** I am looking at your 1983 report, which you submitted in February. I am looking at the particular section dealing with nuclear strategy. I will quote from it here. You say here in this report, which was submitted in February, "While this modernization program is not designed to achieve nuclear superiority for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority and to insure the margin of safety necessary for our security."

Now, the implication that I read in that particular paragraph, and I do not want to just extract one paragraph—it is a lengthy report—but the implication in February, at least, is that that superiority had not yet been achieved, that you want to make sure the Soviet Union does not acquire that superiority, but there was not a statement in here from what I would consider to be a normal reading of this particular section, which would conclude that the Soviets have, in fact, achieved nuclear superiority over the United States.

Secretary **Weinberger.** Senator, I attempted to deal with a point somewhat similar to that earlier this morning, and that is, I just simply cannot take a snapshot of the situation and say that as of 10:45 on Thursday morning the Soviets are superior or now have an edge of superiority or anything of the kind. They do have at the moment very accurate missiles, as I said, that could take out a large portion of our ground-based system. They have an ability to disrupt our communications, command and control. They have designed a great many things in the seventies which are now being delivered, and we have not. They have a momentum that is adding enormously to their forces, while we have been standing still and going down because we have been relying on systems that are 25, 27, or 30 years old.

Now, what we have to do to regain that degree of strength that will enable us to continue the deterrent is to follow in an orderly planned fashion over the full 6-year period the President's program for regaining strategic strength. As of this morning, the Soviets have some edge of superiority in some of the weapons, in some of the accuracies, in some of the ranges, in some of the yields, things of that kind. We have great strengths. Nobody says we do not. But we have a situation on the basis of what is there today and what we can see developing in the next few years, based on the momentum that I have described, which would leave us in an inferior position of great danger.

Senator DODD. Now, that is a little bit different. What you are telling me is, as of 11:40 on April 29, that we are inferior to the Soviet Union in our overall nuclear strategy.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The way the President phrased it is the correct way. They have this edge, this margin, and it is perfectly possible to do something about it if we have the time. None of us knows how much time we have. But it is vital to start—we started last year—and it is vital to continue. If we do not, the margin, the edge, the degree, or whatever you want to say, will widen, the gap will widen.

Senator DODD. I am not asking this because I am trying necessarily to lock myself into a position, but to me it is central to the question. In fact, if the Soviet Union is on an overall basis superior to the United States, then possibly the Jackson-Warner approach makes more sense. If we have rough equivalency, not one for one, as you have accurately pointed out, but rough equivalency, then perhaps another approach makes more sense.

Secretary WEINBERGER. We do not have rough equivalency, Senator, because you have to measure it in something far different than numbers of warheads.

Senator DODD. But that is not the President's statement. He said the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority.

Secretary WEINBERGER. They do. They do have that margin of superiority, because you cannot measure it and see that we have the same number of warheads that they do or anything of the kind. You have to look at deliverability. You have to look at accuracy. You have to look at yield. You have to look at what our missiles could do to their hardened silos. You have to look at the communications systems. There is a whole variety of things that you have to use to measure this. The President is absolutely right on the basis of his statement. Now, it is not an irretrievable situation, and it is not a situation which we cannot correct if we pursue a path of rearmament on a steady, regular basis. If we start one year and stop the next, we are not going to be able to do it in time, and we are all guessing as to the amount of time we have. We barely had time in World War II. This is a vastly different world.

So the President's statement is correct. There is no difference or any kind of disagreement with that statement. The important thing is not to look at a particular hour of one day and say, well, they have 82 more warheads than we do, or we have six more than they do. It is a question of what can you do with them. Can you get them off the ground? Can you refire from silos that have once been used? All of those things. Under all of those circumstances, the President's statement is absolutely right, and it was based upon the information, briefings and material that we have been able to furnish to him.

So, there is no difference there, but that is not the point. The point is that we can now do something about it. We have started to do something about it, and we should continue to do something about it.

Senator **Dodd**. I would like in my next round to come back to what we can do about it, but just candidly with you. Mr. Secretary, since my time is up, I think if you assume, and I believe you do, that the people who are the authors of these various resolutions are very sincere in trying to achieve a bilateral reduction, and no one that I know of in any way wants to see the position, the security interests of the United States jeopardized.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Of course not.

Senator **Dodd**. But it is the confusion over where we presently are. Frankly, it is the kind of statements the President gave. We talk about rough equivalency on the one hand, and yet a definite margin of superiority on the other. I think that creates the kind of confusion that gives birth to a whole host of resolutions with different approaches.

Secretary **Weinberger**. The confusion does not arise from what the President says. The President is absolutely right. The confusion arises because we feel we have rough equivalency, and the simple fact of the matter is, we do not. We are simply measuring it in raw numbers of warheads. That simply is not enough. You have to look at all of the other factors, accuracy, yield, range, whether or not they could be refired, what ours will do to their silos, their targets. All of those things have to be considered.

I do not think there is any confusion at all. I do not challenge the sincerity of any of the Senators. but I do think the Jackson-Warner approach of making your reductions down to the point where there is parity, where there is equivalence, or there is a degree of strength that can continue to provide deterrence at vastly lower levels. is the proper approach, but to freeze at this point, when it is going that way, is not going to provide any inducement to the Soviets to come into discussions or give them any reason to agree to any reductions.

Senator **Dodd**. I will come back to that. My time is up.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Dodd, very much.

Secretary Weinberger, we offered to have you leave here by 11:45, but could Senator Pressler ask you a couple of questions, please, before you leave? And General Jones, would you be able to stay on for a couple of minutes?

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. U.S. global strategy is an issue of balance. This balance must occur at several levels. There must be a balance between that which is required to protect, and advance our interests and those of our friends and allies, and that which our allies and friends should provide themselves. This balance between our efforts and those of friendly nations requires sharing both risks and responsibilities in their regions and beyond. There is a need to weigh the size of our defense effort, on the one hand, and the social and economic needs of our people, on the other. Doing too much abroad while doing too little at home has serious long term implications for American security. After all, the basic ingredients of our Nation's strength is its people and those conditions that allow its economy to thrive.

Arms control has an important role to play in balancing this equation. Our leaders must make every effort to find alternatives that will allow us to obtain security with minimal public sacrifice. This is not to say that our people are not ready for sacrifice, but that they have the right to be shown that sacrifice is required for lack of negotiated options rather than for lack of attention to arms control negotiations.

The same holds true for American assistance to friends and allies. My constituents are ready to assist our friends abroad, but first they must be shown that our friends are doing all that they can on their own, first.

The fiscal year 1983 foreign military assistance program represents a one-fourth increase over the fiscal year 1982 program. I thought that last year's aid package was overly generous. For my part, and for the part of many of my constituents, the administration needs to demonstrate that this large increase is justified.

As for our friends in Europe, it is hard for us in the Senate to sell the need for constant American vigilance in Europe when our allies seem less concerned about their own safety. This applies not only to the continent itself but beyond. Europe's dependence upon the resources of the Middle East is greater than our own. It is time that Europe's defense speeding efforts corresponded to this reality.

I have faith that we in the Senate working together with the administration and with our friends and allies abroad to resolve these problems. What is necessary is hard work, cooperation, understanding and patience. A greater sharing of the defense burden is required by those who can afford it. More attention to negotiations may provide relief from our security dilemma. What is important is that we assure our citizens that such sacrifice as they must make is necessary and not simply the result of insufficient effort either by ourselves or by our friends.

My hope is that these hearings that begin today will help the Congress explore one alternative to a costly defense effort, that alternative is arms control.

In view of the time constraint, the bottom line of my question is: in devising a global strategy, we have to maintain domestic support. The budget includes about a 23-percent increase in foreign aid and security assistance in addition to increases in defense spending, whereas we are making cuts in almost every other place. Since last year, there has almost been a complete turnaround, in the views of my constituents. They have questioned giving the Pentagon a blank check.

I am fascinated by how the Russians can afford what they are doing in the military area. More importantly, I wonder whether we can afford what we are doing unless we achieve greater efficiencies. I find that there is an erosion even among my most conservative constituents of the cost of foreign aid, foreign security assistance, the military budget, and it is rather remarkable change from a year ago.

In view of the domestic budget cuts can we afford a 23-percent increase in foreign aid and security assistance?

Secretary WEINBERGER. Yes. Not only can we afford it, Senator, it is also one of the very best bargains we could possibly have, because it is a way of acquiring greater defensive strength through building a network of alliances and friendships and having people defend their own lands and help defend their own lands in areas that enable us to have a forward defense. That is one of the very best investments we can make. We can clearly afford it, and we have, I think, without any question, recognized the importance of doing it. If we do not do it that way, the defense budget of the United States would have to be infinitely higher, if we were to have the degree of security that we obtain from those investments.

They are essential, and as you would know if you heard the number of conversations that I did with countries that basically want to be friendly and want to help, and can be of enormous assistance to us in providing the kind of collective security we need, quite a lot more is needed.

Senator **Pressler.** Where has this worked best in the world? Can you give me a couple of examples?

Secretary **Weinberger.** It works very well in Korea. It works extremely well in Turkey. It works very well in Morocco. It works very well in Oman. It works very well in every country literally where we do it.

Senator **Pressler.** What about Southeast Asia and Central America?

Secretary **Weinberger.** We have no question as to its value in those areas. In Central America, the President's request is to do more on the economic side to help the economies of many of these countries. He has also, however, in the same message, asked for increases in military assistance, to enable these countries, some of them, to stay free of Soviet domination. If you get a Soviet outpost on the mainland in Central America, our own position of the continental United States becomes much harder to defend.

Senator **Pressler.** The former National Secretary Advisor, Mr. Brzezinski, suggested that we are in a Pax Brittania era with regard to nuclear weapons. In fact, if we had a great agreement or reduction in nuclear weapons, we might need to go back to a more expensive conventional force posture. So I guess he is actually suggesting that the 30 years of relative peace that the world has had is a result of the nuclear stalemate.

Secretary **Weinberger.** It was not a stalemate, Senator. That is why we have the peace. We had enormous nuclear superiority during a very large part of that period. We have lost that now. The alternative is an enormous increase in conventional forces or enough strength to secure the kind of result we all want from the negotiations. If we can get that and ultimately get reductions in conventional weapons which the President also wants, then we can maintain deterrence and peace at vastly lower levels of cost and of danger.

Senator **Pressler.** Well, basically, this business of superiority may be in terms of count, one side is superior over the other. You have gone into that somewhat. But is there really superiority in terms of the ability to destroy? Both sides have that. However much more is built, it really will not exceed the capacity to destroy the other side unless a first strike could get through and destroy all of the retaliatory forces. That is an almost impossible scenario.

Secretary **Weinberger.** No, it is not impossible. That is one of the risks. That is why it is essential to modernize and strengthen in the way the President indicated last October. Soviet ability on a first strike is very great. It is one of the factors that goes into the President's assessment. What is essential is, while we have enormous strength, and no one should ever be misled about that, the important thing is that we have the kind of retaliatory capability which is the essence of deterrence. You deter by having a retaliatory capability that makes the other side realize that a first strike by them would bring about a degree of damage that they would find totally unacceptably high and unacceptable to them. That is the way you deter, and that is what is essential to maintain. It is not just counting up numbers of warheads on each side.

Senator PRESSLER. So in other words there is no way out of this in your view. We must tell our taxpayers that we are in not only for 23-percent increases, but more over the next few years.

Secretary WEINBERGER. I do not know what basis you are using for the 23 percent. What the President's program works out to be over the full 6-year period, with higher increases in the first year because of the necessity for starting as soon as we can is about 7-percent real growth over the full period of time of his program. Less than 15 percent of that goes into strategic programs; 51 percent of it goes into personnel costs. It is simply a very expensive process, particularly when you have neglected it as long as we have.

What is essential is, we embark on this kind of program so that we can secure from negotiations the kind of result we all want. You are never going to do that if you enter negotiations from a position of perceived weakness.

Senator PRESSLER. It is my observation that if this continues, and the size of our deficits continues to increase, some of these increases are going to become unacceptable to a lot of our taxpayers. Are there not ways that we can find to do it for less cost, or perhaps to get more help from our allies?

Secretary WEINBERGER. We are trying to do it both ways. We have before you what we believe is a second year increment of this program that is at substantially less cost than would otherwise have been the case without all of the management initiatives and the multiyear procurements that Congress authorized us to use last year, and other things that we have done. We are making major efforts to get additional sharing of the burden from our allies, but they are sharing a very substantial part of the burden now. We are not going to solve the problem by concluding that the protection of peace and freedom, which is nothing more nor less than what these expenditures go for, has a low priority.

Senator PRESSLER. This must be costing the Russians an awful lot. They must be giving up a great deal in consumer goods. How can they afford this with shortages in grain?

Secretary WEINBERGER. It is the simplest thing in the world, Senator. They do give up everything that you and I would consider to be useful, valuable, pleasant, and good about a civilian economy. They have done it year after year. They have done it regardless of whether there were SALT negotiations or détente or a good or a bad harvest. They have no constraints of any kind. General Ustinov does not come before any committee, and they do not have any polls that bother them or anything else. As a result, they present a very formidable threat to countries that worry about other values.

Senator **Pressler**. My time is up. I would conclude by saying that I have been amazed at the number of comments we have received from people in my area, whom I consider to be political conservatives, that we have to do something about the increases in both military spending and foreign aid and security assistance. The message is coming through. It is going to be a difficult one to resolve in view of what you have said.

Secretary **Weinberger**. Well, I consider myself to be a political conservative, and I certainly hope that the difficulty of the situation will not deter us from completing the job.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler.

Secretary Weinberger, I have just one question left, and I think General Jones can handle it. It is about the controversy of troop withdrawal from Europe. Why don't we excuse you? We thank you very much for your appearance today. We appreciate it very much.

General Jones, let me precede my question by saying that I spent years fighting the Mansfield amendment. I love Senator, now Ambassador, Mansfield, but I just felt that would be a disastrous course for us to take, just as I fought the withdrawal of any ground forces or all of the ground forces, as President Carter had pledged to do, from Korea.

A controversy has arisen now because there are Senators discussing resolutions on the floor that would cause us to withdraw some of our troops from Europe. I have notified every Senator that has such a resolution that I will fight their resolution just as hard as I did Senator Mansfield's, but there is a controversy of sort in the last few days over the number of troops that we have added to our European deployment in recent years as opposed to the number of troops our allies have kept in place.

The committee asked the Defense Department to provide this committee with statistics showing the trends since 1975. According to data that we have received just yesterday, deployed U.S. troop strength increased by 25,600 between 1975 and 1981, while European troop strength increased over the same period by 173,000. Is this information accurate?

General **Jones**. It is accurate, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to address the broader issue of the problem of troop withdrawal from Europe if I may.

The **Chairman**. I would appreciate your doing so. I just wanted to bring out this information, because we have been urging our allies to do their fair share. They have increased their fair share certainly by adding 173,000 troops. They have indicated their concern and their need to keep a strong defense in Europe. I would appreciate your comments on that issue.

General **Jones**. We understand the frustrations that many people have that our allies are not doing enough or that they are building a pipeline which is not in the best interests of the West. The proposals to pull out troops, I think, would be wrong on a number of counts. First, there is some sort of image that they are there to defend Europeans. They are there to defend the United States, and I would hope we have learned in two world wars that the best place for defense is not at our water's edge, but in preventing a war from breaking out in Europe.

If the proposals are a threat, I do not think they will work. We do not respond very well to threats from our allies. If we did make this threat, through resolutions and an indication of action, I think they would decide that they could not count on the United States and would likely try to accommodate with the East—which would not be in our best interests. If we actually pulled the troops out, it would reduce our conventional capability in Europe at the same time we want to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. It would increase the risks of escalation and be just totally counterproductive.

So, I would urge that we not react to this great emotional wave of rising nationalism and isolationism that we see around the world, even here in the United States, as manifested by the "let's bring our boys home," syndrome.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for those comments. I am going to read to you two sentences that I put into my introduction to what I consider to be an outstanding staff study by this committee on Europe and on our situation within the alliance. As a forward to that, I said this, and I want to know whether it checks out with the best of your thinking.

"In light of European burden sharing efforts, the continued Soviet buildup and current mutual strains within NATO, any significant withdrawal of U.S. forces in Europe would be seen in Europe as punitive. It would provoke an angry, confused, and divisive European reaction that would severely harm NATO cohesion," and I might add, United States security as well, because our security does depend upon the cohesion, unity, and strong support of our NATO allies, and nothing can be allowed to interrupt that or be divisive against it. Do you concur with that?

General JONES. I agree with that statement, and I commend the staff for an excellent study. It is a very useful document.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir, very much. This meeting is adjourned. Thank you very much, General Jones.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, April 30, 1982.]

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Mathias, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, and Glenn.

The Chairman. As I indicated yesterday at the opening of this series of hearings, we have assembled one of the most distinguished panels that I think any Foreign Relations Committee has ever put together for any set of hearings.

They are the most important hearings dealing with the single most important subject that we have had to deal with in, I think, the history of this committee: What is the nature of nuclear war? What is the best way to prevent it, and yet how do we protect ourselves in a very dangerous world? What do we do about 50,000 United States and Soviet nuclear warheads, including thousands of missiles that can travel at the rate of 10,000 miles an hour?

What do you do when, as I experienced one time at NORAD, a false alarm comes in? I was there with Tom Watson, head of IBM, at that time, and we watched the panic and chaos that went on when missiles apparently, according to all of our instrumentation, were coming toward us. And that has happened on at least three occasions now, and undoubtedly has happened with the Soviet Union's system as well.

So this is a complicated problem, one of the most complex problems that mankind has ever faced. How do we reason through this problem and how do we deal with it?

It is for that reason that we are having these series of hearings on nuclear arms reduction proposals. This morning we will focus on the current state of United States-Soviet nuclear balance and its implications for arms control and future weapons requirements.

We will hear later this morning from Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense and former president of the California Institute of Technology, who has a unique background. I do not think we have ever had a witness who has had a more unique background than our witnesses this morning.

Our good friend, Jim Schlesinger, who is an adviser and counselor to American business today but who has been in Government in many areas, the first Secretary of Energy, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Secretary of Defense.

So with that introduction and background, I turn to Senator Pell for any comments that he would like to make, or Senator Boschwitz, and then we would be happy to hear from former Secretary Schlesinger.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday we had Secretary Weinberger with us, who told us of what he termed "the decade or more of neglect of our Armed Forces." I am glad that we have with us today two distinguished citizens who presided over the Pentagon during much of that so-called decade or more of neglect, to help the committee put matters into perspective.

During this decade of so-called neglect, we rushed ahead and put multiple warheads in all our submarines and on more than half of our land-based missiles and made other major improvements on the three legs of our Triad. In the last administration, concrete steps were taken to insure steady strengthening of the NATO posture.

The present administration seems to believe that such extreme talk on their part can divert attention from its own sometimes unguided, erratic approach to defense. This administration does not seem to understand that buying every military item it can get its hands on is no substitute for a steady, coherent defense policy.

Certainly, as Santayana said, "If we forget the past, we are condemned to repeat it." And it will be very necessary for us to draw from the lessons that you gentlemen have to offer us.

If the administration is going to abrogate its responsibilities to chart a course to a rational and prudent approach to national security, the Congress has no choice but to seize the initiative. We must find a course that combines a strong defense with effective arms control. In fact, to put it simply, to start START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks].

Accordingly, I hope that the two distinguished former Secretaries of Defense will help our committee with their thoughtful counsel on how best we should proceed. We need to talk in practical terms about what to do with regard to SALT II, whether it might be a good idea to dust it off and move ahead as a first step down the road to starting START, how best to pave the way to and achieve real reductions and other valuable controls.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I have no comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Schlesinger, we are delighted to have you as a witness this morning, and we are pleased to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you very much for your generous remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell, Senator Boschwitz, I am honored by Chairman Percy's invitation to appear before this committee to examine the status of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear balance.

In a brief statement, it is impossible to touch upon the many facets and the many implications of so complex a subject. Therefore, I only have time to touch upon several of the highlights. At the outset I should like to provide a few cautionary notes bearing on the realities and the perceptions regarding strategic arms.

First, it is important for us not to indulge in false nostalgia for the strategic balance which existed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. While clearly there is great comfort for us and those whom we seek to protect in the United States possessing overwhelming strategic superiority, it was an inevitable that that superiority disappear. There is nothing that the United States could have done to prevent an erosion of the strategic nuclear edge that it once possessed, once the Soviet Union had the requisite technology and the resolve to build up her own strategic nuclear forces.

False nostalgia about this earlier era is in itself dangerous, in that it suggests that through direct measures we could once again attain the earlier degree of security; that would be pursuit of a will-o'-the-wisp. Only a major technological breakthrough offers even the prospect of such an alteration in the balance. Such a breakthrough is more than a decade away, at best. And in the interim, we shall have to get through a lengthy period without such miraculous relief.

Second, it is important at the outset to acknowledge the difficulties in comparing widely disparate, closely matched natitonal strategic capabilities or in projecting outcomes in hypothetical nuclear exchanges. The precision that one encounters in paper studies of nuclear exchanges reflects the precision of the assumptions rather than any experience based upon approximation to real-life test data. Specialists, in their enthusiasm, tend to forget how conjectural the entire process remains. To a greater or lesser degree, we are employing speculation regarding delivery system reliability and accuracy, reliability of the nuclear weapons and the impact of weapons effects, and, in addition, silo hardness and communications.

This introduces vastly greater than normal uncertainties into such paper analyses. We must be careful, therefore, not to ignore these dominating uncertainties and thereby to ascribe high probability to the outcomes projected in these paper studies. To do so would be to fall into the error that Alfred North Whitehead once described as the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness."

Happily, no one has ever fought a nuclear war. Not only have IBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] never been tested in flying operational trajectories against operational targets, they have not even been tested flying north. And this may or may not introduce certain errors of bias in the estimates of accuracy. Nuclear weapons have never flown 6,300 miles through space with the accompanying acceleration and deceleration, and therefore, we have no real test data regarding failure rates. Consequently, neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves have appropriate test data to buttress the estimates made about either nation's strategic forces. For leaders on either side that may be enticed into considering the utility of a major strike, I would hope that there would always be somebody there under such hypothetical circumstances to remind them of these realities.

Third, for these reasons, perhaps the dominant element in measuring nuclear forces against each other is the unknown and immeasurable element of the probability of major technical failure. It would tend to dominate any outcome. Given the rather spotty Soviet history in dealing with modern technologies, one would hypothesize that this must be a constant worry of the Soviet leaders regardless of what others abroad may say about the supposed superiority of their forces. We ourselves know a great deal more about helicopter operations and maintenance than we do about actual missile operations. Yet, if we recall the abortive rescue operation in Iran in 1980, even we, with a far more impressive history of technical success, should bear in mind this salient element.

I stress this matter because there has been some tendency of late to overdramatize speculations about hypothetical exchanges that serve to dramatize certain deficiencies in the U.S. strategic forces, which are real but which are also compensated for to some extent by certain deficiencies in the Soviet force posture.

Let me turn then to certain asymmetries in the posture of the United States and the Soviet Union. While the United States presently possesses an edge in the number of RV's [reentry vehicles] and bombs, it is probably advisable not to draw too much comfort from that simple comparison. First, that numerical edge is in the process of disappearing. Second, a far greater proportion of Soviet RVs are higher yield weapons of greater accuracy, deployed on Soviet IBM's.

More important, we must disregard a great deal of widespread, though superficial, commentary regarding overkill: That we and the Soviets have the capacity to kill each other 10 times over, et cetera, as if that were a meritorious military objective. Such commentary seems to imply that any weapon is reliably deliverable to target and ignores possible counterforce strikes, defense penetration, down time, and reliability. Moreover, in all such simple comparisons, it is sometimes overlooked that there are two categories of targets: Class A consists of all of the soft targets both military and civilian, including, notably, the urban industrial structure. Class B targets include those that have been hardened, most notably silos, storage sites, and command and control facilities.

The United States has and will continue to have, in my judgment, sufficient surviving and deliverable weapons to destroy the urban industrial base of the Soviet Union even after absorbing a Soviet strike. Since mutual destruction of the urban industrial bases of both societies is the top of the escalatory ladder, such a capability is frequently considered to be the ultimate deterrent. If the present discussions of superiority and inferiority are taken to suggest that the Soviet Union can deny the United States that capability, then the suggestion that the Soviet Union has superiority is invalid.

On the other hand, we must bear in mind the second class of targets, those that have been hardened. Until the Soviet Union constructed silos in large numbers, the United States possessed major counterforce capabilities. With the deployment started by the Soviets in the late 1960's, the American counterforce capability has steadily waned. Because of the disparity in throw-weight existing at the time of the SALT I agreement and the later marriage of that Soviet throw-weight advantage to newly acquired technologies with the MIRVing of their missile force, the Soviet Union has gradually acquired a hard-target-kill capability against American forces which now in all probability substantially exceeds that of the Americans. The Soviets continue to improve their accuracies, and the combination of yield and accuracy gives to their forces greater estimated lethality against hard targets than we possess—once again, gentlemen, putting aside my earlier cautionary note.

We must not ignore the reality, or exaggerate its importance, that in this one significant dimension of strategic forces the Soviet Union has acquired a distinct edge. Indeed, for certain technical reasons, this edge was an almost inevitable outcome of the massive disproportion in throw-weight existing at the time of the 1972 agreement, a disproportion that we have never corrected.

For almost 20 years I have argued that we should never allow the Soviets to attain a significant edge in terms of hard-target-kill capability. Yet Americans, in their complacency, have been slow to appreciate the cumulative effect and inevitable consequences of the steady Soviet investment in strategic forces. Thus, today we find ourselves in the position that was readily predictable—a clear force deficiency relative to the Soviets in hard-target-kill capability. That is the price of neglect.

While we should not overlook this deficiency, neither should we overstate its importance. It does not gainsay our possession of the ultimate deterrent. Moreover, it is offset by certain other aspects of our forces. While seaborne weapons possess relatively little hard-target-kill capability, we must recall that the majority of U.S. weapons are carried on submarines and therefore are essentially untargetable at the present time. Our submarine forces, moreover, are considerably superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the number of RVs carried in their submarines is small relative to their total forces and to our own seaborne forces.

We also possess continuing advantages in sensor technology, automatic data processing, and capacity to design and execute attacks. We possess a major edge in cruise missile technology. The point is not that we should disregard the Soviet advantages and hard-target-kill capability, but that, properly exploited, these other assets can to a considerable extent be utilized to right the balance.

Moreover, while I believe that we should not have allowed this strategic deficiency to develop, it strikes me as futile and inappropriate to wring our hands about it. We should also acknowledge that over the years immediately ahead, the Soviet advantage in hard-target-kill capability will almost certainly increase relative to our own. There is nothing in our defense program that is going to alter this fact over, say, the next half decade. In short, if the so-called window of vulnerability exists, it will open more during this next half decade. Sometimes the public rhetoric on this issue seems to suggest that strong feelings on our own part may provide an antidote for this Soviet edge. That, perhaps regrettably, is not the case. To offset what will be a continuing and growing Soviet advantage in hard-target-kill capability, we shall have to stress other compensatory advantages.

I believe that we should invest both imagination and effort in exploiting these compensatory advantages. We should not brood about or overstate the recognizable deficiency in hard-target-kill capacity. Above all, we should not suggest that the deficiency in this single dimension implies inferiority, because the word "inferiority" may suggest to others that our deterrent is indeed inadequate.

In light of the compensating advantages and the potential exploitation of those advantages, we may still have rough equivalence, even though, in my judgment, what we defined some years ago as essential equivalence has probably disappeared.

Let me conclude by making three observations:

First, for many years the United States maintained a high-confidence overall deterrent in which its substantial advantages in nuclear forces compensated for severe limitations in conventional forces. Indeed, we have been and remain overly dependent upon nuclear deterrence. The disappearance of the American edge in nuclear forces does not by itself suggest that our nuclear deterrent has become either inadquate or inferior to that of the Soviet Union. The problem that it creates is that no longer can a significant nuclear advantage compensate for deficiencies in conventional forces. We should recognize that, to the extent that confidence in overall deterrence has waned, it is not the inferiority of the strategic forces so much as the disappearance of their capacity to offset other force deficiencies.

If the alliance today suffers from overall military weakness in comparison to the Soviet Union, one should not assume that further investment in strategic nuclear forces will correct that deficiency. It is more important directly to address the true deficiency—notably, weaknesses in the general purpose forces around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Second, in the past 20 years the Soviets have been steadily serious about strategic forces, more so than we Americans. They have made substantial strides and will make additional strides. Nonetheless, we ought always take computer analyses of nuclear exchanges with a grain of salt. Even more, we should encourage the Soviets to do so. Even were we to continue to insist to the Soviets that their nuclear forces possess a high-confidence counterforce capability and are therefore superior overall, the Soviets would probably not believe it. In a society in which few things work particularly well and in which everything breaks down, the Soviet political leadership would quite rightly express skepticism were any of their senior officers to suggest that the Soviet Union now possesses a high-confidence, first-strike capability.

Finally, in recent years, there has been a tendency to blame deficiencies in our strategic posture or adverse trends in the balance on arms control negotiations, which reflect such weaknesses. Yet, even as we attempt to repair deficiencies in our own forces, we should recognize that arms control provides a modest yet reasonable hope for limiting the momentum behind the Soviet program and for improving arms stability. I believe that it is not only a moral but a political necessity that the United States, especially in the light of public opinion in the Western democracies, be seen as continuously ready to negotiate arms control agreements. In the circumstances of today, given the momentum of the Soviet program and the absence of near-term offsets for the United States, it is also strategically desirable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Schlesinger.

We have now enough of our colleagues here so that we will proceed with the 10-minute rule for questioning.

I would like to start by asking you about what you said about the size of the President's defense budget and the buildup. You have been both in the private sector and in the public sector, so you can look from both standpoints at the horrendous effects on the economy if we continue this tremendous-size deficit.

Everything has to be cut someplace, but the President has stood pretty firm on the defense budget. Do you feel, in the light of our overall effort to get down interest costs and stimulate business again that there are some cuts that can be made in defense now and that the buildup perhaps does not have to be as fast? Or do you feel that the President's level of buildup is essential, considering some of the things you have had to say this morning?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, of course, cuts can always be taken in any defense budget. Certain items can be postponed. Certain items are of lower marginal utility than are other items.

I have always been on the side of increasing defense expenditures in the circumstances that we have faced over the course of the last decade.

We must recognize that in terms of outlays, the defense budget, as a practical matter, will not be squeezed by more than $4 billion or $5 billion, and budget authority substantially more than that, even if you wanted to take out those items that are truly marginal. That would not carry you very far toward a balanced budget. We are looking at a budget imbalance in 1983 of approximately $180 billion.

On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, given the tax cuts of last summer, given the prospective deficits, I think it is inevitable that Congress will be forced to cut the defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of what you said in your third concluding point on arms control, would you be specific about START? I have been urging publicly, privately, and every way I can the administration to get this underway, to get started on START. Let us not have to call it "STOP." Commitments were made right here that we would start this spring. I had hoped late winter. Well, spring is now here and is going into summer, and we have not yet set a date for the beginning of the START.

I appreciate your knowledge of the Arms Control Agency as a continuing agency, a bureaucracy that should have been ready and preparing for any change in administrations. All of it is still there. It has been in being and steadily ongoing.

Should we, in your judgment, have gotten started with START talks, and considering the long negotiating process it is going to require, have we lost valuable time that we somehow have to try to make up?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. In my judgment, yes, Mr. Chairman, we have lost valuable time. And more important than the time that we shall have to make up, we have lost the political initiative. The reactions in Europe amongst our allies, the reactions as reflected in yesterday's poll in the Washington Post of our own public, suggests that we are losing the war with regard to putting forward the best that is in the American position, which should be a steady readiness to negotiate arms control agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see any practical reason that we cannot be ready technically to sit down and talk about a subject that has been—and should have been—on the front burner of every single administration since we created an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

Is there any technical basis for saying there is some linkage to Poland? Should something like this be linked to Poland? You have dealt with the Soviets for many years. Is it going to have any practical effect by holding START out as a reward for good behavior?

Should we be waiting until they perform in accordance with our standards all over the world? Or is this a subject that is so urgent and so important that we ought to press forward and see how far we can get with it?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It is not a reward, it seems to me, for good Soviet behavior, because it is in our interest to proceed. It is in our interest strategically and, for the reasons mentioned before, politically. Therefore, I would not link it to anything else.

You inquire, however, whether there is a technical reason for the delay. The administration has been ambivalent about this question from the first. Its initial position, as we will all recall, was that negotiations should not start until such time as we had begun to repair what had been perceived to be the deficiencies in our forces. That would presumably put more capital on the table for a prospective bargaining session.

There is some validity in that view, Mr. Chairman, but I think that time has overtaken us. Whether or not that view is correct with regard to the technical bargaining processes, we are losing more by failure to negotiate at this time than we would by going to the bargaining table with a weaker hand than the administration would prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. I have called for a summit meeting for a long time, and discussed it with Secretary Haig on occasion, feeling that when you have two people who have the power to push the nuclear buttons in Moscow and Washington, they ought to meet. We can put a high priority on meeting the Prime Minister of Jamaica as our first foreign guest and meeting with many others. But I reasoned that it is only rational that we sit down while Brezhnev is in full command and meet wth him.

The President now has said that he would like to meet with him in June. It is the Soviets who seem to be dragging their feet. Do you think it is a good idea to have a summit to just talk things out person to person when you have someone you can really deal with? And there was a clear question of supremacy there by Brezhnev, at least when I saw him, though he has been ill since, of course.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think a meeting between American and Soviet leaders is desirable. I should leave the timing of the meeting to the administration, however.

The administration came into office with the view that this nation and our allies were insufficiently aware of the Soviet menace. I believe we can only infer that as a consequence, there is a feeling in the administration that a palsy-walsy meeting at the summit would detract from their ability to mobilize the public. If one accepts that, one can understand the reasons for the delay.

But I reiterate that it is desirable, particularly for the reasons that you have mentioned, to have a meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. In the past, I had been rather shocked at my inability to get audiences that I address a great deal interested in the subject of arms control, nuclear war, and so forth when I served as the ranking member of this committee and its Subcommittee on Arms Control. But now suddenly, it is a subject that a lot of people are interested in.

How do you evaluate Ground Zero, the educational program to educate the American public about the nature of nuclear war?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that Ground Zero starts with a policy proclivity that I do not accept. When its principal publication states, "Nuclear war, what's in it for you," there is a hint that somebody or other may think that it is beneficial to have nuclear war. The purpose of maintaining our deterrent establishment is to prevent war and that, by and large, goes unstated.

I have no objection, Mr. Chairman, to providing much greater information to the American people about the effects of nuclear weapons. And in that regard, aside from the policy proclivity, Ground Zero is useful.

But it is replowing an area that has been plowed before, perhaps usefully. In the early 1950's, the Atomic Energy Commission published "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons." This tells you in very stark prose—stark prose dating from the 1950's, almost 30 years ago—what the effects of the weapons would be.

The Kennedy administration—and I took this pamphlet from my shelf [indicating]—describes the impact on towns of a 5-megaton blast. The purpose of that, of course, was to alert the public not only to weapons effects but to induce the public to accept civil defense at the time.

But to the extent that, in some of the discussions of the Ground Zero movement, there is an implication that somebody has been holding back this information from the American public, I think is misleading and therefore somewhat mischievous.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that my time is up. But my last question would probably require only a single-word answer. I put this question to General Jones yesterday.

The President has said that the Soviets in the nuclear field have a nuclear superiority, the implication being on overall balance. Would you prefer having at your command, if you had to engage in a nuclear war, the forces of the Soviet Union or the American forces, on balance?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, that is an easy question to answer with a one-word answer, but it is a very difficult question to answer accurately. We have significant advantages the Soviets may or may not have. I would prefer not to buy a pig in the poke. The Soviet forces seem to our intelligence analysts to have certain advantages, but we do not really know.

Their space program, Senator Glenn may recall, was once alleged to have very substantial advantages, and it turns out in that case to be, to a large extent, a fraud.

So I would prefer not to buy a pig in the poke. And I think that our task, Mr. Chairman, should be to repair the deficiencies in our own force structure, recognizing that there are certain aspects of the Soviet forces that are worrisome.

They have a very powerful, alert, accurate ICBM force, as best as we can see it. But by having most of their weapons in that ICBM force, they make themselves, in principle, vulnerable to a greater degree to potential American counterforces. And therefore, in the long term, that may be a disadvantage to them.

I think that I will prefer just to duck the question. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. You do so forthrightly. [Laughter.]

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if you would agree that the likelihood of nuclear war is greater now than it has been in the past and that the trend seems to be moving in this direction? And perhaps this accounts for, as you put it, the replowing of old ground. In essence, do you think we are on a collision course in the regard unless proper arms control measures are adopted?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator Pell, I have a very high confidence in the ultimate rationality and reasonability of senior political leaders. While one may hear very strong words from them on occasion, I believe that they will be very cautious in employing the first nuclear weapon as a practical matter. Therefore, I conclude that we are not on a collision course.

However, the earlier part of your question addressed the issue, of whether the probability of nuclear war has risen somewhat. I believe that it probably has. First because the decline in the Western deterrent may—"may," I emphasize that—induce the Soviets to run greater risks. Second, because the climate, the international climate, has deteriorated to some degree. I do not believe that a nuclear war will ever come between the United States and the Soviet Union save as a result of miscalculation. And therefore, avoiding war is, to some extent, dependent upon maintaining some minimal degree of trust.

It is for that reason that I answered the chairman's question that is it desirable to have the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union meet.

Senator PELL. As of now, we have very little in the way of fixed arrangements, such as treaties, with the Soviet Union. We are abiding by SALT II. We have the old ABM Treaty. But there is not much else in the works for the moment.

What is your own view with regard to arms control as a measure? Do you believe we should be moving faster and more vigorously down this road? And if so, which particular approaches? To be specific, what is your view of the ABM Treaty?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. May I defer that last part for a moment, Senator? I think that we ought to be moving more rapidly, and there are areas of common interests between ourselves and the Soviet Union. And most clearly, the greatest area of common interest, in which the interests coincide, is an avoidance of war through miscalculation.

It is for that reason that I have been quite sympathetic, irrespective of what we do on general limitations of strategic weapons, to proceed with the kinds of proposals recently made by Senator Jackson, Senator Nunn, and others in the Senate, to have a communications center that will provide in the event of ambiguous events an ability to sort them out before hotheadedness on either side should, through miscalculation, lead to war.

I believe that that is something that can proceed right now, and that no matter how hawkish one may be on either side, that there are great advantages.

With regard to the ABM Treaty, Senator, as you know, there have been, I think, advantages, clear advantages, in passing the treaty in 1972. There were strategic advantages at that time. And in addition, just maintaining the political momentum is advantageous.

The Department of Defense is at this moment reviewing the various ways that it may protect our ICBM's. And among the options is the possibility of using close-in ballistic missile defense.

I think that we should be very careful before we were to upset the existing treaty for that reason, partly for the political reasons that I have just mentioned, but equally as important, because we do not know exactly what the Soviet ABM potential is, what their breakout will be. I do not think, for political reasons, the Soviets would renounce the treaty. And in the pursuit of a limited objective for the United States, I think that we should be very careful about upsetting the existing arrangements. It may open us to greater risks than we are capable of dealing with in the short term.

Senator PELL. In other words, you are sold on the idea that we ought to keep the ABM Treaty in effect?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. My disposition is to do so; yes, sir.

Senator PELL. To do so.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator PELL. I remember the original argument for the ABM Treaty, that your predecessor, Secretary McNamara, advanced to us in this room was that it was as a protection against the Chinese threat.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. For the ABM system; yes, sir.

Senator PELL. That obviously has long since gone, or hopefully so.

Now, in connection with the proposed MX strategic missile system, what is your view as to its advisability and, if you think it is advisable, its method of deployment?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If I were a Member of the Congress, I would vote to authorize the MX, to proceed with the construction of the missile. The reason for that is the disproportion in hard-target-kill that I mentioned earlier.

Indeed, it was in the summer of 1973 that I authorized design work on this missile. And the reason for it, oddly enough, was to create an incentive for the Soviet Union as they moved away from their force structure, as they had in 1972, to draw down their throw-weight, and at the same time we would not go ahead with the MX missile.

That arrangement has been overtaken by time. We now have a serious disproportion in throw-weight, and I would go ahead with it.

The question of deployment is a difficult one. My own instinct would be to carefully scour the United States, to discover every bluff, every mountain that we could find that was southward-facing. This would shield us from all save an almost perpendicular reentry of Soviet RVs. And it would permit us to avoid the complexities of the previously prescribed MX deployment scheme and at the same time, I believe, have a much higher level of protection for the missiles than stuffing them into Minuteman silos.

But I think that we should move toward a mixed deployment scheme: On the south side of mountains, movable barges, possibly some of them in Minuteman holes. The natural desire of the Air Force for uniformity is something which, under the circumstances, might well be overridden.

Senator Pell. Thank you. That is a very ingenious thought about taking advantage of natural locations for the proposed MX.

Mr. Schlesinger. Senator Pell, may I add just one word. If one indeed has the south side of bluffs, that would mean that the Soviets would ultimately have to develop a maneuverable RV in order to attack the silo. I believe that the Soviets are probably a long time away from an accurate maneuverable RV.

Senator Pell. Or weapons with a long enough range that they might go the other way. But that is some time off.

Mr. Schlesinger. That creates even greater accuracy problems.

Senator Pell. What is your own view with regard to the advantages or disadvantages of abiding by SALT II? You would support the continued adherence by both nations to SALT II, would you not?

Mr. Schlesinger. Yes, sir. The protocol has now expired, or virtually expired. So I do not address myself to that. But the other elements are probably in the strategic interest of the United States at this time to abide by.

As I stressed in my statement, we sometimes blame arms control negotiations for deficiencies in our posture. This is true with regard to the so-called heavy missiles of the Soviet Union.

Senator Pell. I have one other question way off the subject. Would you support ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [TTB] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty [PNE]? In both cases, as you know, the administration has been delaying recommending that the Senate act on them.

Mr. Schlesinger. I have some technical problems with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Senator Pell, in view of the fact that, as both Secretary of Energy, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, I was responsible for weapons development and the shelf life of weapons. Nonetheless, I would override those technical problems and proceed, I believe, with the TTB.

I think that the achievement of political momentum may be worth whatever technical price is embodied in it. I should stress for a variety of reasons that American nuclear weapons are somewhat more delicate than the Soviet weapons, so far as we are able to tell through intelligence. But at that threshold we are still able to preserve the shelf life of our weapons.

Senator Pell. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Senator Mathias [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, I think we are all very indebted to you for a thoughtful and helpful statement. It has helped me to understand difficult questions better.

Mr. Schlesinger. Thank you.

Senator **Mathias**. I find myself in agreement with a great many of the things you say. I note that you made the comment that it is futile and inappropriate to wring our hands about the disparities that have developed, and I would certainly agree with that.

I would go one step further, too. I think it may be counterproductive, the tactic of wringing our hands may put into jeopardy our strategy of trying to come to the bargaining table in a strong and confident posture.

I found extremely interesting your comments on the reliability factors in whether or not you can deliver a lethal nuclear strike swiftly and as reliably as UPS. [General laughter.]

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Or the Postal Service. [General laughter.]

Senator **Mathias**. Now, I did not say the Postal Service. [General laughter.]

That would bring on such a flood of constituent mail that I would not dare. [General laughter.]

Although they are doing better, I think we should recognize.

But there is a presumption today that you could deliver a lethal blow with a great deal of accuracy. That seems to raise the question about high-value targets, whether they are hardened or otherwise, whether as part of our strategic concept we ought to put much reliance on forces of our own in which we concentrate enormous resources and therefore which begin to have very high values, or whether we ought to look for smaller, lower-value targets in which the factors of mobility and concealment can play a part.

Within the next week or two we are going to have to make some decisions along that line right here. The administration has called for a very ambitious naval program, for example, which is intended to give us a 600-ship fleet, and given the importance of trade, both exports and imports, to this country today, I am inclined to agree that some strengthening of our naval forces is appropriate. It also contemplates 15 carriers and 4 battleships.

I am wondering if the carriers and the battleships get into this category of high-value targets that we ought to be investing in, in very large amounts of money, given the strategic profile that seems to be developing.

Mr. **Schlesinger**. Senator Mathias, my own inclination has always been to build up the submarine force first. That would have my highest priority. It deals more with sea control, which I think we must maintain, than can be obtained for the equivalent dollars in capital ships. Therefore, from my perspective, if the Navy is going to be cut, those are probably more marginal items. The carriers provide us indeed with power projection, but they will not be capable, irrespective of any illusions of some in the Navy Department, of moving against the Kola Peninsula or moving against Vladivostok. We have a very substantial capability at the moment for power projection.

Senator **Mathias**. In other words, what you are saying is they are power projection before you have a declaration of war?

Mr. **Schlesinger**. They are power projection primarily in circumstances other than all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are indispensable in any hypothetical conflict in the Persian Gulf, for example, and one that is limited, even if the Soviets and ourselves are participants, to that region.

But that is different from general war with the Soviet Union. In such a war, if nuclear weapons are used in particular, those carriers would be immediately vulnerable.

Senator MATHIAS. I would agree with you that it is pretty hard to contemplate naval attacks on the Soviet land mass in the event of hostilities, God forbid.

You say you would put a greater reliance on developing submarine forces?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. That would be my priority, in the case that funds have to be squeezed. I think that we have advantages—this is one of those areas where we have a significant advantage—and to the direct subject of this meeting, advantages in submarines provide us with counterforce capabilities, counterforce capabilities not directed at ICBMs but at SLBMs and their carriers.

Senator MATHIAS. Should our emphasis in developing submarines be on strategic weapons, on another Trident or on several more Tridents? Or supposing we have to make choices, should we look at attack submarines?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. My reference was to attack submarines. They do, in my judgment, have a very high priority, higher than other priorities tend to be. In my judgment, I would proceed with the D5 missile, partly for the reasons that we mentioned earlier, that submarines remain essentially untargetable at this time, and ICBM's are targetable, at least reasonably targetable.

Senator MATHIAS. In your statement you mention the possibility of a breakthrough that might be a decade away.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I did not want to dismiss entirely the possibility of such a breakthrough. I should have said "a decade or more away." That is near-term. The reference here is to space platforms with lasers aboard and so on.

The point is that that is not going to deliver us from our problems in the next 10 or 15 years.

And there is no certainty that such a breakthrough could occur or that it would not be countered by the Soviet Union.

Senator MATHIAS. But clearly that is what all of us are thinking about and doing some work on.

You say it will not deliver us from our difficulties within the next 10 or 15 years, and I would agree with that.

I think a further question is, will it ever deliver us from our difficulties or will it, in fact, compound our difficulties if both the United States and the Soviet Union get substantial space capabilities for nuclear war.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It certainly will not permanently deliver us from our perplexities. It would not do so. It might buy us some time for some period. Ultimately, once again, even there the Soviet Union would catch up.

Our problem at base, Senator Mathias, is since World War II the United States has always counted on a technical edge to offset the gross numbers, particularly in the Soviet conventional forces. If we and our allies continue not to put together the conventional deterrent that would be appropriate, then we may be forced to turn to the technical breakout as a way of reestablishing high confidence in the deterrent.

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, that technical edge, experience has shown us, wears out pretty rapidly.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, indeed it does.

Senator MATHIAS. So one of the things we at least have to think about is whether or not some mutual restraint in moving to space war might not be appropriate before both sides invest too much of both money and resources and national prestige into systems that are designed for that purpose.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. That is a most necessary subject for investigation, Senator.

Senator MATHIAS. I see that my time is up, but if Senator Glenn will let me trespass for just one final question. In your intriguing suggestion about mounting or deploying the MX in the shadow of south-facing cliffs, would you contravene the SALT II restrictions on new launchers? Would you have a problem of any sort there?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. You catch me flat, Senator. I do not know the answer to that.

Senator MATHIAS. I do not either.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Senator Glenn.

And let me say we do have to stay very tightly on our time limitations because Secretary Brown has arrived and he has to leave at 12:15.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In talking about the nuclear balance today, I compliment you on your excellent statement. I disagreed rather strongly with the President's suggestion of an existing Soviet superiority to the extent that he apparently believes in. I think we maintain the advantages of a more balanced and less targetable force. We have greater accuracy, greater systems flexibility. We have some 30 percent more warheads that are more accurate, somewhere over 9,000, as compared to their 7,000.

I think the mix is a very important thing, and you have already talked a little about that today. Some 75 percent of the Soviet strategic force is big land-based missiles. We only have about 23 percent of our deliverable weapons that are land based and 52 percent are at sea in submarines. About 25 percent are on long-range bombers.

So I think the President has to make his judgment on a very narrow analysis of megatonnage and throw-weight. Important as those are, they are not to me the measure of our ability to conduct nuclear warfare, and perish the thought that we ever get to that point.

So I disagreed strongly with his view on that. I would be interested in pursuing a little your idea on the MX as to whether you feel that the current direction we are going with MX is the way to go, whether it is a south slope idea, which you mentioned this morning, or other means of protecting it, such as very deep holes and all the things that are being mentioned and studied now.

I have been an advocate for about the last 3 to 4 years, I guess, of a little different idea on this. I think we are trying to get away from the geographic point vulnerability that our ICBM's have. They are targetable. When we try to get away from that by building a big new booster and putting it in the same old holes or even digging new holes in a south slope, we still have a geographic point that can be aimed at.

I have felt, looking at our experience in analyzing foreign targets, that we have great problems with the SS-20. Why? Because it is mobile. They have great problems with Pershings going into Europe, and we asked the Europeans to accept those mobile missiles. We think this is fine so long as it is in Europe or in the Soviet Union because it gives great problems to the targeters, because once those missiles are out of their parks, going down the roads, or out on barges or in the airplanes or wherever, we have no way of targeting them.

I have been a great advocate of going to a much smaller missile, one perhaps a third the size of the MX but one that is truly mobile. I met with the Townes Committee for a couple of hours one day and talked to them as well as other Pentagon officials over the past 3 years, and no one has ever disputed that this would be a better deterrent and that it could be done at a cheaper price.

But there are two major factors, the main one being it is a better deterrent because the Soviets would be less inclined to think that they could hit our missiles. The only reason we have not gone to a mobile is what they call the social interface. Americans would never accept the idea that missiles should be anywhere but out west, out of sight and, hopefully, out of mind, even though it would give greater deterrence at a cheaper cost, which to me is the name of the game.

I know that you in your previous incarnation had as one of the responsibilities to start the MX concept. How do you view the mobile? I think the way this has developed, to take the big MX, the 200,000-pound missile and stuff it into an equally targetable Titan hole, which is what has always been the main problem of the ICBMs, just does not make sense to me at this point. I think things have changed since you initiated that study and I would ask for your views on this at the present time.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. You are quite right, Senator Glenn, that large numbers of small missiles, particularly if mobile, provide a better deterrent and less incentive, however weak that incentive is, for attack on the part of the other side. In the past I fought during our earlier discussions of SALT II to prevent giving away the American right to construct such a mobile missile; and if you will recall, I just mentioned the submersible barge concept in tandem with the south side of mountains in order to provide that kind of mobility.

The political factor, or the social interface, as you called it, is a very difficult one. As you will recall, the Eisenhower administration proposed that Minuteman be mounted on railroad cars. I believe that it is reported that when the Air Force presented a briefing on such a mobile system to Secretary Laird at the outset of his tenure, they made the mistake of having this model running through the city of Chicago. [General laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Well, it got their attention, anyway.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It may be even more disturbing to the chairman of this committee, but it also lies every close to the State of Wisconsin. At any rate, the story goes that Mr. Laird said: Enough of that particular proposal.

We have tried now for 25 years to mitigate the resistance in this area. I am prepared to endorse your proposal that we continue to try, but I think that we also ought to recognize that we may not be able to overcome that resistance.

Senator GLENN. With the social interface being what it is, it is a little inconsistent of us to ask the Europeans to accept exactly that system, a system that they already have there, and to take the new Pershings and put them in there, and in exactly that kind of mobile system. We ask them to accept that in an area much smaller than we have here.

West Germany, for instance, is about the same size as Oregon in in square miles. We also see the Soviets doing the same thing with the SS–20, a mobile, which gives us great pause. How we would ever counter that thing in a real war situation, I don't know. Where would you aim? We don't know where to aim because we don't know where it is going to be.

That would give the greatest deterrence on our side, and yet we are going into the other direction, back into geographically targetable spots that got us into the problem to begin with. So I have questioned whether it is good to go ahead with the MX and these basing systems they have talked about.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, it may not only be inconsistent, it may be blind folly on our part. If indeed we provide lucrative targets for the other side, that increases the risk of attack through vulnerability. In the case of the Germans we are helping mitigate vulnerability.

Senator GLENN. Exactly right. If you put yourself in the spot of Ivan, the targeter, sitting in the Kremlin someplace and he is trying to advise his bosses on whether to make the first attack, the first strike about which we are so concerned in this country, if he says, well, our latest information was from the satellite yesterday afternoon, that is not good enough if you have a mobile system because you don't know where they are this morning.

So it seems to me that it provides far greater deterrence than the way we are trending now with the MX, which is to concentrate it and make an even more attractive target because it is a bigger booster, it is more powerful and makes an even more attractive target. So I think that is going in the wrong direction.

Another factor, too, is the cost of building the booster itself. As I see some of the new basing systems that I have been briefed on and which they are considerating, the cost of the booster itself is going to be a fairly small part of the overall operation. It is going to make MPS and some of the rest of these possibly even pale by comparison so far as costs go.

So I think it is time to fall back and regroup, perhaps, on the MX, and perhaps push along a different line.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I am very sympathetic to the concept of mobiles, Senator. There is one additional cautionary note. When we started with the Minuteman system the notion was that we were going to have 10,000 or 20,000 Minutemen ready at our beck and call, springing, as we did in 1975. The costs of the Minuteman system at that time were staggeringly low in estimate compared to the ultimate costs.

I think we probably have cost estimates that may be based on optimism.

Senator GLENN. Do you think we should get SALT II out again?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I would hope that the Administration and the Congress would review that possibility now, particularly since the debate over the protocol issue has become irrelevant and worries about verifiability have at least diminished.

Senator GLENN. I wrote a letter to the chairman and other members of the committee, and he very kindly has agreed that when we bring up the various nuclear freeze proposals, that will also come out at the same time. I have felt that the nuclear freeze proposals call for a very fine end but none of them really provided the means for getting to that end.

Now that I feel we can verify, I think we are in much better shape for verification now than when I voted against that treaty from this same chair several years ago because of lack of verification capability. So I think we should go ahead. I think we have overcome that now and I think the first step can be to limit in place what we are both living with right now.

Then as a second step we can go to the reduction. Then while we are limiting and reducing, as a third step it seems to me we have to get the nuclear supplier nations to agree not to spread the reprocessing and enriching equipment around the world. In other words, we must prevent the spread to other nations. That is third.

Fourth, we must involve other weapons states as early as possible. The Soviets are never going to agree to bid reductions if the British and French are still free to build.

Fifth, I think that nuclear arms control proposals must not be taken in isolation. We must also move forward on conventional arms control issues such as MBFR and conventional arms transfers.

So that is the reason I thought it was important to get SALT II out as a start, to limit first, then start reduction talks at the same time we prevent the spread, No. 3, involve other weapons states and make it then part of overall arms control. Now, that is a doable 5-point program which I just suggest this morning.

I am glad to have your comments on SALT II because I think that is the first step in a doable thing. It is not just calling for pie-in-the-sky freezes with no method of getting there. But if we limit, reduce, prevent the spread. involve other nations, and make it all a part of arms control. I think that is a program we can move forward with.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

By the way, let me just ask you your reaction to the various freezes. Secretary Brown is inside on the telephone.

Senator MATHIAS. Would the chairman accept an amendment to that question

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MATHIAS. Appended to the various freezes there are various proposals pending which do not have anything to do with freezing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am limiting my question to the freezes because I think Secretary Brown will be in here in just a minute.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. The historic problems with the freeze have been that it limits our negotiating posture. I do not think that in this case that historic objection to a freeze is valid. In the first place, as I indicated in my statement, I believe that if both sides were to freeze in that area in which we were concerned, the Soviets would wind up with a lesser advantage if that freeze were applicable to Soviet forces.

The problem, of course, is negotiating. What does a freeze mean? Does it apply to R. & D.? Does it apply only to deployments? Does it apply to deployments or new decisions with regard to deployments or the continuation of existing deployments and the like?

In the circumstances at the present time, as I indicated, we must break out one way or another from a position in which we seem to be wholly negative on arms control. A freeze is worth considering, and as I indicated to Senator Glenn, I would hope that the Congress and the President would review the possibilities of the revival of SALT II.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We very much appreciate your appearance here today.

Mr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Pause.]

Senator Mathias [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you with us today.

Mr. Brown. It is good to be here, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias. Senator Percy is momentarily called to the phone, but he has asked me to ask you to begin your formal statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union and what I think United States policy should be in this regard. This is not a new subject by any means, for me or for any of you. None of the viewpoints that I would like to state is entirely new either. I hope to be brief so as to allow as much time as possible for discussion afterward. And to that end, I will not read my whole statement.

Senator Mathias. Without objection, your full statement will appear in the record.

Mr. Brown. Thank you.

The first and, in my view, most important point to make about strategic nuclear weapons is the extremely destructive nature of strategic war. This is particularly so when the targets are urban industrial ones, but it is also true for nuclear attacks against military forces of installation.

Given what nuclear bombs of kilotons, let alone megatons, can do to cities, people, and industrial productivity, United States and Soviet societies and European as well would be very unlikely to survive an all-out strategic war.

It seems to me impossible that any result of such an exchange could be described afterward as victory. What then is the purpose and function of strategic forces? The principal purpose is to deter a nuclear attack. A somewhat paradoxical but, I think, accurate way of putting this conclusion is that the main purpose of strategic forces is to make them unusable as a military or political instrument.

I believe, though, that this requires more than what is sometimes called a minimum assured destruction capability, an ability to destroy the cities and industry of the Soviet Union in a final act of revenge.

While the risks are very high that any United States-Soviet nuclear exchange would escalate out of control, I think it is important that the United States have forces with enough flexibility that other more limited responses to limited attacks, if they should come, are also possible.

Whatever our own estimates of the odds on uncontrolled escalation, we cannot afford to give the Soviet leaders any ground to believe that if a limited nuclear attack somehow failed to escalate to an all-out exchange, they could gain a military advantage from aggression. But we ourselves should be under no illusion that we can in any way plan on fighting and winning a nuclear war as a deliberate instrument of national policy.

Thus, in my view, deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, friends, and forces is the chief purpose of our nuclear forces. Some argue that we should, as a matter of national policy, declare that it is their only purpose or narrow it even further. I would not go that far.

With the advent of strategic parity, it has become all the more evident that we cannot expect strategic nuclear forces to make up for deficiencies in our conventional defenses. We with our allies do indeed need to strengthen our conventional defense so as to be able to present the Soviets a serious concern that they might not prevail at the conventional level. But until and unless we are able to do that, I believe there is no substitute for the policy of flexible response.

In sum, there remain some residual effect of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional attacks that risk leading to a nuclear war, though that deterrence is much weaker than the deterrence of a nuclear attack itself.

Deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons as a political instrument implies that we need not only to be able to deter a nuclear attack but also to prevent political intimidation by Soviet strategic forces. It is at this point that perceptions of the strategic balance enter, for perceptions affect the political will and morale of governments and publics.

Thus, it is important for informed individuals, particularly those with government responsibilities, to make every effort to express their judgments of that balance in terms that are accurate—neither alarmist nor complacent.

Alarmist judgments, however well motivated by concern about the need for reversal of adverse trends, will frighten our friends, dismay our own people, and embolden our adversaries.

Complacent evaluations will cause us not to do enough to maintain parity, thereby risking future perceived or actual imbalance to a point that will give the Soviets political leverage or even military advantage. An extreme disparity or perception of an extreme disparity could even tempt them to use their strategic forces in a crisis in a mistaken belief that the U.S.S.R. could survive.

Let me turn now to the state of the strategic balance. In the first place, because nuclear weapons are so catastrophically damaging, small differences matter little. The balance is not made precarious because the other side has advantages by some measures. The risk would be greater if such advantages created, or were distorted into, the perception of being ahead across the board. The risk would be severe if there arose any doubt in our own minds or in those of our friends about our ability or our will to retaliate under any and all circumstances.

The Soviets do not have, in my judgment, anything like strategic superiority in the sense of a militarily or politically usable advantage in strategic nuclear forces. They do have some advantages in the balance, but the United States also has some.

The Soviet Union has an advantage in prompt hard-target-kill capability; in other words, they can destroy, or shortly will be able to, the great bulk of our intercontinental ballistic missiles in their hardened silos with a relatively small portion of the Soviet ICBM force. The reverse is not the case. The Soviets also have more ICBMs and more ICBM payload. This particular set of advantages has become famous under the name of "window of vulnerability," which I am sure you have all heard.

Second, the Soviets have a more redundant and probably a more enduring command-control-communications capability, though there are formidable problems for either side in building a C^3—to use the abbreviation for that term—system capable of functioning adequately after a large-scale nuclear exchange.

Third, the Soviets have more ballistic missile submarines, but—and I think this is important—not as many Soviet as U.S. ballistic missile submarines or submarine-launched ballistic missiles are at sea under conditions of day-to-day readiness.

The United States, moreover, probably still has more submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM] payload and warheads. The United States has ballistic missile submarines that are more survivable and carry far more reentry vehicles, and the United States has a greater antisubmarine warfare capability.

At present, however, neither set of ballistic missile-launching submarines, either United States nor Soviet, is at substantial risk from the ASW capability of the other side.

The United States has more strategic nuclear warheads. The numerical size of this advantage depends, to some degree, on whether the comparison is made under conditions of day-to-day readiness or of heightened alert.

The United States has more intercontinental bombers and more bomber payload. On the other hand, the Soviets have considerably more air defense capability. In net, however, I believe the United States could deliver far more bomber payloads.

In sum, under practically any conceivable circumstances of initiation, a massive strategic nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would kill during the first half hour of that massive exchange over 100 million Americans and a comparable number of Soviet citizens, as well as an equal or greater number in Western and Eastern Europe if European targets are hit.

It is possible to imagine circumstances in which only a few nuclear weapons were used on each side to intimidate the other and to demonstrate determination. But given the certainty of confusion, the uncertainty of assessment, and the likelihood that hundreds of thousands or even millions of casualties would occur on both sides even in such a case, it is very unlikely that any nuclear exchange could be limited in that way.

Thus, the fundamental question is how to reduce—or even avoid increasing—the chance of such a strategic nuclear war. How is this to be done? In my judgment, the keys are: stability and parity. The purpose of parity is to avoid political intimidation, and the strategic losses and increased chance of war that would result. Stability, in differing senses, is important both in a crisis situation and in reducing the motivation for continued or increased competition in strategic weapons.

A more serious problem would arise if the ability of U.S. forces, strategic forces, to survive and penetrate to their targets came into question. For that reason, I favor a modernization of land-based ICBMs to increase their survivability so that it would take a much greater fraction of the total Soviet force to threaten the U.S. land-based ICBMs than is now the case.

A similar result might conceivably be arranged through an agreed rollback of present strategic forces. ICBM forces have some particular features of value in deterrence and in retaliation that are worth preserving.

I also favor action to assure that our air-breathing systems—bombers and cruise missiles—will be able to continue to penetrate Soviet defenses through the rest of this century, even though the Soviets continue to modernize and improve their air defense systems.

And finally, I believe that U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile force should be improved, with better command-control-communications, and higher accuracy. Fundamentally, the most important thing with respect to our SLBM force is to prevent it from becoming vulnerable to Soviet antisubmarine detection and destruction capabilities.

I said earlier that improvement in U.S. strategic forces is only one of the ways in which to strengthen deterrence and to improve the strategic balance. Limiting threats to our strategic forces and improving stability by strategic arms limitation and reduction is another—a major component of any national security program, along with strategic arms modernization.

It will, of course, always be possible for the arms planners on each side to find areas in which improvements in a relative situation can be made by expansion of one's own strategic arms programs, at least in the short run. In the longer run, arms programs undertaken by the other side, either in response or unilaterally, will surely tend to erode any such improvements.

It is in this context, and fully cognizant of the various proposals that have been made for nuclear freezes and deep reductions, that I would strongly urge that this committee consider again the virtues—I know you are aware of its flaws—of the SALT II Treaty, signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union but not yet approved by the U.S. Senate.

Both sides have tacitly observed the treaty, which more than suggests that each side considers the observance of that treaty to be in its own interest. But we cannot count on that tacit observance forever. A clear endorsement of the SALT II Treaty provisions, including the interpretations and reservations already set forth by the Foreign

Relations Committee's favorable action in 1979, would provide a starting point for further negotiations as well as locking in what had already been achieved.

From that starting point, further limitations and deeper reductions should be sought. The United States should move quickly, and in this context, to resume strategic arms negotiations. As we have all seen, Soviet actions which emphasize the fact of its adversarial relation with the United States, as in Afghanistan or in Poland, poison the political atmosphere and inevitably make all dealings more difficult and make approval of arms control agreements more difficult.

But the U.S. reactions to such Soviet moves should be in areas other than strategic arms limitation. Trade embargoes are appropriate responses. SALT embargoes are not.

Making Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the end of martial law in Poland, or an easing of Soviet and Cuban subversion in Central America a precondition for SALT ratification or renewal of strategic arms negotiations would be a bad mistake. It would widen our difficulties with our allies. It would help the Soviet international position. And it would strengthen the support for unilateral disarmament in the West.

Worst of all, it would delay or even abort progress related to one, perhaps the one area, in which the United States and the Soviet Union have a clear common interest: avoiding a thermonuclear war.

Mr. Chairman, strategic arms negotiations should be resumed promptly. It is late, but it not too late. Thank you very much.

[Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss today the balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, and what I think U.S. policy should be in this regard. This is not a new subject by any means, for me or for any of you. None of the few points I would like to make is entirely new either. I hope to be brief so as to allow as much time possible for discussion afterwards.

1. The first, and in my view most important, point to make about strategic nuclear weapons is the extremely destructive nature of strategic war. This is particularly so when the targets are urban industrial ones, but it is also true for nuclear attacks against military forces or installations. Given what nuclear bombs of kilotons, let alone megatons, can do to cities, people, and industrial productivity, United States and Soviet societies (and European as well) would be very unlikely to survive an all-out strategic war. It seems to me impossible that any result of such an exchange could be described afterwards as victory.

2. What then, is the purpose and function of strategic forces? The principal purpose of strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack. A somewhat paradoxical, but I think accurate, way of putting this conclusion is that the main purpose of strategic forces is to make them unusable as a military or political instrument. I believe that this requires more than what is sometimes called a minimum assured destruction capability—an ability to destroy the cities and industry of the U.S.S.R. in a final act of revenge. While I think the risks are very high that any United States-Soviet nuclear exchange would escalate out of control, I believe it is important that the United States have forces with sufficient flexibility that other, more limited responses to limited attacks are also possible. Whatever our own estimates of the odds on uncontrolled escalation, we cannot afford to give the Soviet leadership any ground to believe that if a limited nuclear attack somehow failed to escalate to an all-out exchange, they could gain a military advantage from aggression. But we ourselves should be under no illusion that we can in any way plan on fighting and winning a nuclear war as a deliberate instrument of national policy.

Thus, in my view, deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, friends, and forces is the chief purpose of our nuclear forces. Some argue that we should, as a matter of national policy, declare that it is their only purpose (or narrow it even further). I would not go so far. Extended deterrence—the capability to deter not only nuclear, but also conventional attacks, by the threat of nuclear retaliation, including if need be, retaliation by our central strategic forces—always had problems of credibility: the costs to us as well as to the Soviets of making good on that threat were so great as to create—at the very least—doubts about the absolute certainty of our being willing to incur those costs. With the advent of strategic parity, it has become all the more evident that we cannot expect strategic nuclear forces to make up for deficiencies in our conventional defenses. We, with our allies, do indeed need to strengthen our conventional defense so as to be able to present the Soviets a serious concern that they might not prevail at the conventional level. But no one should underestimate the costs, both economic and political, of creating a conventional deterrence/defense force sufficient to offer a high confidence of success against a Soviet attack possessing the advantages of surprise, concentration and initiative. Until then I believe there is no substitute for the policy of flexible response.

In sum, there remains some residual effect of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional attacks that risk leading to a nuclear war, though that deterrence is much weaker than the deterrence of a nuclear attack itself.

Deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons as a political instrument implies that we need not only be able to deter a nuclear attack but also to prevent political intimidation by Soviet strategic forces. It is at this point that perceptions of the strategic balance enter, for perceptions affect the political will and morale of governments and publics.

Thus it is important for informed individuals, particularly those with government responsibility, to make every effort to express their judgments of that balance in terms that are accurate—neither alarmist nor complacent. Alarmist judgments, however well motivated by concern about the need for reversal of adverse trends, will frighten our friends, dismay our own people, and embolden our adversaries. Complacent evaluations will cause us not to do enough to maintain parity, thereby risking future perceived or actual imbalance to a point that will give the Soviets political leverage or even military advantage. An extreme disparity could even tempt them to use their strategic forces in a crisis, in a mistaken belief that the U.S.S.R. could survive.

3. What is the state of the strategic balance? In the first place, because nuclear weapons are so catastrophically damaging, small differences matter little. The balance is not made precarious because the other side has advantages by some measures. The risk would be greater if such advantages created (or were distorted into) the perception of being ahead across the board, and would be severe if there arose any doubt in our own minds or in those of our friends about our ability (or will) to retaliate under any and all circumstances.

The Soviets do not have, in my judgment, anything like strategic superiority in the sense of a militarily or politically usable advantage in strategic nuclear forces. They do have some advantages in the balance. But the United States also has some.

(i) The Soviet Union has an advantage in prompt hard target kill capacity. In other words, they can destroy, or shortly will be able to, the great bulk of our intercontinental ballistic missiles in their hardened silos with a relatively small portion of their ICBM force. The reverse is not the case. The Soviets also have more ICBM's, and more ICBM payload.

(ii) The Soviets have a more redundant, and probably a more enduring, command, control, and communications capability, though there are formidable problems for either side in building a C^3 system capable of functioning adequately after a large-scale nuclear exchange.

(iii) The Soviets have more ballistic missile submarines, but not as many Soviet as U.S. ballistic missile submarines or submarine launch ballistic missiles are at sea under conditions of day-to-day readiness. The United States probably still has more SLBM payload. Moreover, the United States has ballistic missile submarines that are more survivable, and carry far more RVs and has a greater anti-submarine warfare capability. At present, however, neither set of ballistic missile launching submarines is at substantial risk from the anti-submarine warfare capability of the other side.

(iv) The United States has more strategic nuclear warheads. The size of this advantage depends to some degree on whether the comparison is made under conditions of day-to-day readiness or of heightened alert.

(v) The United States has more intercontinental bombers and more bomber payload. On the other hand, the Soviets have considerably more air defense capability. In net, however, I believe the United States could deliver far more bomber payload.

4. In sum, under practically any conceivable circumstances of initiation, a massive strategic nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would kill during the first half hour of that massive exchange more than a hundred million Americans and a similar number of Soviet citizens, as well as an equal or greater number in Western and Eastern Europe (if European targets are hit). It is possible to imagine circumstances in which only a few nuclear weapons were used on each side to intimidate the other and to demonstrate determination. But given the certainty of confusion, the uncertainty of assessment, and the likelihood that hundreds of thousands or even millions of casualties would occur on both sides even in such a case, it is very unlikely that any nuclear exchange could be limited in that way.

Thus, the fundamental question is how to reduce or at least avoid increasing the chance of such a strategic nuclear war. How is this to be done?

In my judgment the keys are stability and parity. The purpose of parity is to avoid political intimidation and the losses, and increased chance of war, that would result. Stability, in differing senses, is important both in a crisis situation and in reducing the motivation for continued or increased competition in strategic weapons. Stability in crisis would certainly be helped by a situation in which whoever struck first would actually lose relatively in net military balance. At present, this is not the situation, though whoever goes first will lose along with the other side.

A more serious problem would arise if the ability of U.S. strategic forces to survive and to penetrate came into question. For that reason I favor a modernization of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles to increase their survivability, so that it would take a much greater fraction of the total Soviet force to threaten the U.S. land-based ICBMs than is now the case. A similar result might conceivably, though this is not at all likely, be arranged through an agreed rollback of present strategic forces. One reason for wanting to preserve the survivability of the ICBM force is that it has some particular features of value in deterrence and in retaliation: greater assurance of survivable C^3 (command, control, and communications); prompt arrival at its targets. I also favor action to assure that our air breathing systems (bombers and cruise missiles) will be able to continue to penetrate Soviet defenses through the rest of this century even though the Soviets continue to modernize and improve that air defense system. Finally, I believe that the U.S. submarine launched ballistic missile force should be improved with better C^3 and higher accuracy. Longer range and larger payload can come later. Fundamentally, the most important thing with respect to our SLBM force is to prevent it from becoming vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine detection and destruction capabilities.

5. I said earlier that improvement in U.S. strategic forces is only one of the ways in which to strengthen deterrence and to improve the strategic balance. Limiting threats to our strategic forces and improving stability by strategic arms limitation and reduction is a major component of any national security program, along with strategic arms modernization. In the absence of successful strategic arms negotiations, no natural limits to the competition are likely to be found except for funding availability. In an all-out nuclear arms competition there is no reason to believe the Soviets would fail to find the funds necessary to stay in the race—and we certainly could not afford to let economic considerations, however real, force us into inferiority. It will always be possible for the arms planners on each side to find areas in which improvements in a relative situation can be made by expansion of one's own strategic arms programs, at least in the short run. In the longer run, arms programs undertaken by the other side either in response or unilaterally will surely tend to erode any such improvements.

It is in this context, and fully cognizant of the various proposals that have been made for nuclear freezes and deep reductions, that I would strongly urge that this Committee consider again the virtues of the SALT II Treaty, signed by both the United States and the U.S.S.R., but not yet approved by the U.S.

Senate. Both sides have tacitly observed the Treaty, which more than suggests that each side considers the observance of that Treaty to be in its own interest. But we cannot count on that tacit observance forever. A clear endorsement of the SALT II Treaty provisions, including the interpretations and reservations already set forth by the Foreign Relations Committee's favorable action in 1979, would provide a starting point for further negotiations as well as locking in what had already been achieved. From that starting point further limitations, and deeper reductions, should be sought.

The United States should move quickly, and in this context, to resume strategic arms negotiations. As we have seen, Soviet actions which emphasize the fact of its adversary relationship with the United States—as in Afghanistan and Poland—poison the political atmosphere and inevitably make all dealings more difficult. But the U.S. reactions to such Soviet moves should be in areas other than strategic arms limitation. Trade embargoes are appropriate; SALT embargoes are not. Making Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan or an end of martial law in Poland or an easing of Soviet and Cuban subversion in Central America a precondition for SALT ratification or renewal of strategic arms negotiations would be a bad mistake. It would widen our difficulties with our allies, help the Soviet international position, and strengthen the support for unilateral disarmament in the West. Worst of all, it would delay or even abort progress related to one (perhaps *the* one) area where the United States and the U.S.S.R. have a clear common interest—avoiding a thermonuclear war.

Strategic arms negotiations should be resumed promptly. It is late, but it is not too late.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Secretary Brown. Again, we warmly welcome you back to this committee. We miss your counsel and advice on many issues. And this one you certainly help put into perspective.

I would like to go to the original questions that I put to the Defense Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff yesterday. It concerns the question President Reagan raised when he said that the Soviet Union had achieved a definite margin of superiority in strategic capability over the United States. Secretary Weinberger declared that the President was totally correct in his assessment.

Do you concur that the Soviets now have a definite margin of strategic superiority over the United States?

Mr. BROWN. I would have to respectfully disagree with that assessment, Mr. Chairman. One can point to several areas in which indeed the Soviets are ahead. They do have more payload. They do have more megatonnage, which is another way of saying the same thing. They have more launchers. They clearly are ahead in intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.

On the other hand, we are, in my judgment, just as clearly ahead in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and also in bomber delivery capability.

I would define strategic superiority as the ability to use strategic nuclear weapons or their potential for military or political advantage. I do not think either side now has it. I am disturbed by some of the trends. I think we have to follow, as I said, both arms modernization and arms limitation and reduction approaches.

But I do not believe we are in a strategically inferior position at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that the United States today has a credible deterrent to nuclear attack?

Mr. BROWN. I have no doubt of that today.

The CHAIRMAN. You have mentioned some of the specific areas where they have superiority. Could you expand a little on where we have superiority?

Mr. **Brown**. Our ballistic missile submarines are less vulnerable than the Soviets'. But neither set is vulnerable now. We have, I would judge, substantially better antisubmarine warfare capability. Although our bomber force is old, it is on alert, and it is at this time still able to penetrate, to survive and to penetrate, successfully. It needs modernization.

So actually, if you look at it from the point of view of the three legs of the Triad, the Soviets are ahead in one—that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles. We are ahead in bombers and in submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Soviets, I think, have some advantages in redundancy of their command-control-communications system, and I think in many ways that is as important as their ICBM advantage.

But when I add all these up, I find it hard to see anything but parity, which is not a point but a rather broad band.

The **Chairman**. We discussed SALT II somewhat with Secretary Schlesinger. The de facto SALT restraint policy has been left deliberately vague as to what specific provisions are being complied with in SALT II now. Basically, both sides have avoided irreversible steps that would make subsequent ratification of the treaty impossible. For example, they have not increased the number of warheads on their missiles beyond the SALT II limits.

At the same time, though, neither side has taken certain positive actions, such as dismantling systems to meet the 2,250 aggregate limits.

Do you believe it is possible to bring any of the SALT II ceilings into force, short of formal ratification?

Mr. **Brown**. That is a difficult political judgment. I believe it very unlikely that you could get the Soviets to dismantle 250 launchers, especially since the treaty does not provide for us to dismantle any, without a formal ratification. That is one of the limitations of the present tacit arrangement.

And on the U.S. side, it is perhaps worse than tacit agreement, because periodically statements are made that the agreement was no good and fatally flawed, which at the very least tends to throw cold water on it.

The reductions by the U.S.S.R. are one of the things that tacit understanding—not to undercut the treaty—does not implement. I am equally concerned that the improved verification provisions contained in the SALT II Treaty, not to deliberately evade or conceal, may be eroded without a formal ratification.

These provisions are not perfect, but they are far better than nothing. Yet it is hard, in the nuance and legalistic situation that you are in when you deal with verification questions and even with compliance questions, to use the provisions of a treaty that has not been formally ratified or approved.

It might be that we could get by with something less than ratification. Nothing else would be as good. It might be—and this is something on which you gentlemen obviously are enormously more competent than I—that a formal Senate expression of approval of the provisions of SALT II and a statement urging the administration to begin arms control negotiations from SALT II as a starting point might be enough.

The Chairman. You know as well as anyone why the Senate could not take up SALT II at the time that it was scheduled. We had set aside 2 or 3 months to do it, then Afghanistan intervened and made the climate just totally impossible for ratification.

I certainly tried to make that point 1½ years ago in the Kremlin. And they pointed out we have had three treaties now that have never been ratified. They asked: What is the use in negotiating all these things and having them signed by our chiefs of state and yours and then never having them ratified? But I said it was their intervention that was the problem.

If Afghanistan had not occurred, we could have gone ahead and ratified SALT II. I am not sure we could have, even without Afghanistan, but there was certainly a good chance. We had the administration with it and Senator Byrd, as majority leader, was going to put a lot of push behind it, and some of us would have voted for it.

Do you think we would have been ahead? Because here we are observing the limits, and yet by December 31, 1981, last year, they would have had to destroy 250 launchers, as you point out. They would have had that much less in their inventory than they have now.

Mr. Brown. Clearly, we would have been better off, and the strategic situation would have been better from our point of view. I think it would have been better from the Soviet point of view, too, in terms of the values of a strategic arms agreement being actually observed.

I think it also would have been easier for the new administration to have begun new arms control negotiations aimed at reduction if we actually had had SALT II ratified. But that is water over the dam.

The Chairman. Yes. This committee still has SALT II before it. Some Senators have suggested that we take it up for formal ratification. My own political judgment is that without the administration's support, it would be a practical impossibility to get it ratified.

Do you believe that the Senate should now consent to ratification of the SALT II Treaty?

Mr. Brown. Yes; I do. I may be dismissing too easily the political problem. But I believe that for the good of the United States, SALT II should be ratified.

The Chairman. How do you feel about the urgency of getting START underway? I have been urging for a long time that we do that, that we cannot afford to wait. But could you give us your feeling of the sense of urgency of getting those talks underway to see where we stand? Is there any technical reason that you can see that we should not have been ready months ago to have done this?

Mr. Brown. Having been involved in interagency negotiations within the Government to reach a U.S. position, I am aware that it takes time. On the other hand, 15 months have now passed, and I think if one goes back and looks at what previous administrations did, 15 months should have been sufficient.

I would say there are two very strong reasons for going ahead—soon. First of all, we need, from the point of view of strategic stability and strategic balance, to move ahead on this matter. I do not think that the arms race is escalating out of control. But it is not a very pleasant path to be on, and we need to balance it with arms reduction.

Second, if we do not move forward, I think that we and our allies are going to have grave political differences. I think the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations can go only so far in the absence of a strategic arms negotiation.

I believe that the phenomena that we have seen of European disenchantment, pacifism, unilateralism, unilateral disarmament, would then all be aggravated and would increase. And I think some of that is happening and would happen further in this country.

Finally, I would like to note as one gets near the end of a 4-year Presidential term, things get more difficult. Political pressures get greater. Political pressures for unwise compromises get greater. Political pressures for hanging tough also get more difficult.

About a third of that 4 years is now gone. And actually, when you think about it, it is more like 3 years because the last year is pretty well occupied with election activities. Looked at in that way, the 3 years is half gone, and we ought to get on with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I will divide up the rest of the time that you have among the balance of the Senators. There are only two here, so I think there is enough time.

I think you will all be interested in the announcement that Secretary Haig made 10 minutes ago that I was called out for. Walter Stoessel wanted to tell me about it. Secretary Haig has said that the Argentine leaders are unyielding in their position and he is ending his diplomatic mission. that large-scale military action is likely; third, that Argentina believes it must receive assurances now of its immediate overeignty over the Falklands.

For its part, Britain believes that the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands must be respected. Fourth, certain action has been taken today by us. The President has ordered the suspension of all military exports to Argentina, the withholding of certifying of Argentina, the suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees, the suspension of CCC guarantees.

The President has also directed that the United States will respond positively to British requests for military support. There will, of course, be no direct U.S. military involvement. The United States remains ready to assist the parties to find a settlement.

If you would care to comment on that, I think we would all be interested in what you have to say.

Senator PELL. If the chairman would yield for a moment. Mr. Stoessel just made to me a statement to the same effect. And I indicated that I would be strongly supportive of his action and approve of them. I wanted him to know so. And I think that reflects the view of most of my colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, in effect, it reflects the sentiment of the resolution that was adopted by the Senate last night by a vote of 79 to 1. which certainly indicated very clearly how we felt.

And Senator Pressler, who was one of the first voices of the Senate to speak out on this issue, may want to comment.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad our Government is doing what it is doing. I think we should declare unequivocally for

Great Britain. The force that was used by Argentina in the Falklands was very improper. I think we should forcefully and unequivocally declare for Great Britain, as apparently the administration is doing, according to your report. I want to commend the administration for this step.

Also, I want to thank the chairman for negotiating that agreement last night to get the Falklands resolution passed in the Senate. It was very timely. It was hard to get all the parties together. But I think it indicates the support for Great Britain that exists here in the Senate. We should be unequivocal in our support of Britain, and that would help bring this crisis to an end very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to comment, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BROWN. Since I no longer have responsibilities in these matters, I think people may not be too interested, so I will not say very much. But I think these are correct decisions, and I think this is a case in which the President indeed can be said to have gone more than halfway.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I had the chance to read your statement and was particularly impressed with your view that there should not be any linkage, that we should move ahead with arms control talks with either START or SALT.

I was wondering if you could elaborate a little on your views in this regard.

Mr. BROWN. I should begin, Senator Pell, by saying that I am realistic enough to know that a degree of political linkage in practical terms is a fact of life. It is a fact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prevented Senate approval of the SALT II Treaty. I agree with Senator Percy that ratification otherwise would probably have taken place. To that extent, one cannot ignore that some linkage exists.

My view is, though, that we should try to keep that connection as limited as possible. At least we should try in the case of strategic arms limitations, which are, in my judgment, the one interest that the United States and the Soviet Union most have in common in a sea of adversary relationships. Those relationships are genuinely adversary. I do not think they are made up by cold warriors. I think they exist. But strategic arms control is and should be an exception.

Therefore, it is a mistake for an administration or a Congress to set specific political conditions, preconditions, in the way of Soviet behavior in other areas before negotiating strategic arms limitations and reductions or, in the case of the Senate, before approving them.

Senator PELL. Thank you. Moving on to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union and we will conduct a review of that later on this year. I was wondering what your views were. Do you believe that the ABM Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States?

Mr. BROWN. In my judgment, Senator Pell, the ABM Treaty is the single most important achievement of the arms control process over the past 25 or 30 years that that process has been going on. As long as the ABM Treaty is in place and is observed, it would be very hard for anyone, any political leader on either side, to fool himself into thinking that his country could survive a thermonuclear war. Therefore, the ABM Treaty, in my judgment, serves a very useful purpose.

The treaty is without time limitation. It runs indefinitely. There are reviews every 5 years. And I think it is appropriate to have reviews. But I think it would be a great tragedy if, for some reason, either side chose to denounce the treaty, abrogate the treaty or, in the absence of a complete eruption of offensive strategic arms increases, if either side attempted to change it in a very substantial way so as to make a nationwide antiballistic missile capability possible under the treaty.

Senator PELL. How would the French and the British react? Would not any relaxation of the ABM Treaty undermine their individual deterrent capacity, the so-called force de frappe?

Mr. BROWN. Indeed, it would. I think that both the French and the British deterrents are substantial in their effect, in their political effect, although by no means comparable with those of the United States and the Soviet Union. As you say, a major Soviet ABM capability would call them into considerably greater question.

Senator PELL. Thank you. On another subject, what would be your view on the TTB [Threshold Test Ban] Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [PNE] Treaty? Do you think we should go ahead with our ratification or continue to hold that up?

Mr. BROWN. Well, from where we are now, what I would like to see is a substantial reduction of that threshold. Given the political realities, I am afraid that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not going to come soon. But I think that ratifying a Threshold Test Ban Treaty would be perhaps a sensible step, a beginning to then reducing that threshold.

Senator PELL. Now I would like to ask you a more general question. I will speak to you in your role of former Secretary of Defense. Do you think that a nuclear war would leave us—or to put it another way—is a nuclear war survivable? Will we continue to exist as an entity after one? Does it make any sense to move into civil defense spending? Will that really have any impact one way or the other?

In this regard, as you know, the administration has requested a doubling of civil defense spending.

Mr. BROWN. As my statement makes clear, Senator Pell, I do not believe that an all-out nuclear war would leave the United States or Soviet society in a recognizable form. Neither society could survive.

With respect to the question of civil defense, I would agree that if you take certain civil defense actions, then you might have some tens of millions more survivors after such a war, however miserable their subsequent existence might be.

For that reason, I would find it hard to say, no, you should not do anything to save those people. However, you have to weigh against that the risks that come from a massive civil defense program, the risks of fooling yourself into thinking that a nuclear war is survivable. I do not think the risk of thinking that is a very big risk, at least not in my case.

Even with a massive civil defense program, I would not believe that a nuclear war is survivable. There is also the matter of the internal disruption and the changes in society that you may produce if you actually succeed in a major civil defense program. It becomes really quite a different way of life.

The Soviets, I believe, spend much more than we do, perhaps $1 billion or $2 billion a year, as compared to $100 million. That may be because their society is already more regimented so that civil defense is less of a change in their society.

I do not think that a couple-of-billion-dollars-a-year civil defense program in the United States would take. It was tried in the 1960's, and it did not get anywhere. I do not think it would get anywhere this time. And I think it would be counterproductive.

Weighing these various factors, I would come down saying $100 million or $200 million on civil defense is probably all right, even though it may not be very effective. If it went above that, I think it would probably have more bad than good effects.

Senator PELL. I guess the Swiss are the ones who have the most advanced civil defense of any nation in the world.

Mr. BROWN. They have a very elaborate one. But if the war involves lots of nuclear weapons on Switzerland, they would not survive either.

Senator PELL. In connection with your sentence, "We should be under no illusion that we could in any way plan on fighting and winning a nuclear war as a deliberate instrument of national policy," I am wondering what your views are with regard to possibility of a limited nuclear war, which is often discussed, going after purely military targets, or even your reaction to Secretary Haig's thought of a "shot across the bow," that type of exploding of a weapon.

Mr. BROWN. Those are not new ideas. I think we indeed need to have plans, options to do such things. But it is very likely that any significant use of nuclear weapons against targets, even military targets, would escalate into an all-out nuclear war. The reason that I think we need such plans anyway is that we are trying to deter the Soviets, not ourselves, and we need to make sure that they do not think that there is any level of nuclear exchange from which they will come out with anything that they could call a victory.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. I believe Senator Pressler has a question, and I would yield.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

First, I want to get unanimous consent to insert into the record a brief summary of the accomplishments and activities of the Arms Control Subcommittee during the past year and a half.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. That summary will be incorporated into the record, without objection, at this point.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT

While press reports suggest that arms control is back in fashion, for this Senator and for the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations arms controls has always been a top priority. The current hearings on U.S. global strategy and next month's hearing on strategic arms reduction proposals are not only a response to public concern on the need to reduce nuclear weapons and lessen the risks of nuclear war, but these hearings are another element in an on-going effort to deal with the vital issues of defense, security, and arms reductions.

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, I have chaired over forty hours of hearings since the start of this Congress. Other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, including our distinguished Chairman Senator Percy, have assisted in these efforts. Numerous hearings have been held on the full range of issues that fall under the Subcommittees' mandate at several levels. In addition to the hearings before the Subcommittee itself, public and closed sessions have been held in full committee. Later today, for example, I will chair hearings on the nomination of five senior Administration officials, four will be at the center of the U.S. arms reduction effort, and the fifth has been nominated for a key role in the International Communications Agency.

Among the accomplishments of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment have been hearings on "Yellow Rain." This suspected use and/or provision of deadly chemical agents by the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia and in Afghanistan raises serious questions on verification requirements for arms control and on the Soviet record of compliance with arms control accords that lack sufficiently strong verification provisions. On the more hopeful side, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to talk on reducing intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. We have received testimony from Chief INF Negotiator Paul Nitze and other senior officials on the progress in these talks and the prospects for reaching agreement. We held an executive session on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START has yet to begin and it is vital that a date be set for these negotiations and that the start of START occur soon.

I am especially proud of two sets of events that have occurred since I became Chairman of the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee held field hearings on the future of arms control in Sioux Falls, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. These were the first hearings in 26 years to go beyond the confines of Washington to gain the insight of Americans on the resolution of our arms control dilemma. I hope to have further public field hearings in the near future.

On May 26, 1977, the United States signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America, is an important step in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons to non-weapons states. I applaud this progress. On November 17, 1981, Protocol I to this treaty was ratified by the Senate by the vote of 79–0. This Protocol prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in the treaty zone by the nuclear weapons states. For the United States, this means nuclear weapons will not be deployed to or stored in Puerto, the Virgin Islands or the Guantanamo Naval Base. Ratification was achieved by a Republican Senate.

There is much that remains to be done to improve the standing of the United States in the world, to increase global stability, and to reduce the costs of defense to the American taxpayer through arms reductions alternatives—in essence, to make this world a better and safer place for our children and for ourselves. The upcoming May hearings on resolutions that deal with strategic arms reductions will contribute, I hope, to the process of advancing security and stability. Getting START underway will make an important contribution to this important endeavor. I, therefore, again urge that we speed up the process of setting a strong negotiating position and setting an opening date for these talks.

The best time to get an arms race under control is before it gets seriously underway. We currently have an opportunity to prevent a dangerous and unprofitable competition with regard to antisatellite weapons. The Soviets have begun a serious effort to develop weapons of this type and the United States is now following their lead. Unless we move quickly to end this competition, it may get out of control. I have urged that the United States and the Soviet Union sit down for serious discussions on an antisatellite weapons treaty. I have also authored an amendment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's authorization for fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983 that will require ACDA to engage in a serious research effort aimed at stopping the development of these deadly systems before they get out of control. I have supported increased funding for ACDA for this purpose as well as for the many other important activities in the area of arms control.

It is also important for the Administration to complete its review of two significant arms control agreements that were negotiated by two previous Republican Administrations: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE). The TTB was signed in 1974 and the PNE was signed in 1976. They are ready for ratification but the Administration has yet to complete its review and inform the Committee of its judgment. Both agreements make a contribution to arms control. Both agreements go a long way toward greater cooperation on the vital issue of verification that President Reagan has rightly called a linchpin to future progress on arms reductions. The TTB requires the Soviets to provide data on their underground nuclear testing program, in addition to placing new constraints on underground weapons tests. The PNE accord has a provision that could involve some on-site inspection, if either side conducted so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. This is an important precedent for future cooperation on the issue of verification. This marks the first time that the Soviets have agreed to on-site inspection in writing. I should note that the TTB and the PNE Treaties were supported by ACDA Director Eugene Rostow and by Chief START negotiator Edward Rowny during their respective confirmation hearings before the Committee. These agreements provide a wonderful opportunity for immediate progress in weapons control. During the coming months I will give my full attention to these agreements. I hope that in a future statement on the achievements of this Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, I will be able to add the Senate support of ratification of these two treaties to the list.

The list which follows is a summary of the activities before the Committee on Foreign Relations in the area of responsibility of the Subcommittee that I chair. For the purpose of clarity, our hearings are divided into three major categories: Arms Control; Oceans, International Operations and Environment; and, Nominations.

ARMS CONTROL HEARINGS

S. 991, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) authorization request. April 8, 1981.

Arms control issues (SALT and recent NATO decisions) (Executive Session). May 7, 1981.

Overview of nuclear proliferation (Executive Session), May 12, 1981.

Israeli air strike and related issues (Nuclear weapons and safeguards and non-proliferation). June 9, 11, 18, 19, 1981.

Administration's position on nuclear non-proliferation (Executive Session), July 15, 1981.

S. Con. Res. 24—a proposal to improve the international non-proliferation regime (Executive Session), July 16, 1981.

Foreign Policy and Arms Control Implications of President Reagan's strategic weapons proposals. November 3, 4, 9, 13, 1981.

"Yellow Rain" and other forms of chemical and biological warfare in Asia. November 10, 1981.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Executive Session), November 24, 1981.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards programs, December 2, 1981.

Future of Arms Control (field hearings, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Sioux Falls). January 20, 21, 25, 1982.

U.S. and Soviet Civil Defense Programs (Executive Session). March 16 and 31, 1982.

Progress in Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Executive Session). March 24, 1982.

START Talks (Executive Session). March 30, 1982.

U.S. Global Strategy, April 29 and 30, 1982.

OCEANS, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT HEARINGS

Law of the Sea Negotiations. March 5, June 4, July 21, and September 30, 1981.

Testimony on Ex. L., 96–2, Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement with Great Britain, and Ex. X, 96–2, Conservation on Antarctic Marine Living Resources. October 27, 1981.

Protocols to International Wheat Agreement (Treaty Doc. 97–9) November 24, 1981.

Acid Rain. February 10, 1982.

NOMINATION HEARINGS

James L. Malone to be Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs. March 16 and April 2, 1981.

Charles M. Lichenstein to be the Alternate Representative of the United States for Special Political Affairs in the United Nations with the Rank of Ambassador. March 16, 1981.

Thomas Pauken to be Director of ACTION. March 25, 1981.

Elliott Abrams to be Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. April 6, 1981.

Ernest W. Lefever to be Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. May 18, 19 and June 4, 1981.

Eugene Rostow to be Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. June 22 and 23, 1981.

Edward L. Rowny to be U.S. Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations. July 9 and 10, 1981.

Robert J. Hughes to be Assistant ICA Director for Programs. July 23, 1981.

Kenneth L. Adelman to be Deputy Representative to U.N. with Rank of Ambassador. July 23, 1981.

William Jennings Dyess to be Ambassador to the Netherlands. July 23, 1981.

John L. Loeb, Jr. to be Ambassador to Denmark. July 23, 1981.

Keith F. Nyborg to be Ambassador to Finland. July 23, 1981.

Richard J. Bishirjian to be Associate ICA Director for Educational and Cultural Affairs. September 30, 1981.

Richard F. Staar to be U.S. Representative for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations. September 30, 1981.

Jean Broward Gerard for Rank of Ambassador as U.S. Representative to UNESCO. October 27, 1981.

Geoffrey Swaebe to be Representative to the U.N. European Office with Rank of Ambassador. October 27, 1981.

Mark Goode to be Member, Board of International Broadcasting. October 27, 1981.

Frank Shakespeare to be Member, Board for International Broadcasting. November 24, 1981.

Paul Nitze, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations. March 24, 1982.

Senator Pressler. I do have one brief question. It is about the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Agreement. Do you believe that ratification of the PNE and TTB Treaties are useful first steps toward greater cooperation on the verification issue? I know that those treaties have been sitting in the Senate for a long time, including during your administration. What should be done with them? Should they be moved?

Mr. Brown. Now that it is clear that there is not going to be rapid movement toward a comprehensive test ban, I think it would be wise to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, together with the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, for two reasons. First, as you say, it would put in place certain certification provisions that are not in place now; and second, it would provide a base from which one could begin to lower the threshold. A lower threshold would really have a considerably more limiting effect on nuclear weapons development, which I think would be a good idea.

Senator Pressler. Thank you very much.

And I thank you for yielding. Senator Mathias.

The Chairman. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Secretary, I noted with interest both what you said in your statement and what you just said to Senator Pell with respect to limited nuclear war. I would not disagree with you that we have the capacity to deal with that kind of problem. It might be useful to explore the minds of our potential adversaries in this kind of arena.

Within the past year Senator Cranston and I had a conversation with a very senior Soviet military officer on this very subject. He had purportedly written some articles which talked about the possibility of waging a limited nuclear war and winning a limited nuclear war. We asked him about that. And he said, no, he did not really believe that that was a possibility, and he was very graphic in his response. He said, is it to be believed that if I, as a military commander, take 80 tactical nuclear blows, that I am going to respond with just 80 tactical nuclear blows? He said, if I can give more, I will give more, and clearly, we are going to escalate.

Mr. BROWN. I think that is likely a correct evaluation of the situation. But it is not certain. One thing that is left out in that evaluation is it not always up to the military commander how he responds. Sometimes those are political decisions.

I believe, and I think you do, too, from what you have said and from what I have known you to say before, that limited nuclear war, tactical limited nuclear war, would be likely to escalate, and an attempt at limited strategic nuclear war would also be very likely to escalate. But that belief, which I share, is not an excuse for failing to have some plans.

Suppose, for example, the Soviet Union were to launch a strategic attack on the United States with 20 or 30 nuclear weapons, causing great military destruction and considerable collateral civil destruction. I do not think a President would be well served if his subordinates then came to him and said, we do not have any plan for this because we knew it was not going to happen and therefore, what we have to do is have an all-out nuclear war.

I think it is an unlikely scenario, but I think you have to be ready for it.

Senator MATHIAS. You have argued, I think very persuasively, for maintaining the fixed-base ICBM system in some form or another. The MX was studied very extensively during your days in the Pentagon. And a proposal was made for deploying it. That proposal has not been acted upon. Out of the very extensive studies that you have made of this whole problem, what alternative modes of basing the MX would you recommend?

Mr. BROWN. As you say, Senator Mathias, I spent 2 years looking at this. I looked at 30 or 40 different modes and came up with the one that I thought was best. Then President Carter approved it. I think it should not be forgotten that the Congress also approved it. Money was authorized and appropriated to begin that deployment.

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, there is a little echo of your comment about the Soviet military response to limited war.

Mr. BROWN. Do you mean what should we do now?

Senator MATHIAS. No. I mean the commander does not always have the total option.

Mr. BROWN. What you have now is a new commander. The present administration has rejected that option which had been approved by the previous administration and by the Congress. If you now ask me what should be done, my advice is rather simple and straightforward: go back to that one. And if you say that is not feasible, give me another one, I can only say I am not responsible for these things anymore and I do not have to come up with a second-best solution. The best one is good enough for me. [General laughter.]

Senator **Mathias**. So you would revive the racetrack plan?

Mr. **Brown**. I would use a multiple protective shelter basing plan of some kind. And to me, that is clearly the one that is most difficult for the other side to deal with. Now, if you say there are political constraints that say you cannot use that deployment plan, or you cannot use that name, you have to make some changes, then I suppose one can try some modified approaches.

But it seems not very useful for me, no longer a part of that political-military process, to say what should happen. Because what should happen will depend upon the detailed negotiations that go on among the various political and military officials in the U.S. Government.

Senator **Mathias**. The Soviet Union is obviously very much interested in whether or not we are going to dig 4,600 holes or however many it may be that would be required by that plan. Do you see any problems in violating the unratified SALT Treaty if we go that route?

Mr. **Brown**. I think it is manageable. The Soviets, of course, would say anything to try to persuade as many Members of Congress, the administration, the press, many others, that it should not be done. The Soviets, I think—and it has a certain echo in this country sometimes—find anything the United States does terribly damaging, threatening, destabilizing.

But my judgment is that the plan as it then existed was compatible with the SALT II Treaty and that the Soviets would not abrogate the treaty if it is carried out.

Senator **Mathias**. You also said you favored the assurance that our air breathing systems, both bombers and cruise missiles, will be able to continue to penetrate Soviet defenses through the rest of the century. Would that include the B–1?

Mr. **Brown**. I continue to believe that the B–1 is not the best approach to obtaining that assurance. I think that the best approach is to go ahead with the cruise missile program—which is well under way—for use on the B–52, and to build an advanced technology bomber which would have better assurance than the B–1 of penetrating Soviet air defenses through the rest of this century and into the next.

Senator **Mathias**. So you see technology as moving away from manned aircraft in a general way?

Mr. **Brown**. The cruise missiles are also launched from manned aircraft. The question is that of penetrating bombers versus cruise missiles. There I think cruise missiles can do most of the job. I think that it is desirable also to have a penetrating bomber capability, but that the B–1 is not the best way to do that. It is a weapons system whose time has come and gone.

Senator **Mathias**. Can you see any time frame within which manned aircraft may become obsolete, or do you think they will be usable for the foreseeable future?

Mr. **Brown**. I think the manned aircraft will be usable for the foreseeable future. How much it costs has some influence on how much I think it is needed in addition to the cruise missiles. But in general, I guess, I think it should be an important part of our forces through the rest of the century.

Senator **Mathias.** Just one last question, which derives from that and which is a little off the subject for which you came to talk to us about today. But if, in fact, manned aircraft may have some point beyond which they are not going to be good investments, will enormous expenditures in nuclear carriers, which probably will not be commissioned for another 10 years, which will presumably be primarily platforms for manned aircraft, be a good investment for the taxpayers?

Mr. **Brown.** That is a separate issue, Senator Mathias. When you talk about aircraft carriers, you are not talking about strategic weapons but about conventional war, conventional military capability. I believe that aircraft carriers are going to be an important part of our conventional capability for 20 to 30 years. They have, however, become much more vulnerable as a result of the advent of cruise missiles, which to me raises the question of how many such carriers you want and whether they should be larger or smaller.

I think it is a mistake to build very many more large nuclear carriers. I think we would be better off if we balanced our forces somewhat differently, have perhaps carriers that are smaller but not as small as many people talk about. I think that the 30,000- or 40,000-ton carrier is at a distinct disadvantage. On the other hand, I do not think we need the 80,000-ton carriers with nuclear power.

I would tend to hold to not more than 12 or 13 carrier groups. To that end I do not think we now need to fund any additional nuclear carriers.

Senator **Mathias.** Thank you.

The **Chairman.** Thank you, Senator Mathias.

I have one remaining question, Secretary Brown, if you could give us the benefit of your judgment on the various freeze proposals. The Kennedy-Hatfield, the Warner-Jackson, and other resolutions that I think you are aware of are before this committee.

Mr. **Brown.** I believe that the various freeze proposals represent a genuine and well-founded concern that strategic arms control and reduction negotiations have not gone ahead.

I believe they may also be, to some degree, stimulated as a result of careless talk about winnability or survivability of nuclear war. And I believe that they serve a useful political purpose in pushing for resumption of arms control and reduction negotiations as an important part of our national security posture.

Having said that, I have to add that I do not think that putting those proposals into effect would be very helpful to U.S. security. People, I think, are gravely concerned about the effects of a nuclear war, and rightly so. We would be destroyed, if there were a thermonuclear war, by the weapons that now exist.

Therefore, freezing that situation says we will freeze the situation such that if there is a nuclear war, we will be destroyed. Thus a freeze by itself is not enough. And I am afraid it has become something of a substitute for detailed consideration of what is needed to reduce the chance of nuclear war and to reduce the size of nuclear stockpiles.

I think, therefore, that what is needed is not a congressional action endorsing a freeze—they all have bad flaws, in my judgment. Instead we should proceed to detailed negotiations.

The fact that people of very differing views regarding Soviet balance endorse a freeze suggests that they are not talking about the same thing and that a freeze is not very well defined.

I would have grave problems, for example, with a situation that froze U.S. bomber and cruise missile development but had no effect on Soviet air defense systems because they are not nuclear.

I would have comparable problems with a freeze that prevented the United States from improving the survivability of its ballistic missile submarines, but allowed Soviet antisubmarine warfare to go ahead because it is not nuclear.

When you add to that the verification problems, you can see that endorsement of a freeze can be a substitute for constructive action. This constructive action is difficult and complicated. But that is what I think the administration ought to proceed with, and that is what I think the Congress ought to encourage the administration to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I promised you would be on your way at 12:15. It is now 12:15. That promise is a commitment made and a commitment fulfilled.

We thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in preparing very helpful testimony and for your response this afternoon.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You are a man of courtesy and of your word.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, May 11, 1982.]

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

TUESDAY, MAY 11, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

Also present: Senators John Warner and Arlen Specter.

The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee convenes this morning to receive testimony from Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, in this, the third in our series of major hearings on nuclear arms reduction proposals.

Today's hearing follows closely on the heels of the President's most encouraging speech at Eureka College in Illinois; a speech which I believe outlined a sound and balanced five-point program for conducting our relationship with the Soviet Union.

In particular, I welcome the announcement that the administration is now ready to proceed with the START negotiations, and I share the President's hope that the talks can begin next month. These negotiations, together with a summit meeting, which the President again proposed on Sunday, can provide a constructive basis for significantly lowering the risk of nuclear war.

Secretary Haig, we look forward this morning to learning more details concerning the two-phased reduction proposal which the President announced on Sunday. We also hope to learn what measures the administration is considering to encourage stability and continuity while the negotiations proceed.

As the President stated in his address, the task of reducing and reshaping each side's strategic forces to enhance stability may take many years. For this reason, it is especially important that both sides continue to show restraint vis-a-vis existing SALT agreements while conducting START.

Secretary Haig, we are also most interested in knowing the administration position on the various arms reduction resolutions now before this committee.

Senator Pell?

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary Haig to discuss the nuclear arms control resolutions before our committee. I congratulate the President for his decision to propose an early target date for resuming negotiations and for not linking that decision to events in Poland or Afghanistan. I regret, however, that this decision was not made earlier, as we have lost a good deal of valuable time in the critical effort to control and reduce nuclear arms.

I also would like to commend the nuclear freeze movement, which in my view played a major role in focusing the administration's intention on starting START. In this regard, the administration is, in a sense, really responsible for the freeze movement. By delaying for over a year any return to negotiations on strategic nuclear arms, and by engaging in pretty harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, I think the administration aroused fear among the American people that they will be led needlessly into a nuclear war.

That is really what the nuclear freeze movement is all about. I think it was the Duke of Wellington who once said while reviewing his troops during the Napoleonic wars, "I don't know whether they will frighten the enemy, but, by God, they frighten me." Secretary, you may not be frightened, but I believe a lot of American people are.

While I think all of us welcome the President's decision, I am concerned that the administration has said nothing about immediate steps to stop, or at least slow down, the nuclear arms race while negotiations are underway to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides.

The President stated on Sunday that "The monumental task of reducing and reshaping our strategic forces to enhance stability will take many years of concentrated effort." They will, and I am glad that efforts are starting, but the American people want action now.

One way to accomplish that would be to freeze nuclear weapons at current levels and ban all new deployments while reductions are being negotiated. The merit of this approach is highlighted by the fact that in 1983 alone, the administration plans to buy nuclear weapons; enough to constitute an arsenal larger than those that Britain, France, and China have accumulated altogether over a period of many years. I am sure that the Kremlin is planning similar increases.

Another way to achieve immediate results while we are striving for deep cuts would be to put the SALT II limitations in place. That would require the Soviets to dismantle some 250 systems and to observe other important constraints.

One of the difficulties I have had in arriving at a judgment on the START objectives announced by President Reagan is the question of reconciling the reductions proposed with the administration's plan to proceed ahead with the deployment of the MX, the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles and Trident II missiles. As I read the President's statement, none of those programs would be affected one whit by his reduction proposal.

It appears, in fact, that the administration may be in the process of demanding congressional approval of these very programs as a precondition for negotiating seriously on the START proposal. That would concern all of us a great deal, so I look forward very much to hearing Secretary Haig's comments on these thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. For the benefit of the committee membership, the hearing this afternoon will begin, instead of at 1:45, at 2 o'clock. I would cordially invite any sponsors of resolutions from the committee, Senators Mathias, Biden or Glenn, to make any statements on their resolutions, and it might be appropriate to do so immediately following the testimony by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to make a statement this afternoon following their statements.

Senator MATHIAS. I also will do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, thank you.

Secretary Haig, we are pleased to have a statement from you now.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary HAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee.

The timing of these hearings could not be better. We are about to enter a new phase of strategic arms control. On Sunday, the President announced his desire to open strategic arms reduction talks by the end of June. We have proposed to the Soviets that the talks take place in Geneva, and I hope we will be in a position to announce a specific date sometime in the next several weeks.

The decision to begin negotiations on strategic arms reductions is a crucial element in the President's comprehensive policy framework for arms control. In November, we launched America into an entirely new area of arms control, that involving intermediate range nuclear forces. More recently, we have begun to participate in efforts within the 40-member Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a total ban on chemical weapons. We are also engaged in discussions in that forum on nuclear testing. In Vienna, negotiations on reductions in conventional forces in Europe are also underway. In the coming months, we will renew our efforts to make progress there.

Each of these negotiations is important in its own right. Together, they present an opportunity to strengthen deterrence and to reduce the risk of war at all levels. But it is important to remember that arms control is a means to an end, and not an end in itself.

Our objective is to sustain our national security in a changing international environment, and in the face of an expanding Soviet force. Arms control can play a very important part in strengthening our security and restraining the growth of Soviet power through mutually beneficial agreements, but arms control can succeed in this task only if it is coordinated in a strategy that employs the other diplomatic, political, and economic assets at our disposal.

This means, among other things, that we must demonstrate our will and capacity to maintain the military balance. It means that we should consult closely with our allies, and it also means that we should seek balanced, equal and verifiable agreements that reduce the risk of war by reinforcing deterrence.

Our preparations for START have reflected these considerations. The President's proposals have also benefited from the lessons of a decade of American experience with the SALT process. Ironically, the strategic arms competition so troubling to us all reached new heights during the very period when the SALT negotiations seemed so promising.

We therefore developed eight criteria with which to judge alternative approaches to strategic arms control, and these have guided our recent decisions on START:

First, a START agreement must permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy, taking into account the military capability that would be allowed the Soviet Union under such an agreement.

Second, an agreement must be based on the principle of equality. Nothing less than equality is acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement for military and political reasons.

Third, a START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.

Fourth, there must be effective verification with the necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures.

Fifth, an agreement must lead to substantial reductions. We took as a given that whatever unit of account was adopted should lend itself to substantial reductions below current levels of forces, and that reductions should be to equal ceilings.

Sixth, we must be able to explain our objectives and proposals in clear and simple terms to insure that our START approach would enjoy broad public support.

Seventh, our approach had to take into account those matters of particular concern to our allies, including the ability of the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF negotiations and the likelihood of success.

Eighth and finally, we needed to devise a sustainable position which could provide a framework for detailed negotiations and the basis for eventual agreement, even in the face of initial Soviet resistance. This meant the position needed to be demonstrably fair, mutually beneficial, and realistic.

Based upon these criteria, the President has set a new, more demanding goal for strategic arms negotiations. Our objective is to achieve significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby strengthening deterrence and stability both for ourselves and for our allies and friends.

To achieve this objective, we will propose to the Soviets in Geneva a practical plan for phased reductions of strategic weapons. This plan is designed to reduce the risk of war by securing agreed steps which will enhance the stability of the balance. Such a goal can be achieved best by negotiating significant reductions in the most destabilizing weapons possessed by both sides—their numbers, their warheads, their overall destructive potential. This will be the primary focus of U.S. efforts.

In Geneva, the United States will propose that, at the end of the first stage of START reductions, ballistic missile warheads be reduced to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. The United States will propose that, to further enhance stability, no more than one-half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. We wish to see those warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in deployed missiles, achieved just as quickly as possible.

The conclusion of such an agreement would provide the best possible basis for negotiations, leading to a second phase agreement imposing equal ceilings on other elements of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels. In both phases, we will naturally insist on verification procedures to insure compliance with the agreement.

As President Reagan has noted, these proposals represent a very serious and ambitious undertaking. The sheer physical task of reducing United States and Soviet strategic forces and reshaping them to enhance stability will undoubtedly take years of concentrated effort. We believe, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union together can remove the instabilities that now exist, and reduce significantly nuclear forces on both sides.

Our ability to achieve these ambitious goals depends, in large measure, on the Soviets' willingness to negotiate seriously and in good faith. How seriously they will negotiate depends, in turn, on their view of how the military and political environment will look without an agreement.

If we fail to adopt the President's military modernization program, we will reduce not the nuclear danger, but instead the chances of reaching an arms control agreement on strategic forces. A demonstrated willingness to maintain the balance, through unilateral efforts if necessary, is as indispensable to the success of our efforts at strategic arms reductions as INF modernization is to the success of the ongoing talks in Geneva. More than any other single defense or political initiative, the President's strategic modernization program and the Congress support for the modernization program will make or break our attempt to negotiate a reasonable arms control agreement.

The need to maintain the Soviet incentive to negotiate reductions in destabilizing options would also be undercut by endorsement of many of the nuclear freeze proposals now before us. Most proposals would freeze the existing instabilities and perpetuate existing Soviet advantages. They would eliminate the incentives for the Soviets to negotiate toward the even lower levels of nuclear weapons that we can achieve. We want to go beyond a freeze. We want to do better. We believe we can achieve real reductions and thus lessen the risk of war.

We all understand and share the anxiety that motivates those who support the freeze. We all agree that we must not miss this opportunity to make a major step toward meaningful arms control and significant reductions. We are concerned, however, that a freeze on nuclear weapons could frustrate our attempts to achieve stability and balance in this critical area.

The discussions and debates on nuclear policy in the Congress and the country at large reflect both public concern and our capacity as a Democracy to discuss the great issues of today. They have helped to focus American attention on the difficult task ahead of us. We particularly support the objectives set by Senators Warner, Jackson, and others for significant reductions in the number of weapons. We hope, however, that this debate will not culminate in fresh battle lines between divided factions, but rather a new national consensus in support of the President's proposal for a fair, realistic, and truly beneficial strategic arms agreement.

We feel confident that a better understanding of the needs of deterrence, the state of the military balance and the possibilities for arms control will result in strong support for the initiatives we have taken to modernize our forces and to reduce the burden of arms and the risk of war through negotiation. Such support will be crucial in convincing the Soviets that we are determined to compete and, at the same time, that we are eager to reach a meaningful agreement. The incentives for real arms control exist. We have both the means and the duty to supply them.

As we embark on this vital enterprise, now is the time to rally behind the President's proposals. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Again, for the benefit of our committee members, we will, at some point, need nine members in the room to conduct the business meeting. The Secretary understands that we may lose the quorum and would have to vote on our business while he is still here. But I would hope Senators can stay until he finishes. I understand you have to leave at 11:35, Mr. Secretary.

First, I would like to ask you for your reactions, beyond news reports now in Pravda and so forth, as to the Soviets' response. They were given several days' advance notice as to what the sense of the President's message would be. What indications do we have that the Soviets will be ready to start SALT negotiations by the end of June as proposed by the President? And what response can you give us that they have given to you as to their reactions to the proposals?

Secretary HAIG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it is too early to say what the official Soviet response may be. It is unfortunate that some of the observations made by certain American sources that were critical were immediately picked up in TASS.

The CHAIRMAN. And reported in Pravda.

Secretary HAIG. I think this is unfortunate. On the other hand, we have maintained a dialog on this subject over the months. I think, on balance, the Soviet leadership will welcome the resumption of these arms control talks at the strategic level. I have discussed it with Ambassador Dobrynin and anticipate fixing the date in the next several weeks.

We have recommended or proposed Geneva as the site for these talks. I think it is very clear that the unit of measure that has been put forth by the President for the numbers of warheads and missiles is, in general, compatible with the previous work that we had done under SALT II and earlier arms control discussions; and therefore, will be in general welcomed by the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you outline for us, with respect to the President's proposals, whether any onsite inspection would be necessary or would any means beyond national technical surveillance means be required? Under SALT I and SALT II, national surveillance was adequate. Under the proposal of the President, what additional requirements would be necessary to make the resulting treaty verifiable?

Secretary HAIG. I think, Senator, it is a bit too early to tell. We are talking about being absolutely sure, with respect to the units of measure that we have fixed for phase 1 and subsequently for phase 2, that adequate verification can be assured.

As you know, under SALT II there were considerable concerns in the verification area, and especially in certain technical aspects such as telemetry. I know that Senator Glenn had strong reservations about that. We want to be absolutely sure that there is mutual confidence on both sides that the obligations that are incurred in the negotiations can, in fact, be verified with confidence.

So it is still somewhat too soon to say what kind of verification will be required. As you know, we did not and have not fixed our verification requirements for the INF talks, believing that it was far better to get on with the talks and to consider, as these talks develop, the best methodology which will probably go beyond purely national means.

The CHAIRMAN. For more than a year I have been waiting for the administration's reaction to the request I made that they give us their recommendation with respect to whether the Senate should take up and ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed by President Nixon and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty signed by President Ford. We, in the committee, have been waiting for that recommendation for a year now.

The latter, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, contains unprecedented provisions for onsite inspection, a point of agreement which could be very useful in the upcoming START negotiations, particularly if you are going to count warheads.

In August of this year, I turned over to the administration a letter I received from former President Ford, strongly supporting ratification of both treaties. General Seignious, recently of the Arms Control Agency, came out just last week urging ratification.

Why is it taking the administration so long to make up its mind as to whether or not it is going to recommend ratification of two treaties that were signed years ago by two former Presidents?

Secretary HAIG. Mr. Chairman, as I think you are aware, we are heavily engaged now in the 40-nation ad hoc discussions in Geneva dealing with the subject, not just of chemical weapons as I mentioned in my talk, but more importantly, in the comprehensive test ban area. In principle, as you know, we support a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal. There are a host of complex issues, especially those related to verification, involved in all of these treaties you touched upon, as well as in a comprehensive test ban treaty.

We are currently engaged in discussions in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, focusing specifically on the verification question. Now, the consequences of those deliberations in Geneva will set the framework for our approach to the other related treaties that former President Ford endorsed and you have touched upon here. But until this process has been completed, I think it would be both risky and premature to comment, because we must have an international consensus on the vital subject of verification.

The CHAIRMAN. But one of those treaties takes us a step much farther than the Soviets have even been willing to go before. They were fully negotiated. The Arms Control Agency was in being at the time. Some of the same people are onboard, I suppose.

I know in the Carter administration the word we got back was that President Carter simply preferred his own treaty and had no interest in ratifying a treaty from previous Presidents. But in this case, it is two Republican Presidents. It does seem to carry us forward there, not any great shakes. I will admit that. One hundred fifty kilotons is a pretty big explosion. But still, if we had had it with China, it would have covered two-thirds of their explosions. It would be of some use and certainly, the onsite inspection would be, too.

Can we get from the administration a date by which it would say yes or no as to whether we can consider it, because I do not see it as possible to ratify with a two-thirds vote unless the administration says yes. It is the indecision that is affecting the situation.

Secretary HAIG. I do not want to suggest indecision. I want to suggest the need to refine the critical area of verification. Verification has always been the hangup on these lesser test ban agreements and on a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, it is vitally important that these things be clarified, and these involve not just the concerns, incidentally, of the United States and Soviet Union in this area. They involve very important concerns to other nuclear powers who have testing requirements of their own, such as Great Britain and France, for example.

I can assure you that there are concerns in those capitals with respect to the verification topic. I worked in the area of the treaties to which you are referring and I am very familiar with what was accomplished and what is still rather worrisome under those agreements.

What we are trying to do is eliminate all uncertainties and doubts and establish a good framework for verification in which the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nuclear powers can have mutual confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have confidence. As you know, I have been pushing very hard to get started on START. I am very satisfied now that we have the date set. The ball is in their court; it is up to them to respond.

I still think that to show the seriousness of our intention, we ought really to look at these two treaties that do move us forward. We are going to know more about verification and we will have in place verification data and materials if we get these implemented.

If that is the only thing hanging us up, I would hope we could make a quick decision on that and I would look forward to that, just as we have made a decision on the other one now. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on a separate subject, I would like to congratulate you for the work you have been doing regarding the Falkland Islands. I think all of us share the high regard and admiration that I have for your doing the best work that you can, and I commend you.

In connection with the matter before us, the President has said that it will take many years of concentrated effort to get on with the monumental task of reducing and reshaping our strategic forces. How long do you think it will take before we can see results from phase I of the START negotiations? Do you have a tentative timetable? Perhaps a year, half a year or 2 years?

Secretary HAIG. Senator, I think it is too early to say. There is nothing more self-defeating than locking yourself into theoretical deadlines. I do believe that the previous work that has been done in the

SALT arena, both in SALT I, in Vladivostok, and in SALT II where data has been compiled and exchanged, will facilitate a great deal of what would otherwise be preliminary pick and shovel work. That is one of the great advantages of the unit of measures that we are adopting for phase I.

On the other hand, we should not delude ourselves. We are asking for substantial reductions. That is quite different than SALT II. It is not going to be easy for the Soviet Union to adjust to what we call substantial reductions.

Our great concern about SALT II was that it reduced in certain areas and permitted substantial growth in other areas. That is what we are trying to overcome.

We think the objectives that we are seeking would justify the additional time that it may take to negotiate fair ceilings across the board. We are clearly going in there ready to talk and to bargain and to negotiate and make a good faith effort.

Senator **Pell.** A close reading of the President's remarks of yesterday, or the day before yesterday, gives one a sense of great support for what he is trying to do. You sort of see the figure of a treaty that he hopes to see emerge, but it needs a little more spelling out, I think.

As I understand it, phase I would be concerned entirely with warheads; phase II would be concerned with yield or megatonnage. Do you see a separate treaty emerging from phase I focusing just on the warheads, and then moving on from that, which might be the new SALT II, to SALT III which would be the next phase on yield and megatonnage?

Secretary **Haig.** First of all, Senator, it is true the President was intentionally general in his public comments. We think it does not serve our purpose to negotiate details in public, but rather, to do it in the restricted forum of the negotiations themselves. That, we think, is a most constructive approach to successful arms control, and past history confirms that.

So, there are far more details worked out than have been announced publicly in the U.S. position. I want that to be understood.

Secondly, it is true that in phase I, we are focusing not just on warheads but on missile launchers, as well. These are units of account with which both sides are quite familiar and capable of dealing. It also has certain verification advantages. Our hope would be that if we could conclude or achieve the substantial reductions required in phase I then we could move right ahead and conclude such an agreement, that would provide a very constructive base to get into the even more substantial reductions visualized in phase II, which focuses again on warheads launchers, and also on throw-weight. In phase II, we would seek very substantial reductions, at levels of throw-weight below what the United States maintains today.

However, these are not mutually interdependent approaches. Phase I we hopefully could conclude with some degree of alacrity and success. That is, we could conclude an agreement which establishes a base from which to move into phase II. I hope I have answered your question.

Senator **Pell.** You have, and I recognize that you intentionally want to leave a certain vagueness here for when you go to the negotiating table. But this reminds me of going through a fog in a vessel; you see the image of an approaching vessel become clearer and clearer, but in this case I am wondering if we are seeing two vessels approaching, two treaties or one vessel, one treaty, or do you want to leave that a little obscure?

Secretary HAIG. No. I would anticipate a phase I agreement.

Senator PELL. And then a phase II agreement?

Secretary HAIG. And then move into discussions on phase II, on an agreement for phase II.

Senator PELL. In the course of these negotiations, will the administration be willing to abide by SALT II providing the Soviets abide by it, too? This means they would have to dismantle their 250 missiles. I am not saying you can legally affirm it, but do you think the administration will be willing to abide by its provisions provided the Soviets do, too?

Secretary HAIG. Senator, I think I should speak very frankly to you on this subject. As you know, SALT II was considered before this administration came into office, and it was essentially rejected by the U.S. Senate. I am very familiar with those hearings that were held in July and August of 1979, having participated in them myself. We consider SALT II to be dead. We have so informed the Soviet Union and they have accepted and understood that; not with considerable enthusiasm, but they know it.

The worst thing we could do now, as we enter into a new phase, a new approach to arms control, is to attempt to resurrect an agreement which could only generate massive and instantaneous controversy in the body politic of our country and here in the Congress, confuse our allies and even confuse the Soviet Union.

Senator PELL. But do you really think, Mr. Secretary, that the mere following of its provisions while we would negotiate would cause a big row in the body politic?

Secretary HAIG. I think we have, as a national consensus or a congressional or Senate consensus, passed beyond SALT II. Clearly, we have done so.

I would suggest that it was not exclusively attributable to American reaction to Afghanistan, but rather, the inadequacies in the agreement itself. We feel it is very important to start anew, building on the experience of SALT I. Vladivostok and SALT II, but to seek substantial reductions at a level of one-third.

I think there is a peripheral question related to your question, and I want to be clear on that. We do not intend, as long as the Soviet Union does not, to undercut the restraints that were visualized in SALT II. That has been, and remains our position.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell. Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is a real pleasure to see you again. I do have a question that I would like to submit to you. The two great superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., look at each other in fear and suspicion. We have masses of people praying in the streets saying that we must not have a nuclear war, and all sorts of slogans about unilateral disarmament and other impractical suggestions.

These are being made as if we on one side alone could achieve something. Those messages are not being received by the Soviets, or if they are, they are paying no attention to them. What I would like to know is this: What attempts are being made actually to communicate with the Soviets? What are we doing to communicate the concerns of our people to the Soviet Union in a way that changes the climate of opinion, the climate of hostility that has existed between their nation and ours almost since the end of World War II?

That is, we have a kind of mutual paranoia. They are not to be trusted, we say about them. And they are not to be trusted, they say about us. In a sense, whatever negotiations we undertake are taken under the shadow of that profound distrust that exists on both sides. What are we doing to dispel that distrust? Or is that not a military question? Is it not even a diplomatic question?

Secretary **Haig**. Senator, I touched upon this subject in my most recent speech. The point I tried to make was that the United States is in a competitive relationship with the Soviet Union. The values that we espouse and seek to promote—democracy, respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual in the state—clash rather sharply with the totalitarian values of Marxist, Leninist ideology. That is a simple fact of life.

The greatest danger we can have is to delude ourselves into believing we can change the atmospherics and affect those fundamental realities. I pointed out that one of the great dangers of détente, not the term and the effort associated with détente, but our appreciation of it in the early 1970's, tended to delude us that détente really constituted a convergence of values, and a growing convergence of fundamental interests and direction between the Soviet Union and the United States. This was self-delusion.

We also tended to delude ourselves that détente could be a substitute for the maintenance of the essential defense capabilities of this Nation. We learned literally in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, in Southeast Asia, and, most recently, in our own hemisphere that this was self-delusion.

Now, a sharp reaction to that has set in. It has been suggested that, as a result of the Soviet activities worldwide, the doubts and the mistrust that you just touched upon intensified. Then people began to say that we were, on the one hand, too weak to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and on the other, strong enough to maintain a posture of brittle and highly dangerous animosity. Well, the truth is somewhere in between.

We have to work as actively as we can. We have to negotiate, we have to seek common ground, recognizing that the millennium is decades away, and above all, we have to maintain strength and consistency in our dealings with the Soviet Union so that we do not confuse them by this "dialectic of perceptions" that we go through every 4 years in this country.

Senator **Hayakawa**. I agree with you, sir, that the concept of détente was a real adventure in self-delusion. We really kidded ourselves in a big way at that time. At the same time, the level of communication by which we arrived at that détente seemed to me not at all to reach the hearts and minds of the people of the Soviet Union, let alone the hearts and minds of our own people.

There is a whole fundamental question of communication here that still continues to concern me.

Secretary HAIG. Senator, I can understand your concerns since this administration's approach to communication with the U.S.S.R. is somewhat different than the previous administration's.

Senator HAYAKAWA. I am not criticizing this administration, you understand. That is to say, the previous administration was probably less effective in comparison.

Secretary HAIG. I think in the last months of the previous administration there was a sharp reaction following Afghanistan and following the fruitless summitry in Vienna. The point I am trying to make is that we do not have the luxury of dealing with a dialectic in our approach to the Soviet question. We have to remain bipartisan. We have to maintain consistency, and that consistency has to be premised on an understanding that we remain and will remain for the foreseeable future in a competitive posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

It also means that we must maintain a dialog with the Soviet Union. We must seek to resolve our differences through negotiations, not because it is going to change the basic competitive character of our relationship, but because it is clear that they, too, must have vital interests that can be met by fair compromise.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, I see that my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hayakawa. Senator Biden?

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I, too, would like to join with Senator Pell in complimenting you on the very impressive effort you have made on the very difficult situation in the South Atlantic. I thank you for that. It is particularly appropriate that I say that because I have tended to be critical on other occasions, and I want you to know that I think highly of your efforts.

I would like to, at the outset, agree to disagree on one point: SALT was not rejected by the U.S. Senate. As a matter of fact, I honestly believe, when the President pulled it down, so to speak, after Afghanistan, just prior to that, that we had the votes to pass SALT.

I know that is a matter for debate, but I would not want the impression left that we had rejected it. The fact of the matter is the Senate could still ratify the SALT agreement unless this administration brought the treaty down, as I understand the procedure. You may have told the Soviets, but you have not told us that you want it back from the Senate.

Let me get on to my questions, however. I think the President has made a fine speech, and I take him at his word that he feels very strongly that arms control can be, and that the proposal he has offered would be, not only something to diminish the prospect of nuclear war, but would also enhance U.S. security because that is what his responsibility and ours is, to enhance U.S. security.

The President has proposed a framework for future agreements. As far as I can tell, the SALT II agreement which you do not like particularly—and I remember your testimony at the time—would be consistent with the direction of the President's own plan, and it might even be helpful.

General Jones told this committee last fall that SALT II restraints on Soviet MIRVing gave a greater potential in SALT II for future arms controls than what it accomplishes itself.

My question to you, as I look at the eight points of the speech that you made, is this. I do not know of one that the SALT agreement does not meet. Why, if you are going essentially to abide by the terms of the agreement, why, if, in fact, it is already negotiated, why does it not make sense and why is it inconsistent to pass the SALT agreement and move on to START I, or whatever other acronym we would like to use?

I do not see anything in your eight points that is inconsistent with it. The first point says to permit the development of sufficient military capability. We are allowed to develop more under SALT II.

Second, principle of equity. There is asymmetry in SALT II as there is asymmetry in the President's proposal.

Third, the START agreement must promote strategic stability by reduing vulnerability. With all due respect, I do not see how in any way your proposal reduces vulnerability of land-based systems. Does it, in any way? That is a whole bunch of questions. Maybe you could speak to that.

Secretary Haig. Well, I suppose, Senator, when you look at a world series, and when I do, we may have picked a different team. I picked a team on SALT II that would not have ratified. Here in the U.S. Senate—and we did our bookkeeping—those who were concerned, just as those who were in favor, did their bookkeeping. And the facts are that the game was never played.

Senator Biden. I think I can agree with that.

Secretary Haig. The proposal has been abandoned by this administration. We have so informed the Soviet Union that we were abandoning it, and we have been actively engaged for 16 months in a new set of proposals which, we concluded and believe very strongly today, do not entail the risks associated with or the flaws included in the SALT II agreement.

Senator Biden. Can you give me an example?

Secretary Haig. I would like you to know that the eight points I mentioned addressed some of the deficiencies, as we saw them, in SALT II, specifically point three. A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. You will recall that, at the time of my testimony before this committee in 1979, I expressed grave concern about the first strike instant, hard target kill capability that SALT II allowed the Soviet Union without restraint. I am talking about the heavy land-based threat.

Senator Biden. Yes, the SS-18.

Secretary Haig. The threat to our land-based systems. Subsequently, Soviet forces have been modernized and their accuracy has increased.

As we viewed the potential for breakout with additional MIRVing under SALT II in 1985, we became increasingly concerned that we had to address more vigorously precisely the third point that I included in my eight points: The vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.

Senator Biden. Before we leave that point, I think it is a very important point and you made the case in a very forceful manner in 1979. Without arguing whether or not that is correct and for the sake of discussion, let us say I agree with you completely. Isn't it correct that the President's proposal for 5,000 warheads and 850 ballistic missiles would leave the ICBM's on both sides vulnerable to a first strike? Couldn't those 2,500 silo killer warheads on each side be expected to destroy 200 MX missiles?

Quite frankly, we are more vulnerable to a first strike under the President's proposal than we are under SALT II.

Secretary **Haig**. First, Senator, let me avoid getting into a numbers game, and by inference, accepting the numbers you have just put forward as being inherent in our proposal. As I mentioned to the chairman, we seek to avoid this in public hearings: To give the Soviet Union an opportunity to grasp the concept that we are putting forward.

There are additional details, of course, which will come out at the negotiating table in fair give-and-take bargaining.

Senator **Biden**. Without using numbers, let me put it another way. Under the proposal, no matter how it is cut, there will be a limited number of launchers and warheads on each side, but the increased accuracy that we were all worried about that is in that window of vulnerability for us will not be, reduced in any way, in anybody's estimation, by anything that the President has proposed or I have seen in the background or upfront. They are going to have that increased accuracy.

Secretary **Haig**. Let me answer your question which, as I understand it, is: Are we now, under this proposal, creating even more risk to our land-based system? The answer to that is not at all. If you look at the reductions we are asking in the land-based threat from both sides, it would result in residual levels that are substantially more secure than those under SALT II.

Senator **Biden**. My time is up. Perhaps in a second round we can pursue that. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Lugar.

Senator **Lugar**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your statement this morning. Likewise, I applaud the President's desire to enter negotiations.

Let me ask you this so that you might respond on the public record. To what extent is the President's desire to enter into negotiations by the end of June or sometime closely thereafter influenced by perceptions which he has of the Soviet's willingness to negotiate, as opposed to a political predicament in our own country, in which we are negotiating with each other.

To be very specific, the charge was made that the President's speech on Sunday came at the last possible moment, and that he really had to say something or be well behind the power curve regarding strategic negotiations in our own country.

I trust the decision which you are elucidating today is based upon the view that the Soviets, for reasons of economics or fear of technological breakthrough or general fear of holocaust, are prepared to enter into serious negotiations.

Can you make a comment reasurring us along these lines?

Secretary **Haig**. Senator, you mentioned a number of observations associated with U.S. motives and the timing of our approach. I have noted them as well, and they are all wrong. The simple facts are that this administration came into office with the residue of a SALT II agreement which admittedly had been negotiated, but which lost its credibility in our body politic. We felt very strongly that there were serious flaws in SALT II.

What we attempted to do, in a very active interdepartmental environment, is to establish a whole new approach to the arms control question. Admittedly, in each cycle, each iteration, a greater knowledge is developed, a greater understanding of the pitfalls and risks associated with this process, and all of that was folded into a rather substantial interdepartmental effort, involving ACDA, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA.

We moved as rapidly as we could with prudence, professionalism, and care. It is unfortunate that it took the good part of 16 months for us to conclude those deliberations, but the very fact that they were as extensive and thoroughgoing as they were gives us great confidence that we have a sound approach.

Second, there is a peripheral issue associated with your question, and that is the linkage question. You will recall that I met with Foreign Minister Gromyko this past January. We had at that time contemplated fixing a date for the resumption of START negotiations, which was not too different from the time schedule we have held to. However, we felt it was highly inappropriate in the wake of the suppression in Poland to do such a thing until we had taken measures with respect to the Polish crisis which reflected American concern and disapproval.

Now, we have done that. The measures we took were primarily in the economic area. At the same time, you will recall, the President said he considered arms control per se as something in a very special category as far as linkage is concerned. It is linked: It is influenced by Soviet behavior internationally, but to a different degree than the more normal trade, economic, and other relationships, because of its vital importance for humanity, worldwide interests, for interests of the people of the United States.

So, we went ahead with the INF talks in Geneva in November, and they have proceeded ever since. They will resume again on the 20th of this month.

Now, under that same criteria, [illegible] have completed our detailed work. We have put forward to the President proposals which he has approved and which he enunciated this past Sunday.

Now, from the standpoint of the Soviet Union, from the outset—for a lot of good reasons—they would have preferred, of course, SALT II. We think it gave them substantial advantages, but they have also been very strong advocates of arms control talks per se. I think there are a host of motivations there, some more political and not friendly, and some psychological and not friendly. Others, I think, represent a genuine concern on the part of the Soviet leadership to get the nuclear question under better control.

The degree to which each of these motivations dominates, we have to leave to subjective judgment.

Senator **Lugar.** Do we have any indication that their motivation to enter these talks would lead to liberalization of their negotiating position on verification? Clearly, much of our last round foundered on that subject, although there were other problems. Do you have any indication from Gromyko or from others that their position might be somewhat different on this round?

Secretary **Haig**. I think, Senator, we have seen some public statements that suggest somewhat greater liberalization, but this has to be explored in far greater detail, and speculation about it, I think, could be misleading.

Senator **Lugar**. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if I heard and wrote down properly what you said a moment ago, I believe you indicated that we have notified the Soviet Union that SALT II is dead. Was that your word, that we have notified them as such that SALT II is dead?

Secretary **Haig**. In our discussions with the Soviets, we made it clear that this administration is not going to go forward with SALT II, very clear.

Senator **Glenn**. Have we moved outside the SALT II limits yet?

Secretary **Haig**. No.

Senator **Glenn**. Have the Soviets moved outside the SALT II limit?

Secretary **Haig**. If you are talking about limits as opposed to the elimination of systems as agreed, the Soviets have not moved outside the SALT II limits. In general, I think there has been reciprocity here.

Senator **Glenn**. What about in specifics?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, there are some who are nervous about certain aspects, and they should not be discussed in public.

Senator **Glenn**. Now, the SALT II limits that were proposed are very specific. I know they have not destroyed the number of launches they would have been required to destroy under SALT II, and I accept that, but as far as other numbers——

Secretary **Haig**. Major items have been abided by.

Senator **Glenn**. I have been very careful to keep briefed on this, as to whether they have moved out and we have moved out, and whether our systems would move either one of us out. So far, I have been told both by your Department and the Defense Department that neither side has actually moved outside that yet.

Secretary **Haig**. That is right.

Senator **Glenn**. I will have more comments about that this afternoon, when I give testimony on my own proposal in this particular area. Would you run through some of the numbers for us, about the first stage, and what would happen in this reduction, the application of the one-third below current numbers and no more than half on land-based missiles? Does this leave aircraft out of this equation?

Secretary **Haig**. Aircraft were not included in the President's statement, because we wanted a simple, understandable, conceptual approach which could be grasped not only by the Soviet Union but by the public at large. It does not mean, Senator, that we have not provided for aircraft, and indeed aircraft will be included in the American proposal at equitable levels.

Senator **Glenn**. Do the proposals you make here fit with the President's speeches? I read it in the press, about 850, and 5,000 warheads. They do not match up, the way I figure it out.

Secretary HAIG. I would prefer not to get into numbers in public session, because it begins to cheapen the approach that we are taking, which should be discussed at the table.

Senator GLENN. Well, there is one set of figures coming out in your statement here this morning, if we follow it through, or at least as I read it—and I am asking a question, I am not making a conclusion—as I read the President's statement on launchers and so on, and all that business, it does not come out the same at all. Is that correct?

Secretary HAIG. I think we know precisely what we are talking about. I do not know what you mean.

Senator GLENN. How about running through the numbers for me on these things, if you could, please? I do not understand what would happen. Let me ask this question first. We would make these reductions in warheads, and we would actually be destroying warheads, and the Soviets would be destroying warheads before we have any agreement at all on megatonnages or throw-weights. Is that correct?

Secretary HAIG. We would seek reductions in warheads and launchers.

Senator GLENN. That is the first phase.

Secretary HAIG. In the first phase. That would have the indirect consequence, I must tell you, Senator, of substantial reductions in throw-weight, although that would not be a measure of count.

Senator GLENN. OK. Let's say the first phase is agreed to. The Soviets agree and we agree. They accept your proposal, and we start pulling equipment down and they start pulling equipment down. We start destroying warheads, and they start destroying warheads. We still would have the megatonnage and throw-weight imbalances still in place.

Secretary HAIG. No, Senator. The actual consequences of the one-third reduction we are speaking of would have a substantial impact because of the land-based provisions. Only half the remaining missiles would be land-based. That means the Soviets are going to have to reduce a substantial number of their ICBM's, and the United States on its part, because we have the bulk of our forces in sea-based systems, will have to reduce a substantial number of sea-based systems. The consequence will be throw-weight reductions.

Senator GLENN. Do you envision now that the first phase could go into effect without the second phase being agreed to?

Secretary HAIG. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Well, then, I repeat, this will make a huge imbalance on megatonnage. If they stick with the SS-18's, for instance, and the megatonnage they throw, the capability that they have, it seems to me we stand a good chance of being put into a greater imbalance than we are correcting.

Secretary HAIG. Senator, it is precisely the opposite.

Senator GLENN. Well, you explain to me with numbers how that would not occur, because the numbers do not work out the way I plot them here.

Secretary HAIG. I can assure you they work out very well, and they involve precisely what we say, a 30-percent reduction in warheads, a one-third reduction in warheads.

Senator **Glenn**. But they would keep the SS–18. There is no doubt about that.

Secretary **Haig**. And only half of the residual force would be land-based.

Senator **Glenn**. But they would keep their SS–18's. There is no doubt about that, right?

Secretary **Haig**. That is a choice they will have to make in light of the reduction options that are open to them in land-based systems. Clearly, that is the most desirable system to retain. But under any set of reductions available to them, substantial reductions in throw-weight would result.

Senator **Glenn**. Would you run through the numbers as to how we do not wind up with an even greater megatonnage and throw-weight disadvantage than we have now?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, clearly, in a public hearing, I am trying to avoid precisely what you are suggesting, but I would be very happy to explain it in a secure environment, and I think in a very convincing way, Senator, beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Senator **Glenn**. But all of these numbers are being made public, and I think the public has to understand these figures some time.

Secretary **Haig**. There has been speculation in public, but we have not made them public.

Senator **Glenn**. Senator Pell asked in one of his questions about giving us the details of this. You will give us the details to all of these questions in private session. Is that correct?

Secretary **Haig**. If you would like them, I am available to do that, but I think it is very important that we not indulge in public negotiations with the Soviet Union. I can assure you that the proposal that the President has put forward, does not create the consequences your question suggested. Rather, precisely the opposite, and dramatically different than anything SALT II even visualized.

Senator **Glenn**. I certainly am willing to be convinced. Mr. Chairman, I think we absolutely have to get into that, because without that kind of understanding of why we do not wind up with a greater megatonnage throw-weight disadvantage than we have now, we have to get into the figures. Otherwise, the whole thing does not make any sense at all.

Secretary **Haig**. Senator, your arithmetic is pretty good. We say we will reduce by one-third, and then only half of the residual force can be land-based. We are talking about very substantial reductions in the ICBM force of the Soviet Union, just as we are talking about our heavy suite, which is in sea-based systems, and substantial reductions there. Now, if they choose to keep their SS–18's and do away with other systems, then the amount of attrition is going to be all the more substantial to them.

Senator **Glenn**. If they keep their SS–18's, you said, the attrition will be more substantial?

Secretary **Haig**. Yes, they would have to give up everything else.

Senator **Glenn**. Why would that be? I do not understand it.

Secretary **Haig**. Because they would have to give up everything else. It is just that simple. We do have finite figures.

Senator **Glenn**. My time is up, and I am over now, but I must say this. Their throw-weight and megatonnage capacity would go up proportionally to the number of SS–18's they keep. It would have to.

Secretary HAIG. That is all right. They are going to have to get rid of other systems to get down to the totals.

Senator GLENN. But we do not have any megatonnage or throw-weight as part of the first phase. We would be reducing warheads. They would be reducing warheads. But the percent of megatonnage and throw-weight capacity would be going steadily up compared to ours.

Secretary HAIG. Let me assure you, Senator, that, indirectly, the consequences on throw-weight are substantial.

Senator GLENN. I hope so.

Secretary HAIG. I can assure you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Mr. Secretary, as I indicated to you, we have a few items that we need to take up when a live quorum is present. If there are any matters that are controversial or need discussion, we will just set those aside then, but if we can take up, first, looking at the schedule of the business meeting, the ACDA authorization. This is an authorization for fiscal year 1982 of $18,268,000; for fiscal year 1983, $19,893,000; a provision on security clearances; antisatellite activities, authorizing the Agency to conduct research, development, and other studies in regard to all aspects of antisatellite activities; and to keep the name the same.

Is there any discussion on that? Are we ready for a vote?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The second one would be the African Development Fund. Is there any objection to moving then en bloc, or do you want a separate vote on each?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The African Development Fund is simply a total African Development Fund replenishment of $1,060,000,000 over a 3-year period. The proposed U.S. share is $150 million, or 14.2 percent. It is a decrease from 16.5 percent. Japan has increased to 13.3 percent. So there is good movement there. The ICA authorization is also on the agenda. The detail on that is under Tab C.

In the six-member working committee that we had present, they unanimously approved the Percy-Pell proposals as outlined there that we cut $75 million in excess and radio construction, and so forth. Then we discussed use of English-teaching program fees, basic salary rates for senior Foreign Service, and performance pay. Senator Pell thoughtfully agreed to cover that in the report language, and make a decision subsequently when we have more facts on it. Is there any objection to considering those en bloc then?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. All those in favor, say aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Those opposed, nay.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is unanimously carried. We will keep the polling open for Senators who are not here. We do have a live quorum present. We have one proposed amendment that I would like to move in the

Central American resolutions, to substitute the 1962 language, and it is in front of you. It has been there for the language in the resolved part of the Central American resolution, omitting the language, "any other activity which poses a serious offensive military threat to the national security of the United States" and substituting the original 1962 language.

So there is no misunderstanding about it, that language says, "any other externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States."

Senator PELL. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, but what are you reading from?

The CHAIRMAN. I believe there is in front of you a memorandum entitled "Committee Resolution on Caribbean and Central America." On the next to the last page, it is Paragraph I(a), and it substitutes the original 1962 resolution language. It was the feeling of the committee at the time we were marking this up that that language was a little smoother, but there has been some misunderstanding about it. There is no intention to change the intent of that language, so we might just as well revert to the original language.

Senator PELL. I would not want to move directly on this without a little bit of discussion here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We will set that aside.

Senator Mathias, we will go back to our hearing with the Secretary.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I hope you will invite us to one of your business meetings one time.

Secretary HAIG. I hope I am attributed to the quorum, Senator.

[General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as you have already seen, your statement this morning will generate a lot of questions, but I think the tone of it, the thrust of it, will be very welcome; not only here, but around the world. I think it may even offer some hope to the people of the world, and particularly to the young people of the world, that they may have a future after all, and that is an extremely important thing. I know that you weighed each word as you wrote it, and I think we have to weigh each word as we have heard it.

There is a lot of significant thought conveyed. Your second point, for example, the point that an agreement must be based on the principle of equality, I read as an important point which will perhaps lessen fears in Europe and in other parts of the world that we are in fact seeking superiority. I know you meant exactly what you said in this statement.

Today, I assume, is the end of the beginning of the administration's move toward nuclear negotiations, and it is the end of the review that has gone forward since January 21, 1981, in studying the whole concept of arms control. What will be the administration's policy with respect to both SALT I compliance and SALT II compliance during this era of negotiation?

Secretary HAIG. At this juncture, Senator, we intend to comply by those provisions, providing the Soviet Union does likewise.

Senator MATHIAS. Now, that means that to comply with SALT I, we will have to dismantle another Polaris submarine when the U.S.S. *Michigan* puts to sea some time perhaps next month, very shortly. Are we prepared to do that?

Secretary HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. I am personally glad to have that assurance. Do you see any difficulty with observing SALT I and SALT II? Does this interfere, in your view, with any military strategy that the administration might propose or might want to carry out?

Secretary HAIG. No, I think both the force proposals that the President has approved for the enhancement of our defense capabilities in the strategic area, and the arms control proposals we have put forward are interrelated: Each element is compatible with the other, and both clearly evolved together. The area that I think has raised concern, and I may be anticipating a question, is the studies associated with antiballistic missile development. These studies do not violate the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Should they arrive at conclusions that would be counter to the specific language of that treaty, that treaty itself provides procedures for amendments.

Senator MATHIAS. Senator Glenn asked whether the Soviet Union had been acting in a way which was at least not inconsistent with the terms of SALT II, and you said in a general way, yes, but what about SALT I? If we are going to dismantle a Polaris submarine, what has been the record of the Soviet Union with respect to dismantling systems that they were required to dismantle under SALT I?

Secretary HAIG. There have been some questions on timing of Soviet compliance with respect to both missiles and submarines. The U.S.S.R. has already dismantled some nine submarines, for example, and to the best of our knowledge, they are generally complying with the provisions of existing agreements. There may be a variance in the specific date of the modernization step versus the retirement step.

Senator MATHIAS. But, in substance, they have complied with the terms? They have actually dismantled ships?

Secretary HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. The President in his speech at Eureka College referred to verification procedures to insure compliance. Would you anticipate procedures that may go beyond phase I of START? If we are counting warheads and launchers, the existing procedures might be satisfactory, but if we, say, want to worry about reload capabilities, then we might need a great deal more, and that might be very difficult to negotiate, would it not?

Secretary HAIG. We think something beyond purely national technical means is going to be required, but I do not want to get any more specific than that. That gets to the question of Soviet attitudes on the subject of verification, which has been a very difficult subject for them. You will recall that in SALT II, for example, we were genuinely concerned about the Soviet response which was that they would provide us with the telemetry data we need to verify the provisions of the agreement generating assurance.

I think we are going to have to deal with this subject forthrightly and clearly, but I do not believe it is an insurmountable problem.

Senator MATHIAS. As you have described our proposal, half of all warheads, both American and Soviet, only half, could be deployed on land-based missiles.

Secretary **Haig.** [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator **Mathias.** We would not have any particular problem with meeting that, would we?

Secretary **Haig.** Well, not that specific provision, but the overall reductions will require substantial reductions for the United States as well as for the Soviet Union.

Senator **Mathias.** But that particular provision would be more onerous on the Soviet Union, wouldn't it?

Secretary **Haig.** Yes, because we are focusing on the most destabilizing weapons systems. We consider land-based ICBM's, with their first-strike, hard target kill capability, to be the most destabilizing elements of strategic nuclear forces capability.

Senator **Mathias.** But the question is whether it is so onerous that it raises the threshold beyond the point of credibility. What is your judgment on that?

Secretary **Haig.** Our judgment on that, Senator, is this.

I won't delude you, these are tough proposals that require major reductions on both sides. Clearly, they are not going to be easy for the Soviet Union to accept. But they do further the objective of limiting the most destabilizing systems, an enhancement of the objectives which are of concern to the Soviets as well as to the United States.

I suppose that over the years the Soviets have been very concerned about our submarine-launched systems because these systems are less vulnerable, and in the period ahead they are going to have accuracies approaching that of land-based systems. So, there are compensations to the Soviet Union for these mutual reductions.

In the process of negotiating these proposals, I think that will become increasingly clear to them. But it also underlines another factor, which I mentioned in my introductory statement. We need to continue with the modernization efforts that the President has put forward in our defense program: Deployment of the Trident, the D–5 missile, the B–1 bomber. These are absolutely crucial to our hopes for meaningful arms control, meaningful arms reductions.

Senator **Mathias.** Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman.** Thank you, Senator Mathias.

Mr. Secretary, if you would indulge us for just 1 more minute, Senator Pell is now ready to move adoption of the amendment to the committee resolution on the Caribbean and Central America.

Senator **Pell.** I move the language that was put forward by the chairman as a substitute for lines 12 and 13 on page 4 of Senate Joint Resolution 158.

The **Chairman.** You have heard the motion.

Senator **Glenn.** I second.

The **Chairman.** The motion has been seconded.

All those in favor, say aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

The **Chairman.** Those opposed, nay.

[No response.]

The **Chairman.** It is unanimously carried. Let it be recorded that we do have a live quorum present.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, please record me as present. I want to look at this some more and reserve my rights.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Your rights for any further discussion on the floor and so forth will be reserved.

Are we then ready to move the adoption of the resolution itself?

Senator Pell, would you care to make a motion?

Senator PELL. I move adoption of S. J. Res. 158, a resolution expressing the policy of the Government of the United States with regard to the Government of Cuba, as amended.

The CHAIRMAN. I am reserving your rights again, Senator Helms, exactly as you have stated.

You have heard the motion.

All those in favor, say aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

The CHAIRMAN. Those opposed?

Senator HELMS. Present.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms has voted present.

We appreciate again, Senator Helms, your allowing the committee to act on this motion. We do have nine members present.

Thank you very much.

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your indulgence.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if talks were to take place, who would be the American negotiator on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks?

Secretary HAIG. The START negotiator will be Lt. Gen. Ed Rowny, (ret.).

As you know, the INF negotiator is Paul Nitze.

Senator SARBANES. So General Rowny would be our lead negotiator.

What is Secretary Rostow's involvement in the negotiating process?

Secretary HAIG. Gene, of course, is the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is the day-to-day link with the bureaucracy, although the overall negotiations come within the purview of the Secretary of State.

Senator SARBANES. But it would be General Rowny who would be on the scene, and would be the chief negotiator, is that correct?

Secretary HAIG. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. I was interested in the point Senator Glenn asked about, that the administration had abandoned SALT II and had so informed the Soviet Union. When did we inform the Soviets of the abandonment of SALT II?

Secretary HAIG. I don't want to single out one particular day, but in the meetings that I have had with Gromyko, I made it very clear that we were not going to go on with SALT II. That has been very clear in the discussions that I have had with the Soviet Ambassador here in Washington, too.

Senator SARBANES. Was it also clear in those discussions, however, that we would adhere to the limitations contained in the SALT II Treaty if the Soviet Union adhered to the limitations? Does that rise to the level of an understanding between ourselves and the Soviet Union?

Secretary HAIG. It has been stated by both sides publicly, and it clearly has been a guiding principle adhered to by both sides, and I hope it will continue to be.

Senator SARBANES. Well, is the difference between the situation as it would have been had SALT II in effect and the current situation the fact that the requirement to stand down some of the systems, which the Soviets would have had to do under a verified SALT II, that has not applied. Is that correct?

Secretary HAIG. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. But the other limitations have applied thus far. Is that correct?

Senator HAIG. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. Well, what are the flaws in SALT II that would have been such a serious problem for us if, in fact, we are adhering to the limitations of SALT II?

Secretary HAIG. Well, the basic problem with SALT II, Senator, I would put into three categories. First, the verification question we have already discussed, especially the telemetry question, and the unacceptable or undesirable position that the Soviet Union has taken on that subject. Second, and most important of all, is the destabilizing aspects of the SALT II agreement, which permitted the retention of substantial numbers of large Soviet ICBM's with a first strike hard target kill capability which we consider to be very destabilizing.

Third is the broad strategic risks associated with possible Soviet breakout by additional MIRV'ing at the time of the termination of SALT II in 1985. This could have placed the United States at a totally unacceptable disadvantage, so we felt we had to devise a new approach.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think we have a degrade means of verification available to us under the President's proposal, if it should become the applicable agreement?

Secretary HAIG. We feel it is within our grasp, and within—I will not call it the state-of-the-art, but—the general dialog that we have had with the Soviet Union on this subject, and we are confident we can arrive at very acceptable and credible verification arrangements, yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. You think we now have available, so to speak, the external technology to assure verification under the proposal that we have made?

Secretary HAIG. Under national technical means?

Senator SARBANES. Yes.

Secretary HAIG. Not exclusively. It will involve other considerations, but I prefer not to get into the details of it.

Senator SARBANES. I could not hear you.

Secretary HAIG. It would involve other considerations in the verification area to supplement purely national technical means.

Senator SARBANES. You say that one of your criteria is that an agreement must lead to substantial reductions. I take it that precluding further escalation is not an acceptable criterion for an agreement.

Secretary HAIG. We believe that our concerns can best be made through a whole new approach to arms control, an approach that visualizes and indeed requires reductions in levels of armament. Of course, one of our problems with SALT II was, it did neither. It not only did not get the kinds of reductions that we felt were justified by the international environment, but it also permitted asymmetries in strategic forces that permitted the Soviet Union—and the United States for that matter—to continue unbridled growth, and, in the Soviet case, especially in the most destabilizing area. So, we would have rejected SALT II on either ground.

Senator **Sarbanes**. That is not my question. My question is whether a criterion that precluded further escalation is a satisfactory criterion.

Secretary **Haig**. Not if it involved the freezing of the existing imbalances. I say this for several reasons, while understanding the logic of those who put forth such proposals. It does several things. It is a very bad precedent. It means that the United States is willing to accept an agreement per se that relegates us to an inferior position. Somebody laughingly called it the other day the "quit while you are behind" option.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Is that the position you think we are in now?

Secretary **Haig**. I think in certain categories, clearly.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, overall, is that the position we are in now?

Secretary **Haig**. The President has stated, the intelligence community has confirmed, and the Department of Defense and CIA agree, that the United States is in an increasingly disadvantageous position in a number of key areas.

Senator **Sarbanes**. If you have an escalation of nuclear weapons, to what degree does that complicate the verification question with respect to the next generation of technology?

Secretary **Haig**. It is very hard to say, Senator. Clearly, with MIRVing, the verification task has been complicated. If one looks at other units of measure, such as yield and throw-weight, then it becomes all the more complicated. I would not, however, want to draw the conclusion that it makes it more difficult to achieve verifiable agreements because there is, of course, the possibility of technological breakthroughs in verification capabilities. Additional technological competence should go a long way toward dealing with the challenge posed by development of new weapons.

Senator **Sarbanes**. That is my concern. I guess the question, to put it even more directly, is, is there not the very real possibility that if escalation takes place to a new level of technology, the ability to verify will not be there, and therefore an agreement will not be there? Obviously, you have to be able to verify an agreement. Is there not a very real danger that if we do not preclude the escalation, technology will move to a level at which verification is not then possible?

Secretary **Haig**. No; I think that has a Malthusian overtone that worries me. I think technology in warfare has always been compensated for by countering technology. I do not think I would take it as a given that verification is made less feasible by technological advances, because verification becomes more feasible through the same technological advances applied to that objective.

Senator **Sarbanes**. So you do not regard that as a problem?

Secretary **Haig**. No. It depends on what wave of the technology cycle you are in.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I see that my time is up.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I suppose it is a little early to become overly impressed with either the cheerleading or the criticism of whatever is about to unfold. I have had several calls of apprehension about the President's proposal, and my answer is that in the ultimate two-thirds of the Senate will decide what happens to this, but I think it is a little futile, as Mr. Churchill used to say, to get into too much detail, but I do have a couple of questions, and I will make them brief, that have relevant to what we are talking about.

The first is this. I want to know if you know, and if you do know, to what degree of assurance can you speak, that there are or are not Soviet-built or Soviet-supplied nuclear weapons in Cuba.

Secretary Haig. I have seen no current intelligence that would suggest that there are any nuclear weapons in Cuba.

Senator Helms. So you do not believe that there are nuclear weapons in Cuba supplied by the Soviets or anybody else? Is that what you are saying?

Secretary Haig. What I say, Senator, is, I have seen no hard intelligence, nor even less than hard intelligence, from our intelligence family that would suggest that here are such weapons in Cuba.

Senator Helms. So you will rest easy on that situation?

Secretary Haig. To the degree that one can rest easily with the best assessments of our intelligence community. [General laughter.]

Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, I am going to get the transcript, and I am going to look at the semantics of this over and over again.

Let me get a little more definitive now about something else. Instead of taking a sleeping pill the other night, I read a document with which I am sure you are familiar. It is a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. That has been signed, I think, by every Latin American nation. Maybe one or two did not. Cuba did not. Am I correct about that?

Secretary Haig. The Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty? No; Cuba has not signed.

Senator Helms. Now, there are two protocols to this treaty signed by the United States and Great Britain—you are aware of that, of course—among other nations. Now, a question has been raised to me, and I pass it along to you, and I will be interested in how you respond to it. Are you confident that there are no nuclear weapons on any of those British vessels in the South Atlantic?

Secretary Haig. I do not know the answer to that question, Senator.

Senator Helms. You do not think it is an important question?

Secretary Haig. I think it is a very important question that should not be aired publicly.

Senator Helms. Well, then, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have an answer to the question privately.

The Chairman. I am sure you can get an answer privately.

Senator Helms. Oh, no, I am talking about an executive session of this committee.

The Chairman. The Secretary is to have lunch with the President at 12 noon, as I understand it.

Senator Helms. Well, Mr. Chairman, with all due respect to the

Secretary and the President and their luncheon plans, I want to know the answer to this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I doubt that your request will take precedence over a preestablished luncheon date with the President.

Is it true that you are having lunch with the President at noon? [General laughter.]

I ask that question because that is what I was notified.

Secretary HAIG. I certainly hope I do, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Do you know what you are having for lunch? [General laughter.]

Secretary HAIG. I do not know the answer to that question any more than I do to the question you just asked.

Senator HELMS. Your intelligence just is not working this morning, is it? [General laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, in all seriousness, I do want to know the answer to that question, and I think the committee ought to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. If we finish our round, and I would like to yield a couple of minutes to Senator Specter, who has been sitting here very patiently this morning, and we are happy to have him with us, if we have time, we can certainly go into the room behind us and have a little closed session, but it depends on whether there are other questions that Senators want to ask in open session as well. Certainly, the Secretary will make arrangements, without any question, to come up and talk to us on whatever classified basis you would want on that particular question.

Senator HELMS. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I was going to start off by commending you on the Falklands. When I saw your nonresponse to Senators Pell and Biden, I will forgo the opportunity. Let me, if I might, run through a few observations and give you a chance to respond, assuming that my voice holds up. I think if you take the position that you, in essence, allow SALT II to be dead, while in fact you live with it; and you end up pursuing your own treaty, that is, START, which I think is better than SALT; it is a riverboat gamble, to use the majority leader's famous expression regarding economic policy. START is indeed better than SALT, but SALT is better than START if START fails. Basically that is the gamble that you take.

Now, my understanding is that you talked about the World Series previously, and two different teams. My understanding is that teams in this World Series basically divide as follows: Mr. Burt, Secretary Haig, and the Joint Chiefs on team A, and Mr. Perle, Secretary Weinberger, and Mr. Rostow on team B. Team A is interested in missiles and warheads, and team B is fascinated with the issue of throw-weight. Team A won the President's nod.

Now, the question in my mind is whether in essence team A won the battle and may yet lose the war, if team B, having been in essence rejected by the President, seeks to sabotage the process in its own quiet, nonfingerprinted way. I happen to think, for example, that Secretary Weinberger, with his emphasis on throw-weight, is not intent on arms control. That kind of treaty would have been viewed by the Soviets as a monumental fraud, and I think appropriately so. If in essence you are for something that deals totally with your opponent's strength rather than a kind of parity proposal, any opponent will react negatively, and question your intent.

My final observation is this. We talked about the window of vulnerability. It is like the Soviets having a definite margin of superiority, a point which I notice you danced around rather delicately. I think there is a window of opportunity here. Now, you were prominent when Mr. Nixon went to China. I have often wondered what would have happened if a President McGovern had gone to China. What would the reaction have been?

If I had to pass an arms reduction treaty, and I give you the benefit of the doubt on this—I think it is better than what I thought you would come up with—I would have two players. I would have Brezhnev on the other side, in his declining years, wanting something for history. And I would want a President whose right flank is protected. Well, Senator Helms is gone, so I will leave that in some question. [General laughter.]

So, the Reagan-Brezhnev combination is the ideal combination to get a treaty through the Senate. Now, these are my questions. One, are you worried about team B's undermining the proposal? Second, what happens if Brezhnev dies, and therefore you do not have anyone in the Soviet Union who is capable of resolution of the issue? Three, what exactly does Secretary Weinberger have in mind? You can get to the last one first, if you wish.

Secretary HAIG. Let me get to the premises of your question first, Senator, because I would not want them left unchallenged on the record, and that was that START is better than SALT, but that if you take the ingredients of SALT, that is probably better than nothing. The answer to that is, that it serves our purposes to abide by provisions of existing SALT agreements, provided the Soviets do likewise. That should not be misinterpreted to make a Cadillac out of an Edsel. That is to go back to the ball game theory.

Senator TSONGAS. Speaking of technological breakthroughs. [General laughter.]

Secretary HAIG. The other aspect of what I guess I would call public speculation about in-house policymaking, I think you know as well as I do. While it is tantalizing to indulge in it, and it makes awfully good print in this town, it does not serve any useful purpose, and I would not be inclined in any way to discuss it.

Now, on the window of vulnerability, clearly from the outset, one of the main concerns that we have had in formulating our approach to START has been how to deal with the destabilizing aspects of nuclear weaponry. It is indeed those aspects of the weapons which has fostered the growth in nuclear armaments. There has been a constant effort by one side or the other to provide invulnerable deterrent forces—as the United States has sought to do—or to maintain the capability for a first strike blow as the Soviet Union has sought. The Soviet Union's density of weaponry, both as a consequence of the anomalies of technology differences between the two sides, has led to increased vulnerability of our forces.

Senator **Tsongas**. Mr. Secretary, I did not challenge the window of vulnerability. I was simply using that as a challenge to the opportunity of the Reagan-Brezhnev combination, which I suggest is time limited politically.

Secretary **Haig**. I do not think anyone can answer the question that you put forward. There have been different patterns of transition in the Soviet regime over the years. On one occasion, there has been an heir apparent who immediately moved in, and was endowed with substantial decisionmaking power. In other instances, the transition has been more unsure and evolutionary, and there has been a fragmentation of authority. I do not think anyone could honestly suggest that Mr. Brezhnev has not from time to time convincingly portrayed a desire for progress in this area. So, that makes what you say not altogether outrageous.

Senator **Tsongas**. That is the nicest thing you have ever said about me. [General laughter.]

Secretary **Haig**. Well, no. Had you thought to compliment me on the Falklands. [General laughter.]

I did not mean to suggest by not responding to Senator Pell or Senator Biden that I took it flippantly. I just think that the thing has not been resolved yet.

Senator **Tsongas**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Tsongas, you are a hard act to follow this morning.

I would like to say, Mr. Secretary, certainly as others have expressed here, that both the President's bold proposals and his speech Sunday, and your speaking to them, I think, are very important to us. I think it is a time in which we have to be as honest as possible in understanding the intricacies and the arcaneness of some of the debate on strategic weaponry and strategy, but if we are going to accomplish anything, it seems to me we have to start forward with great earnestness.

One of the problems, it seems to me, with SALT II is that it went on for 7 years, through three Presidents. It almost defeated itself with its own strengths and weaknesses. I think if we are going to proceed, and to see how this particular proposal works, we are not going to know until we sit down and talk. In line with that, I would want to ask you, because you yourself have said you believe President Brezhnev was quite ill, seriously ill, do you view this as any drawback to the beginning, and serious beginning, of negotiations?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, first, Senator, let me tell you that I noticed some press speculation that I had said such a thing. I do not think that was the thrust of my statement, primarily because I do not know, and second, because it would be inappropriate to make such a comment in the context in which it was reported. It is clear to everyone that Mr. Brezhnev has had some health problems recently.

Now, I do not think we have the luxury of developing our arms control strategy or our substantive positions in such a way that we are dominated by these kinds of concerns, important as they may be. Our approach must be based on the vital security needs of this country and our allies. It has taken us 16 months to put together as foolproof and sound a set of proposals as we have. Nevertheless, we probably will learn in the subsequent negotiations and analysis that humans are imperfect, and that there are other adjustments and modifications that are called for. I think the answer to your question is that we are putting forth proposals which are fair, just, and serious, which involve substantial reductions, which meet not only the vital interests of the United States and the world at large, but the Soviet Union as well.

As to what the Soviet leadership evolution will turn up, we must hope for the best and press ahead.

Senator **Kassebaum**. When do you envision serious negotiations would begin?

Secretary **Haig**. I would hope by the end of June. It might slip a week or two, but I think the Soviets have been waiting for some time for this, and they are prepared, and will respond rapidly.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I would like to follow on a little with some of Senator Glenn's questioning, because I am having a hard time understanding the rationale for that particular reduction. I am wondering, since the Soviets' great strength is in their land-based ICBM's—75 percent, I believe, to our 25 percent—this is a formula perhaps that you have devised in which it will be of some incentive to them to agree to because they can switch to their sea-based missiles, in fact, would have to. Is that right?

Secretary **Haig**. No; we do not visualize there would have to be any switching at all, Senator. What we visualize is substantial reductions on both sides. The idea is not to replace one system that we reduce by greater emphasis on another, but rather to get substantial reductions—about one-third—in the number of nuclear warheads, and to focus specifically on land-based systems. Our proposal envisages a subceiling, if you will, to deal with this very destabilizing anomaly that now exists.

Senator **Kassebaum**. But this would significantly reduce our own force?

Secretary **Haig**. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Do you see this as encouraging the Soviets to build up their SLBM's?

Secretary **Haig**. No, not at all, because if they agree to the overall aggregate reduction, they would have to take even more off the other destabilizing systems or the land-based systems that they retain. It is not an incentive to build, and that is one of the reasons why substantial reductions were such an important aspect of our proposal.

It is not an incentive to cut in one area and build up in another.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Why would it not be?

Secretary **Haig**. Because the overall ceiling would require a 30-percent or one-third reduction.

Senator **Kassebaum**. And also the requirement that not more than half of it be land-based?

Secretary **Haig**. That is right. But within the figures with which they are dealing, it does not leave a large margin to then go build up in another area. That incentive is not there. The choice, which will be difficult, will be which land-based systems they select for deductions.

Senator **Kassebaum**. And since we are phasing out our Titan II's will we be able to count the Titan II's as far as our reduction?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, within existing restraints which we will live by, we have an MX which will be coming on line under the President's program, an MX system. We also have those existing systems such as the Minuteman and the Titans.

Senator **Kassebaum**. That we can reduce.

Secretary **Haig**. Yes.

Senator **Kassebaum**. The MX?

Secretary **Haig**. The MX will certainly be up for negotiation.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I would hope we would be more expeditious in the negotiations than the projected completion of the MX.

Secretary **Haig**. Well, let me tell you, it is vitally important that we have the MX in order to be able to negotiate credibly with the proposal we are putting forward, virtally important. Now, that does not mean that it has to be deployed in bulk. It means it must be approved and preparations proceed as rapidly as possible to implement the program we have asked for. That is not very different than what we have done under the INF proposals.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I see that my time is up. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Dodd.

Senator **Dodd**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony.

Let me, if I may, just ask a couple of brief questions that may perhaps be responded to very quickly.

As you have noted, the President has proposed a one-third reduction in land and sea based missile warheads. Would that reduction be from current warhead levels on each side or the level at the time the agreement was reached?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, basically it would be current.

Senator **Dodd**. It would be current?

Secretary **Haig**. Yes.

Senator **Dodd**. So you do not envision a race to build up in order to——

Secretary **Haig**. No.

Senator **Dodd** [continuing]. In the one-third reduction of missile warheads, is it deployed warheads or a reduction in warheads per se? In other words, including stockpiled warheads.

Secretary **Haig**. We are counting deployed.

Senator **Dodd**. Deployed warheads?

Secretary **Haig**. Yes, deployed warheads.

Senator **Dodd**. The throw-weight reduction, are you confident or are we confident enough of our data base on the actual throw-weights of various Soviet missiles in order to be able to verify a reduction in that particular category based on present data collection capabilities?

Secretary **Haig**. In throw-weight?

Senator **Dodd**. Yes.

Secretary **Haig**. Well, in phase I that is not a measure——

Senator **Dodd**. I understand that. It is in phase II.

Secretary **Haig**. At the current point in time, as a matter of fact, that had a considerable impact on the unit of measure we have settled on. There is some margin of error in the throw-weight category in terms of our ability to verify which would give us pause. Now, with technology, I would anticipate that error will narrow in the period ahead, as it historically has for a number of other units of measure.

Senator DODD. So you do not envision that really being a problem by the time we reach it?

Secretary HAIG. I would hope it would not be by the time we reach it. At least it would be constrained to acceptable limits of toleration, and there have been those judgments in the past.

Senator DODD. The last question I have for you is this. The President's proposal would reduce warheads on ballistic missiles. I did not note any mention of other types of missiles such as the cruise missile. We are discussing, of course, the bomber capability of carrying cruise missiles and surface ships and submarines as well.

Are you prepared to talk, bargain and negotiate about cruise missiles as well?

Secretary HAIG. Yes, as with aircraft, we anticipate dealing with these categories of weapons. The ground-base cruise missile, of course, is already being dealt with under our INF proposal.

We would deal with the other types of cruise missiles under START.

Senator DODD. We would not exclude them then.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very kindly.

Senator Specter, we are very happy to have you here and you may question the Secretary for just a few minutes.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to ask a question or two, and I shall be brief.

Mr. Secretary, some time ago I introduced a resolution, a sense of the Senate resolution, calling for summit talks between Preisdent Reagan and Soviet President Brezhnev, and when the Department of Defense authorization bill was laid down last week, I thought it relevant to put that on as an amendment to the bill because at the time we were being called upon to spend considerable sums for nuclear weapons.

I thought it germane to express our sense in a very modulated tone to call for the summit talks, and as you know from our discussion last Thursday morning, I agreed to carry over the consideration of that issue beyond the President's speech of Sunday. It is the order of business at 3 today when the DOD authorization bill will be laid down for an hour's debate and then a rollcall vote is currently planned.

My question is relating to the value of the summit discussion, with the word "summit" being avoided to a large extent, in the presentation of these issues because of the concern about building up expectations.

Isn't it of substantial value, if there is a commitment toward a summit, in terms of the President's personal participation with his skills as a negotiator and the qualities of insisting on force very much like President Nixon's movement toward Red China?

And secondly, doesn't the commitment toward a summit really put additional pressure on everyone to do the kind of preparation and lay the groundwork to have the realistic calculation of success which is the criteria which you are establishing before you to commit to a summit?

Secretary HAIG. Well, Senator, I think this is a difficult question and very sincere people—and very well-meaning people—could come down on either side of the issue. As a general rule, and that is a matter of principle, as the Secretary of State and member of the executive branch, I generally prefer to be without such resolutions. However, there have been occasions when we not only welcomed them but actively worked to have them.

I do not necessarily put this issue in that category. I think the President has clearly made an expression of hope concerning Mr. Brezhnev's presence at the June disarmament conference in New York. That does not appear likely, but it was a sincere expression by the President that if Mr. Brezhnev were there, he would be eager and happy to meet with him.

There have been subsequent Soviet proposals that suggest that perhaps October might be a more acceptable time for a summit. I think a clear objective of the President with regard to this issue will be to have a summit just as soon as it will make a constructive contribution to the international environment, to American interests and to improving East-West relationships.

I think he is best able to make that judgment and would therefore hope that he would be permitted to do so as a legitimate exercise of his constitutional responsibility. My concern is that such a resolution, for whatever reason, might be misread in Moscow as legislative pressure on the President. Realistically, it is the President's responsibility and obligation to call for a summit at the proper time.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Secretary, mightn't there be some help to the process by having the Senate express itself as approving a summit talk and a movement in this direction considering the Senate's rejection or its inclination toward SALT II?

Secretary HAIG. Again, that is a difficult question. I have not thought about it in the context of that question. I again say I think the President is on the public record with respect to summitry. He has made himself very clear as have the Russians. Both have also made it very clear that they don't want summitry for summitry's sake; they want it when there will be a carefully prepared agenda with the prospects for progress.

I admit that doesn't answer your question, but it tilts me in the direction of suggesting that it is not necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Specter, perhaps I could just clarify again why I object so strongly to that amendment going on this bill, and so does Senator Tower. We have 13 resolutions before this committee, which has jurisdiction over foreign policy. That is a military authorization bill. If the Specter amendment goes on the bill, then why shouldn't the 12 others get theirs added, all involving relationships with the Soviet Union, arms talk and potentials of nuclear warfare? So from a procedural standpoint we object to it.

Second, I put this question to Secretary Haig in open session a number of times and received his commitment to this committee that he supported a summit meeting sometime in 1982, that he would put the full force of his office behind bringing about such a meeting. That commitment has been totally fulfilled. We have taken the initiative. They are now in the defensive position of saying no, we can't be sure we would be ready in June, but we can subsequently have a meeting.

So I think it is set as a matter of policy. I appreciate your deep interest in a subject which has interested me since a year ago November when I discussed it with President Brezhnev. We have been working on it because it is inconceivable to me that we can have as many meetings as the President has been able to hold in 16 months and not have a meeting between the two men who have the power to push the buttons, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and talk about how we would prevent that holocaust from happening. They must talk about that subject.

I share your concern but I do not think that it belongs as an amendment on the military authorization bill. I think the policy has been established and set.

Mr. Secretary, I know that you must go. You have been commended by our colleagues on the minority side this morning. I would like to speak on behalf of the strong consensus of the majority that not only have we appreciated what you have done to move us forward now to this point in arms talks on strategic weaponry with the Soviet Union, which has been a subject you have been deeply involved in for many months now, but you have moved us forward on that, moved us forward on the summit and you have conducted what I consider, and I have said in other places, that we have not only been honest brokers in the South Atlantic but we have been creative. We have had our own proposals, we have been mediators, we have done everything possible to substitute diplomacy for military action.

Again, your own unique background of 37 or 38 years in the military service has uniquely equipped you as Secretary of State and spokesman for the President to engage in this tireless effort without regard to your personal time in order to mediate that situation and bring about a diplomatic solution.

We commend you very much for what you have done.

Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, on April 28 I sent a letter asking quite a number of questions about SALT. I have not seen your reply yet. I understand that it was sent, but basically I understand that it also said we would reply to these things at the meeting. I have not received a detailed reply.

Secretary HAIG. All you had was an interim reply, Senator. We just received this at the end of last week.

Senator GLENN. It was sent April 28.

Secretary HAIG. There are a number of technical questions.

Senator GLENN. I would like to have those as soon as possible so we could have it as part of the committee record here this morning.

[The material referred to is classified and is being retained in committee files.]

Senator GLENN. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if there is any way we could continue this or have a closed session. We didn't get into some of the figures that we want to get into this morning. Can we do this in an executive session?

Secretary HAIG. Senator, let me suggest this. Let me have Mr. Burt meet with you and provide you a technical briefing.

Senator GLENN. I would like to do so but I think other committee members would like to be there.

Senator **Mathias**. I think other members would like to join in that.

Senator **Glenn**. I would be happy to see Mr. Burt or anyone else privately, but I am sure other committee members would want to participate.

The **Chairman**. We will schedule that and also a session with you or whomever you designate to answer the question put by Senator Helms.

Senator **Glenn**. One further clarification. I understood you to say that the counts we are talking about here would only be on deployed missiles. In other words, they or we could stockpile as many as we wanted in any way, shape or form and those would not count in the agreements we are making; is that correct?

Secretary **Haig**. No, that is really not quite it. The answer to the question was that the 30 percent or one-third reduction uses deployed warheads as a unit of measure.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. This is a very vital point, it seems to me.

Secretary **Haig**. Sure, you cannot verify the others.

Senator **Glenn**. Are we talking about the total inventory that the Soviets have and we have or are we not talking about the total inventory?

Secretary **Haig**. Well, clearly one of the understandings that we have to deal with in negotiations of this kind is to have your assurances that we are not doing one another in by digging holes and putting vast resources there. That is one of the questions of verification that is so sensitive. In terms of our unit of measure for a negotiated solution, however, we are talking about deployed warheads with the assumption that there isn't any——

Senator **Glenn**. But we didn't get into the units of measure. That was something I wanted to get into in the next round. That is a whole different area, whether we are going to start a new unit of measure. We are talking in this particular thing you are proposing of warheads. That is a unit of measure.

Secretary **Haig**. Warheads and launchers.

Senator **Glenn**. But the warheads we are talking about this morning are only deployed, then.

Secretary **Haig**. Deployed for purposes of our counting, now, not for purposes of mutual understanding on our relative balances. You clearly cannot have that kind of situation.

Senator **Glenn**. That is the reason I would like to make them part of whatever we are agreeing to. I don't want to buy a pig in a poke, thinking we are buying one limitation or one reduction and meanwhile there isn't any real reduction to it, it is just counting one little part of what they could do or we could do.

Which way is it?

Secretary **Haig**. You are really talking about breakout and putting curbs on breakout, et cetera.

Senator **Glenn**. I sure am, exactly, and I don't know that I got an answer exactly yet.

Secretary **Haig**. You will get one.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

This hearing will recess until 2 this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Glenn, as long as you are here, why don't you make your statement, please?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought I was going to be on down the line a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GLENN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure we all share an abiding interest in improving the prospects for attaining a meaningful arms reduction. But I do not believe that Congress, with its various freeze proposals, has done all that it could to promote a comprehensive and workable, and I stress the word "workable," arms control policy. All of the freeze proposals advanced so far have established a very desirable end, an end that we all can agree to, the reduction of nucler weaponry, and one that you, Mr. Chairman, and I have been working on together—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act—for about some 5 years now. We go back about 5 years working toward that end.

Mr. Chairman, none of the proposals, the freeze proposals, so far have established the means by which we can attain that desirable end. If we truly want arms reduction and not just satisfying rhetoric, we must have a reasonable and step-by-step plan for bringing about that prayed-for end. That is why I have put forward a practical and a five-point package that starts with what is doable right now with nuclear arms limitations.

I would invite your attention to five key words that I will discuss: limitations, reductions, non-proliferation, involves other nuclear weapons states, and seeks conventional arms control.

Let me go back to the first of those. On limitations, I would seek to freeze testing, production, and deployment of strategic weapons at the SALT II levels through 1985, and thereby formally agree to the limitations it took us almost 7 years to negotiate, and which we have been observing de facto for the past 2 years. Since this would require the Soviet Union to fulfill their earlier pledge to reduce their strategic arsenal by 250 to 300 launchers within 1 year, we would find out very early on if the Soviets are as interested in freeze discussions as they say they are.

Because pressures are already building on both sides to abandon their observance of other SALT II provisions, it is unlikely that our unofficial arrangement with the Soviet Union can last much longer. Since we now have much improved means to verify Soviet compliance with the treaty, Senate ratification is much more likely now than it was in 1979. Unless we proceed, and soon, to ratify the SALT Treaty, or negotiate an executive agreement that formalizes the SALT II reductions and limitations, I think we face the very real prospect of a breakdown in the arms control process and another round of superfluous strategic weapons purchases.

Second, Mr. Chairman, after locking in the SALT II limitations, we should then seek an agreement on balanced incremental reductions in strategic weaponry. Such reductions should preserve deterrence and, of course, be adequately verifiable. We had hearings this morning, of course, in this room, with the Secretary of State, in which we discussed what the President's proposal would be. I think we would all agree there are a considerable number of additional questions that we have that we want to get answered before we think that that is a truly workable plan. We made the start on getting that information this morning, and I was particularly appreciative of the chairman's agreement that we should have a closed door session on that later on so that we can flush out some of the things that were presented to us this morning.

So, after freeze and locking in SALT II limitations, the second step is reductions in strategic weaponry, and letting those talks start, but there are other things that have to be considered, Mr. Chairman, besides just limitation and reduction. Therefore, third, while these limitations and reductions between the superpowers are being negotiated, I think they must be accompanied by new and better efforts toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to more and smaller nations around the world.

I believe the President should give top priority to finding more effective ways for the nuclear supplier nations to halt the worldwide sale of equipment used for making nuclear weapons.

Fourth, the United States should attempt to bring other nations possessing nuclear weapons into these arms control negotiations and related activities at the earliest appropriate time. Obviously, no long-term freeze or reductions agreement will be acceptable to the Soviet Union if France and Britain, for example, are not ultimately included.

Fifth, we should address the question of arms control in its totality, by a continuation of good faith negotiations to reduce intermediate range and other nuclear weapons deployed on the European continent, by also emphasizing expanded United States-Soviet negotiations to reduce conventional armaments in Europe, and by adopting a sensible policy of restraining conventional arms transfers to the third world.

I disagree strongly with those who argue that the Soviets have no incentive to participate in the negotiations called for by my proposal. The Soviets have the same incentives we do. No one profits from an unconstrained arms race. We both risk the horrors of a nuclear war.

Mr. Chairman, I would say that this five-point plan, the first four of which are very specific actions that we can take, are a reasonable approach to this whole problem of a nuclear weapons freeze. A summary would be, put in a limit at the SALT II levels, which is what we are living with now, and which we have been living with for some time. As we had testimony here this morning from the Secretary of State, neither side has broken out of that mold, and he is going to send us more information on that. Then, go on to the reduction talks which the President has proposed.

Therefore, first, limit, then reduce, but while we are doing that, let's prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. It will do us little good to get agreement from the big powers to reduce if we find that only in the interim period of time we have spread weapons to more and more nations around the world.

No. 4 is to involve the other weapons states, because without their being worked into these negotiations at some time, there are not likely to be any serious or large-scale reductions.

Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Glenn.

Do you have a question, Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. No questions, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the realities at this point is that the administration can at this point pretty well dictate the terms of the arms control discussions. I happen to have supported SALT II and support you in your efforts with regard to SALT II. But let me raise Secretary Haig's position and give you a chance to respond to it, because I do not think it is totally without merit, unfortunately.

His argument is that if you try in essence to pass SALT II, you will dredge up the old debate. Congress is more conservative now than it was then. You will have a bloody affair. You will probably pass it, but then again, you might not. You will expend your political capital in pursuit of a treaty that already is being observed de facto. In essence, you will be weaker for the larger battle to be waged over START. So why not have a sort of winking compliance with SALT II, and get on with START, given the fact that START is certainly more comprehensive than I would have expected the administration to come forth with?

That is my interpretation of his position. I would just give you a chance to react to it.

Senator GLENN. I think that is an accurate interpretation of Secretary Haig's position as he expressed it this morning. My view of that is this. I think we are liable to spend many years negotiating the START provisions that they have proposed. In fact, they go so far with it that I wonder whether START does not really mean stop in this case instead of start. If we cannot even get limitations, agreements already negotiated after 7 years, and agree to those, I think it is wishful thinking to think that we can probably go the next step and make the one-third reductions and get all the agreements from the Soviets which might even include onsite inspections and things like that, in order to get satisfactory verification.

I think it is unlikely we would be able to get that if we cannot even get limitations approved on both sides. I think the limitations is a doable thing. We spent 7 years negotiating that. It is sitting there now. Both sides are living with it, except for the fact that the Soviets have yet to reduce the 250 launchers that would be required under SALT II. To me, it just makes sense to start with a less restrictive idea of a limitation, just a cap, a maximum limit, and then proceed from that to try to scale down to the lower levels that would be called for in the President's position.

I do not disagree with the intention of the President, but I think the likelihood of making that huge, huge jump to that in a very short period of time is unlikely, and during that time period, I would like to see us lock in the limitations of SALT II, so neither side breaks out of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. May I just suggest, Senator Glenn, that we resume our regular order now? We can come back to you for questions after we have heard from our scheduled witnesses.

Senator Cranston, if you could hold up now, and follow after our other Senatorial guests, I would appreciate it.

Senator CRANSTON. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee is scheduled this afternoon to hear from Senators Hatfield and Kennedy, to be followed by testimony from our own committee members on their own resolutions. I want to commend both of you on accomplishing, together with Ground Zero, what I have long hoped—many of us have—would be accomplished, and yet it was done with an accelerated speed and widespread movement that we had not really predicted.

I think your book plus the introduction of the resolution has done a tremendous amount to educate and alert the general public to the danger we face, and we are very pleased to welcome you this afternoon. Senator Pell, do you have any comments?

Senator PELL. I have no comments, except I would join you in welcoming our colleagues, and congratulate them for taking the lead in this, which I think has given much to the field and to the Nation as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether we agree with the details or not, you have performed a remarkable service to the country, I believe. Senator Hatfield.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be placed in the record as a part of the record, and I would like to summarize or highlight some of the points in the statement.

Mr. Chairman, during the SALT II debate, I offered a reservation to the treaty that would call for a moratorium on all testing, production, and deployment of strategic nuclear weaponry. I felt at that time, as I do now, that a freeze with the Soviet Union would place us in a strong position to go about the business of diminishing and deescalating both nations nuclear arsenals.

I might say that at that time I do not think it caused a blip on the political screen. There was not significant interest either within the Senate or from the public at large.

When Senator Kennedy shared with me the results of many town hall meetings in New England States, and particularly raised the question of a joint introduction of a nuclear freeze at this time, it was my judgment that really Senator Kennedy and I were responding more to a popular demand than we were initiating an idea. This was an idea whose time had come. In the words of President Eisenhower, the people were demanding that the politicians and the Government step aside and let the people have peace.

I feel that basically what we have proposed is analogous to one in an elevator. If you are going up in an elevator, and you decide that you want to return to the ground level, one is required to stop the elevator before its direction can be reversed. That simple analogy has been, of course, used to calling this whole idea simplistic. It is simple, but not simplistic.

The fact is that we have to somehow stop the upward trend of the nuclear arms race before we can have some kind of meaningful reduction. The logic of those who want to continue to escalate the arms race at a point when we each have the equivalency of a million Hiroshima bombs totally escapes me. I have looked at it thoroughly, trying to find some element of logic in that argument. I have yet to find the logic.

I suppose we are all products of our environment and our experiences. I have shared with my colleagues in the Senate on frequent occasions an experience in my own life of having been in the streets, or what were left of the streets of Hiroshima a month after the bomb had been dropped in 1945, as part of a Navy contingent. That was a primitive bomb. The utter and total devastation that I viewed from the dropping of one bomb on a major Japanese city is something that has remained with me, and something that has caused me to pursue some of the thoughts and some of the ideas that I have pursued.

Mr. Chairman, let me say this to you. I think we have reached a time where we have multiple overkill. Additional warheads for the respective arsenals of the superpowers will only make the rubble bounce. If only you could have seen the utter devastation created by one primitive bomb, as I saw it, and realize what kind of multiple overkill we have now, you would agree that we are actually subjected to a numbers game by the Pentagon. They talk about the Soviet Union having some 2,000 warheads in Europe, and us having some 1,200 warheads in Europe, and out of that we are supposed to draw an opinion that we are inferior and the Soviet Union is totally superior. We have been dealing primarily with the numbers game.

When you consider that two of our nuclear submarines could destroy most major Russian cities, it certainly should be considered along with the specific number of warheads we have in Europe. In other words, let us consider the total arsenal.

Let me share with you two reasons why I am very strongly in support of this freeze. One is, I do not believe the Soviet Union is stupid enough to launch a first strike at this particular time. I do not think our policies are such that would lead us to that kind of stupid global suicidal move. You do not have to be a devotee of the author, who has written this very well-known and popular book on the earth and what the launching of nuclear weaponry would do. I think most scientists and physicians who have studied the case know that after the first launch of either superpower the auxiliary support facilities to sustain life would be so crippled and destroyed that for all intents and purposes life would disappear from this planet.

I think the Soviet Union has that understanding, and I think we have, but when I know, as I think you know, that in the last 20 months we had 147 miscommunications from our advanced warning system as to the possibility of a Soviet attack, I am more concerned about the accidental attack than I am about a strategic attack. That accidental attack could occur at any time. We live on the edge of the abyss.

I also am aware that when people like Colonel Quadhafi boast of building an Islamic bomb, and when we know that by the end of the century some 60 countries will have the capability of building some kind of nuclear weapon, if the superpowers have not been able to reach a stage of maturity to control their own arsenals, then what kind of influence will we have over the kind of governments typified by Colonel Qadhafi, governments that are irresponsible, governments like we had with Idi Amin in Uganda, people who are mentally unbalanced.

If such people have a capacity to build nuclear weaponry, we have created not only nuclear proliferated weapons problems, but we have proliferated a terrorist problem.

So, consequently, it seems to me that we are not running against the calendar on this. We are running against the clock. I think it is 5 minutes to eternity. That is where I think we are on the clock.

I heard the administration's counterproposal. I heard the administration's opposition. Let me say in all candor that I totally disagree with the administration, and feel somehow that after years of monopoly on atomic weapons, somehow we are going to drive the Soviet Union to the bargaining table with some kind of club. They either have not studied Soviet Government, Soviet history, or Soviet politics. The only time the Soviets are going to negotiate will be at a time when it is convenient and of some benefit to them.

I feel that this is the mutually beneficial moment of history. This is the golden moment of history when it is mutually beneficially not just to the Soviet Union and to the United States, but I think they are aware enough of the fact that it is a case for humanity. It is a matter that we are negotiating not between the superpowers, but for the salvation of humanity. That is where we are. They are part of that humanity. They understand that they are a part of that humanity. They have a bankrupt political pholosophy with which I totally disagree, but I think it is mutually beneficial to the Soviet Union to try to control their nuclear arsenal. I will not go into other factors.

You read in the Washington Post this week about the food production problem in the Soviet Union, we all know the fact that their coal production has not been increased, the fact that they will be a net importer of oil in the next year, the fact that they have the racial, ethnic, and religious problems of the Polish, the Chinese, and the Muslims. All of these factors should indicate that the Soviet Union has problems of its own. This would give the Soviets breathing time, and would then add to the mutually beneficial position which they could occupy at the conference table.

I hope this committee will give not only serious consideration to this freeze which Senator Kennedy and a number of others and I have offered, but I would hope we could get this to the floor and raise the issue for debate. I am not under any illusions. I know we are starting an uphill battle. But I also have great hope, because I believe at no time in my political life has there been a public awareness as great as there is today that survival is the issue, not nuclear superiority, which is a myth when you have this kind of arensal on both sides. They realize that survival is the issue.

We ought to be as in tune with that kind of consciousness as the American public is increasingly demonstrating through its awareness.

Thank you.

[Senator Hatfield's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark O. Hatfield

Mr. Chairman, I welcome and appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee today. I commend you for conducting this examination of the various proposals before the Senate. Let me first say as one who has devoted a great deal of time and energy to challenging the assumptions which propel the nuclear arms race, I come here today revitalized with hope. The stirring for meaningful arms control across this land is a profound phenomenon. I have confidence that it is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future.

The Administration's recent announcement of a thoughtful arms control proposal is, in my view, largely attributable to the constructive outcry for fundamental change in this government's attitude toward nuclear weapons. The individuals primarily responsible are not the so-called educated "elite" of this land, rather, they are the very backbone of this land. They are the frightened small children; and the young parents and grandparents who know that their offspring have little chance of living out their lives in a world which permits fallible and sometimes irrational men and women to co-exist with nuclear weapons.

The other night on television I saw a woman at a town meeting in Colorado say to a civil defense planner, "you are trying to sell us a mini-air conditioner in hell. Well, sir, we aren't buying it." That civil defense plan was rejected as resoundingly as the affirmative call for a freeze is being embraced in town halls and houses of worship across this nation. Once again the people are ahead of the politicians. It is quite tragic, really, that we who are so close to this mad nuclear pulse need be awakened by those who have been spared the constant barrage of its ugly details.

There is a tendency to assume that anything simple cannot be realistic or practical. The Freeze is simple, but it is not simplistic. The contemporary version of the Freeze concept was borne out of a desire to integrate technical practicality and a sense of urgency. We seek to take advantage of the only strategic assumption of which there is virtually unanimous agreement—and that is that the United States and the Soviet Union have essential equivalence in overall nuclear weapons capability. This idea made emminent sense to tens of millions of frightened, thinking Americans.

I make this point to counter the fallacious argument propounded by those who have not thoughtfully examined this proposal. They seek to discredit this concept by branding it as a simplistic public relations campaign aimed at fomenting reckless anti-nuclear sentiment. To claim that those who urge the President to propose that we halt the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons on a bilateral basis are uninformed is an insult to the intelligence of the people of this nation. The polls show very clearly that the American people hold no illusions. They do not blindly trust the Soviet Union nor do they believe in unilateral disarmament, they do believe in unilateral initiative.

There are those who caution against this departure from the norm. They admonish us to proceed slowly, and implore us to think logically. My friends, look where our so-called caution and logic have taken us.

Every American President of the last three decades has warned of the danger of nuclear war. Each made grandiose expressions of his desire to elimnate nuclear weapons from the earth; yet the accumulation of nuclear weapons continued unabated.

The chief scientific adviser to every British prime minister since the second world war, Lord Zuckerman, cast light on this dilemma when he said, "The researchers in the nuclear weapons laboratories have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built. Casting spells that embrace us all, they may never have been in battle, they may never have experienced the devastation of war; but they know how to devise the means of destruction. And the more destructive power there is, so, one must assume they imagine, the greater chance of military success."

Nuclear weapons, then, pose to Americans a logic contrary to everything they know about technological innovation. Our great cities and industries could not have been born if someone had not devised the means to make them possible. In the nuclear age, the reverse is true. Everything we have, and everything we are, will cease to exist unless we effectively wipe out the cancerous desire to improve upon our ability to commit global suicide.

But this desire, on both sides, to seek with abandon to improve upon our ability to commit global suicide is not the function of scientists alone. Its momentum is given further impetus by a self-perpetuating bureaucracy of officials and defense contractors who seek to alarm us when their funds are threatened and now to placate us when their logic is torn asunder.

I do not doubt for a moment President Reagan's desire to control nuclear weapons and reduce the risk of nuclear war. He believes that in order to effectively negotiate reductions we must simultaneously seek to attain a "margin of safety." This is a gentle way of saying nuclear superiority. The Soviets also seek such a "margin."

But we have had substantial nuclear superiority since the day the atomic bomb was developed. All of the American presidents who presided over this superiority expressed concern over the danger of nuclear war.

Yet, there have been no reductions, there has been no increase in our security; only a steadily rising accumulation of nuclear overkill. The nuclear freeze proposal offers the president a fresh opportunity to reject the false assumptions that have propelled us toward oblivion.

The primary rebuttal from this administration in rejecting the freeze is that the Soviet Union is displaying ominous trends in nuclear weapons development. I quite agree. But there is only one way to guarantee the death at infancy of a new Soviet bomber, a new Soviet submarine and a new generation of Soviet land-based missiles, and that is to halt the arms race now. Under the "build-up while negotiating reductions" proposals, these weapons will surely come to life, as will new U.S. systems.

We have entered an era in which remarkable scientific advances in weaponry have dramatically heightened the risk of nuclear war caused by anger, accident, or panic. During the past 20 months, U.S. computer malfunction has falsely signaled a Soviet strategic attack 147 times. Painstaking efforts at arms control are likely to be over powered by the forces generated by mutual suspicion and technological weapons innovation.

You can't throw a freight train coming down the track into reverse until you first stop it. I am convinced that the same logic applies to the nuclear arms race. President Reagan's reduction scheme will be worthy of merit as a negotiating position only if it proceeds from this foundation.

Without a prohibition on testing we risk breakthroughs that will overstep our ability to control events. As the New York Times put it today, "If he means to stop the race, he needs not only to negotiate, but to negotiate fast enough to overtake the engineers." The perceived capability of two warheads to penetrate a hardened silo today could be accomplished by a single warhead tomorrow. I underscore the word "perceived" because the perception of capability is all we have to operate on much of the time. Fear need not be based on an accurate and sound reading of a threat.

Without a halt in new systems we pay dearly in precious funds, resources and talent which could be more appropriately channeled toward our national security needs.

Without the comprehensive approach of the Freeze proposal we risk a fragmented arms control policy in which lack of agreement on one front will jeopardize progress on another. We also brush aside the acute danger which tactical battlefield weapons pose as catalysts for escalation beyond the strategic threshold.

Perhaps most importantly, if we forego this opportunity to freeze now we risk ignoring the march of history. What unforeseen conflicts await us over the first 5- to 10-year phase of reductions proposed by the President?

The Soviet Union will soon become a net importer of oil, and is becoming increasingly anxious to secure resources from the Third World.

The Middle East is the first stage on which the growing confrontation of that industrialized world—free or non-free—is likely to be played out. The United States alone is projected to be 100 percent import reliant on 12 raw materials essential for industrialism by the year 2000.

If no concrete steps are taken, the 1980's will become a battleground of industrial societies for the resource wealth of unstable Third World nations seeking their own geopolitical, economic and religious independence.

As we feel the winds of war buffering the initial phase of the 1980's, we can sense both the danger—and the opportunity—that lies ahead. The greatest danger is that we will become whipsawed by the mounting pressures for unnecessary military responses to Soviet provocation. Only dramatic decisions in the coming years can stop this drift toward confrontation.

Surely, we will have created a more durable and stable environment, and one more likely to enable our rationality to endure such crises if the nuclear war machine is not working overtime. Why opt for a fragile peace when conditions point the way toward a more substainable peace?

Finally, we have an urgent and immense moral obligation to place ourselves in a position where we can exercise positive influence on the menace of nuclear proliferation. A halt by the superpowers is insufficient in itself, but it is clearly a critical prerequisite for progress on this front.

We are becoming the national image of a gambler who disregards his family's welfare, blinds himself to the future, and blanks out the past in a feverish effort to achieve illusory security. I deplore the march of totalitarianism. I condemn the brutality and spiritual bankruptcy of the Soviet system. But I am not prepared to abandon the planet itself in deference to an all-consuming and myopic anti-Sovietism.

We are poised on the edge of a strategic nuclear cliff. It is future, not current Soviet capabilities that underlies the chorus for a nuclear arms buildup. No responsible military official of whom I am aware would trade the U.S. nuclear arsenal for the Soviet arsenal today. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked last year if they would make such a trade. All of them answered negatively.

Today's nuclear gladiators speak of nuclear strikes and counter-strikes that the Soviet Union could survive better than we. The ominous, ugly truth is the planet, as we know it, will perish at the conclusion of round one.

An unpredictable cascade of radioactive fallout, fire storms and severe destruction of the ecosystem and the ozone layer will render the planet uninhabitable. Round two, at best, will be an act of benevolence toward those unfortunate few who find themselves temporarily alive in hell on earth. That which masquerades as realism is proving itself increasingly removed from reality.

As Rear Admiral Noel Gayler, the former commander in chief of United States forces in the Pacific theater has said, "In the battles I saw and the military strategy I helped carry out, the means employed bore a reasonable relation to the ends in view. But now the nuclear forces of the United States and of the Soviet Union have become so large and so threatening that there is no conceivable military objective worth the risk of nuclear war"

I do not necessarily expect the view which Senator Kennedy and I have set forth to prevail in its precise form at this early juncture. Given this reality, I would only urge this upon the distinguished members of the Committee who are grappling in earnest with these questions: If there was ever a time to be bold—this is it. If there was ever a time to abandon political considerations—this is the moment. If there was ever a time to reject the misleading 'strangelovian' terminology in which we all indulge for the sake of appearing serious—this is the time. My colleagues, it is five minutes until midnight. We must summon the courage to meet the hour.

We stand by while children starve by the millions because we lack the will to eliminate hunger. Yet we have found the will to develop missiles capable of flying over the polar cap and landing within a few hundred feet of their target.

It is a sad commentary on the health of our nation; numbly investing billions, the best minds and God's precious resources to transform the greatest nightmare imaginable into reality. This is not innovation. It is a profound distortion of humanity's purpose on Earth.

Anyone who has witnessed the testimony of the Hiroshima survivors, felt the pain in their words, the sadness in their hearts and seen the grotesque physical evidence of their experience, could not help but want to take such a small risk for peace. For me, a remembrance of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in Tom Stoppard's play seared my mind with these words. "There must have been a time, somewhere near the beginning, when we could have said 'no."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hatfield, for your statement, which I know came right from the heart.

Senator Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Every time I hear Senator Hatfield make that presentation, it becomes more and more convincing, hopefully not only to the people that he talks to, but to this Nation and to the world, and I have welcomed the opportunity to join with him in presenting this Resolution 163, the nuclear freeze weapon resolution, to this committee today, which now has the support of some 26 Senators and 168 Members of the House.

Our proposal calls for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing and production and further deployment of nuclear weapons, warheads, and other delivery systems with the Soviet Union, followed by the major stabilizing reductions in the nuclear arsensals on both sides. We recognize the distance that the Reagan administration has come on this issue in recent weeks and months, and we welcome the President's new and more affirmative attitude toward arms control. The administration's movement on this issue is a tribute to the growing effectiveness of another movement of great importance, the nationwide grassroots campaign to stop the nuclear arms race by achieving a nuclear weapons freeze.

The prevention of nuclear war is not only the great issue of our time, but perhaps the greatest issue of all time. Today, the two superpowers possess the equivalent of 1 million Hiroshima bombs, an amount equivalent to 4 tons of TNT for every man, woman, and child on this planet, and like building blocks stacked one upon the other in a child's playroom, the nuclear weapons buildup has lifted all of us to higher and higher levels of danger. Inexorably, we are moving toward the point where the slightest accident or miscalculation could bring the whole structure tumbling down and plunge our two nations into a nuclear holocaust.

The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution insists that we must stop the nuclear buildup now before we reach the point of nuclear no return.

The President has now spoken about the need to restrain nuclear arms, but my basic concern over the President's plan is that his START proposal does not stop the nuclear arms race. It merely channels it in a new direction. It permits the continued testing, production, and deployment of the MX missile, the Trident II missile, the cruise missile, the B–1 bomber, the Stealth bomber, and other advanced nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Reagan plan does not cover bombers or cruise missiles at all, a loophole big enough to fly a fleet of bombers through with each plane carrying more destructive force than all the bombs dropped in World War II.

While the United States builds more, the Soviet Union will not stand idly by. They have their own new weapons on their own drawing boards, including the Typhoon submarine and a follow-on generation of missiles beyond the current SS–18 and SS–19, and as the recent history demonstrates, the Soviets are prepared to match us every step, every missile of the way in the futile but increasingly dangerous quest for nuclear superiority.

You do not have to be an Isaac Newton to understand the first law of the nuclear arms race, that every action by one side will be matched by equal and opposite reaction by the other side.

I believe that a nuclear weapons freeze is the most-effective way to halt the nuclear arms race now, so that we can finally begin to run it in reverse. The fundamental question which I ask of this committee is the fundamental question that citizens and communities across the country are asking in ever-increasing numbers. Mr. President, why not start with a freeze as the first step toward arms control? We do not enter a freeze or reduction of nuclear arms because we like the Soviet Union or they like us, but because both of us prefer existence to extinction. A nuclear weapons freeze has the clear advantage of bypassing endless, irresolvable arguments about which side is ahead. Too often, we find that quality is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both sides today are at essential parity. Each side, even after absorbing a first strike, can destroy the other many times over, and the United States can make the Soviet rubble bounce all the way from Moscow to Vladivostock, and the Soviets can make our rubble bounce all the way from the Potomac to the Pacific.

The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution accepts this condition of parity. It calls for a mutual freeze now, mutual reductions to follow, in the interest of preventing mutual annihilation. At best, the administration must anticipate protracted negotiations with the Soviets over its proposal. In this posture, a nuclear freeze could well make all the difference to the success or failure of the Reagan plan. A freeze is the only idea which can stop the spiral of nuclear-arms development in the near term, and avoid the self-defeating delays of long-term negotiations over arms reduction.

As the former Chief of Naval Development, Admiral Davies, says, the virtue of the freeze is to prevent the continued increase of weaponry, and the worsening of the situation during a prolonged negotiation. In fact, the history of our negotiations for arms reductions shows that they are lengthy and difficult, and during that time, there is always a great increase in the number of warheads deployed. So, I would say that the freeze is the only practical way to go with that problem.

A freeze agreement would be a nuclear weapons firebreak. Once armaments and technological advances are stopped at present levels, the two superpowers can negotiate phased and balanced reductions. President Reagan has called for one-third reductions in ballistic missile warheads. The Hatfield-Kennedy resolution calls for across-the-board reductions through annual percentages of equally effective means. George Kennan, our former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and our foremost expert on that country, and Admiral Rickover have argued eloquently and compellingly for deep cuts of at least 50 percent in the nuclear armories of both sides.

These cuts could be achieved by the end of this decade if we mutually agree to reasonable reductions of 7 percent a year. This is the approach in the Hatfield-Kennedy resolution. It is also in the approach suggested by this committee in 1979, which sought sustained reductions from the SALT II ceilings.

Finally, a freeze will enhance, not reduce, our overall national security. It will halt the development of more powerful Soviet rockets, and block their further development of existing weapons. It will prevent one side from perfecting its capacity for a first strike against the other by prohibiting the testing and production of such destabilizing weapons. The result will be a substantial reduction in the fear of a United States or Soviet preemptive attack, and a freeze will also permit additional resources to be allocated to our conventional military forces, where we do need to do more.

Opponents of a freeze claim that the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce their arsenals after a freeze. They call for building new weapons systems in order to pile up bargaining chips for later negotiations with the Kremlin. The arms race has been needlessly and heedlessly perpetuated by this bargaining chip theory, because both sides inevitably feel forced to match new and threatening developments with their own. A decade ago, MIRV's were defended as a bargaining chip during SALT I talks. The United States continued to deploy them, and then we were told that they were too important to bargain away.

This morning, Secretary of State Haig repeated before this committee the outworn bargaining chip argument. He suggested that there are existing Soviet advantages in the arms race, a proposition for which he offered no proof. He argued that a freeze would "eliminate the incentives" for the Soviets to negotiate even lower levels of nuclear weapons, an assertion for which he provided no evidence.

Conceivably, Secretary Haig is suggesting that the United States must threaten the Soviets with another round of arms race in order to achieve any progress in arms control. The effect of this would be to drive the spiral of the arms race upward rather than to stop it where it is at the present level of essential parity. Indeed, the existing instabilities of which Secretary Haig complains provide a strong incentive for both sides to accept a freeze and move toward reductions.

By contrast, I fear that the Secretary's prescriptions to build more weapons now and to threaten more weapons now will only exchange present instabilities for future and even more dangerous instabilities. The administration says that it wants to go beyond a freeze and do better, but with $100 billion worth of new weapons now in prospect over the next 5 years, the administration is still far short of a freeze, and I believe that the best arms control approach is not to branish an arms race as a means of achieving arms reduction, but a combination of three important steps.

First, the administration should pledge unequivocally that it will abide by the limits of the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviets also do. The President has been unwilling to give such a pledge thus far. Second, in order to prevent the massive buildups on either side during prolonged negotiations for reductions, the administration should propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze. And third, the administration should seek to negotiate major reductions in all aspects of nuclear force, not simply in one or two elements of those forces.

Past arms control agreements have been defective because they have failed to prevent quantum leaps in the sophistication of weaponry. The Vladivostock accord and the SALT II Treaty permitted the development of cruise missiles. The military planners saw the loophole and decided to rush through it with the new weapons systems in which they had previously shown only minimal interest. Where there is a loophole, it will almost certainly be exploited. Where a new system is permitted, it will inevitably be pursued.

In order to prevent the adversary from gaining an advantage, a comprehensive freeze, put in place before reduction talks begin, will plug past loopholes and prevent future ones by blocking any further additions to current nuclear arsenals.

Opponents of a nuclear weapons freeze also claim that a freeze is not a practical idea because it will be difficult to verify. I believe that just the opposite is true. In fact, a freeze may well be easier to verify than a complex arms reduction agreement. In a matter of months, the two superpowers, assuming their good will, could reasonably work out satisfactory verification procedures for a freeze.

Members of the Reagan administration, supporters of the Jackson-Warner resolution, and other critics of our resolution, who claim that a freeze is unverifiable, are exhibiting a surprising inconsistency in their logic. They say they will support a freeze tomorrow, after we build some more today. So they must believe that a freeze actually can be verified. In fact, our resolution does not require trust by one side or the other. Every element of the freeze depends on strict verification. What cannot be verified will not be frozen. In fact, there are many experts who believe that a freeze is more verifiable than an arms reduction agreement.

Critics of the freeze sometimes confuse it with a Soviet proposal for a European freeze. Our resolution rejects a freeze in Europe alone. Our proposal is for a global freeze. In the case of a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO, the United States would call on its entire nuclear arsenal to respond. For any administration to suggest that it no longer relies on this option would signal a major and destabilizing change in NATO policy, in which Europe would no longer enjoy the protection of America's nuclear umbrella.

Over the next 2 weeks, the members of this committee will be reviewing several arms control resolutions. Many of these contain constructive proposals for reducing the risks of nuclear war by accident steamming from nuclear proliferation, and holding to the terms of the SALT Treaty. I share all of these goals, but on the critical issue of ending the nuclear arms race now, and reducing the arsenals of annihilation, I believe that our resolution provides a vital alternative, and I urge the committee to approve it.

Whether we prevail at first or not in this cause, and no matter how long it may take, I will continue to stand and speak to work for a nuclear weapons freeze, and so will millions of citizens in every section of the country. American people want to stop the arms race before it stops the human race.

Mr. Chairman, there is just one other point that I would make in support of the general statement that I have just given to the committee, and that is, referring to the Secretary of State's testimony——

The Chairman. This morning's testimony?

Senator Kennedy. Yes, this morning's testimony. He mentions "Ironically, the strategic arms competition, so troubling to us all, reached new heights during the very period when the SALT negotiations seemed so promising." Here is the Secretary of State telling this committee that at the time when these negotiations were being undertaken, new heights were reached of strategic arms competition. He later says:

> The sheer physical task of reducing U.S.-Soviet strategic forces and reshaping them to enhanced stability will undoubtedly take years of concentrated effort.

On the one hand, he is pointing out that it is going to take years of concentrated effort to carry forward the administration's proposal, and in the other place in his testimony he is saying past history shows us that it is just during such a time when the arms race becomes the most competitive, and given the position of the administration in terms of their budget requests of the Congress, and all of these new weapons systems, the MX weapon system, B-1, Trident II, the Stealth bomber, all of the other weapons systems, I think that the concern of the American people is a very legitimate one that basically we are moving and shifting the arms race in a new and perhaps even more dangerous direction, and what is necessary is to put a freeze in place now, which can be, we believe, negotiated in a relatively short period of time, and then move toward the kinds of serious and significant reductions that we believe are possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator Kennedy's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY

I am honored to be here today with Senator Hatfield to testify in favor of S.J. Res. 163, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution which we have introduced, and which now has the support of 26 Senators and 168 members of the House. Our proposal calls for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems with the Soviet Union, followed by major stabilizing reductions in the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

We recognize the distance that the Reagan Administration has come on this issue in recent weeks and months. We welcome the President's new and more affirmative attitude towards arms control. The Administration's movement on this issue is a tribute to the growing effectiveness of another movement of great importance—the nationwide grassroots campaign to stop the nuclear arms race by achieving a nuclear weapons freeze.

The prevention of nuclear war is not only the great issue of our time, but perhaps the greatest issue of all time. Today the two superpowers possess the equivalent of one million Hiroshima bombs—an amount equal to four tons of TNT for every man, woman, and child presently living on this planet.

Like building blocks stacked one upon the other in a child's playroom, the nuclear weapons buildup has lifted all of us to higher and higher levels of danger. Inexorably, we are moving toward the point where the slightest accident or miscalculation could bring the whole structure tumbling down, and plunge our two nations and the world into nuclear holocaust. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution insists that we must stop the nuclear buildup now, before we reach the point of nuclear no return.

The President has now spoken about the need to restrain nuclear arms. But my basic concern over the President's plan is that his START proposal does not stop the nuclear arms race; it merely channels it into a new direction. It permits the continued testing, production, and deployment of the MX missile, the Trident II missile, the Cruise missile, the B-1 bomber, the Stealth bomber, and other advanced nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Reagan plan does not cover bombers or Cruise missiles at all—a loophole big enough to fly a fleet of bombers through, with each plane carrying more destructive force than all the bombers dropped in World War II.

While the United States builds more, the Soviet Union will not be standing idle. They have their own new weapons on their own drawing boards—including the Typhoon submarine and a follow-on generation of missiles beyond the current SS-18s and SS-19s.

As recent history demonstrates, the Soviets are prepared to match us every step and every missile of the way in the futile but increasingly dangerous quest for nuclear superiority. You do not have to be an Isaac Newton to undertsand the first law of the nuclear arms race—every action by one side will be matched by an equal and opposite reaction by the other side.

I believe that a nuclear weapons freeze is the most effective way to halt the nuclear arms race now, so that we can finally begin to run it in reverse. The fundamental question which I ask of this Committee is the fundamental question that citizens in communities across the country are asking in ever-increasing numbers: Mr. President, why not start with a freeze as the first step toward arms control?

We do not enter a freeze or reduction of nuclear arms because we like the Soviets or they like us—but because both of us prefer existence to extinction.

A nuclear weapons freeze has the clear advantage of bypassing endless, irresolvable arguments about which side is ahead. Too often, we find that equality is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both sides today are at essential parity. Each side, even after absorbing a first strike, can destroy the other many times over. The United States can make the Soviet rubble bounce all the way from Moscow to Vladivostok, and the Soviets can make our rubble bounce all the way from the Potomac to the Pacific. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution accepts this condition of parity; it calls for a mutual freeze now, with mutual reductions to follow, in the interest of preventing mutual annihilation.

At best, the Administration must anticipate protracted negotiations with the Soviets over any such proposal. Now, in this posture, a nuclear freeze could well make all the difference to the success or failure of the Reagan plan. A freeze is the only idea which can stop the spiral of nuclear arms development in the near term, and avoid the self-defeating delays of long-term negotiations over arms reductions. The former Chief of Naval Development, Admiral Thomas Davies, says:

"The virtue of the freeze is to prevent the continued increase of weaponry and the worsening of the situation during a prolonged negotiation. In fact, the history of our negotiations [for arms reductions] shows that they are lengthy and difficult, and during that time there is always a great increase in the numbers of warheads deployed. So I would say that the freeze is the only practical way to go at that problem."

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Finally, a freeze will enhance, not reduce, our overall national security. It will halt the development of more powerful Soviet rockets and block their further deployment of existing weapons. It will prevent one side from perfecting its capacity for a first strike against the other by prohibiting the testing and production of such destabilizing weapons; the result will be a substantial reduction in the fear of a United States or Soviet pre-emptive strike. And a freeze will also permit additional resources to be allocated to our conventional military forces, where we do need to do more.

Opponents of a freeze claim that the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce their arsenals after a freeze. They call for building new weapons systems, in order to pile up bargaining chips for later negotiations with the Kremlin.

The arms race has been needlessly and heedlessly perpetuated by this bargaining chip theory, because both sides inevitably feel forced to match new and threatening developments with their own. A decade ago, MIRVs were defended as a bargaining chip during the SALT I talks. The United States continued to deploy them, and then we were told that they were too important to bargain away.

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The Administration says that it wants to go beyond a freeze and do better. But with $100 billion worth of new weapons now in prospect over the next five years, the Administration is still far short of a freeze. I believe the best arms control approach is not to brandish an arms race as a means of achieving arms reduction, but a combination of three important steps:

First, the Administration should pledge unequivocally that it will abide by the limits of the SALT II Treaty, so long as the Soviets also do. The President has been unwilling to give such a pledge thus far.

Second, in order to prevent massive build-ups on either side during prolonged negotiations for reductions, the Administration should propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze.

Third, the Administration should seek to negotiate major reductions in all aspects of nuclear forces, not simply in one or two elements of those forces.

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Where there is a loophole, it will almost certainly be exploited. Where a new system is permitted, it will inevitably be pursued, in order to prevent the adversary from gaining an advantage. A comprehensive freeze, put in place before reductions talks begin, will plug past loopholes and prevent future ones by blocking any further additions to current nuclear arsenals.

Opponents of a nuclear weapons freeze also claim that a freeze is not a practical idea, because it will be difficult to verify. I believe that just the opposite is true. In fact, a freeze may well be easier to verify than a complex arms reduction agreement.

In a matter of months, the two superpowers, assuming their goodwill, could reasonably work out satisfactory verification procedures for a freeze. Members of the Reagan Administration, supporters of the Jackson-Warner Resolution, and other critics of the Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution who claim that a freeze is unverifiable are exhibiting a surprising inconsistency in their logic—they say they will support a freeze tomorrow, after we build some more today. So they too must believe that a freeze actually can be verified.

In fact, the Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution does not require trust by one side for the other. Every element of the freeze depends on strict verification. What cannot be verified will not be frozen. But there are many experts who agree that a freeze is adequately verifiable.

One critical aspect of the freeze, deployment, can be verified with high confidence through "national technical means"—that is, satellites and listening posts equipped with sensors—and through data exchange and restrictions on concealment.

A second critical aspect of the freeze, testing, can also be verified by such means, together with unmanned seismic stations and opportunities for on-site inspection. In the past, the United States has regarded such measures as fully adequate for verifying SALT restrictions on deployment and limits on nuclear weapons testing, and they would be fully adequate for verifying these aspects of a nuclear weapons freeze.

The third critical aspect of the freeze, production, may be harder to verify, but our intelligence is so well developed, according to former under Secretary of

Defense William Perry, that we have been able to monitor Soviet activity at the design bureaus and production plants well enough so that we have been able to predict every ICBM before it began its tests."

It may be that some form of on-site inspection will be necessary to verify production and to check certain limited aspects of testing. To presume that the Soviets will not permit any such inspection overlooks the record of the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations, now postponed by the Reagan Administration, where the Soviets have agreed to the principle of on-site verification.

Even areas where there may be verification questions, such as some areas of production, do not present serious difficulties, since verification in other areas will assure overall enforcement of the freeze. Indeed, Herbert Scoville, former Deputy Director of the CIA, contends that a freeze is easier to verify than a treaty like SALT I or SALT II. Such treaties contain complicated limits on numbers and modifications of missiles and planes; to detect a violation requires continuing and exact measurements of a vast array of possible and prohibited activity. With a freeze, however, a violation would be known if the adversary did anything new at all.

Critics of the freeze sometimes confuse it with the Soviet proposal for a European freeze. The Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution rejects a freeze in Europe alone. Our proposal is for a global freeze. In case of a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO, the United States could call on its entire nuclear arsensal to respond. For any Administration to suggest that it no longer relies on this option would signal a major and destabilizing change in NATO policy, in which Europe would no longer enjoy the protection of America's nuclear umbrella.

Over the next two weeks, the members of this committee will be reviewing several arms control resolutions. Many of these contain constructive proposals for reducing the risk of nuclear war by accident, stemming nuclear proliferation, and holding to the terms of the SALT II Treaty. I share all of these goals.

But on the critical issue of ending the nuclear arms race now and reducing the arsenals of nuclear annihilation, I believe the Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution provides a vital alternative, and I urge the committee to approve it. Whether we prevail at first or not in this cause, and no matter how long it may take, I will continue to stand, to speak and to work for a nuclear weapons freeze—and so will millions of citizens in every section of the country. The American people want to stop the arms race before it stops the human race.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, for an extraordinarily helpful and provocative statement.

Senator Cranston, I understand your statement is a very short one. Is that correct?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but I would rather wait until we have finished with these witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. I would start out by referring to your comment, Senator Hatfield, about the concerns that you have about an accidental detonation or nuclear war. I happened to be in the NORAD headquarters at the time of the first false alert. It was utter chaos, and utter panic that ensued there before our eyes. What is the warning time now? They had, in those days—it was some years ago—they seemed to feel they had some 20 minutes, or 25 minutes, to determine what they could do. What is the time frame today for both an intercontinental ballistic missile or an intermediate-range missile launched, say, from a Warsaw Pact country?

Senator HATFIELD. According to the one briefing I have had on the matter, it is not so much a change in time. Some reduction, but it is more accuracy in the system that they have undertaken some major overhaul, major changes in the system to reduce the inaccuracies, because the time factor, if it is an inaccurate miscommunication, is important, but it is not as important as to get the accuracy of the communication. They had a major review and major overhaul underway, according to the Defense briefings that we received in executive session. The time change has not been that great.

The CHAIRMAN. Your proposal has been criticized by a number of European leaders. Chancellor Schmidt argues that it would undermine the agreed NATO negotiating position in Geneva in the Geneva INF talks. Do you believe the freeze proposal does take into account fully the concerns of NATO? As one European leader said, it freezes us at a 300 to 0 disadvantage with respect to the SS-20, for instance.

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman, let me make two responses. One is that I understand the Chancellor was referring primarily to the Brezhnev proposal, or freezing only in Europe, whereas our proposal is a total freeze on the total arsenal. Let me give you an insight into another part of this problem.

In the last 1982 fiscal year budget, when we met in the appropriations conference, I had adopted by conference approval an amendment that indicated we could not move to production of the binary gas program or the chemical weapon program until we had country-by-country analysis and report on their position vis-a-vis forward deployment of the chemical weapons program. The Defense Department indicated that until we are in production, it is a moot issue to take up with our NATO allies and so they did not comply with the congressional request as represented by this particular amendment.

I think in talking private to a number of our NATO leaders I have found that this is one of those issues that they do not want necessarily to face up to, especially when it came to the issues like the neutron warhead and the binary weapon, which is going to require advanced deployment on their soil. They are also having to deal with antinuclear war movements within their own constituencies.

The feeling I have gotten is that the lowest profile that they can achieve in their political stances is what they are aiming for, rather than facing up to the issue. I really feel that this freeze is not a matter that is just restricted to the two superpowers or to the people who are supporting it in the United States. This is a worldwide movement, and I think sooner or later our NATO allies are going to have to face up to this issue as clearly as we are trying to do here with the introduction of this freeze.

I would not be in a position to quote direct statements that were given because of the fact that some of them were given to me in private.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy, your proposal calls for a total freeze on all nuclear delivery systems. Would you comment on what would be intended thereby in connection with the F-16 or the 8-inch artillery which are dual capable weapons?

Senator KENNEDY. They would be so included. Any weapons systems that have the capability or the capacity to carry nuclear warheads would be so included, and would be so covered, and left to the negotiations about how they could be redesigned or reequipped to only be available for a conventional force. That would be a matter for negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN. Also, I wonder if you could comment on what your feelings are about continued restraint by the United States and the

Soviet Union under the existing treaties that we now have, SALT I, and the unratified treaty that we are observing on both sides, to the best of our knowledge, as Secretary Haig testified this morning. Would you support the concept of continuing to observe now all the provisions of both SALT I and SALT II?

Senator **Kennedy**. The answer would be yes. I would hope that we would conform to the previous agreements. If the matter should come before the Senate, I would vote for it. My concern, quite frankly, is, given the strong statements that have been made by the candidate and President about the SALT agreements, statements that have been made by Ed Meese about SALT II, and the general lack of enthusiasm by the administration for this proposal, should the matter come before the Senate and be voted on, and somehow not get a strong, ringing support in the U.S. Senate, it may be interpreted as a message to the administration that the people are not behind those kinds of limitations. That would be a matter of concern to me.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. My final question is addressed to either one of you or both of you. This committee has before it the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. One of the treaties provides for onsite inspection. There has been some concern that a total freeze would be difficult to verify. Do you think it would be helpful to the whole process if the Senate moved ahead and ratified these two treaties, even though the threshold is quite high, at 150 kilotons? Would it be helpful to the overall process to go ahead and ratify those and then incorporate the onsite inspection that is provided for the first time in one of those treaties? Would you feel that the administration should accelerate the process of study that has been underway for about a year now on that?

Senator **Kennedy**. Mr. Chairman, I am very familiar with the comprehensive test ban proposal, which I and others have supported over a number of years, and actually attended the negotiations in Geneva during the previous administrations when that issue was being negotiated with the British and the Soviet Union, and where there was agreement for onsite inspection during those negotiations.

Of course, as we know, those negotiations were interrupted, and never finalized. Although I have supported that position in previous years, I do believe that now the most sensible, responsible action that can be taken by both this committee and by the Senate, by the administration, is a freeze. This reaches the very real threat which I think exists today, and will exist in greater dimension in the future if we do not take it. Then I would hope that we could move in those other areas which I think are extremely important, and which relate—obviously, if we have a freeze, we incorporate the concept of the comprehensive test ban, because that would get the job done with a freeze proposal, so I would hope the energies would be focused on the freeze proposal, because I do think it is more comprehensive and all inclusive.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is an old expression, it takes two to tango. In this regard, I am wondering about what reactions you perceive from our adversaries concerning your proposals, and also, what movement is there in that part of the world? Because while I strongly support your resolution and am cosponsoring it, I am a little disappointed that I do not see any movement on the other side of the curtain toward popularizing also the effects of what nuclear war would be.

Any spontaneous—and I realize it is much more difficult to be spontaneous from Moscow, Kiev, or Minsk than it is from New York, Chicago, or Detroit—any actions or reactions there in support of opposing this holocaust which can threaten us all?

Senator HATFIELD. Senator Pell, I think we have to realize that we are, of course, comparing an open society to a closed society, and it is much easier to determine public moves and public sentiment in an open society such as ours.

Senator PELL. Of course.

Senator HATFIELD. I have a friend who was over in East Germany not too long ago, and he found that there is a little patch that is being worn on the lapels and on the coats of many people, which is a statue from the United Nations here in New York which was created by a Soviet artist, of a human figure beating a sword into a plowshare. The title around it in German was "Swords into plowshare." It was publicized that anybody caught wearing this patch would be arrested. Literally hundreds of people evidently had been arrested, but these are being manufactured, however, as quickly and as fast as possible and are being distributed.

So we have that as an example in East Germany at least that there is a great deal of interest in a nuclear control program. There are evidences that we have from people who have visited personally and privately with Soviet people and other people in Eastern Europe.

I think we also have to recognize that it is generally assumed there is a growing dissident minority in the Soviet Union that is becoming more vocal in three specific areas. In the area of consumer goods, in the traditional area of expression in the arts and the cultural pursuits, and in the third area of arsenals being built within the Soviet Union, challenging that policy. So there is that kind of evidence that we have that is very privately given.

I think the main thought to consider here, though, is what is this administration—what is the United States of America doing to challenge the Soviet Union? I think we have been on the deep end for too long. We have let the Soviets control our defense policy, our foreign policy, to too great an extent. I think it is time to take the offense. I think it would not only be good for our own country to have a well-defined policy with which we are challenging the Soviet Union, but it would be well I think to cause a subsidance of some of the anxiety in our allies because of their confusion, their anxiety, or their fears. And I think in the Third World it would have a very salutary effect.

I think this is one of those things that could do more to unit humanity, transcending all of these categories that I have enumerated, than any other single issue. In so doing, we are putting resources then to bear upon the causes of violence and autocracies; namely, the hunger, the poverty, and the other problems. Do you realize that what the world spends in 2 weeks could provide enough food, clothing, shelter, and clean water for all the poor people of the world, totaling over 1 billion?

All we are suggesting here is not only a freeze on the arsenal that we are pursuing here with such deadliness, but also that will release, liberate these other resources that are going to these devastating, destructive resources to addressing the causes of East-West tensions, of war and of violence.

Let me close my saying I think if future wars are to be fought they are not going to be fought over political ideologies of the East and West, but the growing dependency of the superpowers on resources outside of their own borders. We will have to import 12—100 percent of 12 of the major raw materials by the year 2000 to keep our industrial machine going. There is where the future wars are going to be fought, and that is why we ought to be addressing those problems with some of the resources we could have with a freeze.

Senator KENNEDY. The only point that I would add, Senator Pell, is that the Soviet Union, I believe, will act out of its own national interest, as the United States should act out of its national interest and security interest.

The Soviet Union has shown in the past a willingness to work toward the reductions of nuclear danger when they signed the Test Ban Treaty in the early sixties, the ABM Treaty in 1972, and to agree to the SALT II agreements. I think they are going to make a very hard and realistic judgment about this proposal. And I think Senator Hatfield said it well when he said what we ought to do is challenge the Soviet Union to this proposal.

I believe that they will act out of their own national interest, and that there is a real possibility and likelihood that it would be accepted.

Senator PELL. Are you aware of any Soviet commentary or any reaction to the proposal for a freeze?

Senator KENNEDY. I am not.

Senator PELL. Are you, Senator Hatfield?

Senator HATFIELD. [Nods negatively.]

Senator PELL. I do believe that Soviet television has broadcast over its Government-controlled TV a picture along the lines that the concerned scientists put up showing the devastation that a nuclear weapon can cause. I think it would behoove us to move ahead in this direction. The movement is strong in the West, and I hope it is getting stronger. I hope it will win out.

I do think it will be helpful for those of us who supported the West to see more evidence of interest in this same kind of movement in the East, one way or the other. Maybe these messages should all be getting to the leaders in the East as well, because you do not have that same sense coming from there that you do building up here.

I have one final question.

Senator KENNEDY. If I may make a very brief comment.

Senator PELL. Please.

Senator KENNEDY. I would think the response of the Soviet Union would be toward the Government and the Presidency. He has the prime responsibility; that is, the administration, and that is where I think the response would come.

I would imagine that what we are urging is the administration challenge the Soviet Union to get a response and to elicit a response. Rather than having the Soviet Union put a freeze on the table, we are asking that the United States put it on the table.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I see that my time has expired, so I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell. Senator Mathias, we look forward to hearing your statement on your own resolution afterward. But would you proceed in questioning, please?

Senator MATHIAS. I would be glad to give my statement while Senator Kennedy and Senator Hatfield are here because I think they might both profit by it. But I will refrain from doing so at this moment.

Let me ask, then, a couple of questions. One of the objections that is put forward to a freeze is that it would freeze us in a position of inferiority, that it would freeze the Soviet Union into a position of superiority. But at the same time that argument is being made, there is also an argument being made that the Soviet Union is in a state of rapid expansion, that they have the momentum.

Now, if that is the case, a freeze would, in fact, be of some value to the United States, would it not? How do you reconcile these two positions?

Senator HATFIELD. Senator Mathias, I do not think the administration can have it both ways. I think we have to decide either one way or the other. We are either willing to trade our arsenal for their arsenal if it is so vastly superior, and which I understand that no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been willing to agree to, or second, when they talk about the fact of the momentum behind the Soviet buildup, this has to be acknowledged as in the time to choke the baby in the crib; of the babies of the new submarine, the new land-based missile and the new air-delivered missile, all of the forms that are supposedly going to raise the Soviet Union to a preemptive strike base, moving from a deterrent strike base.

And I think that is one of the factors we have not really focused upon very much. And that is, what in this freeze we are attempting to do is to get a freeze, to get negotiations at a time when it is more likely that we can attain a certain element of success.

Now, when you develop a more precise instrument of destruction such as a first strike weapon and you get to the point where your launch is aimed at the other person's weapon rather than at cities and destruction of people in vast quantities, I think there you have reached a point of very difficult control.

So what we are suggesting here is if it is a momentum that they are moving on, let us stop the momentum, let us stop them before they get to this new generation of missiles. And as well, acknowledge that we will stop any of our efforts to reach a new generation of missiles which will move us from a deterrent power base to a preemptive strike base. Remember what it was in 1973 when we had the nuclear alert in the Middle East and the tensions at that time, and the change in the threshold that we would have in that desire to preemptively launch or for the other side to preemptively launch their missiles because of the tensions and the edge of nerves that we are working on.

We have created a whole new world when we moved from a deterrent power base to a preemptive strike base. I think this is an example of where the administration is using the fear tactic to try to get more money into the military budget, but at the same time, they are contradicting their own argument by really talking out of both sides of their mouths at the same time.

There is nothing personal in that remark, nothing partisan. I want you to understand that.

Senator KENNEDY. I did not think so. [General laughter.]

Senator HATFIELD. I thought I would say that before Senator Kennedy did. [Laughter.]

Senator MATHIAS. I do not want to plow again the ground Senator Pell already has plowed, but it is a fact that the Soviet Union is now raising a question as to whether or not the nuclear forces in NATO should not be counted on the American side. In future negotiations they want to count the French nuclear capacity and the British nuclear capacity.

I am not sure that either the French or the British are very happy about this. But nonetheless, it does indicate that the Soviet Union is acutely conscious of the fact that there are nuclear weapons other than U.S. nuclear weapons in the possession of NATO countries.

Now, given this public position on the part of the Soviet Union, would they not insist on the participation of at least France and Britain, if not the People's Republic of China, in any general kind of freeze?

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Mathias, this was, of course, also an argument that was put forward at the time when those of us who supported a comprehensive test ban advanced that theory. And the fact that if we reached an agreement with the Soviet Union we could either get the French or British to do our testing for us, and that the Chinese would still have the capability and the capacity for testing, and if the Soviet Union and the United States worked out some kind of agreement it might work to the disadvantage either of the Soviet Union or the United States.

But as you remember the history of that, the Soviet Union at least was prepared to get into serious negotiations with the United States on a comprehensive test ban. The proposal that was being considered had a time limitation, but I think there was a general belief at that time that if we were able to be successful in working out this negotiation with the Soviet Union, obviously the options of including other countries would be available to policy makers. That would be something that would have to be considered down the road.

But I think that what we are talking now is to challenge them, given the Soviet Union to the freeze and given the very substantial differences in the armories of both the United States and the Soviet Union in their relationship to these other countries. In relationship to the other countries, we believe we would hopefully elicit a positive response. Then sometime in the future, we would get on to another phase which would concern the interest of our allies.

Senator MATHIAS. My time is up, but let me ask you very quickly for a one-word answer.

Senator BIDEN. I would be happy to yield the Senator some of my time.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you. You are generous. If we were to have a freeze—and I, as I have told you both personally, would welcome a freeze—if we could move very quickly through the freeze stage and get to negotiations, how long do you think would be tolerable for a freeze to last? How quickly do you think we would have to get to the negotiating table? I think a long freeze would create problems, frankly.

Senator **Hatfield**. I would agree, and I think you ask a question that gives us an opportunity to clarify the minds of many, that this is, No. 1, not a unilateral proposal; that is a unilateral freeze. And No. 2, it is only a first step to a two-step proposal of getting a freeze in order, in order to achieve diminishing of the arsenal.

Senator **Mathias**. The question in my mind is about the possibility of getting stalemated in the first phase.

Senator **Hatfield**. Well very frankly, it seems to me there is much greater chance of success if we negotiate a freeze to get arms control and deescalation of the arms. I think that the one without the other would not be meaningful. I do not think the Russians or the United States would waste their time arriving at conclusions and negotiating fine points of verification, et cetera on a freeze without then moving to some kind of deescalation and disarmament of the arsenal.

Again, we have no guarantee, Senator Mathias, but this is a risk that we think is well taken. We are willing to risk so many things that lead us to the brink of war, it seems to me it is about time we take a bold step, challenging the Russians to take a risk for peace.

Senator **Mathias**. Thank you very much, and I thank the Senator from Delaware.

The **Chairman**. Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you. Gentlemen, if you had your choice and you could have the Senate, with the concurrence of the President, either pass today the SALT II Treaty or pass the freeze, which would you prefer?

Senator **Kennedy**. The freeze.

Senator **Hatfield**. The freeze, because the SALT II Treaty specifically exempts the counterforce weapons and the freeze includes all. I think we get into an awful lot of technical things here such as theater weapons, tactical weapons and strategic weapons, and it all implies that once we launch a nuclear attack, either side, that we can control stages of it or we can withdraw once we have started.

I think when you get down to the bottom line, once a superpower feels constrained to launch a nuclear attack against another superpower, you are off to the races.

Senator **Kennedy**. If I might add to that, I indicated earlier before you were here that if SALT should come up I would vote for it, but I would prefer the freeze, though I would vote for SALT. My concern is given the attitudes that have been expressed about SALT by the administration, should we vote on that and not get a strong vote it might be interpreted as a rejection for the various proposals on it.

Senator **Biden**. I understand that, and appreciate it.

Senator **Kennedy**. The other counterforce argument strengthens it.

Senator **Biden**. Let us talk about the counterforce argument for a minute. I do not understand how a freeze proposal diminishes the counterforce capability. Let us define counterforce so that I understand it. As I understand the counterforce, it means just what it says. Soviet missiles that are directed at our force structure and not our population centers, and vice versa. Counterforce capability is not a consequence of any new missile; it is not a consequence of any new development other than increased accuracy. That is the counterforce capability.

Counterforce capability, after reading the resolution, I do not understand how it is frozen. Are we freezing the technological developments?

Senator **Hatfield**. All testing of all new nuclear weaponry; all production, all deployment. Senator, I could not agree with you more in some of your analysis because we have not even defined—the Soviet Union and the United States have not even defined clearly an accepted definition of counterforce. We think it is from launching from our land. They say it is a launch against the Soviet Union from any other place, including submarines. But we have not even reached that conclusion. This would freeze across the board everything.

Senator **Biden**. I would freeze everything, both central systems and strategic systems. Would it freeze theater systems, also?

Senator **Kennedy**. Yes.

Senator **Hatfield**. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator **Kennedy**. Anything that has the capability or capacity of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Senator **Biden**. Now, what does that do to, as you see it, the political solidarity of NATO? In my experience dealing with our NATO allies, many of the governments have really gone out on a limb to support the decision taken in December 1979. I firmly believe that were we in the Senate to pass the freeze, at least two governments in Europe would fall.

I believe Schmidt would not be able to survive, and I believe quite possibly, Thatcher in Great Britain would come down, and I do not know what would happen in the Benelux countries. I mean that sincerely. Schmidt has put every bit of his political capital on the line in that decision. He is under a great seige within his own party, the SPD, right now. How do you respond to the critics of the freeze who say that this policy of a freeze would, in fact, cause great disruption within the alliance?

Senator **Kennedy**. Senator Biden, I do not think there are any of us who question that there has been new tension between the United States and a number of the European countries. I feel that that new tension has basically been a result not of a discussion of the freeze movement, but one of the fact that there has been a president who has talked about a winnable limited nuclear war. And I think the Europeans have some idea of where that war might be fought.

And two, the Secretary of State's statements that there might be a testing of a nuclear weapon somewhere over the European theater, and that obviously had some important repercussions within Europe. Third, the statements that have been made by Ambassador Burns in Germany about the withdrawal of American troops if NATO was not going to move ahead and expand its defense capability more clearly. And fourth, the general way that administrations handle the whole neutron bomb situation.

It seems to me that when we had the former Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, who was probably one of the most thoughtful and knowledgeable individuals on Europe, certainly, and he spends a good deal of time in maintaining his contacts with European leaders at the present time. When we asked former Secretary Ball about his view whether he felt that putting forward the proposal on accepting the proposal of a freeze was a destabilizing element in terms of Western European governments, he said it would take the most grotesque—and he used the word grotesque—interpretation of modern European history to assume that.

His conclusions about the deterioration between the United States and Western European countries were more targeted on these other items that I mentioned, rather than on a freeze proposal.

Senator **Biden**. I do not disagree with the interpretation as to why things are as bad as they are now. As Secretary Ball also phrased it in an article he wrote: Simply put—and I think I am quoting—the Europeans no longer trust our good judgment and our preoccupation with a two-dimensional view of the world; Moscow and Washington. And he went on from there.

With all due respect, I do not think that directly speaks to the issue of what happens now if we pass a law that in fact is diametrically opposed to what the leaders of Europe have rested their political survival upon. Schmidt has said if, in fact, you in my party force me off the TNF decision, I will leave. He is not saying that much anymore because the facts are he probably would have to leave.

I think it is a different circumstance. My time is up. Let me end with one specific question. Would your freeze include freezing reliability testing of our missiles or warheads? Would it freeze unverifiable software changes that are critically important, or does it just mean that we need negotiations to define freeze in detail, just as in SALT II we defined new missiles by observable characteristics? Won't we have to negotiate what freeze means?

Senator **Hatfield**. Absolutely. That is a negotiable item that has to be negotiated. We cannot lock it into concrete here.

Let me respond if I could to your other point for just one quick moment. I think, Senator Biden, you will recall that the alliance was pressured initially to accept the theater nuclear weapons by the United States.

Senator **Biden**. I do not disagree with that. I was involved with that. It started with Schmidt and his speech in 1977 at the Institute of Strategic Studies in England talking about the Euro-strategic balance. It was Schmidt who did it, not the United States.

Senator **Hatfield**. Well, let us put it this way. We had a good ally in one of them at least. But let me ask the question in return almost to get to the point that I wanted to make. What will be the alternative? Pressure in Europe alone, notwithstanding the U.S. role, could conceivably be so great as to prevent the deployment of the Pershing missile and the cruise missile. And there, it seems to me, we have an alternative to look at that might even be worse than all alternatives or options.

Senator **Biden**. I think that is a very good point. There is no doubt in my mind that if we pass the freeze, deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles will be prevented in Europe. I have no doubt about that. That is one of the problems that I have with the concept and notion of a freeze, even though as you gentlemen know, I am equally as vigorous in my pursuit of the need for arms control in the past. We disagree in degree here and method, not in philosophy where we are going.

I know my time is up. I do not discard out of hand the notion of a freeze, but on balance, I think it has some serious flaws. But given the option of continuing business as usual or the freeze, I do not have any doubt what I would do if I were voting on this thing in my constituency as a citizen or as a U.S. Senator. Thank you.

Senator **Kennedy**. May I have just 20 or 30 seconds on this issue? We support the continued talks on theater nuclear weapons in Europe and, as has been pointed out by Senator Hatfield earlier, obviously we reject a proposal for a freeze in Europe.

We believe in a global freeze. We supported the negotiations at the time for Europe. Any question about the future kind of negotiations obviously would take place within the general kind of a freeze.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Back when SALT II was previously before us I voted against it in committee. It is not that I did not think it sets up good balances. I thought the balances were reasonably acceptable. What they gained on the Backfire we gained on the cruise missile. There were some inequities back and forth, but they basically balanced out.

I had a problem with verification at that time. We had lost our bases in Iran. We could not monitor adequately. We did not have adequate overhead means of doing so at that time. But the situation has changed since then.

So the tack I have taken in the resolution I proposed was that we go for that limit now because we can lock that in. It is something that is doable now. It was basically negotiated out and could probably be resurrected and made acceptable to both sides, and it is something that at least puts a cap, at least places some limit.

Now why is that important? Bill Jackson, who was in the previous administration, of course, on the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, now at Brookings, gave a speech up at, I believe it was, Amherst a short time ago. And he pointed out some of these things, which I think are very good for us to remember.

The Densepack proposal that we are now thinking about in this country may well violate SALT II and give the Russians reason to break out from under that. The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) that we do not even use much any more, as I understand it, because we have never agreed to SALT II formally and so we do not want to go and complain that the Soivets are maybe making violations of SALT II, and so we do not use that Standing Consultative Commission. So we are denying ourselves the opportunity to raise questions about Soviet compliance even now.

In the Soviet reductions, had we gone ahead or if we went now even, the Soviets would have to pull back some 250 ICBM launchers. Once again, we are not going to get the advantage of that unless we go with the SALT II.

Under just some of the other things that could happen under that, the SS–16's under SALT II—they are a mobile missile, but they are made from the SS–20 by putting one other section in. It then becomes the SS–16, which is an intercontinental ballistic missile, not a theater nuclear force missile in Europe. It becomes another several hundred missiles that would be added to the ICBM force. Now that would be locked in and preventable if we went ahead and passed SALT II.

The Soviets under SALT II would be permitted one new weapons system. Without SALT II, if they decided they wanted to scrap a lot of things and develop any number of new weapons systems now, they can do it right now as long as we do not have SALT II locked in.

Their encryption on missiles would be changed. Another one that I think it would be very important for locking in with SALT II is just the SS–18. Right now they are permitted 10 warheads under SALT II and they are still living by this. They are permitted 10 warheads on the SS–18's. They have 308 of those missiles. Now our experts estimate that they can go as high as 40 warheads. That is the possibility for 12,000 warheads as opposed to about 3,000 that they are permitted now under SALT II.

Concealment practices that are prevented under SALT II, which gets into the verification situation that you are talking about here, which is going to be a very big and monsterous problem and may be big enough to prevent the freeze or any other proposals from ever becoming a reality—just that one thing. That is a very tough one, is the verification aspect of this.

But SALT II, it seems to me, does lock in those things at least at a limitation level, and that is why I made the No. 1 item on my proposal as a limitation item. Then we go for the reductions and then I included a couple of other items too that I do not know whether you might want to comment on.

But preventing the spread to other nations. I think we are really remiss in not pushing harder on the nuclear supplier nations that supply the technical equipment with which nuclear weapons can be made, and we may be negotiating for several years with freezes and SALT and whatever it is and start-stop, whatever. We may be negotiating for several years.

Unless we try and prevent this spread to other nations, we will find ourselves still with an uncontrollable problem at the end of this period of time because this technology is just about to—I was going to say explode. That is a horrible thing to say, but it is expanding tremendously and at a very rapid rate. We know there are probably 8 or 10 other nations that are very shortly going to have nuclear weapons. We will be back in the same problem again, involved with other nations instead of just us and the Soviet Union.

Then, unless we involve some of the other nations in this, I just think we will put our finger on one part of this problem and the rest of it will have gotten away from us.

Senator Kennedy commented that he is afraid that low support from the Senate would send the wrong signals about the further acceptance of more meaningful reductions, and I agree with that 100 percent. But it just seems to me that we ought to lock this in first on what we have and have already negotiated. It took 7 years to negotiate. If we cannot get a decent vote in the Senate on that, it seems to me that we could not even consider bringing up anything more stringent than that.

So that is the reason I have supported a limitation. I know this is more a speech than a question. I am sorry, but I would appreciate any comments you might have, particularly with SALT II, because all those things I mentioned—the SS-16—we can lock those in now. Those can stop the Soviets in their tracks right now if we go that route. But those are all big things that are still out there that they may use for breakout if we do not go that route. That is something that is doable right now, it seems to me.

I do not know whether you wish to comment, either one of you, on that, but that is the only thing I wished to say, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HATFIELD. Senator Glenn, I understand where you are coming from and I cannot fault it. I suppose that we both sitting in a situation where we do not have total control over the future of our ideas or our proposals on this subject. We both depend on the administration to a great extent that is in power at the moment or any moment.

I did not hear Secretary Haig's testimony this morning. I only have a sort of brief report on it, so I cannot comment on it. But it appears to me that this is one of those situations that has reached a sort of dead end as far as the administration is concerned. I do not see that kind of activity or interest being demonstrated at this moment.

It seems to me with the people who are involved in this freeze movement across the country—now I may be overreading it, but I think the President's speech on Sunday was in part determined by that kind of political sensitivity at the White House about this growing interest by the people of this country and the world—the Western World—in a nuclear freeze.

Therefore, it seems to me that this is one action where we and the Congress can at least ignite some kind of alternative to what we are following now. Now all it may end up doing is to revive SALT II, but it certainly does represent to me a positive role that the Congress can play at a time to help shift the course of the action and direction of this Nation.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like to thank both of you for your very fine testimony and for the leadership that you have offered in presenting the freeze movement to the Senate. I think you were very generous in suggesting that you were simply responding to the freeze movement in the country, since both of you and virtually every member of this committee has been at work on this issue for a long, long time, seeking arms control agreements that would stop production and lead to reductions.

I applaud what you have done and will be working with you to move this effort forward. I will do what I can to see that this committee deals with this specific approach in the course of the hearings or the markup that will shortly come.

Mark, I wanted to ask you about one statement that you made. You referred to a number of computer failures or whatever they might have been that occurred in rather astounding numbers over a brief period of time. Could you amplify slightly on that?

Senator HATFIELD. It is estimated that in about a 20-month period it has been referred to frequently as the failure of a 10-cent computer chip. I am not certain of the precise part of that advance warning system that caused the failure, but there was a flight of geese on one occasion which flew over, as we are told, that miscommunicated through the system, any one of which could have been interpreted on the basis of the information that was being transmitted, that we should be expecting a launch or an attack.

Senator **Cranston**. How many of those occurred and in what period—20 months?

Senator **Hatfield**. 147.

Senator **Cranston**. I had not heard that figure before. It is a startling one. I agree with you that the major danger is an accidental war and not a purposeful or deliberate nuclear strike.

Thank you both very much.

Senator **Kennedy**. I just want to thank you, Senator Cranston. I know that so many friends on this committee, but I know that you have, as I think all of us in the Senate during—remember during the consideration of SALT provided an additional opportunity for many Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle to become better familiar with those various issues and I think all of us who are involved in this proposal acknowledge the very important leadership you have provided in the Senate on the whole range of different arms control issues.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

Senator **Hatfield**. Mr. Chairman, I would like to confirm that same statement, but I would also like, as well, to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing this forum. I know of no committee on the Hill that commands the attention and focus and respect of the country on an issue that you think is significant enough to hold a public hearing of this kind on than the Foreign Relations Committee.

That is a rather remarkable comment coming from the Appropriations Committee, but I do feel that is a fact and I am very grateful. I know that Senator Kennedy and I were both most anxious to get a hearing on this freeze proposal before your committee.

Now that we have been accommodated, we feel that it has been very helpful in getting our message across and not just to the people, to our colleagues in the Senate, but certainly to the public at large, so we are in your debt and are very grateful to you and other members who have participated in the hearing today.

Senator **Kennedy**. I join in thanking the chairman, Senator Mathias and the others who have been good enough to take the time to listen to our presentation. We are grateful.

The **Chairman**. We are very pleased to have had you here. Again, we commend you. We will be marking up a resolution, I believe, around May 20. Certainly I would want to pay tribute again to Senator Cranston, who has held through the years luncheons that we have attended arousing our interest in this subject, giving us expertise and advice from around the country. Those luncheons have been extraordinarily valuable to all of us and have prepared us for this time when I think we can start to take some action.

Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston, would you take your place at the witness table?

[Pause.]

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Chairman, I have to hold a meeting of the Joint Committee on Printing—an emergency meeting. How long do you think we will be here?

The **Chairman**. I think it will be very short, Senator Mathias.

Senator Cranston.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN CRANSTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Chairman, as this committee meets today to consider the various arms control proposals, a movement for nuclear arms controls and reductions is sweeping our country. It is not a Republican or a Democratic movement. It is not a movement that can properly be labeled liberal or conservative.

It is a grassroots citizen movement driven by good, old-fashioned commonsense. The American people are reexamining the basic facts of the nuclear arms race and are concluding that we will not find greater security in still more nuclear weapons.

They are calling for concrete, verifiable, sincere efforts to freeze the arms race and to reduce the superpowers' nuclear overkill capabilities and the danger of nuclear holocaust.

We have a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to accomplish our strategic missions. We know this. And, as poll after poll endorsing a freeze shows, the American people are satisfied that this is the case.

Government leadership to reverse the arms race has been slow to develop. In October 1980, then-candidate Ronald Reagan pledged that, as President, he would "immediately open negotiations on a SALT II Treaty." Last Sunday, some 19 months later, he offered the first details. I believe the President's proposal for a new arms control treaty—though belated—is a constructive and a welcome step.

It asks unequal reductions in the heart of the Soviets nuclear arsenal, its land-based missiles. But it would entail major U.S. cutbacks in our more advanced submarine-based missiles. If the negotiations are to succeed, concessions must presumably be forthcoming on both sides. Undoubtedly the levels and types of bomber forces permitted would have to be negotiated.

My concern now is how we get from here to there. The Reagan administration, which has heaped scorn on arms control, now professes its dedication to an ambitious departure to achieve major reductions. Even if this new effort is sincere—and I assume that it is insofar as the President is concerned—the negotiating will take a great deal of time.

In the interim, we will have no arms limitation treaty formally in place. And even if the administration's plan is adopted in modified form, the arms race will continue because of the temptation to come up with ever more deadly, accurate systems like the MX to make the rubble bounce higher.

The failure to ratify SALT II harmed our national security. SALT II ratification would have forced the dismantling of more than 250 Soviet systems while providing a foundation from which to achieve deeper mutual cuts. And further delay in negotiating a freeze on the arms race, even as we pursue deep cuts in our arsenals, will harm our security as well.

I therefore propose that this committee act in response to the need for a nuclear arms freeze and in response to the President's proposals by adopting a joint resolution that would state, in brief, the following, which I feel summarizes what we really should seek to accomplish in this committee.

A resolution that would state that it shall be the policy of the U.S. Government: First, to comply with SALT II so long as the Soviets do; second, to seek a mutual and verifiable negotiated freeze on nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment; and third, to pursue aggressively negotiations for major, balanced, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

To this agenda, proposals of many of us here in the Senate on nuclear nonproliferation and establishment of a Joint Crisis Monitoring Center can, and I think should, be added.

On a question you asked of Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, Mr. Chairman, regarding to what the time frame for a warning now is if a launch, accidental or purposeful, is ever made, it is my understanding that there is a 20-minute time frame for seeking to identify what is happening before decisions are made if the Soviets fire from their continent toward ours across Alaska. However, if there is an attack from a submarine, the time frame is cut down to 8, 10, or possibly 12 minutes.

Senator Mathias and I met early last fall with Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, who is Chief of Staff in the Soviet Armed Forces. In the course of that conversation with Senator Mathias and myself, Ogarkov complained that if we introduced Pershing missiles into Europe, the time frame for warning to the Soviet Union would be cut down to 5 minutes. He asked, "How can we be expected to make a rational decision?" How can there be anything but a computer decision? How can we have time to clarify what has happened—and why—in a time frame that is limited to 5 minutes?

We are in a hair-trigger situation and this is one of the reasons that I have advocated steps that would reduce the danger of accidental war.

The first point that I proposed—that we adopt a resolution that would specify that we comply with SALT II so long as the Russians do—seems to me to be a sort of midposition between what Senator Tsongas and Senator Glenn were discussing. If we make that move we are not formally seeking ratification. We are not required to go through all of that process, but there would be something more than the President's statement that we will comply with SALT II as long as the Soviets do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a resolution in on that point?

Senator CRANSTON. I will introduce a resolution that will cover that.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you can cosponsor mine.

Senator CRANSTON. Great. I would like to work together.

The CHAIRMAN. We have done so many things together, but I will be commenting after Senator Mathias on resolution which I introduced. I concur completely with you on that point.

Senator CRANSTON. Good. We will work together on that and other matters, as we always do.

In conclusion, I want to pay tribute to you, Mr. Chairman, for your persistent leadership in pressing this administration to make real progress on taming the nuclear arms race. What you have done, what others in this committee have done and, I think very significantly, what the Freeze Movement—which I am proud to say began as a statewide movement in California in a formal sense, has done, has had a lot to do, I believe, with the administration coming forward with a more forthcoming arms control position than many of us expected.

I want to continue to work with you and the other members of the committee in the days ahead to address the clear and present danger which the unbridled nuclear arms race poses to the security of all of us and all the people of our world. I look forward to doing all that I can to achieve a bipartisan agreement in this committee on a joint resolution advancing a responsible, ambitious nuclear arms control agenda.

I thank you for the opportunity to work with you to that end.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston. Again, we all commend you on your long leadership. You were way out ahead of all of the movements that we have under way now, and I am sure you inspired some of them.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias, we are happy to have your statement. You can give it from your seat or from the witness table, wherever you want to be.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I like to follow Alan Cranston's example.

The CHAIRMAN. You want to see what it looks like on the other side of the street? [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief. The most critical issue we face today is the prevention of nuclear war and yet it does seem to be an issue on which we are in danger of fracturing as a people. The sheer quantity and variety of congressional resolutions on this subject underlines some of the confusion that exists in the minds of the American people.

What we lack—and lack badly—is a consensus, a national consensus, around a strategic security policy which is underpinned by prudent defense efforts and by an ongoing arms control process.

The Reagan administration came to office determined to restore U.S. military strength and global leadership and, by so doing, to convince the Soviet Union that it has more to gain by cooperation than through confrontation. Tactically, the administration has emphasized expanded defense budgets and, again tactically, has generally discouraged a dialog and exchange with the Soviet Union either by ourselves or by our allies. Rhetorically, the administration has emphasized Soviet strength, our weaknesses, and the range of global military threats facing the West.

But it seems to me that the rhetoric and the tactics have risked placing the strategy in jeopardy because this tough rhetoric has not necessarily contributed to a western willingness to do more. Instead, the criticism of bellicose statements and policies is rising both in Europe and in the United States, and this criticism, I think, could really have an adverse effect on defense budgets, missile deployments and other administration plans.

On March 31, President Reagan declared with respect to the Soviet nuclear programs, "On balance, the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority." By these and other efforts to inflate the perception of Soviet power, I think we feed that power.

Now the public criticism of our allies over our policy in Poland, the gas pipeline, handling of the Soviet debt, and trade with the East has given our own colleagues who have been skeptical some verbal ammunition that goes so far as to threaten congressional support for NATO and I think we can only speculate on the effect of all this on the Soviet Union, but we have to keep in mind the observation of one Soviet expert, one Kremlinologist. The most dangerous situation is when the Soviet Union has nothing to fear from the United States and sees no opening for cooperation.

It was to respond to this whole factual situation that I introduced Senate Resolution 343 calling on the President to immediately invite the Soviet Union to begin strategic arms negotiations and I am, needless to say, very happy and pleased that the President has now issued this call and has announced that arms negotiations with the Soviet Union will be resumed.

But I would throw out this cautionary note, and it is one I think that applies to the freeze proponents. We are dealing with an aging Soviet leadership which someday must obey the inexorable laws of nature. At the best of times, the Communist hierarchy does not absorb new ideas quickly. This is not necessarily the best of times in the Kremlin.

Unfortunately, they have had to become used to the fact that each new successive American administration tends to abandon the efforts of its predecessor and tries to come up with something new, something different, something that has its imprimateur on it, its brand. Now these attempts at innovation on the part of American administrations result in some dramatic lurches on our part which historically have accomplished very little. Eventually we will have to recognize that we are not negotiating among ourselves but with the occupants of the Kremlin.

So our task is not to structure an agreement designed to give us everything that we want, because that kind of an agreement would languish on the table in Geneva. Nor do I think it is adequate to simply develop a program which will help us to score propaganda points.

What we need to do is to seek to enhance our security through arms control, a complex job. And the steady march of technology makes it more and more difficult as weapons proliferate and miniaturization and other progress makes verification more difficult. There really are no easy answers and simply adopted slogans like "freeze" on the one hand or "real reductions" on the other I think will have a very limited utility at the negotiating table.

The freeze will not enhance security if in practice its negotiation takes years, and real reductions—real reductions—would not necessarily improve our security if they include massive cuts in our most survivable force, which is sea-based.

We have to insure that our deterrent remains credible, that our forces are survivable, but also we have to seek to negotiate limitations which are in our mutual interest. Things like the prohibition of the encryption of telemetry or limitations on the testings of new missiles are examples that can produce immediate benefits.

I am hopeful that the administration has these concerns in mind. Certainly, judging from the Secretary of State's testimony this morning, I think they have some of them in mind. It must recognize that radical departures will not necessarily move the process in constructive directions. But I would hope, in particular, Mr. Chairman, that the positive achievements of previous administrations will not be jettisoned.

To this end, I intend to introduce a resolution which will commend the President for the prudent course of policy that he has followed to date in taking no action inconsistent with the terms of the SALT II. The resolution will express the support of the Senate for continuing such a policy of restraint in nuclear arms policy and will call on the administration to do nothing inconsistent with the terms of SALT I and SALT II during the START negotiations, provided the Soviet Union restrains itself in a similar way.

It is, I think, helpful that both sides pursue this course of action at present, but it is, I think, necessary that we in the Senate make it clear that, regardless of changes in administration or changes in personnel within the administration, this policy of restraint may be continued.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Mathias. As is customary, we see eye to eye on much of what you have just said. I will take a minute to explain the resolution on arms reductions which I submitted on March 18. My resolution was developed in cooperation with Congressman Zablocki, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who will testify before the committee tomorrow morning on the resolution.

The objective of my resolution is threefold. First, it calls on the United States and the Soviet Union to start the START negotiations immediately. As I stated at the hearing this morning, I welcomed the President's announcement on Sunday that the administration is now ready to proceed with START, and I share his hope that the negotiations can be underway by the end of next month.

Second, my resolution describes as an objective for START attainment of "substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions on nuclear weapons", with specific limitations on the testing and deployment of the most destabilizing systems. I am very pleased that the START proposal which the President outlined on Sunday seeks to achieve the same objectives. I will look forward in the course of these hearings to exploring more fully the specific details of the upcoming U.S. START proposal to determine the extent to which it will indeed promote the attainment of these goals.

The third objective of my resolution is to insure that existing limitations on each side's strategic weaponry are preserved while the START negotiations proceed. As I noted this morning, the President himself has stated that the task of reducing and reshaping our strategic forces in START may take many years. It is therefore vitally important that the stability and reductions which we seek in START not be undermined by a totally unrestrained arms race during the period of negotiation.

Among the resolutions which are now before the committee, there are three separate approaches recommended for dealing with this concern. The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution would have both sides freeze all their nuclear development and development programs as a precondition for subsequent negotiations aimed at achieving substantial reductions. Other resolutions call for the Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty, and it is argued thereby to ensure that some restrictions are formally put in place while START is conducted.

For its part, the administration has opposed both the freeze and the SALT II ratification proposals. At the same time, though, it has, as Secretary Haig reiterated just this morning, declared its intention to avoid any actions that would undercut existing SALT agreements for the foreseeable future, provided the Soviet Union continues to show the same restraint.

In my opinion, in the face of determined opposition by the President, there is simply no chance whatsoever that the resolution of ratification could command a two-thirds vote in the Senate. Moreover, the debate would be sharply divisive and would divert attention from the upcoming START negotiations as well as the ongoing INF negotiations in Geneva. For this reason, and to achieve some positive results that we can actually measure, I would hope we could focus on less formal means by which the limitations that were defined during the 7 years of SALT II negotiations can continue to contribute to stability and continuity in our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.

I suggest that a first step would be for the committee to go formally on record in support of Secretary Haig's declaration this morning that the administration intends to continue to show restraint vis-a-vis previously negotiated SALT agreements as long as the Soviets do the same. In the course of these hearings, I intend to explore other means by which stability can be preserved, and am hopeful that we can reach a consensus within the committee on this crucial point. I certainly look forward to working very closely with you, Senator Cranston and Senator Mathias, on that point, a point that both of you forcefully made in your own testimony.

Nothing in my comments this afternoon is intended to suggest a lack of support for other resolutions before the committee. We have before us an extraordinary range of innovative proposals and ideas, many of which merit the support of all who are committed to reducing the risks of nuclear war. I am hopeful that the resolution which the committee drafts in our markup on May 20 will reflect the most constructive recommendations advanced in these resolutions.

Senator CRANSTON. I would like to comment briefly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of course.

Senator CRANSTON. I think your proposal is a very fine point of departure for this committee to consider as a basis for action when we come to mark up. I do feel that it would be helpful to have in that proposal or in whatever proposal we work out a statement endorsing the concept of a freeze as one step. I think Mark Hatfield put it very clearly and neatly when he said, if an elevator is going up, it has to stop before it goes down. That would be a freeze at that stopping point, until we have negotiated the downward movement that we all want.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. The word "freeze" is, of course, used in the Warner-Jackson amendment. They just modify it by saying that there will be no incentive for any reductions if we do not somehow move in a direction where there will be that incentive and parity is reached. As has been pointed out by a number of Senators today, such as me, Senator Biden, and others, the Soviets would like nothing more than a freeze in Europe as of now, because they do have a distinct advantage, and the Europeans are so deeply concerned because they are concerned that we would not be willing when the chips are down to swap, let's say, Chicago for Hamburg. They therefore are opposed to a freeze with the disparity that now exists. We have been restrained, but they have been building heavily. Of course, we have to find a way to provide an incentive to the Soviets to really come together with us on a real reduction.

Senator CRANSTON. If I may just comment briefly, as Senator Kennedy stated, the resolution of which I am a cosponsor does not call for a European freeze alone. It calls for a worldwide freeze, insofar as we and the Soviets are concerned. It does not call for a unilateral freeze. It does not imply an instant freeze because it requires negotiation. During that time, perhaps each side—well, not perhaps, surely each side will be adding to their arsenals, so there is not a freeze proposed at the precise levels whre we are now, because we know it is not going to be achieved forthwith.

I believe the Soviets share the prime motivation that moves us, and that is a desire to avoid the mutual suicidal catastrophe of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We have another very important meeting scheduled in this room at 4 o'clock with citizens from the greatest State in the Union—Illinois, that is, not California, but I see I am outnumbered 2 to 1 by California's Senators at the moment. Before we leave for that meeting, I know Senator Hayakawa has a short statement. That will conclude the agenda for today.

Senator HAYAKAWA. It cannot be too short, because if it is, I would just as soon postpone it.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is your statement?

Senator HAYAKAWA. I would say at the minimum it would be 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. I had assumed it was a short statement. I do not think we can hold up this group. Is there some other room we could find for my group? Then I could leave you in the chair, Senator Hayakawa, if you do not mind. It is about 30 people.

Let me say that what we are going to have to do is find some place else for our 4 o'clock meeting. I will ask Senator Hayakawa to take the chair, and he can gavel himself closed when he is finished. I will therefore excuse myself, and I thank you very much.

Senator HAYAKAWA [presiding]. If the committee will come to order, I shall proceed.

What I want to do in the light of the discussions we have been having today and the discussions that have been going on all over the country about a nuclear freeze is, as a result of this discussion, I resurrected a paper I originally wrote in 1960, at the time when Herman Kahn wrote his book on thermal nuclear war. Enough of us were scared at that time so that thousands of people around the country were building themselves fallout shelters and storing bottles of water, boxes of biscuits, and so on, for the sake of survival.

We have been through this before, the danger of imminent nuclear war. At that time, I tried to analyze the situation, and I want to present that analysis again today in briefer form. Let me start by giving an example of a psychological principle which I take, let us say, from Orthodox Jews, where marriages are arranged by professional matchmakers. Among the problems of the matchmaker is, when he concocts a marriage scheme to the satisfaction of two sets of parents, the two young people concerned are often not interested in each other. Then what do you do? Well, a favorite trick under these circumstances is to rely upon what the sociologist Robert K. Merton called the self-fulfilling prophesy. He says today, have you noticed how Ruth looks at you, and he says to Ruth, David thinks you are wonderful, he can hardly keep his eyes off you. Up to now David and Ruth have hardly glanced at each other, but after this buildup, when they meet the next time, they look at each other with special interest, and after that, things may begin to happen.

The thing about a self-fulfilling prophecy is, statements such as those of the matchmaker are not true at the time he makes them, but they may become true if they are believed. David may actually become fascinated by Ruth, and Ruth may actually become fascinated by David. If Gallileo says that two cannonballs of unequal size dropped from the Leaning Tower of Piza will hit the ground at the same time, his prophecy does not affect the outcome of the experiment, but statements about human relations are not like physical-science statements. If someone says, I have no friends, everybody hates me, and he believes his own statement, he would treat everyone, including those who are trying to be helpful or friendly, as if they are enemies, and thereby he makes his own statement come true, and soon he has not got a friend in the world.

The reason I speak on this subject of self-fulfilling prophecies is, the world, the whole world is threatened with extinction by them. First, there is a prophecy, apparently widely current, in the Soviet Union that eventually, one of these days the Western capitalist powers, particularly the United States, will attempt to destroy the Soviet Union by armed force. Second, there is the prophecy widely current in the Western World, especially the United States, that the Soviet Union is planning some day to destroy us, and on both sides there are those who say, it has to come, one of these days there is going to be a showdown.

Those who say this usually believe that they are stating an objective fact, like the prophecies of the physical sciences, like there is going to be snow next winter in Minnesota. We do not know what day it is going to start to fall, but by gosh, there will be snow in Minnesota, and Minnesota will be covered with snow.

On both sides, too, influential people have believed these prophecies and have acted upon them. Americans, believing the Russians are preparing to attack, have stockpiled atomic and hydrogen bombs. We have ringed the U.S.S.R. with bases, and are working on new weapon developments constantly, all of which activity further convinces the Russians of what they already believe, namely, that we are preparing to attack.

The Russians, too, have stockpiled atomic and hydrogen bombs, made alliances with governments and anti-governmental revolutionary groups in all parts of the world, and are feverishly working on new weapon developments, all of which convinces the Americans of what we already believe, namely, that they are preparing to attack, and so it goes on and on in what is perhaps the hugest and most fantastic vicious circle the world have ever seen.

One of the serious things that happened during World War II is that we unconciously glided from the concept of war as a struggle between armies and navies and fighting forces to the concept of total war. Many of you remember Picasso's great paining, "Guernica." The horror of that painting was the bombing of civilians. It outraged the entire civilized world. Total war is in our times a facist revival of an ancient concept, the kind of war waged by Genghis Khan or Tamerlane, in which no distinction was made between slaughtering soldiers and slaughtering civilians. They just went out and slaughtered.

Well, when Mussolini revived this technique in Ethiopia, and Hitler in Warsaw and Rotterdam, we were at first horrified, but then before World War II was over the allied nations were doing it, too, by air attacks, by napalm, and by atomic bomb.

Lewis Mumford believes that this acceptance of the concept of total war was the greatest moral abdication of the Western powers of our century, an abdication which led inevitably to our obsessive reliance on atomic and hydrogen bombs in preparation for wars to come. So, having committed ourselves on both sides of the Iron Curtain to nuclear weapons, which means to a policy not of armies and navies and air forces fighting each other, but of mass extermination, we have increased our capacity for destruction to such a degree that we cannot be called, even in charity, anything but insane.

This constant acceleration of preparation for war may well, without specific intent, ultimately produce a spontaneous combustion that we all fear. What would this combustion, whether set off purposely or accidentally, mean? Whole regions, especially around the great cities of America and of Western and Eastern Europe, and no doubt in other parts of the world as well, will not only be destroyed but rendered uninhabitable for dacades to come with radioactive wastes. For generations to come, babies will be born among survivors all over the world with genetic damage due to fallout.

Yet in spite of all of the obvious dangers in our present course of action, both in the United States and the U.S.S.R., we seem helpless to alter them. We are like a small party in a boat, a boat in the river above Niagara Falls, approaching closer and closer to the brink. The United States and U.S.S.R., instead of rowing away from the brink, row madly toward it with their continued preoccupation with the armaments race. Other nations not involved in our quarrels but in the same human boat nervously grip the gunwales in the wan hope that some day they may perhaps survive the catastrophe. This attitude is known as neutralism.

Neither side, in other words, seems to be able to change its attitude. Why this is so is clear, I believe, to studies of the social sciences and students of general semantics. Students of anthropology know how deeply rooted cultural patterns are, and how difficult they are to change. Sociologists know about institutional inertia, and how social institutions, once they are well established, continue to do what they set out to do, whether there is any use in doing those things any more or not.

Students of psychology are acquainted with compulsive behavior, the way in which neurotic individuals repeat over and over again those very actions which got them into trouble in the first place, because they are so ridden with anxieties that they cannot try any other courses of action. And students of economics are aware of the degree to which industries acquire vested interests in those particular forms of madness that are most profitable to them. And as students of general semantics, we have all studied the causes in neurosis, in cultural inertia, and in language habits of evaluative inflexibility.

Let me elaborate on this matter of language habits for a moment, the semantic problems that go to the very root of our thinking about war and peace. The psychiatrist Jerome Frank argues that the very words we use in our discussions are either radically changed in their meanings or have lost their meaning altogether because of the fantastic destructive power of our new weaponry. We commit ourselves to false conclusions even before we have started to think. Let me quote from Dr. Frank's analysis:

> We automatically refer to our nuclear arms policy as one of defense, yet there is no defense in the strict sense of the term. In pre-atomic days, it was a comforting thought that for each new offensive weapon a genuine defense was eventually developed. Even though the protection it afforded was never perfect, it was adequate. Today, when one fighter bomber with nuclear weapons carries more destructive power than all the bombers in World War II, a defense that is even 90 percent effective would not prevent vast destruction. But, in using the word "defense" to justify continued arming, we automatically slip into thinking of it in its old connotation. For example, Robert Nathan recently spoke of our creating a "massive defensive shield." There is no shield against nuclear weapons.
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> Another phrase which no longer means anything is "balance of power," and concepts implied by it, such as "catching up" with the Russians, are equally meaningless. For phrases implying relative strength have no meaning when each side can destroy the other many times over. What does "catch up" mean when according to President Eisenhower we can bring "near annihilation" to Russia, and how do we know when we have caught up. We are said to have about 35,000 atomic bombs, Russia 10,000. Are we balanced or not?
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> A third phrase which is rapidly losing its meaning is "national security." These words imply that one nation can be secure at the expense of the security of other nations. But under present circumstances, no nation can control the fallout it receives from other nations and atomic explosions anywhere in the world. Every inch of the globe can soon come under observation or attack from earth satellites. In today's world, either all nations are secure or none is.
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> One sign that a person's thinking processes have gone seriously awry is inability to detect absurdities. For example, if a patient can see nothing wrong with the statement, "Bill Jones' feet are so big he has to put his hands on over his head," psychiatrists worry about the intactness of his intellectual processes.

Our failure to take account of the changed meanings of words leads us to make statements which are almost as absurd. This is the kind of semantic tangle in which we find ourselves today when we think about defense, so-called defense.

Is there any escaping the destruction with which the world is confronted? Since this is a question involving human relations, any answer we give involves a self-fulfilling prophesy. If we say no, if we say that our present national policy is the only possible one, we shall help bring on the destruction we fear. If we say, yes, if we say we must continue to look for ways and means out of our predicament, we enhance the possibility of finding a solution.

Those who say that a solution can and must be found to this international impasse in which we find ourselves, those who are determined to find that the entire problem must be confronted in new and unprecedented ways will have to turn inevitably to the problem of communication with the Soviet Union. In the past two decades, we have learned much about the degree to which problems of communication are involved in all human problems. Let me talk about one particular aspect of communication which I think are the problems of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Successful communication, as we all know, is therapeutic in effect. As we all know, whether we think of therapy merely as applied to the psychiatrist and his client or broadly as applied to the clearing up of the lesser misunderstandings and delusions that becloud relationships between people in normal business and family contacts, in this broad sense of psychotherapy in which no psychiatrist is involved, and in which the problem is the unblocking of communications between parent and child, partner and partner in the business situation, between employer and employee, between teacher and student, there is always the general question, who is going to be the psychiatrist and who is going to be the patient. To this question, there is always a general answer. Namely, that since listening is at the heart of psychotherapy, whoever has the emotional strength and the courage to begin listening to the other fellow, instead of turning a deaf ear or shouting at the other fellow, can begin the therapeutic process. That is, the emotionally secure mother can act as therapist for the child, but sometimes the emotionally strong child can act as therapist for an upset mother.

The general rule then is this. Whether you are parent or child, employee or employer, teacher or student, if you yourself have the firmness and security of internal organization to listen patiently to the other fellow, even when you know he is wrong, but nevertheless, you are willing to listen and listen and listen, you can start the therapeutic process rolling.

What about applying the same principle to the Soviet Union? If we really believe what we say about our way of life, if we are really sure of its superiority to communism, if we sincerely believe that our Nation is founded on sounder moral principles than any dictatorship, then instead of putting up walls of security regulations around ourselves to guard against communication from Communist sources, we should welcome them. The simplest and most effective way of establishing communication, as every psychiatrist and mother knows, is to listen.

Hence, I would propose that, far from preventing the dissemination in our midst of Communist propaganda, we should invite hundreds, perhaps thousands of Soviet teachers, professors, journalists, parliamentarians, jurists, and plant managers to come here and explain their way of life, to explain their national purposes, their hopes for the future, their accusations against us, their fears. Let them explain these things before every college campus, every luncheon club, every union membership meeting, every chapter of the American Association of University Women, every church group, and every public forum in the country.

The patient, by talking out to his psychiatrist his bitter memories, present frustrations, and fears for the future, gradually overcomes his bitterness, his frustration, and his fear. If the Russians are bitter toward us, frustrated by us, or fear us, and if indeed we have no aggressive military designs that they need to fear, let them come over here and tell us what is eating them, so that they can get over it. Let them come and compare their picture of us with us as we are. Let us try to understand their view of the world as they see it, and then let us debate with them, vigorously but rationally, so that they will understand our view of the world as we see it, and report that view back to their compatriots on their return.

In other words, let us invite them at our own expense and with no strings attached to join the perpetual town meeting in which we are all engaged in a free society, and to lay their ideas alongside of ours for comparison and discussion. For the price of one medium-sized bomber, I am sure we could pay the traveling expenses of 2,000 or 3,000 Soviet lecturers and their translators for 3-month lecture tours. We have tried bombers of all sizes, but none of them has reduced international tensions. Is it not time we tried something different?

The funny thing about human beings, including you and me and the Russians, is that we tend to respect the intelligence of and eventually get to like those who listen attentively to our ideas, even if they continue to disagree with us. Supposing we listened to the Russians. Of course, we would find ourselves disagreeing much of the time, but suppose we continued listening anyway, in order to get a clear conception of what it was that we were disagreeing with.

Some of our ideas may be influenced. We certainly will get new information. Also, we may find ourselves reevaluating some things we thought we already understood. But another question is, what would happen to the Russians who were doing the talking? What would be the effect on Russian public opinion of 2,000 or 3,000 Russian lecturers going back home to tell their local newspapers, friends, and colleagues of the attentive consideration with which their views were received in America? What will be the effect on world public opinion in India, Africa, Japan, and elsewhere in the world of the invitation of Russian speakers to America as contrasted with the Russian jamming of the Voice of America broadcasts to countries behind the Iron Curtain?

But aside from such propaganda victories which we might gain from such a move, there is the more serious matter of the self-fulfilling prophesy. The Russians have long said and they continue to say that they want peace. Nevertheless, on the basis of their aggressive actions in North Korea and Hungary, and Afghanistan and Poland, we call them, with some justification, I think, liars and hypocrites, but what would happen if we took the protestations of peaceful intention seriously? Is there a chance that if we acted on the assumption that they really wanted peace, the self-fulfilling prophesy would begin to operate and they would begin to seek peace?

I do not know. No one does. But I do know that Mahatma Gandhi, in his struggle for Indian independence, always insisted on treating the British as sincere and honorable. There must have been many times when he did not feel particularly like treating them as sincere or honorable, but he persisted in this course. That was his theory of communication, I guess. Ultimately, as we all know, he elicited from the British sincere and honorable behavior, and independence for India.

I also know that the dangers of world destruction confronting us today are enormous, and that the Russians fear the holocaust no less than we.

Finally, I know that our present policy of threatening to blow the hell out of the Russians and their policy of threatening to blow the hell out of us are suicidal to all sides, for us and the Russians as well as for everyone else within reach of atomic fallout, which means the whole human race. So, it may be crazy to talk about inviting Communist speakers here by the thousands to give us their pitch, but it is clear that the only solutions for the problem of human survival for which we can hope are ideas that must of necessity sound crazy when first stated, like the idea of atomic energy itself.

Freedom, including freedom of thought and speech, is one of the most cherished ideas in American tradition, and as we contemplate the precious freedoms we enjoy, we often feel sorry for those people behind the Iron Curtain because they are not free to hear ideas which are in conflict with their own Communist doctrines, but how much freedom have we permitted ourselves when it comes to listening to Communist ideas, and are we not almost as tightly enclosed within our own ideology as they are in theirs?

So, to return to my plea that we listen seriously to the Russians, let us demonstrate to the Russians and to the world that when we talk about freedom, we mean freedom to examine their ideas no less than freedom to discuss our own. Because there is an operational difference between freedom of the Soviet variety and of our own kind of variety, let us operate on that operational difference, and show that it is a difference that makes a big difference, indeed. We really have nothing to lose but our anxieties. We have much to gain, perhaps human survival itself.

The Chair will be glad to entertain questions.

[Pause.]

Senator Hayakawa. I see that there are no questions. Seriously, does anyone want to raise any question of any kind? I invite everybody here to do so.

Question From the Audience. Senator Hayakawa, the Soviets are a closed society. How would the Russian returnees have a chance to disseminate their opinions?

Senator Hayakawa. Well, we issue the original invitation. From there on, first of all, it takes a lot of nerve on their part to accept it. Once they have accepted it, then they have another problem on their hands. As I see it, this would create more problems for them than it does for us. That is, we have already existing in our culture such networks of communication, such as the Kiwanis, the Lions' Club, the AAUW, and so on and so forth, so that people do go around espousing one doctrine or another, such as antiabortion, pro-ERA, et cetera, progun control or antigun control. We are accustomed to this. Have they got any analogous mechanisms in their own culture? Or when they get back, when the visitors to the United States get back, will they all be thrown into prison, or will they not be allowed to come back at all?

I do not know what the outcome would be. It would be interesting, though, to try the experiment.

Question From the Audience. Senator, how much in depth do you plan to have the discussion? Do you see it as a cultural exchange?

Senator Hayakawa. Earlier in the paper, before you got here, I said that certainly I encouraged the continuation of cultural exchanges, you know, art exhibits, dance troupes, exchanges of symphony orchestras, whatever. That is all fine and good, but I want to get to the ideological level, so that there will be people-to-people communication.

One very interesting example of this was, late in the 1950's, around 1958, 1959, a large delegation of Soviet farmers came to visit farms in the United States, in Iowa, Nebraska, the Midwestern States, Minnesota, et cetera. What was so fascinating about it was, American farmers opened their homes. They threw big corn roasts, barbeques, et cetera, to entertain their Russian guests. It was the warmest kind of midwestern hospitality. No one followed up on this, unfortunately, but there was a chance then to make some people-to-people contact.

The fact that this actually happened was one of the reasons for this paper, which, as I said at the beginning, was originally drafted in 1960. So, you go beyond the cultural exchange then to the actual exchange of ideas.

Anybody else?

Question From the Audience. Do you not think that the interchange between Russia and the United States is more or less an ideology, and that the Communists will not submit to our way of doing things? It is a psychological war rather than anything else.

Senator Hayakawa. Of course it is ideological. If we were really trying to sell them an ideology, that is one thing, but that is not what my paper proposes. It proposes simply, look, you tell us what you think, what do you fear, what do you hope for your nation, et cetera, et cetera. What do you hope for your city? What do you hope for your province? What do you hope for yourself and your children? What kind of life do you have? What kind of educational system do you have? Do you want to see it improve? We would like to listen to what your problems are and what your aspirations are. Then we, here in the Lions' Club, and you coming from a foreign country, will talk about it. We do not want to argue. We just want to listen. That is the idea.

The important thing here is very often in psychotherapy the speaker is more influenced by this communication than the listener. Is that not what a psychotherapist is for? If we are wrong, then we will correct what is wrong with our views. If a Soviet speaker is wrong in his views upon America, he will quietly change his own views. That is, if they accept the invitation at all, which itself is a big, big job. But still, the mere act of sending that invitation would be a signal to the whole world that we are an open society and are not afraid of their ideas. We are not afraid if there are a whole bunch of commissars or military men or factory managers or heads of collective farms, anybody who is a community leader, or maybe not community leaders necessarily, maybe just articulate people. Let them send them over, whole bunches of them. Let them speak to us.

We have wonderfully attentive people like the Lions' Club, the Kiwanis, and the Rotary, just waiting for speakers. They are just willing to listen. Then they will go home and say, "Mother, there was the most interesting speaker at Rotary today, and ideas will get rolled around. That is, if we invite them to take part in that process. You see, the whole idea may fall flat on its face because the Soviets will simply say, "We are not going to send any speakers over there." They will not say this out loud, but they might think the first thing they will do is defect, and if they are that much afraid of defection, of course, obviously, that itself would be a criticism of their society.

Well, thank you all very much for listening. [General applause.]

Senator HAYAKAWA. This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 12, 1982.]

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Percy.

Also present: Senators John Warner and Arlen Specter.

The Chairman. This morning the committee continues the series of hearings that I have described as probably dealing with the most important subject the Foreign Relations Committee has ever confronted and probably the most important hearings that we have ever held. As someone said on the floor of the Senate yesterday, or in this hearing, we are dealing really with the future of humanity.

Our witnesses today are both distinguished Members of the Senate, but also serve in strategic positions on its Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner being the chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, and Senator Jackson has been long identified with this subject area. We served together for 16 years, I guess, in the Governmental Affairs Committee now, where we deal with nuclear nonproliferation, among other subjects.

They are well versed on the subject and we certainly warmly welcome them. They have cosponsored an amendment that has attracted the support of over 60 Members of the Senate. It has broad-based appeal, is hardheaded and practical. And yet, it does introduce the concept of a freeze, but based on principles that, when President Reagan was in Illinois on Sunday, he specifically enumerated and pointed out the resolution he supports. He discussed his strong support for the principles and concepts of this resolution.

As I just mentioned to our distinguished guests, at a Land of Lincoln conference, 55 Republican leaders in Illinois discussing the various issues of the day, the resolution they came up with paralleled, in fact was word for word in its beginning phrases, with the Jackson-Warner amendment. It was overwhelmingly supported on a motion from the floor.

Today we will also hear from several other congressional authors of the principal arms-reduction proposals now before the Congress. Senators Warner and Jackson will be followed by Senator Hart, Congressman Zablocki, Congressman Markey, and Congressman Gore. This afternoon we will hear from a panel of public witnesses who formerly held key foreign policy and national security posts.

Certainly we warmly welcome both of you and look forward to your testimony.

We apologize to our guests this morning for the Senate vote which came at 10 o'clock, which delayed the start of these hearings. But we will move right along.

Senator Jackson.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY JACKSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

Senator JACKSON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

It is for Senator Warner and me a great honor to appear before you today. I thank you for this opportunity to speak in support of Senate Joint Resolution 177, a bipartisan resolution whose aim is to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. As my colleagues know, the Senate sponsors of this resolution number well over a majority of this Chamber— to be exact, 61, 26 Democrats and 34 Republicans, and 1 independent.

For almost four decades, Mr. Chairman, our country has been trying to gain Soviet agreement to arms control and reduction measures that would reduce the risks of nuclear war. Speaking for President Truman at a time when this country alone possessed nuclear arms, Barnard Baruch offered the world a plan to turn all of our weapons over to an international authority. But this historic proposal foundered on the rock of Soviet objections.

All six of Mr. Truman's followers in the Presidency, three of them from one party and three of them from the other, advanced arms control proposals to reduce the danger of nuclear war. And now President Reagan takes up the challenge.

The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that despite our 40 years of trying to make the world's weapons stockpiles smaller, they have steadily grown larger and larger.

Mr. Chairman, nuclear force levels at their present size and balance invite both war by deliberate design and war by accident or misunderstanding. To the hundreds of millions who would be killed or maimed in a nuclear holocaust, it would matter not an iota whether they had been victims of malevolence or mistake. Our Nation's first priority in arms negotiations, therefore, cannot be trying to keep things as they are. It must be trying to make things better.

I do not see how there can be any disagreement about the goal of our arms negotiations with the Soviets. It must be to reduce weapons, to bring existing nuclear forces down to lower and lower levels of equality until they eventually reach zero on both sides. Such differences of view as may exist must go to the question of means and not to ends. The real issue is not where we want to go; it is how best to get there.

For many of us a freeze of nuclear forces at their present levels of threat and terror perpetuates the very problem we are trying to solve. Indeed, we would severely lesson the chances for real arms reductions if ever we adopted policies ratifying or acquiescing in or legitimizing the nuclear armaments status quo.

It is time for a change, a big change. Our first order of business must be to reduce the threshold of violence and step by step to win Soviet agreement to substantial nuclear arms reductions.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, now briefly to summarize what our resolution says and why. First, the resolution calls upon the United States to propose to the Soviet Union a verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces. The reductions must be substantial. I have in mind cuts that would shrink present day overall nuclear force levels by one-half or even greater fractions.

The reductions must be equitable. They must result in far lower and equal levels of forces that would give neither side a military advantage over the other.

And the cuts must be verifiable. Neither side must be required to make the safety of its people hostage to the simple assurance of the other that agreements were being observed.

Second, the resolution calls upon our Government to propose practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists. This is an area of arms control in which Senator Nunn, Senator Hart, and now Senator Warner who is playing a very important role, among others, have been particularly interested.

With some 15,000 nuclear weapons now in the stockpiles of the superpowers, with more and more other nations possessing weapons, and with terrorism on the rampage, the danger mounts of incidents that, through inadvertence or misinterpretation, might trigger a nuclear disaster.

As my colleagues know I am urging the establishment of a permanent joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communications and information center that would provide uninterrupted and reciprocal superpower contact and dialog. Such a center would be staffed by senior Soviet and American professionals. It would build on the present hotline and have communications links that give it sure and instant access to the White House and the Kremlin.

Such a center would provide what could be a literally lifesaving arrangement for instant information exchange and consultation when incidents occurred that could be misinterpreted as harbingers of an imminent nuclear assault by one power against the other.

Arms reductions negotiations are bound to be lengthy, as the chairman knows, and complicated. However, it could well be possible to reach early agreement on a communications center, whose establishment would be so clearly in the interest of both sides.

Third, the resolution asks our Government to challenge the Soviets to join with us in a great effort to divert the energies and resources of our nations away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus them on attacking mankind's common and ancient enemies—poverty, hunger, and disease.

Of course our country must do what is necessary to help keep the peace. But every dollar spent on armaments means one less dollar available for succoring the needy and heading the afflicted.

The arms burden weighs even more heavily on the Soviets. Compared with us, they devote to military spending a far larger fraction of a far smaller gross national product.

Nuclear force level reductions of the kind contemplated in our resolution could over time release for other purposes billions and billions of dollars and rubles. We can all visualize the humane and constructive uses to which both sides could put money that would be saved by reduced spending on nuclear arms.

Fourth and lastly, the resolution says we should continue to press, month after month, year after year, for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. It thereby recognizes that there can be only one sure way of reducing to zero the possibility of nuclear calamity, and that is by reducing to zero the number of nuclear weapons in the world's armament inventories. All of us know how far away this ultimate objective now is. But who of us for this reason would dare stop working toward it?

Mr. Chairman, when I look ahead I see no magic breakthrough that will suddenly propel us toward the goals that have so far eluded us. Instead, I see an unremitting need for bold proposals, hard thinking, hard bargaining, and the patience of Job.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your statement, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just ask permission to include at the conclusion of my remarks the letter that I sent to the President dealing with this subject on March 24, 1981, and my statement on the Senate floor in connection with the joint introduction of the resolution by Senator Warner and myself on Tuesday, March 30?

The CHAIRMAN. Those will be incorporated. Thank you very much.

[The material referred to follows:]

JACKSON-WARNER NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION RESOLUTION (S.J. RES. 177)

Senator Jackson (D.Wash.) and Senator Warner (R.Va.) on March 30, 1982, introduced a bipartisan nuclear arms reduction resolution on behalf of a majority of members of the Senate.

The resolution calls on the United States to propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. A copy of the resolution is attached.

The 61 cosponsors of the resolution are as follows:

Mr. Jackson, Mr. Warner, Mr. Baker, Mr. R. Byrd, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Bentsen, Mr. Abdnor, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Boren, Mr. Boschwitz, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Burdick, Mr. H. Byrd, Mr. Cannon, Mr. Chiles, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Cranston, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Dole, Mr. Exon, Mr. Ford, Mr. Garn, Mr. Goldwater, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Hatch, Ms. Hawkins, Mr. Hayakawa, Mr. Heflin, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Jepsen, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Kasten, Mr. Long, Mr. Mattingly, Mr. Melcher, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Quayle, Mr. Rudman, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Specter, Mr. Stennis, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Tower, Mr. McClure, Mr. Roth, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Schmitt, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Zorinsky.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

Whereas, a nuclear war would kill or injure millions and millions of people and threaten the survival of the human race;

Whereas, there can be no assurance that a nuclear war, once initiated, would remain limited in scope;

Whereas, there exists the ever-present risk that nuclear weapons might be employed through accident or miscalculation;

Whereas, the American people who are a people of peace, maintain nuclear armaments only in the defense of freedom and yearn for world conditions in which they could do far more to lift the burdens of human privation and despair;

Whereas, the current nuclear force imbalance is destabilizing and could increase the likelihood of nuclear war;

Whereas, sizeable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far-lower level would enhance stability and the maintenance of peace; and

Whereas, President Reagan, on November 18, 1981, stated that the United States "will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable";

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That

(1) The United States should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term, mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces;

(2) The United States should propose to the Soviet Union practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists;

(3) The United States should challenge the Soviet Union to join in this historic effort to channel the genius of our two peoples away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus the energy and resources of both ntaions on attacking the ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, hunger and disease; and

(4) The United States should continue to press month after month, year after year, to achieve balanced, stabilizing arms reductions, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., March 24, 1981.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following up on my recent talk with you, I want to underscore the importance of your launching a dramatic, sustained American peace offensive at a very early opportunity.

I welcome the emphasis you have put on the goal of East-West arms reduction. I am persuaded the time is ripe for you to put forward a bold and imaginative proposal for serious arms reductions—a proposal challenging the Soviets to join with us in concluding an arms reduction agreement in a manner that enhances stability in the nuclear balance at sharply reduced levels of strategic forces.

We should not allow the Soviets to preempt the issue of peace. Right or wrong, our allies—particularly in Western Europe—are of the view that our country and the new Administration are unwilling to play a responsible role in the restraint of nuclear arms. You and I know this is not true, but it is a bad perception which the Soviet leaders exploit.

The fact is the Soviets are making headway with their peace propaganda among our allies in Europe; they are getting a free ride with their depiction of you and the United States as war-loving. Certain circles in West Europe, especially left-wing elements, have fallen under Moscow's spell, and are having an influence on the leadership of parties and governments out of all proportion to their numbers.

What is missing is a relentless drive on our part to shift to our side the initiative for peace—for real peace and stabilizing arms reductions. Let the Soviets respond and react to U.S. proposals—repeated, repeated and repeated. Make Moscow at least show its true colors.

This country is determined, under your leadership, to revitalize its defenses and enhance deterrence. But we do this because the defense of freedom leaves us no alternative. We are a people of peace. We take no satisfaction in channeling the genius of this nation into building of armaments. We would far rather participate in programs for enhancing the quality of life and ending poverty and disease for decent people everywhere.

This is the down-to-earth truth that President Eisenhower sought to convey to the world in his famous address of April 16, 1953. It is the truth that I believe you should now emphasize—by a far-reaching, innovative drive on behalf of serious mutual arms reductions.

The point is that strategic forces on both sides are larger than they need to be, provided that we can negotiate with the Soviets toward a common ceiling at a sharply lower level.

The urgent task of your Administration is to fashion a plan and strategy that would provide for the mutual reduction of Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces in a stabilizing manner. Some of our friends and allies believe that any smaller number of nuclear weapons is better than a bigger number. Obviously this is not so; what counts are matters of size, deliverability, accuracy, vulnerability, mix, balance and the like. I am confident it is not beyond the capacity of your Administration to develop a responsible proposal that if agreed to by the Soviets would provide a long-term stabilization of the strategic balance on the basis of equality at a reduced level of deterrence.

I do not foresee the Soviet leaders initially welcoming such an effort. In 1974 I outlined and urged a SALT proposal to stabilize the strategic balance through substantial reductions in U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic forces. In mid-February, 1977, after meeting with President Carter and at his request, I supplied him with a detailed analysis of the severely flawed nature of the then current SALT II draft text, advising a fresh start based on salvaging a more balanced, equal agreement to avoid winding up with a disastrous, unacceptable result that would widen and deepen the Soviet strategic margin still more. In March 1977, President Carter proposed in the SALT talks certain mutual force reductions and a ban on the deployment of new ICBM's. While I had no responsibility for his specific proposals, once they were offered, I strongly supported them. But the Administration retreated at the first Soviet objection: it did not even try to convince the Russians. And the SALT II treaty turned out to be an unequal charter for a massive Soviet strategic buildup. Far from putting a damper on the arms competition, it added fuel to the fire.

I am under no illusion about the difficulty of negotiating a fair and balanced arms reduction treaty with the Soviets. It will take hard bargaining, patience and time. Certainly, one speech won't do it—that is just the kickoff. The campaign must be pressed month after month, year after year if necessary. But our nation should not be deterred from championing a noble cause only because our adversaries may continue to act ignobly.

Such a genuine peace offensive on our part is an honorable counter to the shabby Kremlin slogans of peace and plenty. It will clarify to our friends and allies our dedication to stabilizing nuclear arms reduction negotiations. As a minimum, it will put Moscow on the propaganda defensive. It keeps open the possibility of achieving over time real and significant steps in the direction of such a stabilizing disarmament.

At a time when the Soviet economy is in deep difficulty, we can make a convincing case that a redirection of their emphasis away from the military sector is the best way to improve their economic well-being.

If our initiative proved successful, it would permit both sides to shift resources from the buildup of nuclear arsenals to the building up of their economies. It could mean billions of dollars in savings on strategic weapons systems. It could alleviate the atmosphere of mistrust and fear that has for so long clouded East-West relations. The energy of our peoples could be devoted to purposes more constructive and more enduring than the amassing of nuclear weapons—to the struggle against hunger and disease and human squalor, to the provision of houses instead of silos, tractors instead of ICBM's, and medicines instead of nuclear explosives. It would be a turning point in East-West relations of historic proportions.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a speech I delivered on the Senate floor on May 1, 1953 in support of President Eisenhower's plan for "real disarmament." I am also including an April 22, 1974 address which was my effort at that time to articulate the American vision of a peaceful world, and to assure our bargaining position for stabilizing, mutual arms reduction.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY M. JACKSON.

INTRODUCTION IN THE SENATE OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION RESOLUTION

(Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson)

Mr. President, it is an honor for me along with Senator Warner to introduce a nuclear arms reduction resolution on behalf of a majority of the members of the Senate. Our resolution calls upon the United States to propose to the Soviet Union a long-term mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals.

The resolution's sponsors come from both sides of the aisle and they represent a broad spectrum of views on national issues. A nuclear-tipped missile arching its way toward a target in our homeland would not care about the political affiliation of its prospective victims. Nor would it matter whether they were supply-siders or Keynesians.

And the states that our sponsors represent range from Maine to Hawaii, from Alaska to Florida, from the frost belt to the sun belt. The dimensions of America's desire for lasting peace with freedom are as long and as wide as America itself.

* * * * * * *

Our country can be proud of its past efforts to gain Soviet agreement to arms control and reduction measures that would make nuclear war less probable. These efforts began almost four decades ago. Speaking on behalf of President Truman, Mr. Bernard Baruch offered the world an atomic arms control plan of unparalleled selflessness. At a time when we alone possessed nuclear armaments, we said we would be willing to turn over our weapons stockpile to an international authority. But though of unprecedented generosity, our proposal foundered on the rock of Soviet objections.

All six of our nation's Presidents who followed Mr. Truman—three from one party, and three from the other—advanced arms control proposals to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflagration. And now President Reagan fully shares his predecessors' commitments to seek agreement with Moscow on measures that would contribute to this end.

You and I know, Mr. President, that only two words are needed to describe what the basic problem has been—Soviet intransigence.

But there are many who do not agree with us. In Western Europe particularly and here at home as well, the idea is too widespread that our country is unwilling to play a responsible role in the restraint of nuclear arms. And, let us be honest about it, this country has not done all it should be doing to correct such false notions and to set the record straight.

Those of us sponsoring this resolution believe that the time is ripe, if indeed not overdue, when this nation should again take the initiative on the issue of peace. We believe the hour has come to reaffirm again our country's historic commitment to the cause of peace with freedom. And we believe that our resolution will do much to help our country seize and hold the high ground in such a campaign.

* * * * * * *

Let me briefly summarize the resolution's contents:

We recognize that a nuclear war would cause devastation on a truly incomprehensible scale—indeed, threaten the survival of all mankind; that there is no assurance that a nuclear war, once started, would remain limited; and that the risk is ever-present that nuclear weapons might be used through accident or miscalculation.

We affirm that the American people are a people of peace, that our nation maintains nuclear armaments only in the defense of freedom and that our people yearn for world conditions in which they could do far more to lift the burdens of human privation and despair.

We emphasize that today's imbalance in nuclear forces, which advantages the Soviet Union, is full of grave risks to the future of freedom and the maintenance of peace, and that what is needed are sizeable and verifiable mutual reductions of both Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far lower level.

We draw attention to President Reagan's pledge to "seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable."

Then we come to the heart of the resolution. We call upon our government to propose to the Soviet Union a long-term mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces.

We further ask our government to propose to the Soviet Union practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists.

Then, in addition, we advise that the United States should offer its proposals as a dramatic, affirmative challenge to Moscow to channel the genius of our two peoples away from the amassing of nuclear armaments and to focus the energy and resources of both nations on attacking the ancient enemies of mankind—poverty, hunger and disease.

Finally, we stress the importance of perserverance and of pressing our efforts month after month, year after year, looking, in time, to the reduction of the world's nuclear weapons to the level of zero.

* * * * * * *

Mr. President, no fair-minded person could conclude that the actions proposed in our resolution would profit our country at Soviet expense. It asks of Moscow only what we ourselves would be willing to do. If our two nations did what the resolution invites them to do, both would emerge as winners.

It could indeed be argued that Moscow has an even greater economic stake in serious arms reductions than we do. Their gross national product lags far behind ours, and a much larger fraction of it goes toward arms spending than in our case. Burdensome though they are to us, military outlays weigh far more heavily on Soviet shoulders.

Picture, Mr. President, the great and good uses—like more food for the hungry and better care for the afflicted—to which both sides could put the billions of dollars and rubles that would be saved by reduced spending on nuclear armaments. And picture also the easing of tensions that could well come about if the threat of nuclear holocaust diminished. In truth, an agreement of the kind called for in our resolution could make a turning point of momentous proportions in the relations between our two nations.

But despite the splendid prospects that serious arms reductions could open for both our peoples, those sponsoring the resolution believe that the road to an agreement with the Soviets will almost certainly be long and arduous. We know of no magic formula that will catapult us toward the goal which has so far eluded us. It will take extraordinary patience, hard bargaining and time.

* * * * * * *

Permit me, Mr. President, some personal remarks before closing. Both while serving in the House and as a member of this body, I was an observer at nuclear weapons tests then being conducted in Nevada and in the Central Pacific. I saw the radiation-laden mushroom clouds that boiled their way upward into the sky. And I felt the earth shudder when the shock waves from the explosions passed our observation points.

I formed at the time a conviction from which I have never once wavered. I concluded I had no more important legislative responsibilities than trying to help insure that these engines of destruction would never be propelled against our country and, at the same time, trying to do whatever I could to help reduce the possibility of nuclear war.

Toward this end, I have advanced many initiatives for peace-serving types of arms agreements. In 1951, for example, I introduced into the House a counterpart of the landmark resolution of Senator Brien McMahon that sought to place the Congress on record as favoring nuclear disarmament under effective international controls. In 1953, I reintroduced an identical resolution in the Senate.

In 1972, I authored the Jackson amendment which put the Congress on record for mutuality and equality in levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. A year later, I championed proposals that would have reduced the combined intercontinental strategic weapons forces of the Soviet Union and our Nation by about one-third. A few months later, I outlined a detailed mutual arms reduction proposal to stabilize the strategic balance on the basis of partly through substantial reductions on both sides. In mid-February 1977, I advised President Carter to seek a balanced, equal SALT II agreement, and made recommendations for specific mutual force reductions. And a year ago, on March 24, I urged President Reagan to launch a far-reaching, innovative drive on behalf of serious mutual arms reductions.

In addition, after trying in many instances to improve them, I have voted for every arms control agreement that has been submitted to the Senate.

* * * * * * *

In conclusion, let me just say this: I am confident that coming generations of Americans will be generous in their judgments of us if, despite our having done our very best, we still find ourselves not moving as rapidly as we would wish along the road to a lasting peace with freedom. But I am just as confident that those coming after us will judge us harshly if we now do less than our best.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner, as a former Secretary of the Navy, you come with strong credentials in this field.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to acknowledge the fact that Senator Jackson is definitely the senior partner in this partnership of Jackson-Warner.

Senator JACKSON. I will say Warner-Jackson.

Senator WARNER. It has been a pleasure for myself to associate myself with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We can compromise. In Virginia it is Warner-Jackson. In Washington it is Jackson-Warner. And in Illinois it can be the Percy-Dixon, et cetera. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we should also recognize that Senator Jackson's long and trusted staff adviser Dorothy Fosdick has been our chief counsel throughout the preparation of this resolution and the testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I have studied carefully each of the submissions to this committee and I want to pay my respects to you, sir, and to the members of the committee for undertaking this very important task.

In that context, I want to say quite clearly that I also respect the efforts made by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield. In no way do I wish to characterize those efforts as simplistic or unrealistic. I am just hopeful that our thoughts can soon coalesce and that we can reach a common leadership to help the American public.

In turning to the public, I am reminded that 200 years ago when our Nation was founded, it was the meetings in the town halls in this country that struck the blow for freedom. Those same meetings are occurring across this Nation today. I commend those citizens and urge more and more to become involved.

It is my hope that the President, the Members of the Congress and others can provide the leadership to guide these millions of Americans on a proper course of action.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could just interrupt you, I want to thank you for that compliment, because I did mention to both of them yesterday that they, together with movements like Ground Zero, have done so much to alert the American public. This is a subject that some of us have been struggling with for years. You just could not get an audience interested in it when you talked about it. Now they take the subject away from you, practically.

Both of you have contributed immensely in this. We may disagree on some details, but certainly we are all firmly of the objective now that public information on this subject is paramount to a democracy acting on it.

Senator WARNER. I agree with the chairman.

I have been involved in this subject for a dozen years, Senator Jackson for more than 2 dozen. It has been a small group, almost a club. Well, they have knocked down the doors now and we welcome their admission to the club. I hope the membership grows. Again, it is our responsibility to provide that leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for the record in its entirety. I know we are about to vote again, and have delayed this hearing already once. But I do want to bring out what I feel is a central part of my thrust.

Senator Kennedy in his statement yesterday submitted to the committee and represented as follows:

> You do not have to be an Isaac Newton to understand the first law of the nuclear arms race: Every action by one side will be matched by an equal and opposite reaction by the other side.

Well, with no disrespect to my colleague, I do differ. The facts, it seems to me, show that in 1972 the United States took a different course of action. For example, the Soviets deployed at least 10 different variants of new ICBM's since 1972. During the same period the United States deployed no new types of ICBM's and only one variant of the existing Minuteman missiles. We had 1,054 land-based missiles in 1972. We have 1,052 today.

The United States has exercised substantial restraint during this decade. A dramatic example of the U.S. restraint in nuclear weaponry is found in our nuclear stockpile, which is smaller today than in any year since 1961, the year before the Cuban missile crisis. The largest increase in our stockpile occurred during the early sixties. It peaked during the mid-sixties. It has decreased by about one-quarter since 1967, and the trends in the total yield of the stockpile have followed a similar, but much more sharply declining, pattern.

The changes in the stockpile are shown in the chart contained in my testimony. While absolute quantities are classified, relative quantities shown in this chart are approximately correct.

In examining our present stockpile, it is important to recognize that the Presidentially approved plans will not add 17,000 weapons to the stockpile, as is widely claimed. Although the United States will be building new weapons in the eighties, we also retire many older systems. That is a very important point, Mr. Chairman, because the critics of the Jackson-Warner proposal say that we provide the President with the flexibility to continue the modernization. Now, that is correct, but it is a modernization almost on a one-for-one exchange in systems which we now have that have grown vulnerable.

The net result will be, even by the late eighties, that there will be only a modest increase in the size of the stockpile. The increase will still result in a stockpile smaller than the peak of the sixties and one with less total yield than even today's.

One of the great concerns I have about the freeze, Mr. Chairman, is that it would stop an ongoing safety program. For example, over the past 2 or 3 years we have developed a new type of explosive which has markedly improved the safety of these weapons, their handling and storage. As I interpret the freeze, that would stop that type of research and development and would severely jeopardize safety.

Mr. Chairman, I hail what the President has done by way of submitting his new proposals for arms reduction. I believe that the Jackson-Warner approach is fully consistent with that plan that he announced at Eureka College. I believe the Senate should now go on record in favor of a reduction approach rather than a freeze approach.

We all agree on the goal, to reduce the risks of nuclear war. Let us all agree that the President's approach and the approach embodied in the Jackson-Warner resolution is the best way to achieve that goal.

One of the most serious dangers of the nuclear freeze approach was best described by a former President. In the period between 1958 and 1961, we had a bilateral nuclear freeze, a nuclear testing moratorium. The moratorium was based on trust. But on September 1, 1961, the Soviets broke this "gentlemen's agreement" abruptly and without any announcement resumed nuclear testing with the most massive test series since nuclear weapons were developed. Adhering to the spirit of the moratorium, we were caught totally unprepared.

Regarding these events, President John F. Kennedy said:

> We know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparation, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some urge us to try it again. We have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it impossible of execution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator Warner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I consider this a rather extraordinary occasion.

We live in a time unlike any in the history of mankind.

Never before has such an arsenal of explosive power been at the command of so few.

Never before have the lives of so many millions of people been subject to the will of so few.

Never before has the cost for such an arsenal of death taken away so many of the resources and energies needed for the basic needs of mankind.

Never before have the political differences of only two nations controlled the destiny of so many nations.

The subjects of nuclear arms and arms control are critical to the survival of mankind. At last, an increasing number of Americans have become concerned over the issues of nuclear strategy. These issues are no longer confined to the small, fairly self-contained community of policy makers, Congressional specialists, military and arms control experts and military academicians.

From town hall meetings to the White House cabinet room, from state legislatures to the Congress, these subjects—nuclear arms and arms control—are being discussed and debated. This is a welcome development.

We are indebted to those growing numbers of Americans who are studying the complexity of the issues surrounding international nuclear policy, and who are speaking out, urging the leadership of all nations to take affirmative steps now to reduce tensions and eliminate—as near as humanly possible—the risk of even a single nuclear detonation as an accident or act of aggression.

A well-informed public could become a strong force in moving toward a more stable strategic balance and lowering the risks of nuclear war.

Historically, a strong U.S. nuclear weapons force has been the foundation for peace, stability and freedom in the world. It has deterred the Soviet Bloc from using, and threatening to use, its armed forces for blatant aggression against the west for many years now.

Aware of this powerful restraint, the Soviets began in 1974 the deployment of large numbers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of massive throw weight. These missiles carry multiple, accurate nuclear warheads of great yield.

These sobering facts of Soviets ICBM strength emphasize the necessity for maintaining the long term survivability of our sea-based and airborne nuclear forces. The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) is a survivable retaliatory deterrent today. Our bombers, however, are not as viable a deterrent as they were. Continuing improvements in non-nuclear technology (e.g., sonar, radar, computer signal processing, etc.) will make these systems increasingly vulnerable and have the potential of eventually destroying their deterrent credibility.

Therefore, the option to modernize these strategic systems must be retained. The Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) threat to the Poseidon missile is large, varied and growing in sophistication. Some freeze concepts would do nothing to stop further developments in tho e areas that will further negate our retaliatory capabilities, but they would deny us the right to test and deploy new ballistic submarine systems. The new Trident submarine is to replace older missile submarines exactly because of such a threat and not to increase the number of our SLBM's.

The B52 bombers are a very important part of our deterrent. They clearly offer only a command controlled retaliatory second strike capability. Without the cruise missile, this leg of the Triad cannot penetrate the massive and sophisticated Soviet air defenses, nor escape an SLBM barrage attack against their bases.

ICBM's are an area in which the wrong nuclear freeze options not only fail to solve the problem, but actually inhibit desperately needed arms reductions. The vulnerability of U.S. ICBM's is generally conceded. The MX is a very potent replacement which many contend is a patently first-strike weapon. But President Reagan has reduced the planned number of MX missiles for deployment from 200 to 100 when a survivable basing scheme is accepted. This is a very responsible (and unilateral) arms control step. By continuing the option of MX, we may develop a survivable replacement for the Minuteman if arms reductions and control are not forthcoming. At least the MX could help induce the Soviets to reduce their awesome ICBM capability. If we freeze at the current imbalance, there is no incentive for the U.S.S.R. to reduce the numbers of their ICBM's.

The argument is advanced that these detailed improvements of our nuclear deterrent are unnecessary because at least one or two U.S. SLBM submarines will survive and each can place many warheads on Soviet targets. But should this degree of imbalance develop, there would not be a balance of deterrent power. The President may be obliged to back down in any confrontation in which there was an explicit or implicit threat of a Soviet nuclear strike—or go to a launch-on-warning strategy, and this would be a destabilizing move.

Maintaining deterrence requires our constant attention. During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force.

Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBM's. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBM's and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. When the MX missile is deployed, it will be the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years. We had 1,054 land-based missiles in 1972. We have 1,052 today.

The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes.

When the first B–1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers with inherent intercontinental capabilities, and have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force.

A dramatic example of U.S. restraint in nuclear weaponry is found in our nuclear stockpile which is smaller today than in any year since 1961—the year before the Cuban Missile Crisis. The largest increase in our stockpile occurred during the early 1960's. It peaked during the mid-1960's. It has decreased by about one quarter since 1967, and the trends in the total yield of the stockpile have followed a similar, but much more sharply declining pattern.

The changes in the stockpile size are shown in the chart below. While absolute quantities are classified, the relative quantities shown in this chart are approximately correct.

It is important to recognize that the plans outlined by the President last October and approved by Congress last year will not add 17,000 weapons to the stockpile as is widely claimed in the media. Although the United States will be building new weapons in the 1980's, we will also retire many older weapons. The net result will be that, even by the late 1980's, there will be only a modest increase. That increase will still result in a stockpile smaller than the peak of the 1960's and one with less total yield than even today's.

TOTAL WEAPONS IN STOCKPILE



As new safety and security technologies evolve, like the new improved high explosive, they have routinely been incorporated into new weapons entering the stockpile. New weapons routinely replace the older designs which are dismantled and destroyed. As a result, an overall increase in safety and security is being achieved throughout the entire stockpile on an ongoing basis.

For over a decade, the United States has deferred, for the most part, the modernization of our nuclear deterrent forces. We have hoped for a measure of comparable restraint on the part of the Soviets, reposing trust in the arms control process to obviate the need for costly weapons upgrades. We have been sadly disappointed by the results.

President Reagan proposed a strategic modernization program on October 2, 1981 to redress the growing imbalance in the strategic forces. The Congress supported that program in the fiscal year 1982 defense bill, and, I am hopeful, Congress will again support that program in the fiscal year 1983 defense bill now before the Senate.

Experts can debate whether we now have parity, superiority, equality, or whatever. You can take your choice. But the facts are clear. The nuclear balance is less stable today than it was ten years ago, or five years ago, or even one year ago.

This is what worries people—and this is the problem we must address.

Russia's growing nuclear arsenal has already caused a spirit of accommodation in western circles. As U.S. power to protect the interest of our allies and friends has declined, the incentive to build their own nuclear deterrent increases. France has constructed their "force de frappe" out of apprehension of the prospect that we would not be steadfast in our defense efforts. Other countries may do the same. Thus, the nuclear freeze, by halting U.S. efforts to overcome nuclear inferiority, could very likely promote nuclear proliferation.

As cogent as these reasons are for opposition to most of the freeze initiatives, there is another perhaps equally compelling problem. It is simply that a freeze must be verifiable.

Freeze proponents argue that the "freeze and reductions proposed by the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution can be verified by our own intelligence capability." This is certainly not true for the production of nucelar warheads and probably not true even for missiles.

This point is extremely important because if one side does not adhere to the terms of the treaty, significant asymmetry would develop in nuclear weaponry and this would increase, not decrease the chance of nuclear war. We do not know with any accuracy how many nuclear warheads or ICBM back-ups the

Soviets have produced. The previous SALT negotiations have tacitly acknowledged this inability by agreeing to "count" only launchers.

Senator Jackson and I have introduced a resolution which sets a responsible course. It strives to preserve strategic balance; and to do so at lower and lower levels of nuclear capability—levels that are equal and verifiable.

The resolution, as drafted, calls on President Reagan to press for arms reductions.

The President has now completed his policy review on arms reduction and has put forward a bold policy.

I believe that the Jackson-Warner approach is full consistent with the plan the President announced on Sunday at Eureka College. I believe that the Senate should now go on record in favor of a reductions approach rather than a freeze approach.

We all agree on the goal—to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Let us agree that the President's approach and the approach embodied in the Jackson-Warner resolution is the best way to achieve that goal.

One of the most serious dangers of the nuclear freeze approach was best described by a former President.

In the period between 1958 and 1961 we had a bilateral nuclear freeze—a nuclear testing moratorium. The moratorium was based on trust. But on September 1, 1961 the Soviets broke this "gentlemen's agreement" abruptly, and without any announcement resumed nuclear testing with the most massive test series since nuclear weapons were developed. Adhering to the spirit of the moratorium, we were caught totally unprepared.

Regarding these events, President John F. Kennedy said, "We know enough about broken negotiations, secret preparation, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some urge us to try it again—we have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it impossible of execution."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

We have a vote on to recommit the armed services bill with instructions, but I think we can cover a couple of questions before we go down to vote.

Pravda on Monday quoted a number of sources critical of the President's speech. I wonder if you would comment on the President's speech on Sunday in Illinois as to whether you believe the reduction plan outlined by the President falls within the guidelines laid down in your own resolution?

Senator JACKSON. I believe the President's remarks at Eureka College provide a good beginning for negotiations. This is the first time, other than the initial proposal that President Carter made in 1977, that the Executive outlines a program of real reductions, Mr. Chairman.

The resolution that we offered, of course, lays heavy emphasis on achieving substantial reductions. It is not just one reduction; but it is a series of mutual reductions that will take a long period of time.

The tragedy of the past is that, despite our efforts—and my colleague referred to the 1972 agreement—despite all those efforts, we have had a continuing increase in the numbers of nuclear delivery systems and warheads. The President addresses both, that is the reduction in the threatening forces in terms of delivery systems and of course in the number of warheads.

I think it is a good beginning.

Senator WARNER. I share that view, Mr. Chairman. I think the framework of the Jackson-Warner resolution comports with what the President is doing. As a matter of fact, Senator Jackson and I consulted with the President just after we introduced this resolution in the Senate, and as you know he publicly endorsed it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Warner, your resolution calls for U.S.-Soviet discussion of measures designed to lessen the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties or terrorists. Could you elaborate a little bit on that section?

Senator **WARNER**. Mr. Chairman, that was done very carefully by Senator Jackson in his statement. Recognizing in all probability the lengthy time that it will take for negotiations to succeed under the President's framework, we think it is imperative that interim measures be taken of the nature described by Senator Jackson in his statement.

Senator **JACKSON**. Mr. Chairman, I might just add a word or two. I think the immediate problem facing the United States and the Soviet Union is what Senator Warner just mentioned, the danger of war by miscalculation, accident, or simple misunderstanding.

The No. 2 man in the CIA, Adm. Bobby Inman, warned yesterday, I believe it was, about the possibility of Soviet involvement in support in some manner, shape, or form of the Argentine Government in connection with the Falklands dispute. I think this dramatizes the concerns that the people of this country would have with the possibility of that leading to a nuclear conflict.

If we had in place a joint institution, a follow-on to the hot line, where these issues could be addressed so that both sides could know what is going on and be in continuing contact, clearly it would help to allay the immediate concerns that people are expressing in these town meetings that you have mentioned, which are occurring all over the country. This is what is heavily on their minds as I see it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think we can take one more question before we leave to vote.

Senator Jackson, you were one of the principal architects of the March 1977 comprehensive proposal which the Soviet Union just simply rejected out of hand. Do you believe that the President's two-phase plan for deep cuts will be treated seriously by the Soviet Union?

Senator **JACKSON**. Yes, I think it will be seriously considered by the Soviets when they know that we are going to stick with it. The Carter administration took my basic recommendation and upped it by about twice what I would have offered. I had proposed even deeper cuts to the President. Having made the proposal, the Carter administration then made the fatal mistake of dropping it.

The **CHAIRMAN**. They said they had a backup plan.

Senator **JACKSON**. They got away from the fundamental concern of all people on this planet, which is to reduce, to reduce, and to reduce nuclear weapons. That was a fatal mistake in my judgment. Once you propose, you stay put and bargain hard.

The Soviets understand this. But when you start moving around, that is not the way to negotiate with the Soviets as it relates to fundamental principles such as reductions.

The **CHAIRMAN**. I think a helpful comment by the President also is that he would seriously consider—that is, the United States would—any proposals that they wished to make.

Senator **JACKSON**. It has to be a two-way street.

The **CHAIRMAN**. That took it out of the framework of just rejecting out of hand the first proposal.

This committee will recess for 8 minutes.

[Recess.]

The **Chairman**. The committee will come to order, please. Senator Hart, we would be happy to have you testify now.

Let me say first that of all the colleagues that I have had who have been deeply involved in this matter for a long time, you certainly have distinguished yourself with your knowledge and your persistence. It must be very gratifying, indeed, to see that now instead of talking to yourself in front of audiences, you are talking to audiences that are there because they themselves have decided that this also is a tremendously important thing.

I have firsthand knowledge as to how intensely you have felt about this issue for so long. I warmly welcome you before this committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY HART, A U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

Senator **Hart**. Mr. Chairman, you are more than kind. The words you directed toward me equally apply to you. There are those of us over the years, when this issue was not as immediate nor perhaps as popular as it is now, who on both sides of the aisle did their best to educate and inform and instruct the American people on what both of us and some of our colleagues believe is the preeminent issue of our time. So I think your kind words apply equally well to the chairman of this committee.

I thank you and the committee for the opportunity to be here and for directing the attention of the Senate and the American people to this issue. I think the issue, now that the public and Presidential attention finally has been focused on the question of arms control, is that we, as elected representatives, have a dual responsibility both to respond to the public's concerns and, in effect, to provide leadership in translating those concerns into positive policy at the earliest possible date.

Unless those of us in elective office produce results that keep pace with political rhetoric, I think we risk alienating the public, deepening their cynicism and undercutting the sustained domestic support necessary for effective arms control policy. That has happened before and it must not happen again in the early 1980's.

In other words, I think we have to pursue simple and straightforward arms control objectives that Americans can both understand and support, but at the same time, continue to remind the American people that the achievement of those objectives is not going to be simple or immediate.

The SALT II Treaty that is presently in this committee has been criticized both as a giveaway to the Russians and, by other spokesmen in the arms issue, for not going far enough to halt the nuclear arms race. I find it ironic that those who have advocated the so-called freeze proposal have been critical of the SALT II Treaty, alleging that it will divert people's attention from the need to stop the arms race and therefore, that it should be ratified.

On the other hand, those who are concerned about building up our nuclear arsenal have also been critical of SALT II, and curiously enough, for some of the same reasons: That if we ratify that treaty, somehow American public support for arms modernization will dissipate.

Mr. Chairman, the SALT II Treaty will not end the nuclear arms competition between the two super powers, but it would put, in my judgment, a very powerful brake on that competition right now. And I emphasize right now; not years down the road when the United States and Soviet Union conclude any upcoming round of negotiations. The SALT II Treaty is a solid achievement, despite what Secretary Haig said before this committee yesterday.

I do not regard, and I do not believe the American people regard, SALT II as a dead agreement, to use Secretary Haig's phrase. If the treaty is good enough for us to abide by now, and apparently the administration feels that it is, then why isn't it good enough to ratify? If we can monitor compliance well enough to know that the Soviets have not violated the agreement, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee and this committee that we can, then why aren't our verification capabilities good enough for purposes of verifying this specific treaty?

Frankly the administration's position is not consistent logically. As a first step we should ratify the SALT II Treaty without further delay, and then proceed to negotiate a better and more far-reaching agreement as quickly as possible.

Second, Mr. Chairman, we must broaden the scope of any new arms control negotiations. For too long we have emphasized limits on the numbers of weapons. But our purpose, it seems to me, must be more fundamental than the imposition of simple numerical constraints, whether through a freeze or through START or whatever. It must be the absolute prevention of the use of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, I thought that phrase was the most important in the statement the President made last weekend. We must prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Neither the freeze nor the START proposal directly addresses that problem.

On February 24 I introduced a "sense of the Senate" resolution which calls upon the United States and the Soviet Union to initiate negotiations without delay on ways to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations focused on prevention would have four initial objectives. First, new measures to prevent the possibility of a nuclear exchange through accident or miscalculation.

As the size of the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals has grown, so, too, has the number of personnel and the sophistication of equipment necessary to manage those nuclear arsenals. Inevitably, these developments have increased the possibility that human or mechanical error could trigger a nuclear war.

In the more complete text of the statement, which I would like inserted into the record, I discuss in very detailed terms a number of specific proposals for preventing the use of nuclear weapons through negotiations.

The **Chairman**. The full text will be incorporated.

Senator **Hart**. I thank the Chair.

Second, Mr. Chairman, arms control negotiations should also focus on preventing the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, not only by the United States and the Soviet Union but particularly by terrorists and unstable outlaw nations such as Libya.

Exports of sensitive nuclear technology such as spent-fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants and the use of weapons-usable nuclear materials as reactor fuels increase the risk that nuclear weapons will "trickle down" to some other countries. Perhaps 20 countries by the end of this decade could possess nuclear weapons. And certainly, terrorist groups that do not now possess them might gain access.

The United States and the Soviet Union cannot solve the problem of international nuclear proliferation bilaterally. But we can begin bilaterally with negotiations to strengthen both the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Chairman, there is another action that I think we should take, one that would even more directly prevent the use of nuclear weapons. With Senator Cranston, I have introduced an additional resolution calling for negotiations toward a worldwide halt in the production of separated plutonium for either defense or civilian purposes.

As you well know, because separated plutonium is the basic ingredient for building nuclear weapons, as well as a potential nuclear reactor fuel, the resolution that Senator Cranston and I have introduced gets to the very core of today's nuclear threats. It provides the necessary link between efforts to reduce the size of strategic nuclear arsenals and efforts to curb the further spread of nuclear weapons themselves.

Third, Mr. Chairman, I think talks on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons should seek to reduce the vulnerability of both sides' nuclear retaliatory forces to preemptive attack. The increasing technical sophistication of nuclear weapons systems has undermined the stability of the nuclear balance of terror. In recent years, the two superpowers have acquired impressive counterforce and countersilo capabilities, increasing the temptation to strike first.

A secure capacity to respond to an adversary's nuclear first strike is the very foundation of mutual deterrence. We and the Soviets should agree on enforceable steps to stabilize the strategic balance of forces at sharply reduced levels.

Fourth, Mr. Chairman, I think talks on prevention should continue to seek meaningful reductions in the overall numbers of nuclear warheads, and their delivery systems, strategic, theater, and tactical. All arms control analysts recognize that a smaller force of reliable, survivable systems, tightly controlled, would constitute the best deterrent for both superpowers as well as the rest of the world.

Mr. Chairman, nuclear war, as I think we both would agree, is the single greatest threat that mankind faces, and that threat grows every day. Yet, an unlimited, expensive and politically polarizing nuclear arms race is no guarantee against expanding Soviet military power.

We can design our strategic programs much more effectively, much more economically and with wider, more durable public support only if the size and technical characteristics of Soviet nuclear weapons forces are predictable. Only arms control agreements can provide that kind of predictability.

All of the arms control proposals and resolutions put before the U.S.

Senate have a common feature, and that is the call for negotiations. No individual Senator or collection of Senators believes that there is any magical unilateral solution to this problem, nor that there is an overnight magical policy that could be adopted by either side to solve this problem. It must be the result of long and necessarily complicated negotiations.

In a nuclear age, the traditional understanding of national security is no longer adequate. No longer can national security simply mean the ability to prosecute a war successfully. National security now must mean, as well, the prevention of a war that neither side can win.

The initiation of United States-Soviet negotiations focused on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in this direction. Without a renewed and committed effort to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation and to negotiate limits on the nuclear arms race, I fear not only for the future of this country but the future of mankind.

For almost 40 years we have been spared the nightmare of nuclear war. But how much longer can our luck hold? I urge this committee as a first step in the direction that must be taken, to report out the SALT II Treaty and to focus the next round of negotiations on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons and the reduction of nuclear weapons arsensals.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator Hart's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GARY HART

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this Committee on the most important issue of our time—the control of nuclear weapons and the prevention of their use. I commend the Committee for its readiness to address this complex issue at this time.

Seldom, if ever, has there been so much public attention to—and so much public apprehension about—the possibility of nuclear war. The movement in this country to freeze the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons has become the principal vehicle for the expression of those concerns. The importance of this movement should not be minimized as it has renewed the strong consensus in favor of nuclear arms control. At the heart of the freeze movement—and in fact in all of the various arms control proposals—is a call to return to the bargaining table with the Soviets. The message of the American people is clear: it's time to negotiate. And, just last Sunday, the President gave us his response. He finally announced that the Administration will resume negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear weapons.

Now that public and Presidential attention have been focused on the importance of nuclear arms control, we elected representatives have a double responsibility: both to respond to the public's concerns and to provide leadership in translating those concerns into policy. Unless our accomplishments keep pace with our rhetoric, however, we risk alienating the public, deepening their cynicism, and undercutting the sustained domestic support necessary for an effective arms control policy. It has happened before. It must not happen again.

We must, in other words, pursue simple and straight-forward arms control objectives that the American people can both understand and support. More important, the achievement of these objectives must reduce in a real way the likelihood of nuclear war between the superpowers and among other nations.

To advance these related objectives, we should focus our arms control efforts in two areas. As a first step, the Senate should ratify the SALT II Treaty. Almost three years after its signing, SALT II remains the most detailed, the most comprehensive and the most carefully negotiated arms control agreement yet concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ratification would materially advance the goal of those who seek a complete freeze on nuclear weapons. It would facilitate the achievement of deeper reductions in strategic forces, as advocated by the Reagan Administration. It would formalize and make explicit the existing willingness of the two sides to abide by its terms. Most important, nothing in the Treaty is incompatible with the pursuit of more ambitious arms control goals.

SALT has been criticized both as a giveaway to the Russians and for not going far enough to halt the nuclear arms race. It is, in truth, an extremely useful agreement, which would enhance our national security in a number of concrete ways.

First, it would require the Soviet Union to dismantle 250 strategic nuclear systems, or 10 percent of its entire force of missiles and bombers.

It would slow Soviet acquisition of additional strategic nuclear weapons. With SALT in place, the Soviets can not build additional ICBM launchers, and they are prohibited from deploying more than 820 land-based missiles with multiple warheads.

It would reduce uncertainty over Soviet intentions by setting limits on a number of new Soviet nuclear weapons programs. For example, it would ban the deployment of more than one new type of ICBM.

It would guarantee regular United States/Soviet exchanges of information on important nuclear weapons issues, such as the flight-testing of missiles, through the Standing Consultative Commission.

And it would permit the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to ensure a strong deterrent, including the deployment of long-range air-launched cruise missiles, the MX missile and the Trident submarine program.

SALT will not, of course, end the nuclear arms competition between the two superpowers. But it would put a powerful brake on it now—not years down the road when the United States and the Soviet Union conclude the upcoming round of negotiations. SALT II is a solid achievement. Despite what Secretary Haig said yesterday before this Committee, I do not regard—and I don't believe the American people regard—SALT II as a "dead agreement." If the Treaty is good enough to abide by—and apparently the Administration feels it is—then why isn't it good enough to ratify? If we can monitor compliance well enough to know that the Soviets haven't violated the agreement, then why aren't our verification capabilities good enough for purposes of verification? The Administration's position isn't consistent logically.

We should ratify SALT II now, without further delay, and then proceed to negotiate a better and more far-reaching agreement as quickly as possible.

Our second arms control objective must be to broaden the scope of the new negotiations. For too long, we have emphasized limits on the numbers of weapons. But our purpose must be more fundamental than the imposition of simple numerical constraints; it must be the absolute prevention of the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear war is more than a continuation of war by other means; it is an entirely new form of conflict for which we have no frame of reference. This evident but all-important reality of the nuclear age compels us to make a quantum leap beyond the modest objective of numerical limits on weapons.

On February 24, I introduced a sense of the Senate resolution, which calls upon the United States and the Soviet Union to initiate negotiations, without delay, on ways to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Such negotiations, focused on prevention, would have four initial objectives:

First, new measures to prevent the possibility of a nuclear exchange through accident or miscalculation. As the size of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals has grown, so too has the number of personnel and the sophistication of the equipment necessary to manage them. Inevitably, these developments have increased the possibility that human or mechanical error could trigger a nuclear war.

In 1980, Senator Goldwater and I led a Senate Armed Services Committee investigation into the continuing, serious computer problems in the North American Defense Command (NORAD); we found that during one 18-month period, NORAD experienced 151 false alarms—one of which lasted a full 6 minutes, half the time it takes a submarine-launched ballistic missile to reach its target.

As disturbing as the problems are with our own systems, it is even more troubling to contemplate Soviet systems. No one in the United States knows with any degree of confidence how reliable Soviet personnel and computers are.

This ignorance only underscores the importance of taking joint and immediate steps to reduce the likelihood of starting a nuclear war by mistake. Talks on prevention should seek to:

Update the 1963 "Hotline Agreement" to ensure instant, continuous and secure communications between the two heads of government during a crisis;

Update and extend the 1971 United States-Soviet agreement on measures relating to accidential nuclear war, to provide prompt and reliable notification of any accidental launch; and

Establish what Senators Nunn and Jackson have termed a Crisis Control facility, in which personnel from the United States and the Soviet Union would monitor all nuclear weapons-related activities, including missile test launches.

Second, preventing the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, particularly by terrorists and unstable outlaw nations such as Libya. Six countries have demonstrated the capability to build nuclear weapons; as many as 20 countries could possess nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. Exports of sensitive nuclear technology, such as spent fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants, and the use of weapons-usable nuclear material as a reactor fuel increase the risk that nuclear weapons will "trickle down" to countries and terrorist groups that do not now possess them.

The United States and the Soviet Union cannot solve the problems of international nuclear proliferation bilaterally. But we can begin bilaterally with negotiations to strengthen both the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We must:

Agree not to traffic in nuclear materials and technologies that cannot be adequately safeguarded;

Ensure that the fiscally-starved IAEA has the resources to safeguard effectively materials and technology that can be safeguarded;

Strengthen IAEA safeguards in those areas where they can be strengthened. For example, both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the IAEA have admitted serious difficulties in safeguarding so-called bulk-handling facilities—reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants whose products can easily be transformed into weapons.

Mr. Chairman, there is another action we could take, one that would, even more directly, prevent the use of nuclear weapons. With Senator Cranston, I have introduced a resolution calling for negotiations toward a worldwide halt in the production of separated plutonium for either defense or civilian purposes.

Because separated plutonium is the basic ingredient for building nuclear weapons, as well as a potential nuclear reactor fuel, this resolution gets to the very core of today's nuclear threats. For once current stockpiles of plutonium are exhausted, no new strategic nuclear weapons could be built.

This resolution provides the necessary link between efforts to reduce the size of strategic nuclear arsenals and efforts to curb the further spread of nuclear weapons. It recognizes that nuclear "have-not" nations are unlikely to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons as long as the nuclear "have" nations resist disarmament. And by forestalling the advent of the Plutonium Economy, in which weapons-usable plutonium for nuclear reactor fuel becomes an article of international commerce, a "plutonium freeze" would make it more difficult for non-nuclear weapons states and terrorists to join the nuclear club.

Third, talks on prevention should seek to reduce the vulnerability of both sides' nuclear retaliatory forces to preemptive attack. The increasing technical sophistication of nuclear weapons systems has undermined the stability of the nuclear balance of terror. In recent years, the two superpowers have acquired impressive counterforce and counter-silo capabilities, increasing the temptation to strike first in a crisis.

The secure capacity to respond to an adversary's nuclear first strike is the very foundation of mutual deterrence. We and the Soviets should agree on enforceable steps to stabilize the strategic balance of forces, such as:

Continuation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It remains our most important agreement to prevent the development and deployment of destabilizing defensive nuclear weapons systems;

Limitations on particularly destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and defense-related technologies. For example, the two countries should consider reducing, gradually and verifiably, the number of highly accurate MIRVed ICBMs, which pose a formidable threat to the retaliatory forces of the other side, and replacing them with fewer, survivable single warhead missiles. Representative

Gore has made a similar and more fully-developed proposal along these lines;

Constraints on anti-satellite weapons which, if deployed, could disrupt vital command, control and communications facilities; and

Limitations on strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) activities. Strategic ASW threatens the most survivable and least destabilizing component of the two sides' strategic arsenals.

Fourth, talks on prevention should continue to seek meaningful reductions in the overall numbers of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems—strategic, theater and tactical. All arms control analysts recognize that a smaller force of reliable, survivable systems, tightly controlled, would constitute the best deterrent for both countries.

Unfortunately, the President's START proposals do not advance this critical objective. The Administration's proposal apparently leaves both sides free to procure new and more deadly nuclear delivery systems—even as the negotiations proceed. Nothing in the President's plan, for example, would prevent the United States and the Soviet Union from deploying a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons as long as their eventual numbers are lower than the yet-to-be-determined ceilings. In addition, no effort is to be made at the outset to limit bombers or cruise missile deployments, which could seriously undermine the attempt to control the development of more advanced weapons capabilities. It's hard to see how this approach to arms control is consistent with the declared goal of "deep reductions."

The President's plan also contains a misplaced emphasis on reducing missile "throw-weight." Constraints on "throw-weight" are less important than limits on numbers of delivery systems and warheads, a point that has been well understood by American officials since the beginning of the negotiating process in the 1960's. In and of itself, the amount of missile throw-weight or payload is meaningless. And the Soviets—with their "heavy" missiles—are unlikely to respond favorably to this proposal. It would, after all, require them either to dismantle much of their existing force or to develop a whole new generation of smaller missiles.

Mr. Chairman, nuclear war is the single greatest threat we face, and the threat is growing every day. Yet an unlimited, expensive and politically polarizing nuclear arms race is no insurance against expanding Soviet military power. We can design our strategic programs much more effectively, much more economically, and with wider, more durable public support only if the size and technical characteristics of the Soviet force are predictable. And only arms control agreements can provide this predictability. Greater predictability will allow us to develop stronger conventional forces as well, so nuclear weapons will always remain our last line of defense, not our first.

In a nuclear age, the traditional understanding of national security is inadequate. No longer can it mean only the ability to prosecute a war successfully. National security must now mean as well the prevention of a war neither side can win.

The resumption of United States-Soviet negotiations on preventing the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in this direction. Wthout a renewed and committed effort to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to negotiate limits on the nuclear arms race I fear for our future.

For almost forty years, we have been spared the nightmare of nuclear war. But how much longer can our luck hold?

I urge this Committee to report out the SALT II Treaty, and to focus on the next round of negotiations on prevention.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hart. I appreciate your statement very much.

You mentioned in your testimony that we have had 151 false alarms, one of which lasted a full 6 minutes at NORAD. Well, I mentioned earlier at these hearings that I was in NORAD, the command headquarters at the time, with Bob Galvin, head of Motorola, and Tom Watson, who was then chairman of IBM.

At the time we had that false alarm—that must have been a 6-minute period because it seems like hours to us—panic just broke out. It was a very frightening and disconcerting thing. You wonder what recommendations they finally would have made at the end of those minutes, until they discovered that it was just an electronic problem.

Do you believe the reduction plan outlined by the President on Sunday falls within the guidelines laid down in your resolution concerning the STOP talks?

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, first let me comment briefly on your observation. As a result of the number and seriousness of some of the breakdowns in the strategic early warning system, 2 years ago Senator Goldwater and I, on behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee, conducted an investigation of that strategic early warning system. We focused our investigation, in particular on a half a dozen very serious false alerts.

As a result of our looking into that problem and our report to our committee, some changes were made in the strategic early warning system and particularly, in our ability to modernize it very rapidly and very quickly with new technologies, new generations of computers, and so on.

Even so, my own personal feeling, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, is that the possibility of miscalculation or the breakdown on one side or the other of the strategic warning system and its reliability constitutes a very serious problem. That is why I would like to see arms control discussions broadened to include not just overall limits or reductions in numbers, but also serious proposals to monitor whether or not an accidental launch or an accident or a miscalculation has been involved in some decision affecting the nuclear arsenals.

In this regard, and more directly responsive to your question, I think the President's proposal does not go far enough. Although he did in his prepared statement mention the need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, the two fundamental hallmarks of his proposal still focus on overall numerical limits.

I do not detect in the President's proposal, at least not on first reading, the kinds of specific steps that negotiations should include to prevent that kind of accidental or miscalculated use of nuclear weapons. I certainly do not see the kind of policy commitment to reducing proliferation, which is the third part of the testimony I gave you this morning, that would curb the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other nations. I think that has to be part of this overall proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The resolution that I have introduced calls for strict observance of the terms and conditions of SALT II, on both sides. I am hopeful that in our markup—and I will strongly recommend to the committee—that we incorporate that language there.

You have called for the ratification of SALT II. There have been indications in these hearings that without the support of the administration, ratification by a two-thirds vote would be impossible, and therefore, not worth the effort. And it may also detract from the emphasis being placed upon the START talks.

I have called for SALT II to be a basis for those talks. A beginning, not to throw away 7 years of those negotiations. And after all, President Reagan has said that there is much good in SALT II with which he agrees, though he felt it was fatally flawed in a few areas.

In view of that, would you care to comment? Are you still proposing the Senate go through the formality of trying to ratify SALT II?

Senator HART. I am, Mr. Chairman, because I strongly believe that if both sides are observing it, we should not go back and start all over on a process which, as you properly indicated, took 6 years.

If both of those facts are the case, then why not submit the treaty for ratification? Ratification would advance the START process, or whatever process we begin, greatly in term of momentum, in terms of concrete results on which to base a SALT III treaty.

What happened in 1979, 1980, and to a degree in 1981 was a very unfortunate occurrence, and that is arms control became politicized. In the process of politicization and, to a degree, partisanship, SALT got a bad name. Frankly, I was puzzled by the Secretary's testimony yesterday in which he said we probably are going to observe it, but we certainly oppose formalizing it. As far as I could tell in reviewing his testimony, he expressed no concrete reason why this should be the case.

In the statement just alluded to the administration's mentality emerges. But it is not a logical mentality. It is: If we ratify the treaty, then there will not be political or public support for further negotiations. I do not understand that at all. I have never understood it. It was an argument used by those who thought we should build up our nuclear arsenal in 1979. We cannot ratify this treaty, they argued, even though the Joint Chiefs said it would not impede any nuclear force modernization, because it may rob us of public support.

Well, I trust the American people more than that and I think this administration and the Secretary of State should trust the American people more than that. They are intelligent people. I think if you have a case to make, that the MX missile or B–1 bomber or Trident submarines or cruise missiles are necessary for the defense of this country and for our security, then the people will support that. If you cannot make the case, then somehow resisting ratification of a treaty is not going to bring about public support that does not exist already.

We are, frankly, confusing apples and oranges here. I think the American people will support ratification of the treaty, particularly given the events of the last 2 years, and go forward with whatever negotiations are necessary and whatever nuclear force modernization programs are necessary.

I do not think emotionally, logically, militarily, or economically there is any competition among these various proposals.

The CHAIRMAN. We were delayed by two rollcall votes, one of them being 40 minutes long, so we got off to a late start. There is one question possibly you could comment on very briefly, and then amplify it for the record.

Do you believe the various dates specified in the treaty, in the protocol to the treaty, would have to be adjusted before it could be into force? How likely is it that Soviets would demand an extension of the SALT II protocol before they would act under their constitutional process to ratify the treaty?

Senator HART. I, of course, have no way of knowing the answer to the second question. That is a question that only our State Department or the White House can answer. They have had the contacts with the Soviets.

As you know, with regard to the first part of your question, there are those in the Senate who were either dubious about the treaty or the protocol to the treaty or who were outright opposed to it, who now have indicated that they could support the treaty because the protocol has lapsed. If that is the case, then I think we should ratify the treaty without the protocol and include the terms of the protocol in future negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We very much appreciate your presence here this morning.

Senator HART. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that Chairman Zablocki will not be here until 12 o'clock, and I believe Congressman Ed Markey is not here yet, but that Congressman Albert Gore is. Senator Specter, you were not put on the agenda this morning because we had felt that you had adequately covered the subject and your amendment has already been voted on and adopted by the Senate.

Congressman Gore, why don't you come to the witness table? Senator Specter, is there any comment that you would like to make at this time?

Senator SPECTER. I would like to say briefly, Mr. Chairman, that I appreciate the opportunity to comment at this moment. In pursuing the resolution which I had filed in the form of an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill, I did not intend to circumvent the processes of the Foreign Relations Committee, and had, in fact, intended to appear, as I have this morning, to testify in support of my resolution.

It was my thought that when we would be called upon to vote very substantial sums of money for nuclear arms, it would be appropriate to add a statement at that time because it was relevant to the consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

When the White House had announced on Monday, May 3, that no decision had been made on a Summit talk, as shown by reports in both the New York Times and the Washington Post for May 4, which I made a part of the record, it therefore became most important to recast the text of my resolution at an early date in the form of an amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill.

I think I have said in some detail for the record what I had in mind. I would again express appreciation to the chairman for permitting me to participate very briefly yesterday in the questioning of Secretary of State Haig. I think, although as the Secretary testified, he was inclined against the substance of my amendment, he said it was a subject on which reasonable men could differ, and on the consideration of having the Senate support the move to indicate a different point of view than opposition, as was evidenced by Senate opposition to SALT II or at least nonratification, that there were good reason to proceed as we have.

I do think that the record is full. We had a vote this morning on a tabling motion which was defeated 60 to 32. The bill has now been recommitted, and procedurally it will be necessary for me to offer my amendment again, which I intend to do.

I have discussed with Senator Tower getting the floor, which is agreeable to the managers of the bill, immediately after the current social security item is concluded, but I did not want this morning to pass without my appearing here and saying for the record why I proceeded as I have, and to express my appreciation to the chairman, as the matter has unfolded.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I certainly appreciate your comments. I want you to understand, once again, that my move to table the Specter amendment was simply a procedural and jurisdictional one. The support for the ranking member and chairman of the Armed Services Committee and Senator Pell, the ranking member here, is strictly on the basis that we are in the midst of hearings. We have a markup set for May 20, which may well incorporate provisions of the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania's resolution, but that we felt it might establish a precedent for all of the resolutions up before this committee being tacked on as amendments to the Armed Services Committee. In fact, three Senators came up to me and said why don't we put ours on that.

Well, that procedure we felt would be unfortunate, and also, in view of Secretary Haig's comment yesterday that it might be misinterpreted. It might be interpreted that the President was leaving to talk about this subject in Europe under the direction of the Senate, when on Sunday he had amplified completely that he wants a conference. He outlined in detail some of the things he wanted to talk about at the Summit meeting, and they have been in direct personal communication with Brezhnev and invited him personally to such a Summit meeting. It seemed like a redundant action then, but I am all for it.

As anyone who has attended these meetings know, for 1 year I have publicly called for it, and got commitment from the Secretary of State just a couple of months ago that he would work personally and put the prestige of his office behind requesting the Senate to do it. So we are of one mind; it is just a matter of procedure that we are talking about. But I thank you very much indeed.

I can say that such a meeting is absolutely crucial and essential and is very germane to the whole subject of nuclear war and how to prevent it. There are two people who have more power to prevent it than any other two people on earth, so they are to have a Summit and talk about how they are going to do that.

Thank you very kindly.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gore, we are delighted to have you here. We appreciate your presence this morning and are happy to have your testimony. You can summarize it in any way you want. The full text will be incorporated in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. ALBERT GORE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM TENNESSEE

Representative GORE. Thank you, Chairman Percy.

I intend to summarize portions of my statement. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I appreciate and applaud your leadership for a long period of time on this most important of all issues.

I thought I would address briefly this morning, rather than elaborating the details of the plan that I put forward earlier this year, the proper role that we in the Congress can and should play in the aftermath of the President's position.

The President's speech at Eureka College has. as he hoped it would, changed the nature of the debate over strategic arms control in the country and here in the Congress. Regardless of the merits of the proposal, the very fact that he has now called for resumption of talks with the Soviet Union and has outlined our official negotiating position alters the terms of the discussion from this point forward.

In my opinion, advocates of a nuclear freeze and proponents of alternative plans for strategic arms control must reassess the roles they now wish to play as the debate continues, perhaps taking some comfort in the knowledge that they have apparently forced the President to change his timetable and have helped to convince the President to adopt a meaningful as opposed to a cosmetic approach to the negotiations.

Now, the proposal itself raises many questions. It is, of course, an opening position and should be analyzed as such, but it looks like a bid for formal numerical parity between the United States and Soviet ballistic missile forces at sharply reduced numbers.

In the first phase, the President calls for sharp reductions to a level where both sides have equal numbers of warheads on an equal number of ballistic missiles, with more or less equal numbers of those warheads deployed on land, specifically, 5,000 warheads for each side, 850 ballistic missiles, both land and sea-based, with no more than 2,500 warheads based on land.

In the second phase the President calls for a ceiling on the overall throw-weight of the ballistic missiles of both sides at a number lower than the figure for current U.S. forces. According to the President, these reductions would be made with the objective of achieving "stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles."

Now, this State is in line with a growing consensus in our country that the vigorous use of arms control and should be used to help resolve strategic nuclear problems that will otherwise force both sides to deploy ever greater numbers of weapons in a search for safety.

The problem is that not all reductions are benign and not all forms of parity lead to stability. Stability is not something inherent in the strategic forces of either country in isolation; it is, instead, dependent on the relationship between the two forces and on how these forces tend to influence decisionmaking when they are played off against each other.

So in order to assess the President's program, it is essential to know how the forces of each side might evolve through the two phases of his proposal. There are many paths that either side could take, but it is quite possible to realine the forces of both countries in strict conformity with the President's proposal in a way that would lead not to greater stability but to less stability.

Both sides could have numerical parity. Indeed, they could be almost symmetrical, and both sides could have smaller numbers, yet each side would still be in a position, even an enhanced position, to theoretically launch a first strike against the other's ICBM's while retaining a substantial force in reserve.

At the conclusion of the exchange, the attacking side would enjoy substantial numerical advantage over the victim. In other words, the formula could work out in a way which leads to the worst possible arrangement, mutually vulnerable forces poised always on a hair-trigger alert.

I have calculated a force structure on both sides that is in conformity with the President's guidelines. This exercise is of limited utility insofar as the President's proposal is an opening position, but let me just briefly outline a force structure that would meet the proposal and would be even more destabilizing.

If the United States deployed 200 MX missiles with the new advance ballistic reentry vehicle system, which carries with it 8 warheads instead of 10, and 300 Minuteman-3's with 3 warheads, that would be a total of 2,500 warheads on 500 land-based missiles; if we then deployed 6 *Ohio*-class submarines with 144 D–5 missiles, once again with the new advanced warhead system carrying 6 warheads, and kept 12 *Lafayette*-class submarines with 192 C–4 missiles with 8 warheads each, that would be in conformity almost exactly with the President's guidelines.

If then the Soviet Union deployed 70 SS–18's with 10 reentry vehicles and 300 SS–19's with 6 reentry vehicles, and then if it deployed a submarine force consisting of 3 Typhoons with 60 launchers, 15 Delta–3's with 240, 4 Delta–2's with 64 launchers and 9 Delta–1's with 108, the forces of both sides would be in strict conformity with the President's proposal. However, the situation resulting would be more unstable than the present situation.

This is obviously not a desirable outcome, and presumably one which both countries will seek to avoid as both countries negotiate from their opening positions. It certainly can be avoided if both nations wish to avoid it. In my opinion, the key to a successful agreement in this age of parity is the elimination of even the theoretical possibility of a strategic first strike by either side. And I think there is a lot that is implicit in the President's position, his opening position, and it is quite understandable that much would not be made explicit.

Earlier this year I introduced an arms control proposal which begins from premises rather like those of the President. I will not elaborate it at this time. I would ask your permission to put a detailed analysis of it in the record of these proceedings.

As I have indicated, however, the existence of a Presidential position transforms the way in which we must address the question of arms control. As a first priority, we have to ask ourselves how relevant to the issue and how helpful to the country are the proposals that have been advanced in the Congress and in the public to date.

The principal value of a freeze proposal was as a means for showing the depth of the public's belief that arms control has been held in abeyance too long and that it needs to move rapidly. Having fulfilled this function, the freeze movement would be wise to change its agenda, in my view. The United States is not going to adopt a freeze proposal while the present administration is in office, and to continue advocating this course of action would mean that the movement would be sidelined.

Now, the principal value of the current proposal to resurrect and ratify the SALT II agreement was to underscore a fact that the administration seems to have learned since taking office but which it has not acknowledged, that there was value in the arms control process and in the SALT II agreement.

The fact is that the President's position is relatively closer to SALT II than to the more radical concepts pushed by others in the administration. But, Mr. Chairman, the administration would feel forced to go to the political battle stations to head off any formal efforts in the Congress to bring SALT II into force. That effort at this stage in the game could serve as a distraction from the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

We in the Congress would do better to take a less confrontational route. A resolution to the effect that the Congress desires to be consulted in advance by the President should he decide to break with current policy of informally observing the major elements of the SALT II agreement would be a better approach, and I introduced such a resolution yesterday. It is in conformity with one section of the resolution that you have introduced on the Senate side.

But the most important thing is that the President has now chosen to pursue a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Hopefully, with arms control off dead center, the way may now open up for discussion of other areas of United States-Soviet friction. The President's speech contains much on these issues that deserves our support and careful attention in Moscow.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Representative Gore's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALBERT GORE, JR.

The President's speech at Eureka College has, as he hoped it would, changed the nature of the debate over strategic arms control in the country, and here in the Congress. Regardless of the merits of his proposal, the very fact that he has now called for a resumption of talks with the Soviet Union and has outlined our official negotiating position alters the terms of the discussion from this point forward.

Advocates of a nuclear freeze and proponents of alternative plans for strategic arms control must reassess the roles they now wish to play as the debate continues, perhaps taking comfort in the knowledge that they have forced the President to change his timetable and have helped convince the President to adopt a meaningful as opposed to a cosmetic approach to the negotiations.

The proposal itself raises many questions. It looks like a bid for formal, numerical parity between the United States and Soviet ballistic missile forces, at sharply reduced numbers. In the first phase of his proposal, the President calls for sharp reductions to a level where both sides have equal numbers of warheads on an equal number of ballistic missiles, with more or less equal numbers of those warheads deployed on land. Specifically, there would be 5,000 warheads for each side, 850 ballistic missiles including both land and sea based, with not more than 2,500 warheads to be based on land.

In the second phase of his proposal, the President calls for a ceiling on the overall throw weight of the ballistic missiles of both sides, at a number lower than the figure for current U.S. forces.

According to the President, these reductions would be made with the objective of achieving "stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles."

This statement is in line with the growing consensus in our country that the vigorous use of arms control can and should be used to help resolve strategic nuclear problems that will otherwise force both sides to deploy ever greater numbers of weapons in a search for safety.

However, the problem is that not all reductions are benign, and not all forms of parity lead to stability. Stability is not something inherent in the strategic forces of either country in isolation—it is instead dependent on the relationship between the two forces and how these forces tend to influence decision making when they are played off against each other.

In order to assess the President's program, it is therefore essential to know precisely how the forces of each side would evolve through the two phases of his proposal.

There are many paths that either side could take. But it is quite possible to realign the forces of both countries in conformity with the President's proposal, in a way that would lead not to greater stability but to less stability.

Both sides could have numerical parity—indeed, they could be almost symmetrical—and both sides could exist in smaller numbers. Yet each side would still be in a position to launch a first strike against the other's ICBMs, while retaining a substantial force in reserve. At the conclusion of the exchange, the attacking side would enjoy a substantial numerical advantage over the victim. In other words, the President's formula can be worked out in a way which leads to the worst of all possible arrangements: mutually vulnerable forces, poised always on a hair trigger alert.

This is obviously not a desirable outcome and presumably one which both the United States and the Soviet Union will seek to avoid as both nations negotiate away from their opening positions. It can certainly be avoided if both nations wish to avoid it.

In my opinion, the key to a successful agreement in the age of parity is the elimination of even the theoretical possibility of a strategic first-strike by either side.

Earlier this year, I introduced an arms control proposal which begins from premises rather like those of the President. It selects counterforce weapons as its focus and it had two phases.

In the first phase, we and the Soviets would avoid making any additions or improvements to the counterforce inventory of either side. This selective moratorium was designed to be followed immediately by negotiations for synchronized reductions beginning with the dismantling of counterforce weapons on both sides, starting with the MIRVed version of the Soviet SS-18. In return for substantially larger reductions on the Soviet side, the United States would agree not to deploy the MX or the Trident D-5, although development and testing of both would continue as a hedge against the breakdown of negotiations. To maintain mutual deterrence, the agreement would mandate replacement of MIRVed ICBMs with a new, less destabilizing type: an ICBM carrying just one warhead.

If both sides were to carry out this change, neither would be in a position to make the arithmetic of a first strike work. Although either side could attack the other's ICBMs, the attacker would have to use up his entire ICBM inventory and a very large proportion of his submarine based missiles to do the job. Both sides would be in a much better position to continue the arms control process toward greater reductions. And, as a byproduct of these changes, the Soviet advantage in throw weight would be substantially narrowed, and indeed, the United States could close the gap. Moreover, the number of ICBMs would be equal.

I will provide a detailed discussion of this plan for the record. As I have indicated earlier, however, the existence of a Presidential position transforms the way in which we must address the question of arms control. As a first priority we have to ask ourselves how relevant to the issue and how helpful to the country are the proposals that have been advanced in the Congress and in the public to date?

The principal value of a freeze proposal was as a means for showing the President the depth of the public's belief that arms control has been held in abeyance too long, and that it needs to move rapidly.

Having clearly fulfilled this function, the freeze movement would be wise to change its agenda. U.S. policy is not going to adopt a freeze proposal while the present Administration is in office. To continue to advocate this course of action means that the movement will be sidelined.

The principal value of the current proposal that the SALT II agreement should be resurrected and ratified was to underscore a fact this Administration seems to have learned since taking office—but which it hasn't acknowledged: there was value in the arms control process and in the SALT II agreement. Its constraints were not merely cosmetic but were useful to the national security.

The fact is that the President's position is relatively closer to SALT II than to more radical arms control concepts pushed by others in the Administration. But the Administration would nevertheless feel forced to go to the political "battle stations" to head off any formal effort in the Congress to bring SALT II into force. That effort, at this stage in the game, could serve as a distraction from the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

We in the Congress would do better to take a less confrontational route. A resolution to the effect that the Congress desires to be consulted in advance by the President, should he decide to break with current policy of informal observation of major elements of the SALT agreements would be a better approach. I am introducing such a resolution this week.

The most important thing, however, is that the President has now chosen to pursue a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

Hopefully with arms control off dead center, the way may now open up for discussion of other areas of United States-Soviet friction. The president's speech contains much on these issues that deserves our support, and careful attention in Moscow.

BEYOND THE FREEZE: A NEW APPROACH TO MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. GORE. Mr. Speaker, for many years, arms control has been the province of a handful of specialists in government and in the academic world. By and large this small group has decided what was to be considered feasible in arms control from a theoretical point of view, and it comprised judge and jury for the finished products; that is, arms control agreements worked out with the Soviet Union and brought forward to the Senate for advise and consent.

The failure of the SALT process has often been attributed to extraneous events. For example, many now say the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan made it impossible for the Carter administration to submit the treaty to the Senate.

But in a larger sense, the SALT process may be said to have failed even without help from the outside. If was clear that the treaty, whatever its merits or demerits, had no broad constituency in our country. True, it had a number of lukewarm supporters, who were prepared to argue that it was better than nothing, but it had very few who were really willing to go to the mat for it. Certainly the people who have always distrusted arms control and who want to try to buy and deploy our way to safety did not like it, and even the arms controllers themselves were unenthusiastic.

The treaty we and the Soviets had devised certainly would have limited strategic arms, but only at enormously higher numbers of weapons. By the time we and the Soviets would have reached levels of deployed strategic warheads, as permitted by the treaty, the United States would have gone from about 8,946 in 1980, to approximately 13,438 in 1989, and the Soviets from about 7,273 in 1980, to approximately 15,500 in 1989.

Now we have a new administration which wishes to greatly accelerate the rate at which the United States deploys new strategic weapons, which is manifestly doubtful about the value of arms control for national security, and which appears to want to dangle prospects of arms control mainly for purposes of linkage and leverage against the Soviets.

As a result, people all across this country are becoming alarmed. They see on the one hand rhetoric about arms control, and on the other hand, massive real resources going into programs for new weapons. They are concerned that the direction in which we are headed is only too clear: an unlimited, ungovernable competition with the Soviet Union to build new strategic weapons; vast sums expended for what would in fact turn out to be diminished safety in the world.

This foreboding is the stuff of which grassroots movements are made. From the vantage point of the Congress, we can already see that arms control is in fact moving fast into the political arena. The conventions and concerns of "academic" or "professional" arms controllers—their appreciation for the niceties and nuances—are not likely to make much of an impression on the kind of debate we seem to be heading into.

There are calls for dramatic and allegedly simple solutions—total freezes, drastic reductions on fixed timetables, and the like—which have become the program of an emerging political coalition in this country. To an extent, this is a positive development: The people are telling their Government to get moving with meaningful arms control discussions. But there is also a danger that reasoned consideration of this country's real security needs will be impatiently overlooked and that important factors about how the real world operates will be blithely ignored.

Recently, numerous Members of the House and Senate sponsored a rather carefully worded resolution, which calls for a lot of changes in our approach to arms control. That resolution apparently means quite different things to different people: to Members who supported it, and to the public at large.

We have an obligation and a political need to go further than giving nominal support to resolutions such as these. We owe the people an effort on our part to think carefully and deeply about the implications of such proposals, to advance suggestions as to how, in detail and in practice, we might actually shape a new program for strategic arms control.

For the past 14 months, since being assigned to the Intelligence Committee, I have worked hard to develop an understanding of our dilemma and our options. In a long series of briefings with arms control experts and in a series of breakfast seminars on this issue which I have sponsored with the Library of Congress, I have developed the conviction that this problem is not a Gordian knot. It can be solved with patience and understanding and commitment. And of course, it must be solved.

What I am submitting today has been developed with the assistance of individuals at the Congressional Research Service and other experts in and out of government. I wanted to know whether it was possible to get at the single most important strategic problem we have—the vulnerability of land-based ICBM's—by means of a vigorous and innovative arms control concept. I wondered if we could somehow focus our efforts on this problem, and I stipulated the conditions to be respected in the detailed analysis:

The objective would not be reductions per se, although this was an important consideration—but reductions of those systems which contribute the most to strategic instability, and to the risk of nuclear war by reflex, rather than on purpose. This meant doing something drastic about one particular system: land-based, MIRV'd ICBM's. My suggestion was to explore what would happen if both sides agreed to get rid of such ICBM's, replacing them with new single warhead ICBM's on both sides. If this could be done, without at the same time disturbing the strategic balance at some other point, we might emerge with more stable and secure arrangements—but not at the cost of deploying enormously costly mobile systems, or an ABM system to defend them.

I am now convinced that we could indeed accomplish these objectives, and that we could do so with a modified "moratorium" in selected areas and actual reductions in other areas. Here is the outline of the proposal:

First, a moratorium for 4 to 5 years, during which each side would agree to do nothing that would add to the number of deployed, MIRV'd ICBM's, or to increase their accuracy. During this time, however, both sides would be able to continue research and development of certain new kinds of weapons: A step which we have to take as a hedge against the collapse of efforts to negotiate the vital second phase of reduction with the Soviets.

Second, an agreement which would begin a prolonged readjustment of strategic forces on both sides. At the end of this period; first, neither side would have MIRV'd ICBM's, though they would have deployed new single RV ICBM's in equal numbers; second, no other system—such as the SLBM—would have been deployed with hard target characteristics; third, overall numbers of deployed launchers and weapons would have declined substantially; fourth, the process of adjustment for both sides would be prolonged so as to be realistically in tune with replacement cycles for existing weapons—allowing each side time to amortize their expenses in deploying those weapons, and to make the necessary changes in the shape of their overall strategic deterrents.

As a direct consequence of this approach, the window of vulnerability would have been closed through arms control, and strategic stability enhanced. As an enormously important byproduct of this approach, the total destructiveness of weapons in the hands of either side would also have been cut to a fraction of the numbers that SALT II would have allowed.

Arms control goes beyond the technical questions of who shall reduce what. When we and the Soviets sit down to talk about strategic arms control, we are affirming a basic—even a transcendant—fact: That nuclear weapons are indeed "different." We and the Soviets must make clear to ourselves and to each other that we recognize what nuclear weapons really mean; that they could bring to an end both the values and the people that both sides are seeking to promote and protect.

The grassroots movement we are experiencing in this country is based on the fear that neither side truly appreciates the odds, that specialists and ideologists on both sides are thinking that a nuclear war would somehow be winnable. The people are demanding that their political leaders show that they understand what the specialists may not, and that these leaders will reach out and grasp their responsibilities.

We can do so, Mr. Speaker, and we must.

Proposed Guidelines for a Comprehensive Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Between the Soviet Union and the United States

While engaging in START and through December 31, 1986, the Soviet Union and the United States will agree to a moratorium under the following terms:

Additional ICBM launchers to those currently existing will not be deployed.

ICBM launchers with single or multiple reentry vehicles will not be converted to launchers for MIRVs.

The number of MIRVs on currently deployed ICBM types will not be increased.

Further testing of currently deployed ICBM and SLBM types is not allowed.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are allowed to develop, test (no more than 25 times), and deploy one new single-warhead ICBM type, provided this new ICBM does not have a "bus" to dispense MIRVs, replaces an existing ICBM, and has a throw-weight not greater than that of the Soviet Union's SS–19 ICBM.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States are allowed to develop and test, but not produce or deploy a new MIRVed ICBM and a new MIRVed SLBM, as hedges against failure to achieve a strategic offensive arms reduction agreement.

Starting January 1, 1987, the Soviet Union and the United States will proceed to reduce the aggregate number of their strategic offensive weapons launchers (launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers) to an aggregated ceiling no larger than the lowest ceiling agreed to in the SALT II Treaty. By the end of 1987, neither nation may have more than 2,250 strategic offensive weapons launchers, of which no more than 1,080 may be ICBM launchers and 120 heavy bombers equipped with an aggregate total of not more than 2400 long-range (more than 600 kilometers range) air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

To reduce the possibility and incentive of the Soviet and U.S. ICBM forces from engaging in a counterforce attack, starting January 1, 1987 the Soviet Union will begin to retire launchers for its MIRVed SS–18, SS–19, and SS–17 ICBMs (in that order), followed in the same order by launchers for the single-warhead versions of these ICBMs. Concurrent to Soviet retirement of these ICBM launchers, the United States will retire some launchers for the Poseidon SLBM and launchers for the Minuteman III ICBM (in that order). Each nation will retire at least 80 launchers per annum until all the launchers for the SS–18, SS–19, SS–17, and Minuteman III ICBMs have been retired. However, the retirement of launchers for the Minuteman III will take place after the Soviet Union retires 250 launchers for the MIRVed version of the SS–18.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL

Currently, the numbers and types of SLBMs being deployed is routinely verified by observing the SSBN in which the SLBM is being introduced. Overhead photography and other means of detection are used.

The accuracy improvements of ICBMs and SLBMs is verified from intercepted test telemetry, and by tracking the missiles during operational tests.

The performance and characteristics of new types of ICBM's and SLBMs is primarily determinable from data intercepted when the missiles are tested.

Verification that ICBM or SLBM launchers are being dismantled is made from overhead photography.

The deployment of silo-based ICBMs is verified from overhead photography.

Silos containing MIRVed ICBMs have characteristics (signatures) that are distinct from silos containing single-warhead ICBMs.

Bomber aircraft equipped with ALCMs have observable differences from bombers not equipped to carry these weapons.

The numbers and types of heavy bombers deployed is verified by photographic surveillance of the aircraft production facilities and bomber operational bases.

There is no indisputable method to verify that the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) is not being increased in a currently deployed MIRVed ICBM which has been tested to carry a higher number of RVs. The U.S. may not be able to detect the conversion of 8-MIRV SS-18 ICBMs to the 10-MIRV configuration. However, if the conversion continues, approximately 350 additional RVs would be added to the Soviet ICBM force. The gain to the Soviets in continuing the conversion of the MIRVed SS-18s would be of short duration, because under the terms of the proposed START the MIRVed SS-18s will be the first ICBMs to be retired.

Significant violations in the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and bombers deployed would be readily detected. Also, the Soviets would not be able to attain a comfortable degree of confidence in the performance of additional accuracy improvements to their ICBMs and SLBMs without thorough testing of the whole missile system.

U.S. STRATEGIC PROGRAMS UNDER THIS PROPOSAL

Reductions

No hard-site ABM defense needed.

No procurement and deployment of the M-X ICBM, and no construction for basing the M-X.

No procurement, production, and deployment of the Trident II SLBM, but continue its development.

No implementation of ballistic missile accuracy improvements (such as stellar-inertial system for Trident I SLBMs).

No deployment of larger or more lethal reentry vehicle warheads.

Retirement of the Titan II and Minuteman III ICBM force.

Phased retirement of the B-52D, B-52H, and B-52G bombers.

Reduction in the number of B-52 aircraft that would be modified to carry ALCMs. Without START, more than 120 B-52 bombers would be converted to ALCM carriers.

Curtailment in the total number of tanker aircraft needed to support the strategic bomber force.

Phased retirement of the Lafayette-class (Poseidon and Trident I) SSBNs from the strategic forces, and their conversion to attack submarines.

Curtailment in the total number of Ohio-class (Trident) SSBNs that would probably be deployed without START.

Curtailment in the total number of ALCMs that would be deployed. Without START, more than 120 B-52 bombers would be converted to ALCM carriers.

Curtailment in the total number of SRAMs or other short-range attack missiles that would be deployed. Without START, more than 100 penetrating bombers, armed with SRAMs or other short-range missiles, would probably be deployed.

New deployments

630 single-warhead (without a "bus") ICBMs (denoted in tables as MX-2), with 28 new additional ICBM silos (to provide a total of 1,080 launchers), would need to be constructed.

100 B-1B bomber aircraft (initially tasked to be penetrating bombers, and later phased to ALCM carriers, replacing B-52Gs CMCs, as the more advanced STEALTH aircraft assume penetrating role), or alternatively 100 new CMCs.

100 STEALTH penetrating bombers or 100 advanced CMCs.

PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS UNDER THIS PROPOSAL

Reductions

No expansion of current ABM capabilities.

No deployment of a mobile ICBM with a hard-target capability.

No construction for basing of a mobile ICBM.

No deployment of larger or more lethal reentry vehicle warheads.

No deployment of a SLBM with hard-target capability.

No implementation of accuracy improvements to existing ICBMs and SLBMs.

Retirement of the SS-11 ICBM force.

Retirement of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs a few years earlier than anticipated.

Retirement of Yankee I SSBNs from the strategic forces, and their conversion to attack submarines.

Retirement of SS–N–6 SLBMs on Yankee I SSBNs.

Retirement of Golf III SSB and all Hotel II SSBNs.

Retirement of SS–N–5 SLBM on Hotel II SSBNs.

Retirement of the TU–95 Bear and Mya–4 Bison bombers.

Retirement of the Kangaroo air-launched missile.

New deployments

1,020 new single-warhead ICBMs (denoted in tables as SS–X), with throw-weight not to exceed that of the Soviet SS–19 ICBM.

120 new heavy bombers (denoted in tables as TU–X SWL).

Replacement of Yankee I SSBNs with a new 16-launcher SSBN (denoted in tables as SSBN–X).

Continued deployment of Typhoon SSBNs.

Continued deployment of SS–N–20 SLBMs on Typhoon SSBNs.

Deployment of SS–N–17 SLBMs (or other existing type) on new SSBN (denoted in tables as SSBN–X) replacing the Yankee I SSBNs.

PROJECTED SOVIET SSB/SSBN INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

SSB/SSBN class (SLBM type)	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Typhoon (SS-N-20)	1	3	5	7	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Delta III (SS-N-18)	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Delta II (SS-N-8)	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Delta I (ISS-N-8)	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Yankee II (SS-N-17)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
SSBN-X (SS-N-17)	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21	22	22	22	22	22
Yankee I (SS-N-6)	22	20	18	16	13	11	9	7	5	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Hotel III (SS-N-8)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hotel II (SS-N-5)	6	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Golf III (SS-N-8)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Golf IV (SS-N-6)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	70	70	70	69	68	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69

PROJECTED U.S. SSBN INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

SSNB class (SLBM type)	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Lafayette	31	31	31	31	30	25	20	15	13	12	11	9	7	5	3	1
Poseidon	(19)	(19)	(19)	(19)	(18)	(13)	(8)	(3)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Trident I	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(11)	(9)	(7)	(5)	(3)	(1)
Ohio	2	3	5	6	7	9	11	13	15	16	18	18	19	20	21	22
Trident I	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(9)	(11)	(13)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Trident II	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Total	33	34	36	37	37	34	31	28	28	28	28	27	26	25	24	23

ESTIMATED TYPE AND NUMBER OF SOVIET AND U.S. SLBM LAUNCHERS IN SSBS AND SSBNS

Soviet SSBs and SSBNs are believed to have the following type and number of SLBM launchers: Typhoon, 20 SS–N–20; Delta III, 16 SS–N–18; Delta II, 16 SS–N–8; Delta I, 12 SS–N–8; Yankee II, 12 SS–N–17; Yankee I, 16 SS–N–6; SSBN–X (projected), 16 SS–N–17 (or other existing SLBM); Hotel III, 6 SS–N–8; Hotel II, 3 SS–N–5; Golf III, 6 SS–N–8.

U.S. SSBNs have the following type and number of SLBM launchers: Lafayette-class, 16 Poseidon or 16 Trident I; Ohio-class, 24 Trident I.

PROJECTED SOVIET SLBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

SLBM designation (SSB/SSBN class)	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
SS-N-20 (Typhoon)	20	60	100	140	140	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
SS-N-18 (Delta III)	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
SS-N-17	28	60	92	124	156	188	220	252	284	316	348	364	364	364	364	364
Yankee II	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)
SSBN-X	(16)	(48)	(80)	(112)	(144)	(176)	(208)	(240)	(272)	(304)	(336)	(352)	(352)	(352)	(352)	(352)
SS-N-8	292	292	292	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286
Delta II	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)	(64)
Delta I	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)	(216)
Hotel III	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)	(6)
Golf III	(6)	(6)	(6)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
SS-N-6	352	320	288	256	208	176	144	112	80	48	16	0	0	0	0	0
(Yankee I)	(352)	(320)	(288)	(256)	(208)	(176)	(144)	(112)	(80)	(48)	(16)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
(Golf IV)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
SS-N-5 (Hotel II)	18	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	950	984	1,018	1,046	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050	1,050

PROJECTED U.S. SLBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

SLBM designation (SSBN class)	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Trident I	240	264	312	336	360	408	456	504	552	576	584	576	568	560	552	544
Ohio	(48)	(72)	(120)	(144)	(168)	(216)	(264)	(312)	(360)	(384)	(408)	(432)	(456)	(480)	(504)	(528)
(Lafayette)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(192)	(176)	(144)	(112)	(80)	(48)	(16)
Poseidon	304	304	304	304	288	208	128	48	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lafayette	(304)	(304)	(304)	(304)	(288)	(208)	(128)	(48)	(16)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Total	544	568	616	640	648	616	584	552	568	576	584	576	568	560	552	544

PROJECTED SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

ICBM designation	By end of calendar year— 1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
SS-18 (10 MIRV's)	75	75	75	75	75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-18 (8 MIRV's)	175	175	175	175	175	170	90	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-19 (6 MIRV's)	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	230	150	70	0	0	0	0	0
SS-17 (4 MIRV's)	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	110	30	0	0	0
SS-18 (single)	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	8	0	0
SS-19 (single)	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	0	0
SS-17 (single)	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	20	0
SS-13	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
SS-11	518	518	468	418	368	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-X	0	0	50	100	150	280	360	440	520	600	680	760	840	920	1,000	1,020
Total	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,398	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080

PROJECTED U.S. ICBM LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

ICBM designation	By end of calendar year— 1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Minuteman III (MX-12A)	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	300	220	140	60	0	0	0	0	0
Minuteman III (MK-12)	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	250	230	150	70	0	0
Minuteman II	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450
Titan II	52	52	52	52	52	45	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MX-2	0	0	0	0	0	7	34	80	160	240	320	400	480	560	630	630
Total	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,052	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080	1,080

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC BOMBER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Bomber designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
TU-95 Bear	113	113	100	90	60	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mya-4 Bison	43	43	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TU-X SWL	0	0	5	30	60	90	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Total	156	156	148	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120

PROJECTED U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Bomber designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
B-52D	76	76	76	76	76	46	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B-52G	157	122	87	53	53	53	53	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B-52H	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	96	66	36	6	0	0	0	0
B-52G CMC	16	51	86	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	90	54	18	0
B-1B	0	0	0	0	0	30	60	90	100	100	100	100	76	46	16	0
B-1B CMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	55	85	100
Stealth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	29	49	69	89	100	100	100
Total	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	325	315	305	295	280	255	219	200

PROJECTED SOVIET AGGREGATE STRATEGIC LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher type	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's	1, 398	1, 398	1, 398	1, 398	1, 398	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080
SLBM's	950	984	1, 018	1, 046	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050	1, 050
Bombers	156	156	148	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Total	2, 504	2, 538	2, 564	2, 564	2, 568	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250	2, 250
Of which the following are counted as MIRVed ballistic missiles and cruise missile-launching bombers:																
ICBM's	820	820	820	820	820	740	660	580	500	420	340	260	180	100	20	0
SLBM's	260	300	340	380	380	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
Bombers	0	0	5	30	60	90	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Subtotal	1, 080	1, 120	1, 165	1, 230	1, 260	1, 230	1, 180	1, 100	1, 020	940	860	780	700	620	540	520

PROJECTED U.S. AGGREGATE STRATEGIC LAUNCHER INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher type	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's	1, 052	1, 052	1, 052	1, 052	1, 052	1, 052	1, 052	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080	1, 080
SLBM's	544	568	616	640	648	616	584	552	568	576	584	576	568	560	552	544
Bombers	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	345	219	200
Total	1, 941	1, 965	2, 013	2, 037	2, 045	2, 013	1, 981	1, 977	1, 973	1, 971	1, 969	1, 951	1, 938	1, 895	1, 851	1, 824
Of which the following are counted as MIRVed ballistic missiles and cruise missile-launching bombers:																
ICBM's	550	550	550	550	550	550	550	550	470	390	310	230	150	70	0	0
SLBM's	544	568	616	640	648	616	584	552	568	576	584	576	568	560	552	544
Bombers	16	51	86	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	115	109	103	100
Subtotal	1, 110	1, 169	1, 252	1, 310	1, 318	1, 286	1, 254	1, 222	1, 158	1, 086	1, 014	926	833	739	655	644

WARHEAD LOADINGS USED IN PROJECTIONS

Unless otherwise specified in the tables, all other ballistic missiles except the following are estimated or projected to carry a single independently-targetable reentry vehicle:

Soviet: SS–N–20, 10 MIRVs; SS–N–18, 7 MIRVs.

United States: Minuteman III, 3 MIRVs; Poseidon, 9 MIRVs (average); Trident I, 8 MIRVs (average).

Bombers weapon loadings are estimated and projected to be as follows:

Soviet: TU–95 Bear, 1 AS–3 Kangaroo missile or four bombs; Mya-4 Bison, 2 bombs; TU-X SWL, 12 ALCMs (average) + 4 bombs.

United States: B–52D, 2 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B–52G/H, 4 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B–52G CMC, 12 ALCMs + SRAMs + 4 bombs through 1985. Thereafter, a total of 348 ALCMs added per year (replacing SRAMs and bombs) until B–52G CMC's are equipped with 20 ALCMs; B–1B, 8 SRAMs + 4 bombs; B–1B CMC, 24 ALCMs; STEALTH, 8 SRAMs + 4 bombs.

PROJECTED SOVIET REENTRY VEHICLE INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

ICBM/SLBM designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's:																
SS-18 (10 RV)	750	750	750	750	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-18 (8 RV)	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,360	720	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-19 (6 RV)	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,380	900	420	0	0	0	0	0
SS-17 (4 RV)	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	440	120	0	0	0
SS-18 (1 RV)	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	8	0	0
SS-19 (1 RV)	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	0	0
SS-17 (1 RV)	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	20	0
SS-13	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
SS-11	518	518	468	418	368	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-X	0	0	50	100	150	280	360	440	520	600	680	760	840	920	1,000	1,020
Subtotal	5,158	5,158	5,158	5,158	5,158	4,130	3,570	3,010	2,590	2,190	1,790	1,410	1,170	1,080	1,080	1,080
SLBM's:																
SS-N-20	200	600	1,000	1,400	1,400	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600
SS-N-18	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680	1,680
SS-N-17	20	60	92	124	156	188	220	252	284	316	348	364	364	364	364	364
SS-N-8	292	292	292	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	286	285	286	286
SS-N-6	352	320	288	256	208	176	144	112	80	48	16	0	0	0	0	0
SS-N-5	18	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	2,562	2,964	3,358	3,746	3,730	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930	3,930
Grand total	7,720	8,122	8,516	8,904	8,888	8,060	7,500	6,940	6,520	6,120	5,720	5,340	5,100	5,010	5,010	5,010

PROJECTED U.S. DEPLOYED REENTRY VEHICLE INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

ICBM/SLBM designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's:																
Minuteman III (MK-12A)	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	660	420	180	0	0	0	0	0
Minuteman III (MK-12)	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	690	450	210	0	0
Minuteman II	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450
Titan II	52	52	52	52	52	45	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MX-2	0	0	0	0	0	7	34	80	160	240	320	400	480	560	630	630
Subtotal	2, 152	2, 152	2, 152	2, 152	2, 152	2, 152	2, 152	2, 180	2, 020	1, 860	1, 700	1, 540	1, 380	1, 220	1, 080	1, 080
SBLM's:																
Trident I	1, 920	2, 112	2, 496	2, 688	2, 880	3, 264	3, 648	4, 032	4, 424	4, 608	4, 672	4, 608	4, 544	4, 480	4, 416	4, 352
Poseidon	2, 736	2, 736	2, 736	2, 736	2, 592	1, 872	1, 152	432	144	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	4, 656	4, 848	5, 232	5, 424	5, 472	5, 136	4, 800	4, 464	4, 568	4, 608	4, 672	4, 608	4, 544	4, 480	4, 416	4, 352
Grand total	6, 808	7, 000	7, 384	7, 576	7, 624	7, 288	6, 952	6, 644	6, 588	6, 468	6, 372	6, 148	5, 924	5, 700	5, 496	5, 432

PROJECTED SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COUNTERFORCE—CAPABLE RV INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START (CLOSING THE "WINDOW OF ICBM VULNERABILITY")

	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Soviet:[1]																
SS-18 (10 RV's)	750	750	750	750	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-18 (8 RV's)	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,360	720	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-19 (6 RV's)	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,380	900	420	0	0	0	0	0
Total	3,950	3,950	3,950	3,950	3,950	3,160	2,520	1,880	1,380	900	420	0	0	0	0	0
United States:																
Minuteman III (MK-12A)	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	900	650	420	180	0	0	0	0	0
Minuteman III (MK-12)	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	750	690	450	210	0	0
Total	1,650	1,560	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,410	1,170	930	690	450	210	0	0
Strike ratio[2] (RV's/ICBM's):																
Soviet	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	2.99	2.40	1.74	1.28	0.83	0.39	0	0	0	0	0
United States	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.53	1.53	1.53	1.31	1.08	0.91	0.64	0.42	0.19	0	0

[1] The RV's carried by the MIRVed version of the SS-17 are not included. Currently, the MIRVed SS-17 does not have sufficient accuracy to destroy U.S. ICBM silos with a high degree of probability.

[2] Assuming 100-percent availability and reliability of the missiles and warheads (an optimistic assumption), a strike ratio equal to or larger than 2 denotes a theoretical capability to target at least 2 reentry vehicles against each silo. Thus, if each of the reentry vehicles has a high single-shot-kill probability (SSKP) of destroying a silo, a strike ratio equal to or larger than 2 signifies a theoretical capability to destroy the opposing ICBM force at their silos.

PROJECTED SOVIET DEPLOYED BOMBER WEAPON INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Bomber and weapon designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
TU-95 Bear:																
Kangaroo	75	75	75	75	60	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bombs	152	152	100	60	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mya-4 Bison Bombs	86	86	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TU-X SWL:																
ALCM's	0	0	60	360	720	1,080	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440	1,440
Bombs	0	0	20	120	240	360	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480
Total	313	313	341	615	1,020	1,470	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920

PROJECTED U.S. DEPLOYED BOMBER WEAPON INVENTORY UNDER PROPOSED START

Bomber and weapon designation	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
B-52D:																
SRAM's	152	152	152	152	152	92	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bombs	304	304	304	304	304	184	64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B-52G:																
SRAM's	628	488	348	212	212	212	212	156	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bombs	628	488	348	212	212	212	212	156	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B-52H:																
SRAM's	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	264	144	24	0	0	0	0
Bombs	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	384	264	144	24	0	0	0	0
B-52G CMC:																
SRAM's	64	204	344	480	306	132	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bombs	64	204	344	480	306	132	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALCM's	192	612	1,032	1,440	1,788	2,136	2,400	2,400	2,400	2,400	2,400	2,400	1,800	1,080	360	0
B-1B:																
SRAM's	0	0	0	0	0	240	480	720	800	800	800	800	608	368	128	0
Bombs	0	0	0	0	0	120	240	360	400	400	400	400	304	184	64	0
B-1B CMC: ALCM's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	600	1,320	2,040	2,400
Stealth:																
SRAM's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	72	232	392	552	712	800	800	800
Bombs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	116	196	276	356	400	400	400
Total	2,800	3,210	3,640	4,048	4,048	4,228	4,408	4,560	4,776	4,476	4,476	4,476	4,380	4,152	3,792	3,600

PROJECTED AGGREGATE OF DEPLOYED SOVIET STRATEGIC WARHEADS UNDER PROPOSED START

Delivery system	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's/SLBM's	7,720	8,122	8,516	8,904	8,888	8,060	7,500	6,940	6,520	6,120	5,720	5,340	5,100	5,010	5,010	5,010
Bombers	313	313	341	615	1,020	1,470	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920	1,920
Total	8,033	8,435	8,857	9,519	9,908	9,530	9,420	8,860	8,440	8,040	7,640	7,260	7,020	6,930	6,930	6,930

PROJECTED AGGREGATE OF DEPLOYED U.S. STRATEGIC WARHEADS UNDER PROPOSED START

Delivery system	By end of calendar year—															
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
ICBM's/SLBM's	6,808	7,000	7,384	7,576	7,624	7,288	6,952	6,644	6,588	6,468	6,372	6,148	5,924	5,700	5,496	5,432
Bombers	2,800	3,210	3,640	4,048	4,048	4,228	4,408	4,560	4,776	4,476	4,476	4,476	4,380	4,152	3,792	3,600
Total	9,608	10,210	11,024	11,624	11,672	11,516	11,360	11,204	11,364	10,944	10,848	10,624	10,304	9,852	9,288	9,032

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCHER RETIREMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher	During calendar year—																Total
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
ICBM's:																	
SS-11	0	0	50	50	50	368	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	518
SS-18 MIRVed	0	0	0	0	0	80	80	80	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	250
SS-19 MIRVed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	70	80	80	70	0	0	0	0	300
SS-17 MIRVed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	80	30	0	0	120
SS-18 single	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	8	0	58
SS-19 single	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60	0	60
SS-17 single	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	20	32
Subtotal	0	0	50	50	50	448	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	20	1,338
SLBM's:																	
SS-N-8 (Golf III)	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
SS-N-6 (Yankee I)	48	32	32	32	48	32	32	32	32	32	32	16	0	0	0	0	400
SS-N-5 (Hotel II)	0	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18
Subtotal	48	38	38	44	48	32	32	32	32	32	32	16	0	0	0	0	424
Bombers:																	
TU-95 Bear	0	0	13	10	30	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	113
MYa-4 Bison	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
Subtotal	0	0	13	53	30	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	156
Grand total	48	38	101	147	128	510	142	112	112	112	112	96	80	80	80	20	1,918

PROJECTED SOVIET STRATEGIC LAUNCHER NEW DEPLOYMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher	During calendar year—																Total
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
ICBM's: SS-X subtotal	0	0	50	50	130	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	20	1, 020
SLBM's:																	
SS-N-20 (Typhoon)	20	40	40	40	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	160
SS-N-18 (Delta III)	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
SS-N-17 (SSBN-X)	16	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	16	0	0	0	0	352
Subtotal	52	72	72	72	32	32	52	32	32	32	32	16	0	0	0	0	528
Bombers: TU-X SWL (subtotal)	0	0	5	25	30	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	120
Grand total	52	72	127	147	112	192	162	112	112	112	112	96	80	80	80	20	1, 668

PROJECTED U.S. STRATEGIC LAUNCHER RETIREMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher	During calendar year—																Total
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
ICBM's:																	
Minuteman III (MK-12A)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	80	80	80	60	0	0	0	0	300
Minuteman III (MK-12)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	80	80	70	0	250
Titan II	0	0	0	0	0	7	27	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	52
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	7	27	18	80	80	80	80	80	80	70	0	602
SLBM's:																	
Poseidon (Lafayette)	0	0	0	0	16	80	80	80	32	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	304
Trident I (Lafayette)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	32	32	32	32	32	176
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	16	80	80	80	32	16	16	32	32	32	32	32	480
Bombers:																	
B-52D	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	76
B-52G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	33	0	0	0	30	36	36	18	173
B-52H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	30	6	0	0	0	96
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	36	33	30	30	30	36	36	36	18	345
Grand total	0	0	0	0	16	117	137	134	145	126	126	142	148	148	138	50	1, 427

PROJECTED U.S. STRATEGIC LAUNCHER NEW DEPLOYMENT UNDER PROPOSED START

Launcher	During calendar year—																Total
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	
ICBM's: MX-2 (subtotal)	0	0	0	0	0	7	27	46	80	80	80	80	80	80	70	0	630
SLBM's: Trident I (Ohio class) (subtotal)	24	24	48	24	24	48	48	48	48	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	504
Bombers:																	
B-1B	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	30	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Stealth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	20	20	20	20	11	0	0	100
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	30	30	30	19	20	20	20	20	11	0	0	200
Grand total	24	24	48	24	24	85	105	124	147	124	124	124	124	115	94	24	1,334

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman Gore.

We have had reports that the Soviets have shown an interest in your proposal. Would you elaborate?

Representative GORE. Yes, sir. I would be delighted to. The proposal was brought up by a delegation in the Soviet Union during meetings with a visiting group of Americans headed by the mayor of Minneapolis, Don Fraser.

The Americans were somewhat surprised. Only one had heard anything about the proposal that I advanced, but the Soviets were familiar with it in some detail. It had been spelled out in the Congressional Record, and Oleg Bikov, the Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, brought it up first and said that it could provide a promising framework for negotiations.

I think it was a significant reference. It is always hard to interpret references of that kind, but in speaking with arms control and Soviet experts I believe it was an important signal. I think that it is possible that the negotiations could move from the opening position that the President has outlined toward an agreement along the lines of the proposal I have offered. That would include a decision by the United States to forego deployment of those counterforce weapons that we now have in the process of development.

That, I think, is still a distinct possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Your proposal would produce a nuclear balance, as I understand it, by the next decade that was far less weighted toward destabilizing systems. At the same time, though, it would require substantial additions to each side's nuclear arsenal.

For example, you envision the United States building 100 B-1's, 100 Stealth bombers and over 600 new single-warhead ICBM's. In your judgment, as you have explained this to your own constituency and the American public, do you think they could develop an understanding as to the nature of the program and its concomitant expense that necessarily the strategic stability is enhanced?

Representative GORE. The reaction has been excellent. I might say that the forces would be 50 percent lower than those contemplated under SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. How much under the levels proposed by President Reagan?

Representative GORE. It would be comparable in numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. Comparable.

Representative GORE. The key difference is that the proposal I have advanced focuses on counterforce weapons. The strategic policy in both countries has focused on counterforce ability for quite some time. I think it is useful to choose a complementary focus for arms control. MIRVed land-based ICBM's present the most destabilizing part of the nuclear arms race because they have the devilish characteristic of presenting a tempting target and at the same time a deadly threat.

When a single silo represents a threat to multiple silos on the other side, then there is an advantage to the side that attacks first. So long as our two nations retain counterforce weapons that are theoretically capable of being used in a first strike, then both sides will have to fear the other side and will have to be apprehensive about the possibility of such a strike. Both sides will claw for advantages, even marginal advantages, on the other, and the arms race will continue unrestrained.

Since we have come to a stage of parity, in my view the key to an agreement from this point forward is to eliminate the fear of a first strike on either side.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, President Reagan's speech placed great emphasis on reducing the most destabilizing systems, that is, MIRVed ICBM's. There was a heated debate that we had here for a long time on that particular issue. What similarities and differences do you see in the administration's plan and your own proposals?

Representative GORE. The MIRVed issue was debated in the Senate in 1969 and 1970, and if the Senate's advice had been taken at that time, we would not be in this difficult situation. The President does refer to the most destabilizing systems, and I think that is commendable. I think he has made a wise decision there.

The problem is that the specific proposal may or may not get at the most destabilizing systems. Depending on the counteroffer that is made and the progress of the negotiations, there is no specific prohibition on land-based MIRVs and no specific effort to back away from land-based MIRVs.

The administration proposal could be viewed as an indirect approach to the problem of land-based MIRVs on the assumption that the Soviet Union would choose to give up its SS-18's and SS-19's. That may not be a reasonable assumption, and to the extent that it is a reasonable assumption, it may be unrealistic to think that the Soviets would accept that kind of approach.

But the President's position is an opening position. I think that the negotiations could very well proceed in a way that might bring both sides to focus on the most destabilizing weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much for your initiative and for your appearance here today, which I found most interesting. There may be other questions from other committee members. We will keep the record open for those questions.

Representative GORE. I would be delighted to respond for the record, and thank you for your courtesy and attention.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much.

Chairman Zablocki, hello. Welcome to the committee. Chairman Zablocki travels to the Senate for conferences and I travel to the House for conferences that we participate in together. I think this is the first time, though, that you have appeared as a witness before this committee, at least since I have been in the chair.

I think it is rather interesting that you appear to testify on a resolution that we just happen to have worked on together. So we see eye to eye on so many things. I want to warmly welcome you to this hearing today on what I have described as the most important single subject facing mankind today.

I know that you have given through the years a tremendous amount of thought to this subject. You are in the forefront of the concern. It must be gratifying to you now that the country has caught up with some of the Zablocki concerns of past years.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM WISCONSIN, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Representative ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I became chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I would be so unhumble as to say the world is being saved. [General laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. And may we leave under our own volition and not as some of our predecessors have, against their will. [General laughter.]

Representative ZABLOCKI. That is true.

My testimony will be brief, Mr. Chairman, and, I hope, to the point. We have had enough talk. I think we have had a lot of rhetoric but little action. I submit that it is long overdue time that we stop talking and that we start START.

No subject is more urgent, as you have stated, Mr. Chairman, than nuclear arms control. It is, I submit, perhaps the most important issue with which we have to deal in this session of Congress. Nor is it an exaggeration to say that the very survival of mankind may depend on what we do or do not do on this question. And God forbid, I hope we do not do nothing.

I therefore commend you, Mr. Chairman, for convening these hearings and giving me this opportunity to appear. These hearings are similar in many respects to those held by my own House Foreign Affairs Committee. I applaud even more your determination to work together with me in reporting out a meaningful resolution. We owe nothing less to the American people.

One clear and indisputable fact is that those Americans are concerned about a possible nuclear holocaust and by the overwhelming majority of 3 to 1 want action now on nuclear arms control. A recent Washington Post/ABC poll reflected that support to be surprisingly broad-based: shared almost equally by Republicans and Democrats, men and women, conservatives and liberals.

That classic phrase has never been more true: The desire for nuclear arms control is an idea whose time has come. It is time that the Congress and the administration catch up to the leadership of the American people on this crucial question.

It is apparent to me that the only freeze we have in the nuclear arms control area is the failure to move toward negotiations. This, I submit, is intolerable. It is also counterproductive to U.S. national security interests. I repeat, the time for action is now. We must move on this question, and move we will. I hope that President Reagan's proposals in Eureka, Ill., last Sunday unfreezes this tragic fact.

By way of achieving that goal, you and I have introduced resolutions, and since the introducion, at least in the House, more than 65 Members have cosponsored my resolution. These are similar resolutions. Your introduction of Senate Joint Resolution 171, Mr. Chairman, reassured me that our joint approach on this question has the clear promise of success.

As you know, a number of our colleagues who share our concerns and objectives have introduced a variety of nuclear arms control measures. Those various proposals involve two basic approaches.

The first of those approaches calls for a mutual United States-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons development. The second approach, the administration approach, or at least it is endorsed by the Reagan administration, essentially argues that an equitable agreement at sharply reduced forces is possible only after a significant U.S. nuclear weapons buildup.

Our own virtually identical positions embodied in House Joint Resolution 443 and Senate Joint Resolution 171 attempt to bridge the gap between those two approaches. We are, so to speak, taking the middle of the road.

The more detailed statement that I am submitting for the record today sets out an analysis of how our resolutions achieve that bridging concept. Its central message is that we must preserve present arms control achievements and build on them, and that we must begin this task immediately. It also shows the many shared concerns and interests that we have with both the freeze proponents and those who advocate the need for a buildup before we negotiate.

If there is one clear message I leave with you here today, Mr. Chairman, it is this: There is a basis for agreement within the Congress on this important issue. We must, we can, and I am sure we will overcome whatever differences there may be regarding the means to our shared objective.

We must, we can, and we will reach understanding on an agreement to once and for all reduce nuclear weapons on both sides. It will be a position shorn of partisan bickering. It will be a position that advances the national security interests of the United States. It will be a position that the American people want and deserve and are waiting for us to provide.

Again, Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here. It is always a pleasure to come to the Senate side, particularly since your chairmanship, when we have our conferences. You are so understanding and so reasonable. It is a pleasure to do business with you, and indeed it is a pleasure to be here to testify before your august committee.

I am prepared to answer any questions that you may have.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that my more detailed statement be made a part of the record.

[Representative Zablocki's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today before this distinguished Committee on the subject of nuclear arms control. Our two Committees have had a long, fruitful relationship in our joint effort to strengthen U.S. foreign policy. I am sure that the actions of the two Committees on the profoundly important issue of nuclear arms control will be no exception.

As you well know, Mr. Chairman, mounting concern in recent months over the effectiveness of the Reagan Administration's arms control policy has generated numerous proposals to reduce the growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In response to these proposals, both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have been conducting far-reaching hearings on U.S. arms control policy and the best means of avoiding nuclear war and enhancing deterrence.

At the outset it must be stated that while Congress cannot be responsible for ongoing negotiations in strategic arms reduction, Congress can and should establish flexible guidelines to which U.S. negotiators can adhere in conducting future arms reduction talks. Much as the Jackson amendment to the SALT I executive agreement set the general guidelines for the subsequent negotiation of the SALT II Treaty, a joint resolution of the Congress can set the general guidelines for subsequent negotiations on strategic arms reduction. Furthermore, Congress has a responsibility to act decisively on agreements presented to them. For this reason, Mr. Chairman, I endorse efforts undertaken in both the House and the Senate to favorably dispose of SALT II, either by executive agreement or Treaty.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the various arms reduction proposals introduced in the Congress have taken a number of forms. Two basic approaches have been most prevalent. The first calls for a mutual United States-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons development. This approach has been sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and Representatives Markey and Conte. The second approach is sponsored by Senators Jackson and Warner and is endorsed by the Reagan Administration. It essentially argues that an equitable arms control agreement at sharply reduced levels of forces is only possible after a U.S. nuclear weapons buildup which forces the Soviet Union to make concessions.

Two central elements are missing from both of these proposals that are crucial to a positive, definitive Congressional input on the U.S. negotiating posture for strategic arms reductions. The first element concerns how to address existing arms limitations and controls. The second concerns how U.S. arms control strategy and defense modernization efforts are to be coordinated in order to form a sound national security policy.

Because of these shortcomings, a third approach is needed. Mr. Chairman, such an approach is embodied in House Joint Resolution 443, which I introduced on March 17. I was delighted to learn you subsequently introduced Senate Joint Resolution 171, which is virtually identical. The two resolutions establish the fundamental guidelines for the conduct of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), to which President Reagan is committed. These guidelines are:

(1) Present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be preserved while pursuing equitable and verifiable reductions through various means;

(2) Every possible means should be employed to avoid the testing and deployment of new and destabilizing nuclear weapons; and

(3) Ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles should eventually be merged into the START negotiations.

The final element of both H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 is that the START negotiations should begin immediately. I presume that this objective has the President's full support, as a result of his May 9 speech on strategic arms reductions. The President's speech was a most welcome, long overdue initiative in keeping with the sentiments of the American public. His call for major reductions should complement the Congress' efforts to produce effective arms control agreements and reinforce the objectives of H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171.

Mr. Chairman, our resolutions provide the two central elements missing from other Congressional arms reduction resolutions. First, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 argue for the preservation of existing limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

I believe the prospects for reductions in nuclear weapons will be greatly enhanced by continued adherence to existing limitations provided in treaties already negotiated, including SALT II. These include:

Limits on the number of strategic submarines; limits on the number of strategic launchers; limits on the number of MIRVed ICBMs; limits on the number of MIRVed bombers (cruise missile carriers); limits on the number of cruise missiles deployable on each MIRVed bomber; limits on the size and throwweight of missiles; and limits on deployment and testing of ABM systems.

As is well known, SALT II is in hand with its limitations being adhered to by both sides even though formal instruments of ratification have not been exchanged. If it were ratified, it would lead to full implementation of its dismantling provisions, most notably, a reduction by over 10 percent in the Soviet strategic force levels, or some 250 delivery systems. Ratification would ensure that its terms would be observed by both sides throughout the conduct of the START negotiations.

SALT II thus provides a baseline for new talks on reductions. Because that baseline is one with which the Soviet Union is familiar they would be more willing to negotiate from it than from a totally new framework like START or a freeze alone.

By drawing on the existing controls from SALT II, whether ratified or simply reaffirmed by this Joint Resolution, and by also directing the incorporation of INF negotiations into START talks, our resolutions represent an improvement from other Congressional efforts because they do not disregard the contributions made to strategic stability by arms control agreements reached over the past decade. The important gains of "customary approaches" to arms control should not be dismissed. H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 reaffirm these gains.

The second missing element addressed in our resolutions concerns the interrelationship of U.S. arms control and defense modernization efforts. Here both the Kennedy-Hatfield and Jackson-Warner approaches may unwittingly produce negative results.

The freeze proposal could destroy needed flexibility to bargain over new U.S. systems in exchange for reciprocal Soviet restraint. Under conditions of a freeze, strategic forces could not be replaced or modernized. Without the advantage of modernizations completed more recently on Soviet systems, U.S. forces could fall into a position of insufficient capability to maintain U.S. deterrence. In order to avoid that possibility, the United States would be put in the politically awkward if not untenable position of abrogating the terms of a freeze.

On the other hand, the Jackson-Warner proposal, supported by the Administration, seems to assume that a successful outcome from negotiations can be achieved only through a massive unilateral increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That approach discounts the incentive shared by the United States and the Soviet Union for reducing the dangers of confrontation by limiting nuclear arms. Uninhibited modernization could derail negotiations.

H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 produce neither negative result. Our resolutions permit defense modernization within the limits of SALT to provide a practical basis for U.S. negotiators to bargain with the Soviets. At the same time, the resolutions recognize that any addition of new destabilizing weapons to either side's nuclear arsenals will jeopardize arms control and thus should be avoided. New systems should be pursued only if they contribute to the preservation of essential equivalence and the ultimate objective of achieving significant reductions.

In addition to addressing these two missing elements in other arms reduction resolutions, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 have several advantages over the other two approaches.

For example, while the freeze proposal is designed to be simple and straightforward—and admittedly draws much of its support from that fact—that approach does not offer a simple solution. The freeze is actually a "two-step" approach, calling for negotiations first on "when and how to implement" a freeze, and negotiations after that on reductions. I question whether in actual negotiations the issues involved in a "freeze" can be separated from those involved in reductions. Accordingly, I fear that the freeze proposal unnecessarily complicates the process.

By contrast, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 offer a more direct, "one-step" approach to reductions, because they rely on SALT limits to provide the baseline for those reductions. If the Administration approaches the Soviet Union with an all-new proposal based on either a freeze or on new definitions and new units of account, the Soviet response could be similar to their rejection of the U.S. initiative in March 1977.

By taking this approach, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 promise to lead the United States to an agreement with the Soviet Union more quickly than the other approaches. By providing a framework for incorporating INF talks as well, those negotiations may also have a greater prospect of success with timeliness related to NATO's plans for nuclear modernization.

In addition, in the crucial area of verification, freeze supporters argue that the monitoring to verify compliance with the terms of a freeze would be less demanding than what would be required to verify compliance with the terms of an agreement like SALT. In the first place, either approach will eventually require monitoring capabilities for a reductions regime, since reductions are the common objective; and since the capabilities for monitoring activities with respect to SALT II compliance already exist, nothing is saved by reducing the requirement for those capabilities now. Monitoring Soviet activities pursuant to SALT II provisions for verification also provide valuable information about their forces and capabilities.

In the second place, verification of a freeze appears less demanding only in terms of monitoring system characteristics as revealed through test activities. Since tests would be banned under a freeze, any such activities would be prima facie evidence of a violation. On the other hand, a freeze would also prohibit production of launchers and warheads. No capability presently exists to monitor production of either, if efforts were taken to conceal them; accordingly, verification of compliance with such terms would impose greater requirements than now exist.

In addition to the improvements discussed above in comparison with the freeze, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 also improve on the Administration-backed proposal in several other ways as well. For example:

Preservation of SALT constraints called for in our resolutions will limit the possibilities for the Soviet Union's establishing a position of significant advantage over the Unted States before negotiations succeed;

No prospective actions in violation of SALT limitations could be used to extract concessions from the United States.

And finally, preservation of the provisions of SALT guards against Soviet fractionation of MIRV warheads on ICBMs thereby reducing U.S. ICBM vulnerability.

While making essential improvements to both the Kennedy-Hatfield and Jackson-Warner proposals, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 preserve many of the key assumptions of both.

Our resolutions embody the following principles of the freeze resolution:

A strategic relationship of rough parity or essential equivalence now exists between the United States and the Soviet Union;

Nuclear arms control negotiations should begin immediately;

Arms control talks should lead to an agreement on substantial and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.

Our resolutions also embody the following principles of the Administration-backed resolution:

Arms control negotiations should be directed toward an agreement on substantial and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons;

U.S. negotiators should be given necessary bargaining room, thereby increasing the prospect of an agreement that will meet each side's requirements for a balanced deterrent;

Negotiations should address force reductions directly. Only then can the United States avoid the situation that a prior freeze could produce—namely, that prolonged negotiations under frozen conditions would weaken the U.S. deterrent by comparison with Soviet strategic forces, which have been modernized more recently.

On the basis of these commonalities, H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 serve as a "bridge" between the two other approaches to arms reductions. However, it goes beyond both approaches in several important respects. Now that the question of whether or not the Administration will undertake arms control talks has been answered, these resolutions address the substantive question of how.

Finally, in presenting my arms reduction proposal, I would like to emphasize the bipartisan support that arms control has enjoyed over several Administrations. That bipartisan support has led to several arms control milestones whose limits I want to preserve. These include the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, as well as the verification provisions of these agreements which have permitted knowledge of each other's activities so as to prevent the fear and insecurity that can give rise to another pointless arms race.

I intend to sustain that bipartisan support in seeking positive action on H.J. Res. 443. The resolution now has over 60 cosponsors, both Democrat and Republican, from all ideological perspectives (see attached list).

Adoption of our resolutions would serve as a practical and meaningful Congressional statement that instructs the Administration to conduct Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) as part of a coherent national security policy, necessarily integrating arms control with the modernization efforts that may be needed to support our objectives in negotiations. Although we may not use the term "freeze," our resolutions embody many useful elements of the freeze proposal by mandating the preservation of strategic arms limitations now being observed by both superpowers.

By bridging the freeze resolutions and the Administration's view regarding nuclear arms reductions, our resolutions will allow Congress to present a strong and realistic position that should be accepted by this Administration as it pursues the arms reductions we all want. Most importantly, by reaffirming the positive contributions that past arms control efforts have made, and by insisting that those gains be preserved, our resolutions will help to assure that future negotiations will take place under conditions that can best prevent instability as reductions are made and best assure that mutual deterrence remains fully intact.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe the resolutions we have introduced provide a significant, effective and practical outline of what U.S. objectives in START should be. They reflect a common-sense realization that we must preserve what has already been achieved in nuclear arms control and build on such achievements. Freezes proponents should have no doubt that our resolutions will spur genuine movement in arms control. The Reagan Administration should have no concern that our resolutions will arbitrarily cancel its nuclear modernization program. H.J.Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 will, however, enable Congress to do what it does best in foreign policy: provide a guiding hand in the conduct of crucial foreign policy matters like the START negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, progress in arms control has never been more important to the survival of mankind. It is my hope that H.J. Res. 443 and S.J. Res. 171 will form the basis for Congressional action to help encourage such progress.

Thank you very much.

COSPONSORS OF H.J. RES. 443

Frank Annunzio (D-Ill)
Les Aspin (D-WI)
Michael Barnes (D-MD)
Tony Coelho (D-Cal)
Berkley Bedell (D-Iowa)
Charles E. Bennett (D-Fl)
Lindy Boggs (D-La)
David R. Bowen (D-Miss)
Julian Dixon (D-Calif)
Bernard J. Dwyer (D-NJ)
Larry DeNardis (R-Conn)
Bob Edgar (D-Pa)
John N. Erlenborn (R-Ill)
John G. Fary (D-Ill)
Vic Fazio (D-Cal)
Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ)
Paul Findley (R-Ill)
Harold E. Ford (D-Tenn)
L. H. Fountain (D-NC)
Edwin B. Forsythe (R-NJ)
Bill Frenzel (R-Minn)
Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY)
William F. Goodling (R-Pa)
Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind)
Cecil Heftel (D-Hawaii)
Dennis Hertel (D-Mich)
Frank Horton (R-NY)
Andrew Jacobs (D-Ind)
Tom Lantos (D-Cal)
John LeBoutillier (R-NY)
Norman F. Lent (R-NY)
Bill Lowery (R-Calif)
Mike Lowry (D-Wash)
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R-Cal)
George Miller (D-Calif)
Norman Y. Mineta (D-Calif)
Dan Mica (D-Fl)
Austin J. Murphy (D-Pa)
Henry J. Nowak (D-NY)
Mary Rose Oakar (D-Oh)
Jerry M. Patterson (D-Cal)
Claude Pepper (D-Fl)
John Edward Porter (R-Ill)
Melvin Price (D-Ill)
Nick Joe Rahall II (D-W. Va.)
Robert A. Roe (D-NJ)
Marge Roukema (R-NJ)
Frederick W. Richmond (D-NY)
Martin Olav Sabo (D-Mn)
John F. Seiberling (D-Oh)
James F. Sensenbrenner (R-WI)
Philip R. Sharp (D-Ind)
Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine)
Gerry E. Studds (D-Mass)
Morris K. Udall (D-Ariz)
Ted Weiss (D-NY)
Jim Wright (D-Tx)
Gus Yatron (D-PA)
Leo C. Zeferetti (D-NY)
William H. Gray III (D-Pa)
Ike Andrews (D-NC)
Fortney H. Stark (D-Cal)
Stephen L. Neal (D-NC)

Total: 46 Democrats
17 Republicans

63 Total

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Your detailed statement setting out an analysis of how our own resolutions achieve the bridging concept between the Kennedy-Hatfield and Warner-Jackson amendments is very helpful and we very much appreciate that.

I wonder if you could tell us what sort of reaction you have had from your own committee members to the President's speech on Sunday. Is there any kind of consensus or is everyone all over the lot on it?

Representative ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, there are diverse views. There are some who are not happy with the President's speech because they felt it was further rhetoric. They do not give the President credit; nor do they think that he is sincere or intends to follow through. However, I think the majority of House members to whom I have spoken, as I, welcome the President's Eureka speech.

I welcome it because it conforms to our resolution for immediate resumption of strategic negotiations with the Soviets. My resolution, as yours, Mr. Chairman, adds on two important steps beyond what the President had stated in the Eureka speech.

First, our resolutions stipulate that the best way to improve stability and to avoid a nuclear holocaust is for both the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid any new additions to the counter-force inventory on either side. Secondly, our resolutions reaffirm continued adherence to the SALT agreements as we negotiate substantial reductions with the Soviets. Both sides are abiding by the SALT II agreement, for example. So I think we should add on, and our resolutions do just that.

The President's speech, coupled with these two points that I singled out from my resolution, I believe deserve bipartisan support.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you would explain your belief with respect to the reduction plan which the President outlined. Does that fall within the general guidelines, do you feel, of the resolution that you have introduced into the House?

Representative ZABLOCKI. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The President's reduction guidelines are generally in the spirit of the concept of our resolutions. I believe that the President's Eureka speech, at least this is my opinion and this is how I have interpreted it, is a support for the type of resolutions we have introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. Several Senators in recent weeks have called for the ratification of SALT II. Your resolution states that both sides should agree to preserve present limitations on strategic forces. Do you believe the Senate should act to approve the treaty or do you believe that the present limitations can be kept in place by a less formal and possibly less divisive approach?

Representative ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, our resolutions deal with SALT II agreement which both sides are maintaining. But if one is practical, with the situation as it is now, the ratification of SALT II would be difficult, particularly as long as the Soviet Union remains in Afghanistan.

I submit that that was one of the major reasons, if not the reason that SALT II was not ratified in the Senate in the last Congress. As long as both sides are adhering to SALT II, we should now begin negotiations by building on SALT II with the START talks beginning as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, the resolution you have introduced in the House calls for the INF talks in Geneva to be incorporated in the START negotiations. A similar provision is in my resolution which I introduced in the Senate. I notice that the President has indicated in his remarks that the two talks should be closely correlated. Would you elaborate on how closely you think they can be taken into account, because I don't think progress is going to be made in one, really, without progress in the other.

Representative ZABLOCKI. I don't think they should be going closely in tandem to the extent that the progress of negotiations, for example, on the START talks should be dependent on the progress made in the talks at Geneva. At some point, however, the INF and START negotiations will have to merge. That is what we call for in our resolutions. And the reason we do so is to get an integrated product that will benefit U.S. national security.

I am sure that there will be a process of consultation with our Western allies, and at some time there should be an opportunity where both of the negotiations can be finalized. I don't think we should put a higher priority on one or the other, but understandably, more progress can be made on START and I think we should move ahead immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jackson, I know you have had no preparation for this. But perhaps you could start out on something on which I know you could be prepared to talk, with your long background in the field.

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have something to say. Please give me a minute, for you do catch me by surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, I have a luncheon starting at 12:30. I am hosting 18 Senators, so I will not be able to be too late for it. As soon as Congressman Markey comes in, we will have to interrupt. But I just wanted to have you have a chance to make a few comments.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, you are very kind, and I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN Would you give us also a preamble on your own background in the field.

[Mr. Jackson's biographical sketch follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF WILLIAM E. JACKSON, JR.

BACKGROUND

1981—Foreign Policy Adviser to former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Wolff.

Guest Scholar, the Brookings Institution Consultant, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University.

1980–81—Senior Legislative Management Officer, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State.

(Note: Charter member of the Senior Executive Service, U.S. Government, July 1979).

1978–80—Executive Director of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, a group of 15 private citizens appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, with a statutory mandate (since 1961) to advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on arms control and national security matters.

Special Assistant to the Director of ACDA from January to October 1978.

1974–77—Legislative Assistant to Senator Alan Cranston of California, the Assistant Majority Leader (Whip) of the U.S. Senate. Responsible for foreign policy and defense policy.

1968–73—Assistant Professor of Political Science, Davidson College.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. JACKSON, JR., GUEST SCHOLAR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I was the executive director of President Carter's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, which Ambassador Thomas Watson chaired before he went off to Moscow. Before that, I taught and worked in the Senate for many years on this subject. Currently, I am a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and have other affiliations.

Mr. Chairman, my basic concern—which I expressed in a May 5 speech [1]—is as follows: that is, how do we get from where we are to where the President would like to take us? There is an assumption, an easy assumption that the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee just accepted, that the SALT II regime is in place, that it is working.

But yet Mr. Meese said on Friday in a breakfast with reporters that we will feel bound by it only if it does not interfere with our military plans. In other words, he went a step beyond what Secretary Haig and others have been saying: that we will do nothing to undermine the SALT II informal regime as long as the Soviets do the same.

Mr. Chairman, I do not see how it is possible to get from here to where the President wants to take us and at the same time protect our national security without that regime being in place. If we send signals to the Soviets that we regard the SALT II regime, however informally, very casually and opportunistically, we can expect them to see it in the same way.

As you know, it is much easier for the Soviets to break out of the constraints of SALT II than it is for us. Secretary Haig yesterday, to use one of his phrases, was out of context in time. He talked about how SALT II was flawed because it would not protect against a Soviet breakout come 1985.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I am talking about protecting us from breakout in 1982. It would probably take one launch test, one more launch test, an actual test of the SS–18, for the Soviets to be sure of being able to carry more than 10, many more than 10 warheads on their SS–18's.

So there is a real prospect, in other words, as strange as it may seem, a real prospect of this administration, by the Reagan administration—and notice I do not say the President—by the administration, though, and many in it, by the casual way in which they regard the SALT II regime, of actually encouraging this move toward Soviet military superiority that they so often warn us about

What can we possibly do in the next few years to match what the Soviets could do if they chose to break out of SALT II? There is nothing in the strategic modernization program announced last October that in any way could match the Soviets putting 20, 30, or 40 warheads on their SS-18's. How would this warhead buildup affect the assumptions and figures in the START proposal?

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[1] See page 248.

Mr. Chairman, you tell me when my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Markey has arrived. That might be a good point for you to break off. You can elaborate on your comments as much as you like, Mr. Jackson, and we will incorporate them in the record and your text will be incorporated in full.

Mr. JACKSON. You are very kind, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

[Mr. Jackson's May 5, 1982 speech follows:]

THE ERODING SALT II REGIME

(By William E. Jackson, Jr.)[1]

The former director of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control—in the previous Democratic Administration—warned on Wednesday night that the official U.S. policy of observing only informally the unratified SALT II treaty—as long as the Soviets do the same—"undermines" the chances for strategic arms control and threatens a new round in the arms race. William E. Jackson, Jr., who directed the presidential advisory committee in the Carter Administration, charged in a speech at Amherst College that a "breakout" from the provisions of SALT II can result from current actions by the Soviet Union and/or the United States.

Jackson, currently a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and a member of the board of advisers of the Arms Control Association, pointed to several areas in which the U.S. position—not to take actions inconsistent with the provisions of SALT II so long as the Soviets do likewise—is becoming unraveled: "Under the policy of rejecting seeking formal approval of the treaty by the Senate, that is the policy of informal observance or passive adherence to SALT constraints"—he argued—"our government is actually encouraging the Soviets to break out of the limits on their strategic weapons, thereby adding to the security threat to this country." Further, "we are deliberately promoting uncertainty on the part of the Soviets about our own weapons plans. The purpose is to exacerbate their fears while leaving the United States free to pursue a potentially destabilizing weapon (the MX). Some in the Administration want to challenge the Soviets to an arms race without any constraints."

"If it can be said that the previous Administration sometimes shot itself in the toe, surely it can be said of the Reagan Administration that it carries a pistol in its pocket and aims at an even more sensitive part of our own anatomy"—Jackson chided. "The current Administration has no coherent security policy; indeed, it does not know how to protect U.S. security. Our government chooses, apparently out of perverse stubborness in adherence to old campaign rhetoric, to denounce a treaty that it claims, paradoxically, to be living within. It entertains the illusion that we can drive the Soviets to accept a major new arrangement (radical reductions) because of uncertainty over present constraints while we remain free to experiment with new weapons that are probably excluded by SALT II. When will we learn that the Soviets are neither 20 feet tall nor do they have a 10 feet wide yellow streak down their backs?

Not to seek formal ratification of SALT II—now that the protocol to it has expired—is to invite the end of the arms control process with the Soviets, Jackson asserted. Specifically, he cited the following areas as examples of where SALT II constraints are either being undermined or could be eroded in the near-term future: (The numbered points are lifted from the text of the speech.)

1. *U.S. actions.*—There are things that we are doing or potentially may do:

A. *Densepack.*—This latest Weinberger idea for basing the MX in close-together silos would seem to violate SALT II's prohibition on any new fixed silo launchers. Will the Soviets idly accept the same convoluted rationalizations we offered them on the mobile MX-MPS basing scheme in the Carter Administration? It is more likely that they will view such a scheme as constituting a

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[1] Mr. Jackson spoke in Converse Hall at a public forum sponsored by the Foreign Affairs Club and the Department of Political Science of Amherst College in Amherst, Mass., May 5, 1982.

SALT breakout. A super-hardened hole in the ground will be considered as a missile launcher.

B. SCC (*Standing Consultative Commission*) policy.—Because the U.S. Government does not wish to give the Soviets the impression that it will seek formal Senate passage of the SALT II document, we deny ourselves—currently in Geneva—the opportunity to raise questions about Soviet compliance with its provisions. For example, we do not raise concerns we have about possible Soviet denial of missile test information that impedes verification. Whose side are we on, anyway?

C. *Soviet reductions.*—In the absence of SALT II constraints, we are enabling the Soviets to maintain 250 strategic delivery vehicles which otherwise they would have had to dismantle by the end of 1981.

2. *Soviet actions.*—U.S. insistence on not seeking Senate consent to ratification leaves the Soviets free—without being questioned in any forum—to engage in activities either prohibited or circumscribed under SALT II.

A. *SS–16's.*—The U.S. Government has detected "activity around old SS–16 test sites, a Soviet mobile ICBM that is banned under SALT II. Even though these missiles are not being deployed at the present time, what if the infrastructure is being kept ready? Even though the SALT II treaty allows only *one* new type of ICBM, how can we expect to prevent the Soviets—in the absence of formal ratification—from procuring *two* new ICBM's as a "hedge" against the breakdown of the arms control process? For example, *both* an SS–16 follow-on mobile ICBM and a replacement for the fixed silo SS–11 with one warhead.

B. *Typhoon NX–20 SLBM.*—What if the Soviets were to encrypt test information in regard to this submarine-launched missile? Under our "head in the sand" posture, we ask no questions in the SCC.

In fact, the Soviets are free to encrypt on all missile tests, and may be doing so.

C. *SS–18 Warhead Capacity.*—If the Soviets were encrypting or otherwise concealing some information relating to the number of warheads (beyond 10) tested on these heavy ICBM's, how would we determine whether or not an *irreversible* step had been taken that posed the threat of a "breakout" with as many as 14 or 20 or 30 warheads reliably placed on the SS–18? (Indeed, they have the short-term option of a quick fix that would add as many as 1200—4 × 308—warheads to the SS–18 threat.)

At what point would such a step be irreversible, would the threshold have been crossed, with this already well-proven system? That is, how many launch tests would be required? How can we ever plan for a viable MX system when we don't invoke the full, formal provisions of SALT II so as to be able to check finitely this most destabilizing threat?

D. *Other concealment practices.*—Monitoring Soviet compliance with various SALT provisions requires that the Soviets not "cover up" their intercontinental strategic delivery vehicles. Under SALT II, we have to be able to measure *and* count.

Jackson concluded his attack upon the Reagan Administration's position by warning: "Looking down the road, this Administration has to decide if SALT II is on or off. It cannot have its cake and eat it, too. The national security of the United States is being compromised by the deliberate and dangerous acceptance of an ambiguous situation. As long as we refuse to raise questions about compliance, and flirt with weapons deployment schemes of our own that are inconsistent with SALT (as Secretary Weinberger is prone to do), the government is unnecessarily subjecting the security of the United States to the unknown and to the latest Evans and Novak column. I do not believe this is the way to level the Soviet Union into accepting a new, more demanding treaty to limit arms. The President must bear the responsibility for loose cannon the deck."

Nevertheless, the former Executive branch official and Senate legislative assistant agreed, President Reagan still has open to him the path of nailing down the most useful provisions of SALT II, adding a few new features—such as an indefinite expiration date to protect against Soviet "breakout" in the mid 1980's—and proceeding with a major reduction agreement that could be negotiated over the next several years.

"If the Administration cannot bring itself to seek the advice and consent of the Senate to formal ratification of SALT II, perhaps it will consider a less negative endorsement of an informal SALT II régime; while clearing the agenda for START by referring the SALT II protocol issues, and the requirement for the Soviets to reduce their systems by 250 under the main provisions of this treaty, to the SCC in Geneva. In other words, a clean slate before getting down to START."

A NEW ARMS RACE?

(By William E. Jackson, Jr.)

What is the meaning of the President's statements on SALT and START? I believe the President is announcing a unilateral American *breakout* from the constraints of SALT II, even as informally observed under his administration.

Leaving aside the President's inaccurate assertion that we are abiding by the provisions for monitoring compliance—in fact government policy is to raise no questions about Soviet activities under SALT II in the SCC (Standing Consultative Commission) in Geneva nor to permit them to raise questions about our activities—there is a clear implication that these provisions are the only ones the President finds useful. When placed in the context of comments by Mr. Meese on Friday—we do not "feel bound by" SALT II constraints if they should interfere with our military plans; by Mr. Haig on Tuesday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—we have told the Soviets that SALT II is "dead" but we will abide by the "good parts"; and by Mr. Rostow before the same committee on Thursday—"for the time being" we intend to informally observe SALT II as long as the Soviets do the same—*all together* Moscow is receiving a clear signal that the Reagan Administration is rejecting SALT II both formally and informally.

This is the most dangerous and destabilizing action yet taken by the President—for it immediately, in the short term, puts the security of the United States at risk. The President has "legitimized" an arms race outside of any SALT constraints, the first time our government has taken such a position in over 10 years.

The Soviets can move the quickest to break out of the real, if modest, limits placed on their land-based missiles and associated warheads (MIRV's) under SALT II. Without these SALT limits, the Soviets can develop and deploy—not one—but several new types of ICBM's. And, more ominously, they can double or triple or quadruple the number of warheads on their large, land-based SS–18 ICBM's. There is nothing in the Reagan defense plan for the next five years that would make possible a comparable increase in U.S. intercontinental missile strength.

To encourage the Soviets to regard SALT II as non-binding is to enable them to gain clear strategic military superiority—a position they do not now enjoy.

Has the President thought of the consequences of another Soviet buildup for his START proposal which is designed to decrease the number of warheads?

The question remains: How does the President plan to restrain the Soviets, having rejected SALT II, during a U.S. Military buildup and pending the beginning of START negotiations? We cannot expect unilateral restraint from such a superpower, regardless of their internal economic problems.

The President's actions are likely to set off a new round in the arms race, at the very time he has offered a laudable long-term proposal for real reductions.

Last night the President of the United States, in response to questions at his press conference, said the following:

1. "A Democratic-controlled Senate refused to ratify it (SALT) . . . The reason why it was refused ratification . . . the limitation in that agreement would allow, in the life of the treaty, for the Soviet Union to just about double their present nuclear capability. It would allow us to increase ours. In other words, it simply legitimizes an arms race."

2. "Now the parts that we're observing of that (SALT II) have to do with the monitoring of each other's weaponry. And both sides are doing that."

3. "What we're striving for is to reduce the power, the number and particularly those destabilizing missiles that can be touched off by the push of a button, to reduce the number of those, and there is just no ratio between that and what SALT was attempting to do. I think SALT was the wrong course to follow."

4. "I don't know that you could project a time frame on (negotiating START). But I do think there is one thing present now that was not present before, and that is the determination of the U.S. to rebuild its national defenses, and the very fact that we have shown the will and are going forward on the rebuildup program is something that I think offers an inducement to the Soviet Union to come to that table and legitimately negotiate with us. In the past several years those negotia-

tions took place with them having a superiority over us and us actually unilaterally disarming."

5. "Time and time in the campaign I said that my goal was going to be to try for an outright reduction, particularly of nuclear weapons. And I think I'm being consistent. It's taken me a while to get there, but we have some other things to do, but that's what we're trying to do. I have not changed my mind. I believe that it would be naive for us to go into any of these negotiations without complete protection with regard to verification. Because I believe that there are two moral standards at issue. . . ."

6. "Nothing is excluded (in START), but one of the reasons for going after ballistic missiles . . . that is the one that is the most destabilizing. That one is the one that is the most frightening to most people, and let me just give you a little reasoning on that, of my own. . . .

"That is the missile sitting there in its silo in which there could be the possibility of miscalculation. That is the one that people know that once that button is pushed there is no defense. There is no recall. And it is a matter of minutes, and the missiles reach the other country."

"Our decision was to start with the most destabilizing and the most destructive."

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Markey, I had announced earlier today that I have a luncheon with 18 Senators. Some of them have arrived, so we will not hold you here very long today. But we are very pleased to have you here. I came back from Chicago with the President Monday night. I went home, and my wife had the McNeill-Lehrer report on, and your pleasant face was there, dealing with this very weighty subject. So I have the benefit of a half hour with you, in a sense, in our living room.

Representative MARKEY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You may summarize your comments in any way that you wish, and your full text will be incorporated in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Congressman MARKEY. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity of being able to appear before you today.

As you know, on the House side, Congressmen Bingham, Conte, and I have introduced a resolution similar to the one that Senators Kennedy and Hatfield have on the Senate side. We have 171 cosponsors in the House on our petition.

The difference between our freeze resolution and the other resolutions and proposals that are coming before you is that our petition is something that emanates from the grassroots. It is something that comes from the people. Our freeze and reductions resolution is not a product of the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House, or the Washington think tanks.

Our resolution is a product of the grassroots and the people. It was born in town meeting halls, community centers, religious congregations, college campuses, business gatherings, and State legislatures.

Across the country, people by the millions have begun to organize to demand a halt to the nuclear arms race. For more than 25 years Americans have dealt with the unthinkable—nuclear war—simply by not thinking about it. For more than 25 years Americans have left it up to the experts to grapple with the nuclear arms race. But after 25 years or promises, hedges, delays, and official rhetoric from the experts about having to "arm to disarm," the American people have decided to do something themselves about the threat of nuclear war and have organized the freeze movement.

The freeze movement's demand is simple and straightforward: The United States and the Soviet Union must stop building nuclear weapons, and they must cut back on the huge arsenals they have already stockpiled.

Now, some have accused the freeze movement of being simplistic, of failing to grasp the complexities of the arms control issue. I disagree. What we are finding in this country is not a simplistic response to the problem of the nuclear arms race but a new level of sophistication among the American people on this issue.

A recent Washington Post/ABC poll tells the story. A majority of the people polled said they did not believe the Soviet Union could be trusted. A majority of the people polled agreed the Soviets would have an advantage—I repeat, an advantage—over the United States in nuclear weapons if we froze now.

But three-fourths of the people polled said it did not matter whether the United States or the Soviet Union is ahead in nuclear weapons, because both sides have enough firepower to destroy the other no matter who attacks first. And by a 3-to-1 margin—I repeat, a 3-to-1 margin—the people polled favored an immediate nuclear freeze on both sides.

So the message from the grassroots is clear: They have heard all the arguments. While the Pentagon and State Department quibble over who is ahead in this weapons system or that, the American people have cut through all the facts and figures and have come to what I believe is a very perceptive conclusion. The problem with the nuclear arms race is not who is ahead of whom in any particular weapon; the problem with the arms race is the arms race.

Our resolution, therefore, is a reflection of that grassroots demand to stop the arms race because the resolution calls for a treaty which should be mutual, which would be verifiable, and which would be able to be implemented in the short term rather than in long, protracted negotiations which we are looking at in the President's START proposal.

So it is our hope that it will be recognized on the part of this body that the arms race can never end. When we MIRV, they will MIRV. When we build the cruise missile, they will build the cruise missile. The arms race can never end.

The difficulty with the President's START proposal is that it really does not deal with the crucial question of the qualitative aspects of these weapons. It allows for the building of the MX missile and the Trident II, which have a destabilizing first-strike capacity. It allows the Soviet Union to build counterpart lethal weapons.

All this will do is result in an easily achieved reduction in the yield-to-weight ratio in their weapons, so that we will have fewer missiles but with the exact same capacity to destroy this world.

And so the freeze movement is here. It will not be defused by attempts to placate them with half-step measures that they know the Soviet Union cannot respond to except by making extreme counterproposals that will result in long, protracted negotiations, at best.

What they ask for is a proposal that can put a freeze upon the existing nuclear arsenals and can then move on to deal with the second question of reductions in existing nuclear arsenals.

And this movement is not going to go away. It is going to be, along with the economy, the single major issue that confronts this country in the elections this year. And I believe that when history comes back to record the latter quarter of the 20th century, that all other issues combined will be merely a footnote in history compared to the importance that historians and chroniclers of world history place upon the way in which we deal with this issue.

I believe that the window of opportunity that we have to deal with these first-strike destabilizing weapons is only going to be open for the next 3 to 5 years. If we do not act now, we will wind up with these weapons having been deployed—the cruise missile, the MX, the Trident II missile, and their counterparts in other countries—without us having really taken the opportunity which the freeze movement here and in Western Europe gives us to place pressure upon the Soviet Union to come to the table to discuss this subject seriously with us.

Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed.

[Representative Markey's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate having the opportunity to speak before the Senate Foreign Relations hearing on the nuclear weapons freeze and reductions resolution, which Congressman Conte, Congressman Bingham and I have introduced in the House and which Senators Kennedy and Hatfield have introduced in the Senate.

I think the Senate can be proud of the fine work Senator Kennedy and Senator Hatfield have done on this issue. Their leadership has helped push the freeze movement to the forefront of national issues.

Mr. Chairman, you will be considering a number of resolutions on the nuclear arms race, but our freeze and reductions resolution is the one resolution that comes from the people.

Our freeze and reductions resolution is not a product of the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House or the Washington think tanks. Our resolution is a product of the people.

It was born in the grass roots, in town meeting halls, community centers, religious congregations, college campuses, business gatherings and state legislatures.

Across the country, people by the millions have begun to organize to demand a halt to the nuclear arms race.

For more than 25 years, Americans have dealt with the unthinkable—nuclear war—simply by not thinking about it. For more than 25 years Americans have left it up to the experts to grapple with the nuclear arms race.

But after 25 years of promises, hedges, delays, and official rhetoric from the experts about having to "arm to disarm," the American people have decided to do something themselves about the threat of nuclear war and have organized the freeze movement.

The freeze movement's demand is simple and straight forward: The United States and the Soviet Union must stop building more nuclear weapons and they must cut back on the huge arsenals they have already stockpiled.

Now some have accused the freeze movement of being simplistic, of failing to grasp the complexity of the arms control issue.

I disagree. What we're finding in this country is not a simplistic response to the problem of the nuclear arms race but a new level of sophistication among the American people on this issue.

A recent Washington Post/ABC News Poll tells the story.

A majority of the people polled agreed that the Soviets would have an advantage over the United States in nuclear weapons if we froze now.

But three-fourths of the people polled said it doesn't matter if the United States or the Soviet Union is ahead in nuclear weapons because both sides have enough firepower to destroy the other no matter who attacks first.

And by a three to one margin—I repeat, a three to one margin—the people polled favored an immediate nuclear freeze on both sides.

The message from the grass roots is clear. They've heard all the arguments. While the Pentagon and the State Department quibble over who's ahead in this weapons system over that, the American people have cut through all the facts and figures and have come to what I believe is a very perceptive conclusion:

The problem with the nuclear arms race is not who's ahead of whom in a particular weapon. The problem with the arms race *is the arms race.*

Our resolution, therefore is a reflection of the grass roots demand to stop that arms race.

Our resolution calls on the United States and the Soviet Union to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and a verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems and then to pursue major reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals.

The resolution, I might add, also asks both sides to give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

The resolution also states that the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major and mutual reductions in a way that enhances stability.

In the House 171 Representatives have signed on to this resolution and the number is growing. And I predict we will win on this resolution in the House and win decisively.

Members of the House are receiving a good deal of feedback on this issue from their district. They are telling me that the response is almost unanimously in support of the freeze and reductions resolution. And these are House members from all regions of the country.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution is a bold, comprehensive and common-sense proposal. While other resolutions have advocated selective freezes on certain types of weapons, this resolution proposes to stop the arms race in its tracks and freeze all nuclear weapons.

However, the resolution does recognize the realities of diplomacy. It recognizes that the development of both sides' weapons systems do not run in tandem. It recognizes that there will have to be some give and take at the negotiating table in deciding how to draw the line on testing, production and deployment and in figuring out how to cut deeply into the arsenals of both sides.

The resolution also realistically recognizes that the freeze and reductions must be mutual and they must be verifiable. We are not asking for unilateral disarmament. We are asking that both sides stop the arms race.

We are not asking that the United States sign a treaty it cannot verify. But we must realize that verification is as much a political problem as it is a technical problem. And when there's a political will there's a way.

This resolution is a bold proposal because it goes beyond the traditional arms control approach of attempting to manage the dangers, cost and damage of the nuclear arms race.

The previous arms control agreements have been steps in the right direction. They all furthered the cause of strategic stability. And I think it is a tragic mistake that this Administration has opposed the ratification of SALT II.

However, we must remember that even though SALT II was a worthy treaty we should ratify, it still did not stop the arms race. SALT II still allowed both sides to stockpile new and even more dangerous weapons.

The freeze and reductions resolution, on the other hand, would stop the arms race, not manage it.

Our resolution also calls on both sides to freeze and reduce now. The other so-called freeze resolution, introduced by Senator Jackson and Senator Warner calls for a long-term freeze that would go into effect after we complete the arms race.

But the arms race can never be completed. When we build more, they build more. When we MIRV, they MIRV. When we build the cruise missile, they will build the cruise missile.

This weekend, the Reagan Administration presented its latest START proposal.

The START proposal President Reagan outlined at Eureka is limited in nature. It appears to have been hastily pieced together to try to diffuse the freeze movement nationwide. And it appears to be so attacked against the Soviets, that at best the proposal will result in long and protracted negotiations that will go nowhere.

But even more disturbing is the fact that while the Reagan proposal calls for quantitative cuts in the nuclear arsenals, it completely ignores qualitative cuts.

The Reagan proposal still enables the United States to build dangerously destabilizing first-strike weapons like the MX and the Trident II missile. It still enables the United States to build unverifiable weapons like the ground-launched cruise missile. And it allows the Soviets to build a host of lethal weapons.

In other words, on the two important questions of deterrence and crisis stability the Reagan proposal fails. It allows the building of more first-strike destabilizing weapons, which keep the hair trigger on deterrence and which are harder to contol in a crisis.

Our freeze reductions resolution, on the other hand, would call for stopping not only the quantitative arms race, but also the qualitative arms race.

It is unequivocal on that point. While there is room for negotiations, there is no room for hedging. Our proposal was written to stop the arms race not to keep Pentagon contracts in tact while attempting to stop the arms race.

Our resolution is a reflection of what the people want. And I urge you to respond to this call from the grass roots and draw the line on the stockpiling of more weapons. I urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to approve the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze and reductions resolution at the earliest possible date.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In talking with President Reagan during the course of his campaign in 1980 on arms control, he was very critical of SALT II because it did not call for steep enough reductions. He said we ought really to reduce the level of arms. He feels very strongly about that.

The freeze proposal itself, as you have introduced, has been criticized by President Reagan now for not going far enough to reduce strategic inventories on each side. Now, do you believe the deep-cut proposal outlined by the President on Sunday diminishes the appeal of the freeze proposal?

Representative MARKEY. I do not think it does at all. Our proposal is actually more comprehensive than the President's proposal, because our resolution deals with the question of the qualitative aspects of these weapons.

It deals with whether or not the new destabilizing first-strike weapons can be constructed, whereas under the President's proposal, as comments by the State Department and Pentagon officials indicate the administration would be able to go forward under this new proposal to construct the Trident II and the MX missile.

So, in fact, ours is more comprehensive, because it deals with the qualitative and the quantitative dangers of the nuclear arms race, of vertical proliferation, and it does not limit itself as the START proposal does. If the President is going to have a comprehensive proposal, he is going to have to include bombers, he is going to have to include cruise missiles. He cannot exempt these from negotiations.

And he has to deal with the very real dangers that we have that the fewer missiles that both countries will be able to build will actually have a greater likelihood of endangering the world because of their greater destructive capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. We very much appreciate your appearance as our windup witness this morning.

We will resume this hearing at 2 o'clock today.

I would like to announce for the benefit of staff members that in response to Senator Glenn's request yesterday the committee has scheduled a closed briefing on the U.S. START proposal for 5:30 this afternoon in S-116. The briefing will be conducted by Richard Burt, the Director of Politico-Military Affairs of the State Department, and will be held at the top-secret level.

Any Senator on the committee who would like to hear the briefing but who cannot attend the meeting this afternoon should so advise our staff director.

This hearing is recessed until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Senator Nunn and Congressman Bedell were unable to attend the hearings and present their testimony due to other commitments. Without objection, their statements will be inserted in the record at this point.

[Senator Nunn's prepared statement follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., May 18, 1982.

Hon. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CLAIBORNE: I regret that I was unable to testify personally before the Foreign Relations Committee on May 11, 1982 due to on-going hearings in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on that same day that I was chairing.

I have enclosed my prepared testimony and a copy of a resolution I introduced which deals with the subject of accidental nuclear war and potential arms control steps to deal with this possibility.

I appreciate your consideration of this matter as the Committee works on the nuclear arms control issues.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN.

Enclosure.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR

I appreciate the opportunity to present my views on some of the issues relating to arms control measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. I believe it is extremely important for the Senate to include provisions relating to this aspect of the nuclear situation in any resolution approved. I have introduced a resolution which deals primarily with this issue which follows my testimony.

The Senate has also passed an amendment I offered to the Defense Authorization Bill which requires that the Secretary of Defense conduct a full and complete study of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons. A copy of that amendment is also attached.

NUCLEAR DEBATE—THE MISSING LINK

In all of the current focus on nuclear freezes, "no first use" and arms control policies in general, there is an extremely important element missing—the need to deal constructively with the prospect of a nuclear war triggered by a third country or terrorist group. No change in NATO's nuclear doctrine and none of the freeze proposals would decrease or prevent the chances of such a catastrophe. An accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation should be of mutual concern to the two superpowers.

I have been concerned about the potential of an accidental nuclear exchange between the two superpowers for some time. On March 10, 1981, I wrote the Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Richard Ellis, and asked SAC, as the premier defense command in nuclear matters, to analyze the potential of this type of exchange and to recommend some initiatives for dealing with the problem. General Ellis is now retired and serving as the U.S. representative on the Standing Consultative Committee and is one of the most thorough and knowledgeable military men in the arms control area as well as an expert in nuclear policies and weapons.

I ask that my letter to General Ellis be included in the hearing record.

In the letter, I outlined my belief that our strategic arms control efforts have for some time concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about what could be more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many factors that need assessment as to how the U.S./U.S.S.R. would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict. For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the superpowers could precipitate a United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.

I asked General Ellis to examine four key areas in his study as follows:

1. Is our communications, command and control capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?

2. What capabilities do the Soviet have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?

3. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?

4. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

General Ellis established a study group that spent many months working on these issues, and in July of that same year I went to SAC in Omaha to discuss the results of their study.

I believe that their conclusions are even more relevant today. The SAC analysis showed that the U.S. and the Soviets must dramatically improve their warning and attack characterization to deal with the use of a nuclear device by a third party in either peacetime or a crisis situation.

The SAC analysis dealt with the potential third party threat by examining the various unconventional delivery systems that could be utilized to explode such a device on U.S. or Soviet soil.

SAC also identified many unconventional methods of delivery other than the normally discussed platforms such as fighter planes, missiles or bombers that a third world nation might utilize.

By the end of the decade over 20 nations will have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons, and the possibility of possession of these weapons by terrorists cannot be dismissed.

After talking to many other experts in the field, I wrote an article for the *Washington Post* which appeared on November 12, 1981. I ask that this article be included in the hearing record.

A major part of this article dealt with the whole issue of the Third World trigger and accidental nuclear war. After pointing out the real and growing dangers in this area, and the fact this is certainly an area of U.S./U.S.S.R. mutual interest in preventing such a crisis, I made two major recommendations.

The first recommendation was that the United States and U.S.S.R. establish a joint military crisis control center for the monitoring and containment of nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups. The second major recommendation was to address other mutual arms control steps such as strengthening and enhancing the U.S./Soviet hotline.

I am convinced that both the United States and U.S.S.R. have a common and mutual interest in preventing such a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that both nations have mutual interest in working together to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack. I am convinced that arms control efforts can be made relevant to the growing danger of this type of a nuclear catalyst.

Everyone now seems to be in search of an easy solution in the arms control area, but there are no nuclear quick fixes. What we can begin to do jointly with the Soviet Union is to build a capability and mutual trust to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation. This step could add a strong element of deterrence to any party contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of provoking a confrontation between the superpowers.

For this reason, I introduced an amendment to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Authorization Bill which the Senate passed directing the Secretary of Defense to conduct a full and complete study of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons including:

(1) Establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

(2) Development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

(3) Development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

(*a*) an improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

(*b*) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

(*c*) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

(*d*) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

This study and report would be provided to the Congress by August 1, 1982, and I would further require that the President review the results of the DOD analysis and submit to the Congress within a month his views on the merits of the proposals and their relevance to U.S. arms control policies and proposals.

I believe this amendment will provide a sound analytical framework for the key agencies in our government and the public to deal with the issue of accidental nuclear war. There has been very little work done in this area other than the pioneer study by SAC under General Ellis' direction.

This amendment will also serve to focus attention on this important element of the nuclear issue which is missing in the current debate and discussion and which is a more likely contingency, in my view, than a premeditated nuclear attack or "bolt out of the blue."

I ask that a copy of the amendment be included in the hearing record.

AN AMENDMENT TO EVALUATE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES TO INCLUDE MILITARY CRISIS CONTROL CENTER AND HOTLINE ENHANCEMENTS

Intended to be proposed by Mr. Nunn to S. 2248, a bill to authorize appropriation for fiscal year 1983 for the Department of Defense.

At the end of the bill add the following section:

SEC. . (a) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a full and complete study and evaluation of initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly in crises. Such study and evaluation shall include but not be limited to the following initiatives:

(1) establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

(2) development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information on nuclear weapons that could be used by third parties or terrorist groups; and

(3) development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis stability and arms control to include:

(A) an improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control:

(B) enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

(C) measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

(D) measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

(b) This report shall be provided to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the House and Senate by August 1, 1982 and should be available in both a classified, if necessary, and unclassified format.

(c) The President shall report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations one month later on September 1, 1982 on the merits of such initiatives developed in section (a) to the arms control process and on the status of any such initiative as they may relate to any arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union.

[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 17, 1981]

SENATOR NUNN ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1981]

ARMS CONTROL: WHAT WE SHOULD DO

(By Sam Nunn)

America's arms control goals have been vague and poorly understood by the public. Our tactics have been short-term, and our strategy ambiguous. Our patience at the negotiating table has been short-lived. Our timing has too often been driven by election considerations and our expectations have swung between euphoria and despair.

Three arms control treaties with the Soviet Union have been signed (by presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter) but have not been ratified by the Senate. This may demonstrate that our "separation of powers" is alive and well, but it also raises serious questions as to whether any American president can conclude an arms control treaty any more.

THE SETTING

The United States is now abiding (without formal agreement) by a SALT treaty that President Reagan himself declared "fatally flawed." While awaiting leverage from newly announced but as yet unapproved strategic programs, we are not renegotiating this unratified treaty. Testimony indicates it will be at least the late 1980s before any new strategic programs close the "window of vulnerability" and bring us back to "parity." Several key parts of the recently announced strategic program, which are not yet well-defined, will have major arms control implications.

We are about to begin negotiations with the Soviets on tactical nuclear weapons, an area in which the United States has little leverage and NATO is at a pronounced military disadvantage. These negotiations provide the Soviet Union a considerable opportunity to prevent the long overdue NATO tactical nuclear force modernization. They also create an increasingly unrealistic separation between strategic and theater nuclear weapons and allow the Soviets skillfully to manipulate growing European skepticism of American leadership.

Under these circumstances, should we be puzzled when we look over our shoulder and our allies aren't following our lead? They don't know where we're going. Do we? Whether we like it or not, our arms control efforts and NATO's future are now linked. A clear, consistent arms control approach that enjoys the support of Congress and the American people is a national security imperative.

CONTINUITY

If the American position on arms control is to have more credibility with our allies, our adversaries and the American people, we must bring some continuity to our process for formulating and executing arms control policy and integrating it with military policies. We must develop a clear set of long-term goals, objectives and priorities that can be understood by the public, our allies and, ideally, even our adversaries.

Procedures within our government must be developed to ensure that strategic weapons programs and arms control measures mesh together better. We can no longer separate the two functions, giving civilians the job of controlling arms and the military the job of procuring weapons. U.S. military planners must have a greater input in shaping our arms control objectives so that arms control measures can also be treated as viable instruments for attaining required security objectives.

For more than a decade, the Soviets have had essentially the same people negotiating SALT. During that same period, the United States has had six chief negotiators and the major support staff has been changed many times. Why shouldn't the Soviets be confident they can wait out the Americans? Why shouldn't our allies and our adversaries believe that our patience and our horizons are limited in the arms control arena?

One way to improve arms control continuity would be to upgrade substantially the current General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. The present committee is colocated with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and, rightly or wrongly, is viewed as an adjunct of that agency. We should consider creating a bipartisan presidential commission to be the board of directors for our arms control efforts.

The commission would be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for overlapping terms long enough to give it independence and continuity. It could not, and should not supersede the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch to negotiate, and the Senate to ratify, treaties. It could, however, be asked to bring some coherence to our arms control philosophy and implementation. Reporting directly to the president, the board should have a broad charter to consider arms control under the rubric of overall national security and foreign policy.

It could provide a publicly respected review board to:

Help formulate long- and short-term arms control objectives, goals and priorities consistent with our national security and our defense policies;

Monitor negotiations; and

Keep the American public informed of the goals, objectives and priorities of our arms control efforts in a way that can be separated from partisan political considerations.

STABILITY

The U.S. arms control process has had a narrow scope that undermines its potential positive impact in military terms and in international opinion. Over the last decade, most of our arms control effort has been directed at limiting the size of nuclear arsenals rather than avoiding or limiting the potential use of nuclear weapons in crises—socalled "crisis-stability." We hope to reduce the number of weapons in the long run, but reductions in numbers do not automatically or necessarily increase crisis stability. We hope to save money with a sound arms control agreement, but an even larger strategic budget would be well worth the money if the result were the reduced likelihood of nuclear war. With thousands of nuclear warheads available to each side, control of their use in crisis is more important than reduction of numbers, cost or technological development.

We must begin to think about arms control initiatives that will address crisis stability.

How would the Russians react if a low-flying aircraft with U.S. markings delivered a nuclear device on one of their cities? Do they have the capability to determine the true origin of the aircraft? Would stunned and angry Russians react calmly and cautiously or would they draw immediate conclusions and launch a nuclear attack against America? How would we react if a nuclear device exploded in a ship of unknown origin in San Francisco harbor and obliterated the city? Will we sit idly by while the possibilities grow in the years ahead that a fanatical leader may attempt to rid the world of the superpowers by pulling a Third World trigger?

Are these unreal science fiction fantasies or is there a growing possibility of a third-party or terrorist use of nuclear weapons? At my request last spring, Gen. Richard Ellis, then commander of the Strategic Air Command, undertook the evaluation of the possibility of a third party triggering a superpower nuclear exchange under a variety of scenarios. Unfortunately, this evaluation showed that there are real and developing dangers in this area.

Do the U.S.S.R. and the United States have a mutual interest in preventing a Third World trigger or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons? Should both nations have a mutual interest in working together to be able immediately to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a third country or from a terrorist attack? Can arms control efforts be made relevant to the growing dangers of this type of nuclear catalyst?

The point is not to frighten, but to stimulate the best minds in both the United States and the Soviet Union to think soberly about the future potential for destruction facing the world. There are an increasing number of scenarios that could precipitate the outbreak of nuclear war that neither side anticipated or intended. By 1990, our government believes that more than 20 nations may have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons. Terrorist possession of nuclear warheads in the future cannot be dismissed. Several nations are now also developing rockets for "commercial purposes." The simple fact is that we really don't have an international framework or mechanism for quickly and decisively controlling or containing these possibilities. In a world growing more dangerous with proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other nuclear powers, have growing reason to work together to prevent nuclear war.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET COOPERATION

While there is still time, serious thought should be given by ourselves and the Russians to our possible mutual interest in establishing a military crisis control center for the monitoring and containment of nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups. This could take the form of joint U.S.-Soviet information-sharing combined with a multinational center for crisis management. A precedent for this type of effort can be found in the four-power Berlin center for movement of aircraft in the Berlin corridors.

The crisis management group could be a permanent standing team of highly qualified civilian and military personnel, in full operation 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, with access to the top political and military leadership. Its purpose would be to provide a mechanism that gives each side more confidence in the facts during a nuclear crisis. It would afford the leaders of both nations a better chance to determine, independently and jointly, the origin and parties responsible for any explosion of nuclear weapons. It has the potential for encouraging cooperation and building confidence between the superpowers, even when political relations are at a low ebb. These steps could contribute to crisis stability. They could also add a significant degree of deterrence to third-country or terrorist attempts to light the nuclear bonfire.

This will not be a simple task completed quickly, but the discussions and negotiations should begin. These negotiations could be broadened to address other mutual arms control steps, such as confidence-building measures to enhance verification, strengthening the U.S.-Soviet hot line, as well as reducing the vulnerabilities of command, control and communications of both nations. We could also begin discussions on a possible nuclear weapons deployment agreement that would lengthen the warning time both nations would have of a nuclear attack.

The nuclear powers must begin to improve our capacity to control a nuclear crisis—regardless of origin. Our nation must adopt clear goals that establish a foundation for arms control that has long-term continuity and less vulnerability to domestic partisan politics. We must find an arms control policy we can live with.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., March 10, 1981.

Gen. RICHARD H. ELLIS,
CINCSAC,
Offutt AFB, Nebr.

DEAR GENERAL ELLIS: The March 6th Subcommittee hearing on Strategic Communication, Command and Control as well as connectivity was important and informative. I have the impression we are at least making a beginning in this crucial area. You and your staff are to be commended for your leadership.

I have believed for some time that our strategic arms control efforts are concentrated almost exclusively on the number of launchers and warheads and the "bolt from the blue" premeditated strategic strike. While I certainly agree with the importance of this focus and these negotiations, I feel that we should also begin to think seriously about other perhaps more likely catalysts which could lead to nuclear war. There are many other factors that need assessment as to how the U.S./U.S.S.R. would interact at the strategic level in times of crises and conflict. For example, a disguised third country attack on one of the superpowers could precipitate a U.S./Soviet nuclear exchange.

Pursuant to our conversation during the hearing break, I look forward to a visit to SAC sometime this spring. While there, I would like, among other topics, to discuss this with you and your staff with several questions in mind:

1. Is our C-3 capable of discerning the source of attack under this type scenario?
2. What capabilities do the Soviets have in this respect (warning and threat assessment)?
3. What other scenarios should be considered in terms of U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic interaction in periods of crises and conflict?

4. Are there arms control innovations and initiatives that can be proposed in this general area as well as the overall C-3/connectivity area?

I look forward to seeing you again in the near future.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN.

[S. Con. Res.—97th Congress, 2d Session]

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

Whereas, by the end of this decade over 20 nations will have the industrial capability to build nuclear weapons; and,

Whereas, the possession of nuclear weapons by Third World countries or terrorist groups widens the possibility of their use; and

Whereas, reductions from the current levels of thousands of nuclear warheads available to each side would not automatically or necessarily increase crisis stability; and,

Whereas, an effort should be made to limit the prospect of a nuclear war being triggered by a Third World country or a terrorist group either as part of a world crisis or as an isolated event; and,

Whereas, there is no existing international framework or mechanism for quickly and decisively determining either the origin of the use of nuclear weapons or controlling such use; and,

Whereas, an accidental nuclear war or war by miscalculation should be of mutual concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union, even in periods of great tension between those two superpowers; and,

Whereas, the United States and Soviet Union should have a mutual interest in preventing and containing a Third World or terrorist trigger for such a war; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that

(1) The United States must broaden the scope of arms control and begin to develop initiatives that will address crisis stability, including working to develop the capability to identify the source of a nuclear strike from a Third World country or from a terrorist attack.

(2) To this end, the United States should consider an arms control initiative to establish a multinational center for crisis management, manned by a team including highly qualified military personnel, with the purpose of giving each side more confidence in the facts during a nuclear crisis.

(3) Further, the United States should consider the establishment of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. forum for mutual sharing of information on nuclear weapons used by Third World countries or terrorist groups.

(4) Finally, the United States should seek to develop mutual confidence building measures for crisis stability and arms control, including an improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. communications hot line for crisis control, enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements, and measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides.

[Representative Bedell's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BERKLEY BEDELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM IOWA

I would first like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for permitting me this opportunity to appear before you today. I also would like to commend you all for your continuing attention to this most urgent issue pending before the nation and the world—that of the nuclear arms race and available alternatives aimed at the effective control of its escalation and prevention of the possible outbreak of nuclear war.

Thirty-seven years ago, a cancer was introduced into the world ecosystem when the United States used two, very small atomic bombs in our war effort against Japan. Since that time, however, the global stockpile of these weapons, their lethality and the numbers of nations capable of producing these instruments of mass destruction continue to proliferate. For thirty-seven years, these weapons have threatened us with virtual extinction and, for thirty-seven years, we have seemed very comfortable in denying both their existence and the threat they pose to our survival.

We are told the purpose of nuclear arsenals is the deterrence of general war and in many respects, America's strategic and tactical nuclear forces have served this purpose. Today, however, a renewed and more threatening round of the nuclear arms race seems imminent as both sides are intent on increasing both the survivability and deadliness of their strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces. While I support an American defense capability that is second to no other power, I question the wisdom of our own and the Soviet Union's present path. These modernization efforts will introduce thousands more warheads into our respective inventories by the end of this decade but, despite their expense neither program will contribute very much to world peace and global stability. Indeed, in all probability they will increase the risk and likelihood of nuclear war before the end of this century.

In my opinion, these efforts pose two distinct threats upon United States, allied and world security. First, of course, is the threat posed by their possible use in a crisis, confrontation or in an act of terrorism and, the monstrous consequences that would befall world civilization if these weapons were ever used again. The second threat is more subtle and is represented in the enormous strain that the development and production of these weapons place on our own, the Soviet and the world economy. For example, our own strategic modernization program is projected in constant dollars to cost more than $180 billion over the next five years. Can our economy truly withstand the inflationary pressures that this program will exert? Does this program truly better or lessen United States security? Clearly, we must begin to more carefully evaluate our weapons programs and reverse the trends of our mutual penchant to obtain more nuclear overkill capacity. Otherwise, we face true risks to the stability of our economy and thus, the integrity of our national security.

Coupled to these threats is an ever more ominous peril that is posed by an apparent reevaluation of American strategic doctrine. Beginning in July 1980, with President Carter's announcement in PRM-59 that the United States would rely, in some limited sense, on nuclear arms to defend vital American interests abroad and, continuing with President Reagan's outright rejection of the SALT II agreement, the United States has been perceived as being reckless and irresponsible in world affairs. The current Administration's initial intransigence toward negotiating with the Soviets strained the Atlantic alliance's confidence in our leadership of world affairs. Discussions about possible nuclear warning shots, the development of first-strike weapons and the revitalization of an abandoned and impractical civil defense program provoked domestic and world concern and led many to believe that the United States implied an ability to wage, survive and win a nuclear war. In my mind, these trends are sheer madness.

Nevertheless, several recent developments give me cause for optimism in our mutual efforts to cure the growing malignancy of unbridled nuclear weapons competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the American public is no longer willing to ignore or deny the implications of the nuclear arms race. For the first time, they are waking up and facing the realities of the madness of "MAD" in both its economic consequences upon their immediate future and the risk it poses to their survival and that of their children. This growing awareness is reflected in grassroots movements such as the National Freeze Campaign and Ground Zero Week, as well as in local communities rejection of civil defense relocation plans. At long last, the public is demanding action and responsible arms control efforts from their leaders.

Second, Congressional concern and activity over the unabated and continuous nature of the arms race has been mounting. Perhaps this can be attributed to constituent pressures or our own frustrations in attempting to better develop meaningful arms control policies and true reductions in nuclear force levels that lessen the risk and probability of nuclear war. The special order that many of us participated in on March 30, demonstrated that we too are no longer willing to look to the Pentagon with a "business as usual" attitude when evaluating strategic weapons proposals.

Finally, the President has also faced the reality that he must be willing to negotiate with the Soviets. Last November, the President proposed a "zero option" to the Soviets with respect to intermediate range nuclear forces and, in his commencement speech at Eureka College on Sunday, he indicated a willingness to seek sharp reductions in current strategic force levels currently deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union. While the particulars of Sunday's announcement are still unknown, they represent a starting point for negotiations and serve to restore both domestic and allied confidence in the President's leadership abilities and commitment to world peace. I too am encouraged by the President's acceptance of arms control negotiations as a means of better ensuring United States and allied security into the eighties and beyond; and, would like to point out that my own resolution establishes a framework that would accomplish the deep reductions that the President has proposed we seek.

Ultimately, however, this Subcommittee must inspect and evaluate any arms control proposals brought before Congress and that is the purpose in my testimony today, to share with you, the objectives and features of my own proposal, House Concurrent Resolution 280, currently sponsored by thirty-one of our colleagues.

Simply stated, my proposal embodies the approach offered by George F. Kennan in accepting the Albert Einstein Peace Prize and represents a positive and meaningful alternative to the "build now, negotiate later" proposals that have recently been offered. House Concurrent Resolution 280 calls upon the United States and the Soviet Union to immediately begin to seek a 50-percent reduction in the agreed to aggregate ceilings on delivery vehicles, MIRVed launchers, MIRVed ballistic missiles and MIRVed ICBM's that were established in the SALT II accords.

This proposal does not suggest a policy of unilateral disarmament by the United States. The Soviet Union would have to agree to concurrent reductions in their strategic force levels, as well as on-site inspection and verification of all dismantled systems. Further, while this proposal does call for significant reductions in the numbers of systems currently deployed, it does not hamper or prevent the development of any element in the President's proposed strategic modernization program. While I personally retain several reservations with respect to many of the elements of this plan, I recognize our need to maintain our deterrent capacity against Soviet attack. My proposal allows us to keep our options open, while at the same time reducing the size and destructiveness of both superpower arsenals.

These lowered ceilings make both sides less vulnerable to preemptive attack and induce defense planners on both sides to move away from the deployment of more vulnerable weapons systems such as land-based ICBM's. Once these types of targets are removed, the incentive to attack preemptively is also removed.

The second and third features of my resolution emplace two mutual United States and Soviet bans, or prohibitions, on the technological improvement of weapons systems currently deployed or under development. The first ban prohibits further increases in missile fractionation by prohibiting the testing and deployment of intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles armed with new, lighter weight reentry vehicles than those with which each system is currently deployed. I believe this to be an essential element of my proposal. As we are all aware, the Soviet SS-18 missile is an extremely capable weapons system that, to many, threatens the survivability of our own land based missile forces.

My proposal serves to lessen the threat posed by the SS-18 to our own forces because it places a permanent ceiling on the number of warheads that this system can be armed with. At present, the Soviets deploy 308 SS-18's. Although many of these missiles are not currently MIRVed, the SALT II agreement counted each of these weapons as MIRVed and limited them to no more than 10 reentry vehicles each or, an upper limit of 3,080 warheads. In the absence of SALT II, however, the SS-18 could carry as many as 30 reentry vehicles or, 9,240 individually targetable warheads. My ban on further missile fractionation restricts the capabilities of the SS-18 and thus, its potential threat to the survivability of U.S. land-based ICBM forces.

The second ban in my resolution is a prohibition on the testing and deployment of cruise missiles equipped with multiple nuclear warheads. While the current generation of cruise missiles are armed with single warheads, this prohibition serves to eliminate the destabilizing effects that would result if either the United States or the Soviet Union scored a breakthrough in multiple warhead, cruise missile technology. This prohibition is important because it removes the incentive to develop such weapons. The nuclear arms race is fraught with examples of one side responding to the perceived, or real, advantage of the other. The U.S. decision to exclude MIRV technology from the SALT I agreement gave us a temporary advantage over the Soviet Union. It also gave the Soviet Union a tremendous incentive to invest incredible sums into MIRV technology. Today, the Pentagon informs us that Soviet investment has paid off. Today, MIRVed Soviet ICBM's theoretically threaten the survival of our land-based ICBM forces. Sooner or later, we must learn from our past miscalculations in judgment. Section 2(c) of my proposal reflects this learning process.

Finally, my proposal goes on to address the extremely complicated problem that is posed by theater nuclear systems and supports the President in his "zero option" alternative that he presented last November. My proposal requires the United States and the Soviet Union to first establish an upper limit on the number of intermediate range nuclear weapons that are deployed in Europe. This number can be the number currently deployed by the Soviet Union, ourselves or some intermediate number between U.S. and Soviet levels.

Once this ceiling is established, a timetable for the gradual reduction and elimination of theater nuclear systems is set into motion. This timetable requires a 50 percent reduction in intermediate nuclear forces by 1990 and an additional 25 percent reduction by 1992. Finally, this timetable requires both the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to eliminate all theater nuclear weapons from European deployment by 1994. It is my sincere hope that this timetable will provide the incentive for the Soviets to eliminate and dismantle SS–20's, in exchange for European participation in these theater oriented negotiations.

The advantages of my proposal are numerous. First, United States leadership and preeminence in arms control is once again clearly established. Soviet efforts to drive a wedge into the Atlantic alliance would be blunted and they would have to respond to our offer for deep reductions in both strategic and theater nuclear weapons.

Second, if successfully negotiated, nuclear forces would be reduced numerically and somewhat restricted technologically.

Third, lower strategic force levels would serve to diminish the risk and probability of nuclear war. The primary objective of arms control negotiations is prevention. This resolution serves that purpose.

Fourth, verification procedures would be enhanced. Each side would continue to rely on national technical means of verification but on-site inspection of dismantled systems would serve to enhance each sides confidence in the others adherrence to an agreement of this nature.

Fifth, the continuous and upward nature of the arms race would be reversed. The significant build-up of Soviet strategic forces would be blunted as they would have to move away from their almost exclusive reliance on land-based missile forces. United States efforts to develop first-strike weapons would be negated as a result of greater confidence in the survivability of our strategic force.

Finally, the American public's confidence in our abilities as their leaders to produce real and meaningful arms control agreements would be restored. The peril of the nuclear arms race and the risk of nuclear war would be reduced and the prospects for greater world peace and global stability would be enhanced.

In conclusion, I tell you that one of the original motivations behind my decision to run for Congress in 1974, was my concern over the continuous and upward spiral of the nuclear arms race. At that time, we had just concluded both the SALT I Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The prospects for arms control seemed bright. Since taking office, however, I have watched as dedicated professionals at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency negotiated the Vladivostok Agreement and the SALT II Accords which have been essentially scuttled. Today, there are growing pressures in both societies to renounce arms control negotiations and instead, embark upon even more grandiose armament programs. The history of the arms race tells us it represents a costly and nonproductive spiral in which neither side will relent or permit any advantage to the other. For this reason, negotiations are essential to our security.

In my mind, we must never blush from attempts at negotiation or allow the arms control process to go bankrupt. Recent events tell me that the President, the Congress and the people are now prepared to move once again in this direction. In my opinion, House Concurrent Resolution 280 represents a thinking person's approach to arms control and reduction and, goes far in preventing the possible outbreak of nuclear war while at the same time, better insuring United States, allied and world security into the decades ahead. I urge you to support passage of this proposal.

House Concurrent Resolution 280

Mr. Bedell submitted the following resolution for himself and, Mr. Rangel, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Seiberling, Mr. Edwards (of California), Mr. Sunia, Mr. Burton

(John), Mr. Moakley, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Weiss, Mr. Mitchell (of Maryland), Mr. Lowry, Mr. Edgar, Mr. Forsythe, Mr. DeNardis, Mr. Dwyer, Mr. Weaver, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Dellums, Mr. Mineta, Mr. Lehman, Mr. Bingham, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Savage, Mrs. Schroeder, Mr. Brown (of California), Mrs. Chisholm, Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. AuCoin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Ottinger and Mr. Richmond.

Expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.

H. CON. RES. 280

Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons

Whereas the nuclear arms race has continued unabated, the United States and the Soviet Union now possess more than 37,000 nuclear warheads and are both engaged in significant modernization programs that will introduce thousands more warheads into their strategic and theater nuclear inventories in this decade;

Whereas the continued proliferation and accuracy of these nuclear arsenals increase the risk of their use in a crisis or confrontation;

Whereas any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union could escalate to a point where nuclear weapons would be introduced, and a limited nuclear war would be impossible to wage;

Whereas any nuclear conflict would result in the devastation of United States, Soviet Union, and European societies, and would threaten the survival of civilization;

Whereas the Congress notes growing domestic and worldwide support for nuclear arms control and the reduction of all military arsenals; and

Whereas all nations of the world share a common goal to eliminate nuclear weapons and the United States and the Soviet Union share a common and special responsibility to the citizens of the world to assume leadership in reducing and eliminating these nuclear stockpiles from the Earth: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) That (a) it is the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the United States representatives at the arms reduction talks in Geneva, Switzerland, to inform the representatives of the Soviet Union at those talks that—

(1) the United States is willing to reduce its (A) total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from 2,250 to 1,125; (B) total MIRVed launchers from 1,320 to 660; (C) total MIRVed ballistic missiles from 1,200 to 600; and (D) total MIRVed ICBMs from 820 to 410, provided the Soviet Union seeks corresponding reductions in its strategic force levels; and

(2) each country should seek to begin such reductions immediately and the reductions should be adequately verifiable through national technical means as well as on-site inspection of dismantled systems.

(b) It is further the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree to a mutual ban on testing and deploying intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles with new, lighter weight reentry vehicles than those with which each system is currently armed.

(c) It is further the sense of Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree to a mutual ban on testing and deploying cruise missiles armed with multiple nuclear warheads.

(d) It is further the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Soviet Union, at the ongoing negotiations relating to theater (intermediate range) nuclear weapons, that—

(1) both the United States and the Soviet Union agree to limit the number of such weapons either to—

(A) the number currently deployed by the Soviet Union,

(B) the number currently deployed by the United States, or

(C) some other number between the numbers described in subparagraphs (A) and (B);

(2) the number to which such weapons are limited under paragraph (1) be reduced by 50 percent by 1990 and by an additional 25 percent by 1992; and

(3) both countries agree to eliminate all such weapons from Europe by 1994.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. this same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. This afternoon the committee is particularly pleased to have Senator John Warner, a principal author of one of the major resolutions before the committee on nuclear warfare, sit with us at this table.

This afternoon we have testimony from a panel of four public witnesses, each of whom formerly held key foreign policy or national security posts. The panelists are the Honorable Kenneth Rush, former Deputy Secretary of State, Acting Secretary of State, and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Ambassador to France and to Germany. He is a very valued director of the Alliance to Save Energy and a friend of longstanding. I will not say old friend, but a friend of longstanding of Chuck Percy.

Roger Molander, former defense and arms control specialist on the staff of the National Security Council and presently head of the Ground Zero organization. I probably have quoted you more in recent months than anyone else I can think of.

Adm. Noel Gayler of the U.S. Navy, retired, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces, Pacific and former Director of the National Security Agency. We are happy to have you with us, Admiral.

We have with us here, of course, a former Secretary of the Navy, and you are appearing now before a former apprentice seaman of the U.S. Navy. Finally, after 3 years of hard struggle and work, I left a lieutenant.

Admiral GAYLER. Carry on, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In those days when I saw an Admiral approach me I literally fainted. I still do sometimes.

I understand, Admiral, that you have to leave at 2:30 because of an emergency, is that correct?

Admiral GAYLER. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure, with the concurrence of our other colleagues, we will let you go first.

But I would like to introduce as our final witness the Honorable Paul Warnke, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and chief SALT negotiator. Paul and I have not been on the same program since we were up at the Pugwash Conference in Banff, Canada. We had a delightful time up there. You are a man whose judgment and whose experience has always been of value to this committee. We warmly welcome you back.

Admiral, would you please start off?

STATEMENT OF ADM. NOEL GAYLER (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF U.S. FORCES, PACIFIC, AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Admiral GAYLER. I greatly appreciate your courtesy.

I think the most important thing to address is how to reduce the probability that nuclear war will ever happen. I am not going to take up your time telling you how bad it is. I think everybody knows that.

It is my belief that the only differences of opinion that exist are those having to do with how to drive down that probability.

There are a couple of facts that I think we should have in mind. One is that the relative nuclear posture of the two superpowers has rather little to do with the numbers of weapons they have at the present levels of weapons. It is quite insensitive to the numbers over which we have been haggling in the past. For example, it makes more difference what the targeting policy of either side is, with respect to the targets to be hit, the altitude at which the bombs are designed to go off, the state of forces of readiness and even the way the wind blows carrying the nuclear fallout than a thousand weapons on either side.

In the same way, advanced technology in this field makes very little difference in any respect except accuracy, and accuracy is only useful in attacking point hard targets like missile silos, like hardened command posts. It is very questionable whether it is a good idea to attack either one of these targets. Missile silos, if they are put at risk, create a great temptation to fire out on warning or to strike preemptively before you lose your force. It is certainly questionable whether you want to cut off any possibility of a negotiation with the other side to stop a war once it's started by killing all their leaders.

So I think with these two things in mind we can put down a list of things that are necessary in order to reduce the probability of nuclear war. One is we ought to cool the rhetoric. It is not easy to get an agreement with somebody who you are gratuitously insulting all the time.

The second is we should be much more respectful of the proposals of either side than we have been in the past. When President Reagan or President Brezhnev makes a proposal, it should be respectfully received, in my judgment, and not rejected in the pages of Tass that afternoon or in a presidential speech the following day.

I think we must make major changes in military doctrine which remove from the mine of any military commander on either side the idea that he will be able to use nuclear weapons to enhance a conventional campaign. I am talking specifically about declarative doctrines like Presidential Directive 59 and corresponding Russian doctrines. This would not be a mere exercise in declaratory policy or paper. If the document is changed, the weapons systems will follow.

I think it would be useful to redeploy the short- and medium-range weapons out of range of each other so that the hair trigger quality of engagement is reduced. Of course they can be deployed back up again, but from the standpoint of the commander, if they are not immediately available, then his capability to use them is diminished.

I support an agreement with the U.S.S.R. against the first use of nuclear weapons. I think that we can get such an agreement, and I think it will not hurt but will enhance our security position.

So far as a freeze on nuclear weapons is concerned, their development, testing and so forth, I think that can be useful. I do not think it puts us in a relatively poorer position with respect to the Soviets. If you consider the total of the nuclear forces on both sides, we are pretty evenly matched.

Finally, and most importantly of all, we should make massive reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons. The American Committee on East-West Accord commissioned me sometime ago to make a study of this subject. I have studied it. I have come up with a proposal which meets most, if not all, or the objections raised in the past on the Russian side and on the U.S. side which have kept us from getting a significant arms reduction treaty.

A first problem is we have been hung up on verification, making sure there is no cheating. We are hung up on what is fair to each side, and we are even hung up on agreement about what to call things: Is the Soviet Backfire bomber an intercontinental weapon or not? In short, we have been hung up on how to do it.

I think we can make a breakthrough that carries out Ambassador George Kennan's proposal for a 50-percent cut in nuclear weapons, but it is a new approach that can easily go further than 50 percent.

Incidentally, so far as I can tell it is not inconsistent with the beginning thrust of the President's proposals, although it is a different method of carrying them out.

In short, it is let each country turn in an equal, very large number of explosive nuclear fission devices to a single conversion site offshore. Under supervision convert the devices to powerplant fuel for generation of electricity. This is turn your swords into plowshares. Let each side choose the devices it turns in. Each device counts as one. That is fair because each side makes its own choice, and that clears up any argument about classification. A device is a device.

Let Soviet and American teams and perhaps a third party as referee identify and count each device. They are uniquely identifiable by scientific means. That is verification without intrusive inspection in either country.

What would happen to the stockpiles? I would imagine that they would be rapidly reduced to a point first where warfighting strategies would not be possible because there would not be enough tactical weapons to carry them out, and then to a point where counterforce strategies would not be possible because there wouldn't be enough weapons to credibly attack the missile silos and the command and communications of the opposing side. I think we can reduce the weapons beyond that point in a relatively short length of time given the political will.

Now, what strategy are the two sides most likely to adopt as the stockpiles evaporate? It will be best for each to retain only their invulnerable central strategic forces under tight control. Again, I believe this is consistent with the President's proposal.

What will the effect be? Electrifying. Imagine the worldwide press and television coverage as the first weapons with hammer and sickle and stars and stripes are turned into the inspectors. The dark clouds of irrational danger to humanity would start to roll away.

What is needed? A fresh approach. The political will, courage and force needed to carry the Congress and the Politburo to a firm policy. A political directive from President Reagan and President Brezhnev to their planners and negotiators: make deep cuts in nuclear weapons to reduce our joint peril and enhance the security of both of us. Above all, recognition that the United States is not the enemy and the Soviet Union is not the enemy. Nuclear weapons are the enemy of both of us and of all mankind.

Einstein has said, "Everything should be made as simple as possible but not simpler." Our proposal is simple, uncomplicated, and understandable. It is also sophisticated in that it meets the security, political, physical and economic needs of both countries. All that is needed is the will to get going.

What is the bottom line? Deep cuts are practical. They will enhance the security of all hands: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the world. They can be stabilizing, equitable, and verifiable They can be negotiated by the great powers, and they will be supported domestically and worldwide. And there is a straightforward way to begin. The way to get rid of nuclear weapons is to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, sir.

[Admiral Gayler's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Adm. Noel Gayler (USN, Retired)

Everybody knows that nuclear weapons are the most dangerous things ever invented. The responsible leaders, Russian and American alike, have called for deep cuts in nuclear stockpiles. But no effective agreement on substantial cuts has ever been negotiated, let alone carried out. We are in worse shape than ever, with nuclear weaponry increasing daily on both sides.

What's the problem? We're hung up on "verification"—making sure there is no cheating. We're hung up on what is fair to each side. And we're even hung up on agreement about what to call things—is a Soviet Backfire bomber an intercontinental weapon or not? In short, we have been hung on how to do it.

Today, we—the American Committee on East-West Accord—are proposing a breakthrough. It's breakthrough that carries out George Kennan's proposal for a 50-percent cut in nuclear weapons, but it's a new approach. It's a new approach that can easily go further than 50 percent.

What's the proposal?

Let each country turn in an equal very large number of explosive nuclear fission devices to a single conversion site offshore.

Under supervision, convert the devices to power plant fuel for generation of electricity. Swords into plowshares.

Let each side choose the devices it turns in. Each device counts as one. That's fair, because each makes its own choice, and that clears up any argument about classification: a device is a device.

Let Soviet and American teams, and perhaps a third party as referee, identify and count each device. They are uniquely identifiable, by scientific means. That's verification, without intrusive inspection in either country.

What would happen to the stockpiles? I have here a couple of charts that show examples of how fast we can reduce weapons, beyond the point where we can threaten each other with a first strike, beyond the point where anyone would have the means for nuclear war-fighting.

What strategy are the two sides most likely to adopt as the stockpiles evaporate? Best for each will be to retain only invulnerable central strategic forces, under tight control. A much, much safer situation than the present.

What would the effect be? Electrifying. Imagine the worldwide press and television coverage as the first weapons with hammer and sickle and stars and stripes are turned in to the inspectors. The dark clouds of irrational danger to humanity would start to roll away.

What's needed?

A fresh approach and the political will, courage and force needed to carry the Congress and the Politburo to a firm policy.

A political directive from President Reagan and President Brezhnev to their planners and negotiators: Make deep cuts in nuclear weapons to reduce our joint peril and enhance the security of both of us.

Above all, recognition that the United States is not the enemy, and the Soviet Union is not the enemy. Nuclear weapons are the enemy of both of us, and of all mankind.

Einstein has said "Every thing should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler." Our proposal is simple, uncomplicated and understandable. It is also sophisticated, in that it meets the security, political, physical and economic needs of both countries. All that's needed is the will to get going.

What's the bottom line?

Deep cuts are practical.

They will enhance the security of all hands: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the world.

They can be stabilizing, equitable, and verifiable.

They can be negotiated by the great powers, and they will be supported both domestically and worldwide.

There is a straightforward way to begin. The way to get rid of nuclear weapons is to get rid of nuclear weapons.

[From the New York Times magazine, Apr. 25, 1982]

HOW TO BREAK THE MOMENTUM OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

(By Noel Gayler)[1]

Everyone understands that nuclear weapons are the most deadly things ever invented by man. If they were ever to be used, the chances are overwhelming that they would be used in great numbers. And that would mean the slaughter of innocents in the hundreds of millions, the end of Western civilization, perhaps even the end of a livable world.

What many Americans do not understand is that there is no sensible military use for any of the three categories of nuclear weapons—strategic (of intercontinental range), or theater (capable of reaching targets within one theater of military operations) or tactical (designed, like atomic cannon, for battlefield use). I say this as a military man, a former commander in chief of all United States forces in the Pacific, an aviator and mariner, soldier and intelligence officer of 46 years' experience.

In the battles I saw and the military strategy I helped carry out, the means employed bore a reasonable relation to the ends in view. But now the nuclear forces of the United States and of the Soviet Union have become so large and so threatening that there is no conceivable military objective worth the risk of nuclear war.

This truth offers us a way out. There are specific ways in which we and the Russians can reduce the now very real risk of nuclear conflict. We and they can renounce first use of nuclear weapons. We and they can redeploy tactical weapons beyond each other's range. Together, we can freeze nuclear-weapons activity just where it is, as a prelude to cutting back. Most especially, we and the Russians can agree on massive cuts in our nuclear arsenals.

There are fancy theories current about controlled nuclear exchanges and bloodless, chesslike calculations between opponents in the middle of nuclear war. People who think like that do not understand nuclear weapons, and they do not understand war. Real war is not like these complicated tit-for-tat imaginings. There is little knowledge of what is going on, and less communication. There is blood and terror and agony. We cannot deal with war a thousand times more terrible than any we have ever seen in some bloodless, analytic fashion. To kiss off nuclear war in this abstract way makes it more likely, for we and the Russians may convince each other that we have aggressive plans that we do not in fact have.

Both the Soviet and the American Governments have repeatedly expressed their wish to reach agreements reducing the risk of nuclear apocalypse. But President Reagan's campaign pledge to commence strategic arms limitations talks "immediately" upon taking office has not been honored. The pacific statements of the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, are compromised by the continuing buildup of Soviet nuclear arms and the not-so-veiled threats of Soviet counteraction if agreement is not reached. The only nuclear arms-control game in town now is the negotiation in Geneva on so-called medium-range weapons in the European theater. But the news from the negotiating table seems to rehearse the same tired old arguments that have gotten us nowhere in the past. What's the problem?

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[1] Adm. Noel Gayler, retired, former commander in chief of United States forces in the Pacific and former director of the National Security Agency, is a member of the board of directors of the American Committee on East-West Accord.

In all our negotiations, past and present, both we and the Russians have been hung up on the following three issues:

1. What is fair and equal? Neither side will stand still for unilateral disarmament, nor should it. But we Americans talk about equal effectiveness in terms of weapons systems, while the Russians talk about equal security, and the way they define their security needs is unacceptable to us.

2. What is verifiable? We are tremendously concerned about the potential for Russian cheating. They are equally concerned that our proposals for inspection inside the Soviet Union might be a cover for espionage.

3. How do you classify weapons, and what weapons do you count? For example, is the Russian Backfire bomber capable of intercontinental range, as our military contend, or is it a medium-range aircraft, as the Russians insist? Do you count as "strategic" those long-range weapons that cross oceans (our idea) or any weapons that can reach Soviet soil no matter where they start from (their idea)?

These built-in difficulties were the principal reasons the United States Senate refused to ratify the SALT II nuclear-arms limitation treaty signed by President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. And they are still bedeviling the current talks in Geneva. What can we do to get negotiations moving again?

When I joined the Army as a kid, the old sarge had a hell of a time getting us slew-foot recruits to march in some decent semblance of order. Once in a while, when things got out of hand, he would order: "Fall out and fall in again!" That's what we have to do with arms-control talks. Time is running out. We need a fresh approach.

On the occasion of receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize in Washington in May 1981, George F. Kennan, the distinguished Soviet-affairs scholar and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, put forward a proposal that goes to the heart of the problem. Kennan proposed an immediate 50 percent across-the-board reduction in American and Soviet nuclear weapons, "without further wrangling among the experts." Eloquently, he spoke a simple and profound truth: "There is no issue at stake in our political relations with the Soviet Union, no hope, no fear, nothing to which we aspire, nothing we would like to avoid, which could conceivably be worth a nuclear war."

His suggestion has had a strong impact. A Gallup Poll last December showed three out of four Americans backing the idea. There is compelling evidence that public opinion in Western Europe and Japan is strongly in favor of such an approach, and the same appears to be true of public sentiment in the third world. Yet our policy makers in Washington do not seem to have grasped the proposal's extraordinary promise. They tend to dismiss the notion as simplistic, or impractical, or impossible to negotiate. Some even see danger in any deep cuts, arguing that they might arouse false hopes, or offer opportunities for Soviet propaganda, or tend to destabilize the precarious balance. There is even some flavor of N.I.H. (Not Invented Here) that is many a bureaucrat's instinctive reaction to new ideas in his field.

Yet all these concerns are misplaced. Deep cuts are practical. They can be negotiated, simply because they are in the best interests of both parties. They can be designed to have a stabilizing effect and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Solutions are available to all obstacles, real or imaginary.

Einstein once said that "everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler." Kennan's proposal is pretty close to that idea; the trick now is how to go about it. Let us take a leaf from Grover Cleveland, who said: "The way to begin is to begin." The way to get rid of nuclear weapons is to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Here is the idea. We look for a solution that is fair, that we can verify and that does not get us into fruitless arguments about how different kinds of weapons should be classified. To do this, we have to look at security requirements, the politics of negotiations and the nature of nuclear weapons. Taking these factors into consideration, we find there is a way to bring about arms reduction that satisfies essential concerns on all three counts.

Let each side turn in an equal number of explosive nuclear devices. Let each side choose the weapons it wishes to turn in, whether missile warheads, bombs or artillery shells. Each weapon would count the same—as one device.

This proposal has some major advantages. A nuclear device is uniquely identifiable and can be counted without error when turned in; thus, there is full verification without intrusive inspection in either country. Since each side chooses the weapons it wishes to turn in, there can be no problem about what is fair. And since all explosive fission devices count equally, we have no arguments about how the weapons should be classified.

Self-interest will make each side turn in its more vulnerable weapons. This is good. As we now stand, both the United States and the Soviet Union have relatively vulnerable land-based strategic missiles, mounted in fixed silos. It would be logical for both sides to start giving up these weapons, while retaining their less vulnerable strategic bombers and virtually invulnerable nuclear-armed submarines. In this way, the temptation of either side to fire first in time of crisis, lest it lose its weapons to an enemy who attacks first, will be reduced. The "hair trigger" character of the nuclear forces, the most dangerous aspect of the present situation, will be eliminated.

Similarly, the missiles on each side that are the more threatening to the adversary's fixed silos—such as the highly accurate, high-yield, multiwarhead Soviet SS–18 and the equally formidable projected American MX—will tend to lose value. They will be deprived of their "counterforce" targets—the land-based strategic missile force of the other side, which they now threaten with destruction in a pre-emptive first strike. If deep enough cuts are made, the strategies of both sides are likely to revert to reliance on the relatively invulnerable components of their strategic forces. Crisis stability will be improved, and the chances of accidental or unauthorized firing will be greatly reduced.

To whom do we and the Russians hand over these weapons? Probably to a joint Soviet-American commission established for the purpose; perhaps a third party can be brought in as referee. What do you do with the devices? Convert them, under safeguard, to nuclear power for civilian purposes. Uranium 235, one of the elements of nuclear weaponry, can be diluted with the plentiful isotope uranium 238 to a level of concentration suitable for nuclear energy but not for bombs. Plutonium, another such element, can be burned directly in a nuclear power reactor.

We can start by each turning in a relatively small number of weapons—say 50—to test the system and establish confidence. From there, we should proceed on an agreed schedule to a very large reduction—say 10,000 devices each. Again, the idea is to compel each side to choose to retain only a small number of weapons in a strategic reserve.

How will this or some similar proposal satisfy the basic concerns enumerated above?

Let us look first at security. America's primary security need is that the United States, its allies and the free world not be conquered, coerced or threatened by the military forces of the Soviet Union and its proxies. Historically, we have relied partly on the deterrent role of nuclear weapons to contain aggression employing conventional arms. The military doctrines of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still plug the usefulness of nuclear force against a conventional Soviet attack. But now, with the Soviet Union's strategic forces roughly equal to ours, these doctrines are obsolete. Kennan and three other former senior American officials—Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Gerard C. Smith—hit the nail on the head in their recent article in Foreign Affairs urging retreat from our strategy of defending Europe by first use of nuclear weapons: "Deterrence cannot be safely based forever on a doctrine which more and more looks to the people of the alliance like either a bluff or a suicide pact." There is growing recognition that the game is not worth the candle. The security of the United States and its allies must be protected in ways other than with nuclear weapons.

Yet our European allies are torn by conflicting impulses. Their governments, as well as important segments of the political opposition and of public opinion, want the United States to be married to the defense of Europe not only by conventional force but by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Hence, the original demand by European leaders for the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Western Europe. At the same time, Europeans entertain the entirely reasonable wish not to be the nuclear battlefield of the giant powers. This wish finds expression in popular demonstrations against deployment of the new American missiles.

Current United States policy also has violently conflicting elements. On the one hand, Presidential Directive 59, issued by Jimmy Carter in 1980, still implies readiness to fight and win a limited nuclear war—as do many previous and subsequent official statements. There is still a green light—and an enormous appropriation—for development of the MX missile, even though the best brains in the country cannot figure out a sensible way to provide it with an invulnerable base. The B-1 bomber program bids fair to waste as much money on an obsolete means of weapons delivery as would be required to modernize, in many respects, the entire United States Army. And the so-called neutron weapon is still in the works, even though it is a battlefield weapon not so different from other nuclear weapons and is clearly regarded by the Russians as offensive and not defensive in nature.

On the other hand, President Reagan himself has expressed a desire for deep cuts. He has also proposed a "zero option" for Europe—no American medium-range weapons in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory and no Soviet weapons aimed specifically at Western Europe. He has spoken of the overriding need for strategic nuclear talks, though at other times he and his aides have conditioned negotiations on better Soviet behavior.

In any event, the overwhelming logic of the situation, the political imperative being created by the growing revulsion against nuclear arms, dictates movement toward real and deep reductions. There are two major political problems yet to be overcome.

First, the primitives in American politics will not be satisfied with anything less than the unattainable—American nuclear "superiority." Why is this unattainable? In the real world, "superiority" has no meaning. We and Russia are like two riverboat gamblers sitting across a green table, each with a gun pointed at the other's belly and each gun on hair trigger. The size of the guns doesn't make much difference; if either weapon is used, both gamblers are dead. In the same way, the size of the nuclear forces makes little difference. States of readiness, targeting decisions, even which way the wind is blowing (carrying nuclear fallout), make a greater difference than a thousand extra missiles on either side.

Moreover, even if having more missiles than Moscow did give us "superiority," the Russians would not stand still for it. They have said they won't, and we had better believe them, for in their controlled society they cna put into weapons whatever resources they choose. So the argument that we have to attain "superiority" before we can negotiate—an argument still being made in some Administration circles—just won't wash. We are not "inferior" in any meaningful sense, and we are not going to become "superior," no matter how much we ratchet up the nuclear arms race.

The second major political problem in the United States is the notion that we can punish the Soviet Union for its misdeeds—many of them very real—by withholding nuclear arms talks. We cannot use nuclear arms talks as a stick or carrot to make Moscow behave. And if we wait for the Soviet regime to shape up, by our standards, before we engage in nuclear arms reductions, we will wait a long time indeed. The reverse is true: The more our relations turn sour, the more imperative it is to drive down the risk of nuclear war.

What about the Russians? They see themselves, however erroneously, as surrounded by hostile, nuclear-armed powers on their long borders. Their leaders are greatly concerned by any change that would threaten their power, the security of Mother Russia or the control of the Communist Party. Yet they, too, understand the terrible dangers of nuclear war. Many an official pronouncement and many an unofficial approach testifies to their willingness, even eagerness, to entertain the idea of deep cuts in nuclear weapons.

Soviet spokesmen contend that Soviet doctrine on nuclear war has changed in the past five years, and radically so in the last two. This is what they are saying:

"To try and outstrip each other in the arms race, or to expect to win a nuclear war is dangerous madness."—Leonid Brezhnev, in a speech before the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Feb. 23, 1981.

"Western politicians and strategists stubbornly push the thesis that Soviet military doctrine allegedly assumes the possibility of an 'initial disarming strike,' of survival, and even of victory, in a nuclear war. All this is a deliberate lie."—Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense, in a speech at a Kremlin rally, Nov. 6, 1981.

"Political and military doctrines have been changed. This has been reflected in our internal life. There is new determination to seek sharp reductions."—Nikolai N. Inozemtsev, director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations, at a Soviet-American seminar in Washington, Jan. 12–14, 1982.

These and other similar statements are accompanied by the interesting assertion that the change of doctrine is recent, that it involved internal political struggle, and that it was resolved by Brezhnev himself. We in the West are invited to note that this change will find expression in Soviet military schools, in military training manuals and elsewhere.

How much can we trust these declarations? Are they not just propaganda, intended to put us to sleep? If I were planning a military campaign, or even betting on the stock market, I would evaluate the downside risk of any given course of action. If we treat these statements as sincere and the Russians are deceiving us, the worst that can happen is that we lose some propaganda points or get otherwise snookered in some inconsequential way during arms negotiations. For no matter what the Russians say, we would never accept an unequal treaty. But if we fail to take these statements seriously—and hence fail to negotiate on arms reductions—we risk getting our heads blown off. It will be little consolation that the Russians will lose theirs also.

But the most compelling reason to take the Soviet authorities seriously on this score has been given by W. Averell Harriman, President Roosevelt's Ambassador to Moscow and, like, Kennan, a profound scholar of Soviet Affairs: "You can trust the Russians—to act in the Russian interest." Our own best minds have come to the conclusion that nuclear war is unwinnable. It would be folly to assume that the Russians are too dumb to have reached the same judgment.

Thus, in measuring the deep-cuts proposals against the security interests of the United States, the West and the Soviet Union, we find no major obstacles in the way.

Let us look next at whether deep cuts are negotiable—in other words, whether such reductions can be embodied in a treaty that (1) takes account of practical realities, and (2) can be sold to those elements within the American and Soviet societies that dominate the two countries' domestic politics. These are tough criteria, and they can be met only by a treaty that conforms to a strict set of principles.

An acceptable treaty must not only reduce the risk of nuclear war or nuclear blackmail but must be readily seen as achieving those ends. It must not only improve the security of both sides but must do so in ways that each side recognizes as valid for its own concerns. It must be equitable in mutually acceptable ways. The planned reductions must be such as to improve stability in a crisis by cutting down the advantage to be gained by striking first. Most especially, the negotiating parties must not be duplicitous, or strike phony poses, or arouse false hopes or unreasonable expectations.

Fortunately, these principles can be solidly based on the common interest. Neither superpower wishes to be destroyed. Neither wishes nuclear weapons to be in the hands of a variety of small powers or terrorist groups. If these overriding concerns can be kept separate from all other issues between Washington and Moscow, fruitful negotiations are almost certain. It is essential, however, that each Government give a clear political directive to its negotiators: "Find solutions that remove our joint peril and enhance the security of both."

The third factor—the physical technicalities of deep cuts—presents lesser difficulties. The essence of a nuclear weapon is its fissionable material. All else is mere supporting hardware—missile or cannon or airplane, guidance system or re-entry shield or arming and fusing. Moreover, all nuclear weapons have roughly the same amount of fissionable material. In a "small" weapon, the fission element accounts for the weapon's entire explosive yield; in a megaton-range weapon, which depends on fusion, a similar quantity of fissionable material acts only as the spark for the enormously greater succeeding explosion.

Hence, in counting the weapons to be eliminated from the nuclear arsenals of both sides, all weapons can be treated alike. That provides a realistic basis for counting every weapon, no matter what its size, as one nuclear device, and for implementing the cuts by converting the fissionable material to nuclear energy. A desirable, though not essential, corollary to enhancing the effectiveness of weapons disposal would be an agreement to stop manufacturing weapons-grade fission material—both from reactors designed for that purpose and from the spent products of civilian power plants. A stop to production from weapons reactors can be verified by each side with current intelligence techniques. Diversion from nuclear-power reactors is more difficult to monitor, but not impossible.

The effect of deep cuts would be extraordinary. Reductions in the nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would prove the superpowers' willingness to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. That would produce a much better climate for efforts to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. Major reductions in the more threatening or more vulnerable systems would enhance stability, thus reducing the probability of nuclear war. Weapons would no longer be available for "war-fighting" strategies, and greater validity would be given to the assurances of national leaders on both sides that their nuclear forces had no objective beyond deterrence. The chances of accidental or unauthorized firings would be greatly diminished.

In all of the above, several things stand clear. Deep cuts are practical. They will enhance the security of the United States, of NATO, of the Soviet Union, of the world. They can be equitable and verifiable. They can be negotiated by the great powers and sold domestically. And there is a straightforward way to begin.

No one can doubt the extreme peril that nuclear weapons pose to civilization on earth. Getting rid of a lot of weapons on both sides will reduce the peril immeasurably. In Leonid Brezhnev's astonishing phrase, "God will not forgive us" if we do not act.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

If it will be all right with the other panelists, we will put a question or two to you so that you can leave by your stated time of 2:30.

The nuclear freeze has been criticized on three major grounds: First, that it is not verifiable; second, that it would undermine the INF negotiations in Geneva; and third, that it would remove Soviet incentives to negotiate substantial reductions in strategic hardware.

Do you believe these criticisms are valid?

Admiral GAYLER. I will take them one at a time. I do not think there can be absolute verification of anything in this world, but I do not see that the nuclear freeze presents special difficulties because we are talking really about absorbable things like testing both of rockets and warheads; and we are talking about observable things like construction of submarines and construction of missile silos and so forth.

Certainly it is possible to hide away a few weapons in Russia. It might even be possible to hide away a few over here, although I doubt it. But a few weapons do not make that much difference. So from that standpoint I think it is adequately verifiable and much preferable to a continuing buildup while we negotiate, because negotiations probably are going to take a long time.

So far as undermining the negotiators is concerned, I think that our potential strategy of building up in order to negotiate is flawed in that the Soviets will continue to build correspondingly. They have said that they will. In that controlled society there is every reason to believe that they can, in fact, do that even though their economic base is much smaller than ours.

Some people argue that we should do these sorts of things in order to force expenditure on the Soviet Union. I think that is a rather dangerous thing to try because it is not at all clear to me that a Soviet Union that is broke is not more dangerous than one that is at least competent in an economic sense.

I am old enough to remember when people, respected economists, said Hitler could not make war because he was too broke. It just did not turn out that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Admiral, refresh my recollection. When we were associated together I remember that one of the distinctive chapters in your career was to go to Omaha as the Navy's representative on the Joint Command there for targeting. What year was that?

Admiral GAYLER. That was between 1967 and 1969.

Senator WARNER. At that time, as a baseline, was it not rough parity between the two strategic arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States?

Admiral GAYLER. Yes, that is right. I remember the calculations that we did in those days approximate the same calculations that we see now. In the event of an exchange people would die in both countries at the level of 100 million plus.

Senator WARNER. But my point is it was judged that there was a rough parity there between 1967 and 1969.

Admiral GAYLER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Now, since that time the Soviets have added 60 new ballistic missile submarines to their fleet. We have added one, the *Ohio*, the first Trident. They have added some 300 Backfire bombers, and they have enhanced their ground-based systems with the SS-17's, 18's, and 19's numbering somewhere around 300 or 400.

In view of those add-ons by the Soviets, and parallel we have not taken the same restructuring, how can you take the position we would now not be frozen into a position of inferiority?

Admiral GAYLER. Well, I take it on two grounds, Senator Warner. One is that while they are superior in megatonnage, we are superior in the numbers of weapons; and that is significant in that if you talk in terms of destructive capability against usable targets, there is a tradeoff there. We have more of some; they have more of the other.

Senator WARNER. But if we had parity at that time, rough parity, and you have this enormous addition to their arsenal, I cannot understand how you would have parity now and we would not be frozen into inferiority.

Admiral GAYLER. We have made enormous additions to ours, too. Roughly we have about twice the number of weapons that we had in the days when I was taking part in the targeting, so we have not been sitting still either.

And, in addition, we have invented and have had a considerable time lead in some of the more potent weapons like the high accuracy MIRV missiles; and if we keep on, we will be having high accuracy MIRV missiles fired from submarines, for example.

So we have had a technological edge, and in my judgment we have a rough parity trading numbers against megatonnage. But a more important point to me, sir, is that the levels we are talking about are just enormously disproportionate to the target system. Even back then—I think enough time has gone so that I can say this—even back then the targeting problem was never how to adequately attack targets; it was to find enough targets for the weapons we had, and we have about twice as many now.

Senator WARNER. That is quite a statement.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one final question that I wonder if you would care to comment on; that is, the negotiating position taken by the President last Sunday.

Admiral GAYLER. Mr. Chairman, I think it represents a very welcome movement toward major reductions in nuclear arms; that the

President's stated objectives are ones that we can all support. As many do, I have some reservations about the specific proposals, mostly two.

One is that they are, of course, an opening position, and for that reason will not be favorably received by the Russians. I do think it is very hopeful that the Russians have indicated, I gather, that they will come back with counterproposals rather than rejecting them.

The other thing which I like very much is the President's emphasis on survivability of the systems and of moving to systems which are not vulnerable. I note that the implication of that attention is that we and they must abandon counterforce strategies. If that comes to pass, that will remove the hair trigger component which is so worrisome right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral GAYLER. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Ambassador Rush, we are delighted to come to you. With your industrial background and your deep background in Government, both here in Washington as well as abroad, I think you are in the position to give us a feel for the European Community and how they react to these various proposals, as well as a profound knowledge of how the American public is reacting or should react.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH RUSH, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE AND FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

Ambassaador RUSH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your very kind remarks.

It is a privilege to be with you today to have the opportunity to explain to you why I strongly support Senate Joint Resolution 177. This resolution, introduced by Senators Warner and Jackson, and bearing the names of many other Senators as well, speaks with a clarity and purpose that transcends party lines and should, I think, commend itself to both sides of the aisle in both Houses. The issues demand nothing less.

The people of our country and of our allies as well are today sorely concerned over one fundamental question of exceeding importance. How can the chances of nuclear war, frightful as that would be, be cut back without imperiling the peace and freedom on which the ways of life we cherish depend? Governments, Mr. Chairman, have responsibilities to their own people and indeed to all mankind to make nuclear war as remote a possibility as can be, but it is too often forgotten that part of that responsibility is to make the aggressive use of military power of every sort equally remote. As the President said at Eureka College on Sunday, his duty as President is to insure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs. He added, and I quote, "I wish more than anything there were a simple policy that would eliminate the nuclear danger."

There are two hard facts that are all too often overlooked. One, the genie cannot be completely put back in the bottle. Even if agreement could be reached to ban all nuclear weapons, there is today no way to make sure that all nuclear weapons would be in fact eliminated forever. Before that sort of solution could be attained, mutual respect and confidence would have to be earned by all concerned through a demonstrated devotion to standards of international conduct for the respect of human rights and the integrity of all nations.

Second, the probabilities are overwhelming that nuclear war would grow out of nonnuclear hostilities rather than being resorted to in a first use surprise attack. It follows therefore that the best way to control the use of nuclear weapons is to keep the peace not only at the nuclear level but, of at least equal importance, at the conventional level as well. Peace with freedom is the goal, freedom from the genocidal threat of nuclear weapons, freedom from fear of force, threat, pressure, or intervention, freedom of individuals to those rights of thought, conscience, expression, and action with which mankind is endowed, freedom of peoples to choose their own governments, and to seek social justice through a balance between individual liberty and responsibility to others.

In addition to the risks of armed attack, there is the more immediate problem of how to live in peace without sacrificing those freedoms. It is how, and Poland is an object lesson, to stop the Soviets and other bullies from using their military machines to pressure people to accept the repression of their own freedom and the freedom of friendly nations elsewhere.

I do not think the Soviet rulers are likely to risk their political system or their own positions of power by seeking to get into a war with the United States or its allies. They would rather prefer to dominate a productive and compliant divided Western Europe, or other strategic target areas elsewhere, than to see those lands wasted in warfare. The driving of a wedge between the United States and its allies would be a major step in that direction, as clearly shown by the massive propaganda Moscow is mounting in an effort to depict the United States as a belligerent country bent on war and disdainful of arms control.

Here is an immediate political threat, Mr. Chairman, which we must never overlook, while focusing on the military dangers which concern us, or on the domestic burdens which these days loom so large.

I said, Mr. Chairman, that the genie cannot be put back into the bottle. This by no means implies that there is nothing that can be done in the way of nuclear arms control. To the contrary, there is much that can and must be done. First, by maintaining a general balance of nuclear weapons, neither side can have a reason to be attracted to instigating their first use in combat. Two, by reducing nuclear arsenals, the risks of mishap and the burdens of cost can be held down. Three, recognizing the difficulty of limiting qualitative as well as quantitative improvements, this problem nevertheless must be taken into account so that the stability that comes from a general balance can be retained.

Four, confidence-building measures to cut the risk of nuclear warfare, like the measures for advanced notification of maneuvers of the Helsinki accords, can be expanded by such proposals as the French proposal for a conference on European disarmament. Five, restraint in weapons programs, but only if mutually practiced, can be of major importance. Arms control arrangements directed to these ends are essential to any program of peace and freedom. Without them, the risks will continue to grow.

In the absence of a general balance of nuclear weapons, the weaker side would be open to silent nuclear blackmail as its confidence in its ability to chart its own course with impunity would falter. In the absence of a cutback of nuclear arsenals, continuing proliferation and improvement of weapons would increase the risks of nuclear war. Without mutual restraint, the arms race would expand. Without improved confidence-building procedures, the chances of blundering into nuclear war would grow.

This road toward lower risk is indeed a rocky one, but there is no other. There are no simple answers. Both sides will have to be prepared to sacrifice the goal of superiority. Obtaining temporary advantages on the part of one side only insures greater efforts by the other side, and hence an arms race. It must be checked in a way that leads to a general balance as both the Soviet leaders and our own have repeatedly said.

It is for these reasons that I welcome Senate Joint Resolution 177. In concise, yet most cogent words, it demands an American initiative in arms control that would reinforce the safety and security of all mankind.

The President at Eureka College has taken the initiative along the lines called for in that resolution. As he said, "We must seek agreements which are verifiable, equitable, and militarily significant." There are some others who would pursue other paths: Arms control cannot be achieved by catchy slogans. As the President said, "Agreements that give only the appearance of arms control breed dangerous illusions." There are proponents for an immediate freeze on the production of any further nuclear weapons, but this would accept the very disparities in nuclear strength which are of serious concern to ourselves and our allies.

As the independent International Institute for Strategic Studies recently noted with regard to theater nuclear system, "Even with the inclusion of Poseidon on the western side, and the continued exclusion of Soviet strategic systems, the balance is distinctly unfavorable to NATO, and is becoming more so."

Moreover, is not a freeze at equal and sharply reduced and verifiable levels, as there is with the Jackson-Warner resolution, a more stable solution than one at present levels? As a former Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and to France, I never fail to try to consider fully the views of our European allies. The rejection of the concept of an immediate nuclear freezer by Chancellor Schmidt was immediate and categorical. It would, as he said, be an acceptance of the "unbelievable Soviet armada that is aimed against us."

This leads me to an important point, Mr. Chairman. There has been much public attention to the mass public demonstrations of concern in Europe, and more recently here at home, at the dimensions of a possible nuclear holocaust and the horrors of nuclear war, and with worry that some government might believe that limited nuclear war could be a prudent option. Everybody abhors the prospect of nuclear war, but mere abhorence is not enough. The essential question is how to prevent the outbreak of any major war which might escalate to nuclear weaponry, in other words, how to keep the peace, and the answer is deterrence.

The concept of deterrence at lower levels is fully preserved by Senate Joint Resolution 177, and thus supports the Alliance policy. To quote the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher:

> Along with deterrence and defense, arms control and disarmament are an integral part of the Alliance's security policy. The arms control policy aimed at achieving a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level, a policy which the Federal Government has helped to shape, is also expected to make an effective contribution to prevent war and safeguarding peace.

There has been a great deal of attention lately to the question of renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons. A recent article in Foreign Affairs on this subject, I must confess, leaves me confused. First, it urges a policy of no first use. This concept gives me grave concern. It leaves the Soviet with a conventional advantage which the West is unlikely to meet in peacetime, unless the Soviet dominates Western Europe by fear. The German Foreign Minister has flatly rejected that approach, and I quote:

> The strategy of the Alliance, the prevailing NATO doctrine of flexible response, is occasionally criticized, most recently by voices in the United States. The federal government considers the speech given by Secretary of State Alexander Haig on April 6th to be an impressive reaffirmation of the basic security concept of the Alliance.

And he explains why in these words:

> In the conventional sphere, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage compared with NATO. If deterrence is to be reliable, it must take into account this conventional superiority of the other side. In addition, the proven strategy of flexible response links the conventional and nuclear capabilities in order to preclude aggression at any level as well as political pressure.

Second, the Foreign Affairs article seems to urge a policy of no first use except as follows, and I quote from the article:

> There remains one underlying reality which could not be removed by even the most explicit declaratory policy of no first use. Even if the nuclear powers of the Alliance should join with the support of other allies in a policy of no first use, and even if the decision should lead to a common declaration of such policy by these powers and the Soviet Union, no one on either side could guarantee beyond all possible doubt that if conventionl war broke out on a large scale, there would in fact be no use of nuclear weapons. We could not make that assumption about the Soviet Union, and we must recognize that Soviet leaders could not make it about us. As long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of their use will remain.

That is the end of the quotation from the article.

I must say I fail to see how that is a no first use policy. If it means what it says, it is a "no first use except . . ." policy. Yet by fudging, it fails to expressly tell the Soviets that there is a real risk of nuclear holocaust inherent in any and every level of East-West hostilities. It is true that resort to tactical nuclear weapons by the allies would be likely to make them worse off under today's balance of forces as not only the national infrastructure and populations of Western Europe, but NATO's military forces themselves would be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear counterattack. but as noted in the just released NATO study of force comparisons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact,

> The overall survivability and complementary characteristics of NATO's strategic nuclear forces guarantee the Alliance's ability to threaten retaliation, thereby ensuring deterrence.

Since we are faced with the necessity of living with nuclear weapons, with all their risks, let us make a virtue of necessity, and continue to preserve, expressly and without ambiguity, such deterrent effect as can be obtained from our strategic strength. In a recent study by the NATO working group of the Atlantic Council, which Brent Scowcroft and I cochaired, we said:

> As long as nuclear weapons exist and general strategic parity prevails, the risks of allied first use of nuclear weapons in response to armed attack by the Warsaw Pact, particularly in times of confusion and anxiety, or as a measure of last resort, simply cannot be excluded from the thinking of the Soviet planners. The loss of escalatory control appreciably reduces the readiness with which NATO would be prepared to initiate use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons; at the same time, it does not go so far as to necessarily reduce that chance to zero.
>
> If large-scale Soviet conventional attack were met with a stubborn and sustained conventional defense, but nevertheless was at the point of prevailing, the Soviets could not but be uncertain that such a resolute enemy would not turn to nuclear weapons as a measure of last resort. In such circumstances, with the conquest of a viable western Europe no longer possible, and with the survival of the Soviet regime and homeland at risk, the Soviet planners simply would not have the ability to guarantee a reasonable chance of success.

Let us not forget one cogent fact that is stressed in the NATO study. The U.S.S.R. now has "the potential capability to destroy most of the United States' ICBM silos while NATO," including the United States, "by contrast does not have a corresponding capability against the Soviet Union's ICBM silos." Surely, Mr. Chairman, when the START talks commence, Senate Joint Resolution 177, with its call for equal and reduced levels of nuclear armaments, will demand a solution of this imbalance downward rather than by having to respond to it by entering into a further escalating arms race in survivable land-based weaponry.

The President's proposal asks that this be reduced downward by at least one-third of all current levels. In the same vein, the intermediate nuclear force talks in Geneva presents the opportunity to move either upward or preferably downward. The new generation of Soviet SS–20 nuclear missiles place the population and infrastructure of Western Europe and the military forces of NATO under the guns of the Soviets. With these new and more accurate weapons, the Soviets might make the mistaken judgment that they could threaten our allies without fear of any retaliatory attack on their territory, especially if they did not threaten to attack U.S. forces or Territory. The result has been to shake the confidence of the European allies in being able to stand up to the Soviets in light of the pressure provided by this prime example of an imbalance in power.

There are only two ways to bring things back into balance. The first choice, vastly to be preferred, is through arms control arrangements such as the Reagan proposal at the Geneva talks for a zero option which would eliminate this sort of weapons for both sides. Should that fail, the alternative is to build a new NATO missile force in Europe to put the Soviet missiles in check and disburse the shadow of nuclear blackmail from Western Europe. Such a force need not match the Soviets weapon for weapon. Its function would rather be only to frustrate Soviet exploitation of a risk-free situation by making it too costly an option to pursue.

There is, of course, one other choice. By resigning themselves and letting the Soviets dominate the situation, the allies could avoid the costs and tensions of competition with the Soviets, but only at the expense of their cherished heritage of freedom from external domination, domination by a police state which cannot tolerate and must suppress liberty. How the Poles would welcome the chance to reject that choice.

Mr. Chairman, Senate Joint Resolution 177 wisely avoids specifics, but it charts a general course that cannot but appeal to all peoples, the Soviets as well as ourselves, as principles to be vigorously pursued. As our Government responds to this call, I warmly hope that it is understood that we thereby totally reject the false concept that arms control agreements are not of importance to the security of our country. Let us truly search for a stabilizing agreement with the Soviets that will benefit all the world, not only our two countries.

It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that we never be inflexible at the negotiating table, so long as we stay within the parameters of security. These are wise words of hope, and at the same time caution. In Ambassador "Chip" Bohlen's valuable memoirs, from which I quote, he says:

> Although I see no bridge that can be built between the ideological commitments of the Soviet Union and the United States and insistence on protecting the independence of its allied countries, it does not follow that the two superpowers are on a collision course. Both governments deeply believe that a nuclear war is unthinkable. Neither will set out on a course that would lead to mutual suicide. If Moscow lost the war, the whole house of cards would come tumbling down. For this reason, war is to be avoided. Therefore, I do not see any circumstance under which the Soviets would deliberately embark on World War Three. Circumstances might develop along the peripheries of the lines of power, however, which, step by step, could lead to a confrontation in which neither country would back down.
>
> This fear of war is another reason why the Kremlin has been serious about disarmament. There are too many sections—

In SALT II—

> open to varying interpretations, and as we have seen, the Kremlin always takes advantage of loose drafting to evade the spirit of treaties.

In conclusion, let me share with you one aspect of the question of arms control that has increasingly given me concern. The questions of arms control and of defense capability are inseparable and equally important aspects of our national security, and should go hand in hand. However, they get separate and disproportionate attention before the Congress. I would very much hope that as hearings transpire on the defense aspect of our policy, they could as thoroughly look at the arms control aspects, since both are part of our foreign and security policy.

There is, of course, a grave security question, for public disclosure of matters under private discussion between the negotiating parties can be the kiss of death. This has tended to inhibit both the executive and the legislative branches from a continuing open discussion of arms control initiatives, but I am sure that by collaboration between the legislative and executive branches this issue can be transcended. Public opinion could be better informed and better aware of the fact that our attention to arms control as a part of our security policy is in fact unflagging.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very kindly, Ambassador Rush.

Mr. Warnke, we would be very happy to hear from you now. I understand that you do not have a prepared text. We have not received one. Whatever text you might have for us will be incorporated in full in the record. Please summarize in any way that you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY; FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY; FORMER CHIEF NEGOTIATOR; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not have a prepared statement, but I do have a few comments that I would like to make.

First, the brief comments of the President's Eureka College speech last Sunday constitute an interesting, if sketchy, outline of one part of an arms control program. Now, obviously, there are many questions that President Reagan's speech leaves unanswered and, as a consequence, a sound evaluation of the merits of this particular proposal and its prospects requires an understanding of the context in which this proposal would be placed.

What is clear to me, however, is that any sound progress toward genuine arms control requires a quantitative and qualitative freeze on further nuclear weapons developments on both sides.

I think it also requires the prompt consolidation of the important restraints that have been achieved by the previous three administrations, two of them Republican, one Democratic. I know, Mr. Chairman, from sobering personal experience, the temptation to try for a dramatic breakthrough, for that one single step that will end the overhanging horror of nuclear devastation.

But I know, too, that security concerns on boths sides make it impossible to get where we want to go in one step. It is impossible because of the fact that both sides are dealing with matters that are integral to their national survival. So, as I say, we cannot forfeit the progress that predecessors have won through painful and painstaking negotiations.

What the President has set forth is a desirable goal. I do not know anybody who would disagree with that. Certainly, a very substantial reduction in the total number of ballistic missile warheads and selective reductions of the land-based ICBM's is a goal that everybody should recognize as being a cardinal one.

But a crucial question remains: What happens in the meantime? Now, the goal of reducing respective nuclear armaments to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads each cannot be served and cannot be achieved if, by allowing the already agreed-upon constraints to disappear, the Soviet Union is free to add more than 6,000 warheads just on the SS-18's alone. We would be headed in exactly the wrong direction, the opposite direction of where the President wants to go.

Nor do I think that we can expect that the Soviets, concerned as they are about their own national security, will reduce their land-based ICBM's so that they carry a total, as the President has proposed, of no more than 2,500 warheads, if at the same time we increase the counterforce capability of our own nuclear weapons by building the MX, by building the D-5 SLBM, so that the greatly reduced number of Soviet ICBM's would become much more vulnerable.

Now, similarly, we could not reduce our land-based force further without having some constraints on the Soviet growing counterforce capability.

In addition, I think that it is obvious that the President's proposal will be considered by the Soviets in connection with whatever proposals are put forth to deal with the possible proliferation of thousands of nuclear warheads by deployment of cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships as well as on land.

At the present time, for example, we have a substantial lead in numbers of strategic bombers, and in the technology that will permit these bombers to be equipped with long-range cruise missiles.

Our submarines, as Senator Warner knows, are quieter, they are more efficient, we are able to maintain a higher percent of them on station. And we have far easier access to the oceans of the world. We cannot expect, I believe, that the Soviets will stand still and allow us to require reductions in the respects in which the asymmetries favor them without having something in the way of a quid pro quo with regard to the asymmetries in which we have the advantage.

As I have said, the goal of significant reductions in ballistic missiles and the warheads they carry is a goal that all must share. But as we strive for that goal, we must avoid having it recede into the distance because we have allowed technology to race ahead, warheads to multiply, and instability to increase.

The SALT I interim agreement on control of offensive arms ended 4 years and 8 months ago. SALT II, signed almost 3 years ago, remains unratified. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is described by current administration officials as a worthy project, but one for which international conditions are not now propitious.

A cutoff of nuclear weapons materials, proposed by Admiral Gayler and proposed by Senator Cranston, was first proposed by President Eisenhower in 1953 in a speech to the United Nations. It is still on the bargaining table, but has never been brought into reality.

We should, of course, strive for major nuclear disarmament, but we cannot build on the quicksand of an agreement that has expired and on promises that we refuse to confirm.

What is essential is the firm foundation of the proposals that have already been hammered out and that both sides have accepted.

On warheads, for example, President Reagan's ceilings will need the verification provisions that President Nixon and President Ford proposed and that were finally embodied in the SALT II Treaty under President Carter. Without those verification provisions, we would never know whether they had gone down to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads. So that that part of the already agreed constraints is an essential precondition to doing what the President now wants to do.

But if the START talks are to succeed, then I submit that we have to stop and the Soviets have to stop now. The Soviets have agreed to stop additional MIRVing. They have agreed to cut 10 percent of their present strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. All we have to do is to hold them to that promise by formalizing the already agreed-upon restraints.

I think we should hold them to their deal and not let them off the hook. I agree with the proposals that have been advanced by a number of Senators, by Senator Cranston, Senator Pell, Senator Glenn, and Senator Kennedy. What we have to do is to see to it that the existing restraints do not fall into desuetude, that we do not give up all that has been accomplished since 1969. We have not accomplished enough since 1969.

But what we have to recognize is that there is no one ideal arms control agreement. The only way we are going to be able to achieve our objective is by resuming a step-by-step process.

I was dismayed by Secretary of State Haig's testimony yesterday in which he seems to think that the SALT II Treaty somehow is what preserves the Soviet advantage in heavy ICBM's. If SALT II is allowed to lapse and the constraints are allowed to lapse, that is not going to reduce a single Soviet SS–18. All that will happen is that they can increase by many times the individual warheads with which their SS–18's are now equipped.

I think we have to get on with the job. I think what we have to do is see to it that we are in a position where we can keep in place those agreements that have been hammered out up to this point and then go on to achieve the President's objective. In my opinion, it is a legitimate objective, it is a crucial objective, it is a feasible objective. But we cannot get there if we are going to discard everything that has happened up to this point.

That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I think we can get to questioning you, Mr. Warnke, before you have to leave at 3:30. So we will ask Mr. Molander to give us his statement next.

Mr. Molander, you have started quite a movement.

Mr. MOLANDER. I do not think I was the one who started it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very anxious to hear from you today. I want to commend you on one of the most astounding educational processes that I have seen.

STATEMENT OF ROGER C. MOLANDER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GROUND ZERO, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. MOLANDER. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, I have submitted a formal statement, and I will read maybe 60 or 70 percent of it.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. I will focus my formal statement on the issue of strategic arms control and the recently manifest strong public concern about this and other aspects of the nuclear war problem.

Certainly, the recent statement by President Reagan on the START negotiations, calls for Senate reconsideration of SALT II, and strong public interest and support for a freeze provide an excellent opportunity for looking at different approaches to arms control.

But first, I would like to offer an observation on that renewed public interest in the nuclear war issue. As you know, that interest is very strong. It has its roots really in a loss of faith in the ability of elected officials and technical experts to find a solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war. People are also questioning the candor with which past arms control efforts, weapons systems initiatives, and other facets of the nuclear war issue have been conveyed to the public.

Thus, there is a challenge from the American people to all of us to describe and evaluate new and old proposals for both arms control agreements and weapons systems in the most honest, nonpartisan, and most forthright fashion possible. Only in this manner can we forge that nonpartisan consensus and partnership between elected officials, technical experts, and the general population which is clearly going to be necessary to meet the challenge of preventing nuclear war and especially the challenge of dealing with the Soviet Union.

I think that the three alternatives to arms control that are within our purview can be exemplified in, if you will, lay terms, which I am very much into these days, by "Go for it all," "One step at a time," and "Don't bother me with the details, just stop it." And with that in mind, first let me review a little bit the origins of the United States-Soviet efforts to control arms.

These origins not only were in the strong belief by both sides that it was in their mutual interests to control such weapons but also in a belief by both that the other had or was pursuing particular weapons systems which made nuclear war more likely.

And, in fact, I think the strategic arms control negotiations to date can be characterized as having two tracks of this character: First, the dominant track, certainly one of let us see how many avenues of the strategic nuclear weapons competition we can constrain, or freeze, in common parlance; and second, certainly less successful, why do you not make your force structure look like mine?

With this characterization, let us look at the three different approaches that we have before us.

It is clear that President Reagan's START proposal represents a significant departure, as we all know, from the negotiating approach begun under President Nixon. Rather than emphasizing the control of different avenues of strategic competition, it essentially calls for the Soviets to restructure their strategic missile forces along lines much closer to our own. The focus is missile warheads and especially ICBM warheads. I do not have to review for you the numerology.

But I think it is important to point out that basically what the President's proposal calls for is to change the ratio between Soviet ICBM warheads and SLBM warheads from the current ratio of almost 4-to-1 to something like 1-to-1. It is a profound change in the structure of the Soviet force.

It is also important to note, of course, that it would not in any meaningful way decrease the threat which the Soviet ICBM's pose to the U.S. silo-based Minuteman force.

The deal is also good from our standpoint, if you will, in the sense that it does not control strategic bombers or does not deal with cruise missiles. And as we all know, many of the cruise missiles really should be included in intermediate-range force negotiations.

In sum, it is quite clear that the President's proposal would be a very good deal for us. And I think I and every other American would rejoice if the Soviets accepted the proposal tomorrow.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that historical experience is not encouraging in terms of the likely success of a proposal of this radical character. The proposal calls for far and away the most dramatic restructuring of the other side's strategic forces of any proposal that has ever been put forward in the history of strategic arms control negotiations.

And it is important to note that both bombers and cruise missiles have been included in the negotiations since the Nixon administration.

It is important to realize just how far-reaching this proposal is, because in the past the response to such proposals has either been outright rejection or a comparable counterproposal which leaves the two sides miles apart and struggling to find common ground.

The term we apply to those is "sweetheart deals," and one of the clearer lessons of negotiations to date is that they significantly extend the time required to reach agreement. SALT II, in the fall of 1972, started with a pair of similar and even less demanding proposals, and it took nearly 7 years to complete that negotiation.

Thus, if history is any teacher, as I think the President and certainly his chief negotiator, Ed Rowny, recognize and have stated, we are talking about a proposal and an effort that will take many years to complete.

Certainly, the experience of recent months has indicated that the American people are anxious to see concrete results in the arms control area soon, which raises the question, as always with an opening proposal of this character, of whether the President is ready to accept interim steps between where we are now and the goals he has set.

Which brings us to SALT II. SALT II is, in fact, an interim step between where we are now and what the President has suggested. I do not need to review for this committee and especially for you, Mr. Chairman, after the many hours you spent listening to such testimony, the advantages and disadvantages of the SALT II Treaty. I have briefly talked about the history of how we got there, a number of different steps leading to SALT II. And I would say that each step probably fit the Joint Chiefs of Staff's characterization of SALT II as modest but useful.

Finally, there is the freeze approach. This approach certainly stems from a popular frustration with the slow step-by-step approach of past arms control efforts. It is also clearly at variance with "Let us start over and go for it all at once even if it takes many years" approach, which the President has put forward.

The strength of the popular support for the freeze—three out of four Americans support it, according to a recent poll—really is a clear no-confidence vote by the American public with respect to previous efforts by elected officials and technical experts to control the strategic arms competition.

The message is really quite simple. It says: "Stop the competition. Do it in a verifiable manner. Do it as soon as possible. And when you have done it, then let us start talking about restructuring forces and other such issues."

Unfortunately, we know that the problem is not that easy. Much of the effort that we have seen today, in fact, has gone into halting or freezing the many avenues of strategic competition. In fact, the SALT II Treaty is essentially an agreement that freezes many avenues of competition, maybe 10 different areas, and slows it down in many others. And the magnitude of the challenge of putting together a treaty of that character is reflected in the document that you people reviewed here in front of the committee in 1979.

So why have past efforts not succeeded? I believe the answer lies in an examination of the basic approach which we and the Soviets have taken to the problem of preventing nuclear war in the search for an exclusive and elusive technical solution to this problem, a solution in weapons systems and arms control agreements. It is that effort, commencing after the Cuban missile crisis, which, in fact, has failed. And it is time that we admitted it.

The magic formula of weapons systems in arms control agreements has not appeared to date. And though I wish President Reagan well in his efforts to find that formula, the weight of history is clearly against him.

The American people are not likely to wait patiently by while we in Washington engage in yet another Quixotic search for that elusive combination of weapons systems and arms control agreements that will make us all feel safer. They know that we just simply do not have time to experiment with that hope for another generation and then come up empty handed in a world of 50,000 more nuclear weapons and maybe 10 more nuclear-weapons states.

It really does go against the grain of commonsense. And perhaps, to paraphrase Robert Frost, this may well be the time to reexamine the path that we have been on, the strategy and methodology for success that we have been using, and consider paths not taken. Clearly, weapons systems and arms control agreements will be necessary components of any solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war, at least for the foreseeable future.

But if they are not by themselves sufficient, what additional elements or factors must be added? To answer this question it is necessary to go back and look at what we are about, trying to prevent nuclear war, and to look at how it might occur—a bolt from the blue, escalation in a Third World crisis, et cetera—to the question of what elements beyond weapons systems and arms control agreements might be brought into the equation or strategy to prevent nuclear war.

One factor stands out above all others: the prevailing United States-Soviet relationship must be altered. The United States and the Soviet Union simply must begin to make the transition from visceral enemies to friendly adversaries, as we are currently trying to do with China.

In the past, we assumed that arms contral negotiations alone could carry the burden of improving the United States-Soviet relationship. That was clearly illusory. We must attack the problem of the United States-Soviet relationship directly. To that end, I am far more encouraged by the plan for President Reagan to meet with President Brezhnev than I am by the impending renewal of formal arms control negotiations, the renewal interest in SALT II, or any of the various freeze proposals. And from the recent Ground Zero Week experience, I believe that most Americans would agree.

The fate of the Earth, to quote Jonathan Schell, is not going to be decided by experts' ideas for new weapons systems or new approaches to nuclear arms control. It is going to be decided by people talking to people as fellow human beings and the mutual recognition that we are living on a frail and increasingly dangerous planet.

So, if you will pardon me, I will not be anxiously waiting for the latest press leak from the negotiations in Geneva, but instead, looking to the talks between President Reagan and President Brezhnev, extending them my hopes and wishes for a successful meeting in the fall. I hope they like each other as human beings. I hope they spend most of their time talking about their kids, their grandchildren and their friends, and their responsibility to future generations instead of all this missile stuff.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Molander's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER C. MOLANDER

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to address the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. While this problem has many facets, I will focus my formal statement on the issue of strategic arms control and the recently manifest strong public concern about this and other aspects of the nuclear war problem.

As you know, I am at present the Executive Director of Ground Zero, a nonpartisan, non-advocacy nuclear war education project. The Ground Zero effort seeks to meet a strong public interest in obtaining relevant and comprehensible information on the nuclear war problem. My statement and my answers to your questions will be responsive to this public interest, within the non-partisan, nonadvocacy posture which we have adopted for the Ground Zero project.

The recent statement by President Reagan on the U.S. position in the START negotiations, the recent calls for Senate reconsideration of the SALT II Treaty, and the strong public interest and support for the so-called nuclear freeze, provide an excellent opportunity for examination of alternative approaches to the challenge of controlling strategic nuclear arms. However, before commenting on these three approaches to this problem, I would like to offer an observation on the renewed public interest in the nuclear war issue. As you know, that interest is very strong, and has its roots in a loss of faith in the ability of elected officials and technical experts to find an exclusively technical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war, i.e., to find some combination of weapon systems and arms-control agreements that would insure that nuclear war would never occur. People are also questioning the candor with which past arms control efforts, weapons systems initiatives, and other facets of the nuclear war issue have been conveyed to the public. Thus there is a challenge from the American people to all of us, and especially to elected officials and technical experts, to describe and evaluate new and old proposals for both arms control agreements and weapons systems in the most honest, non-partisan fashion possible. Only in this fashion can we forge the non-partisan consensus and partnership between elected officials, technical experts and the general population, which, in a democracy is necessary to meet the challenge of preventing nuclear war—and especially to meet the challenge of dealing with the Soviet Union.

Returning to the alternative approaches to strategic arms control I believe the three approaches exemplified by the President's START proposal, the SALT II Treaty and the nuclear freeze campaign can be characterized as:

"Go for it all."

"One step at a time."

"Don't bother me with the details, just stop it."

Before examining these three approaches it is useful to briefly review the origins of the United States-Soviet effort to control strategic arms. This effort, initiated by President Johnson and begun in earnest in 1969 under President

Nixon, had its origins not only in a recognition by both sides that it was in their mutual interest to control these weapons but also in a belief by both that the other side had or was pursuing particular weapons systems which made nuclear war more likely. In fact, the profound differences in the strategic nuclear force structures on the two sides gave vivid testimony to the existence of two distinctly different points of view on what constituted a safe or stable nuclear force structure. Thus, the strategic arms control negotiations to date can be characterized as having two tracks. The first, and to date the dominant track, is:

"Let's see how many avenues of strategic nuclear weapons competition we can constrain—or freeze, in today's parlance."

The second is:

"Why don't you make your force structure look like mine?"

With this characterization, let's look at the three approaches currently on the table.

It is clear that President Reagan's START proposal represents a significant departure from the negotiating approach begun under President Nixon. Rather than emphasizing the control of different avenues of strategic competition, it essentially calls for the Soviets to restructure their strategic missile forces along lines much closer to our own. In that sense, START might be characterized as a call not only for a focus on reductions, but also as "STARTing over."

The focus of the President's proposal is missile warheads and especially ICBM warheads. Today, the Soviet Union has about 8,000 missile warheads. The ratio between Soviet ICBM warheads and SLBM warheads is almost four-to-one. President Reagan's proposal calls for a one-to-one ratio. To accomplish this change at the warhead levels called for (a ceiling of 2,500 ICBM warheads), the Soviets would have to tear down all 308 of their ten warhead SS–18 heavy missiles and roughly one hundred of their six warhead SS–19s or their four warhead SS–17s. This would leave them with about 400 MIRVed ICBMs, compared to their current level of 818. Obviously these would be profound changes in the Soviet force structure. However, it should be kept in mind that they would not in any meaningful way decrease the threat which Soviet ICBMs pose to the U.S. silo-based Minuteman ICBM force.

On the U.S. side, we currently have 2,150 ICBM warheads and about 4,500 SLBM warheads. We could thus meet the proposed 5,000 warhead ceiling by dismantling 500 older single warheads ICBMs and roughly 130 MIRVed Poseidon SLBM launchers.

The deal looks even better when you consider that the proposed agreement does not include strategic bombers, an area where we have a ten-to-one advantage—3,000 warheads to less than 300 on the Soviet side.

The proposal also does not deal with cruise missiles, a realm of profound U.S. advantage, although it is clear that certain types of cruise missiles, notably ground-launched cruise missiles, should be included in intermediate range force negotiations.

In sum, the President's proposal would be a very good deal for us, and I think I and every other American would rejoice if the Soviets accepted the proposal.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that historical experience is not encouraging in terms of the likely success of a proposal of this character. First, it should be noted that the President's proposal calls for far and away the most dramatic restructuring of the other side's strategic forces of any proposal ever put forward in the history of the negotiations. Secondly, it is important to know that both bombers and cruise missiles have been included in the negotiations since the Nixon administration.

I point out these facts because it is important that we all recognize just how far-reaching this proposal is. In the past, the response to such proposals has been either outright rejection or a comparable counter-proposal which leaves the two sides miles apart and struggling to find common ground. The term applied to such proposals is "sweetheart deals," and one of the clear lessons of negotiations to date is that they significantly extend the time required to reach agreement. SALT II started with a pair of much less demanding proposals of this character and it took nearly seven years to complete the negotiations.

Thus, if history is any teacher, an agreement based on the President's new proposal will take, as he and his chief negotiator, Ed Rowny, have both admitted, many years to negotiate. But as the President must realize, the American people are anxious to see concrete results in the arms control area soon—

and not in the seven years that it took to negotiate SALT II. This of course raises the question of whether the President would be willing to accept interim steps between where we are now and the goals he has set—which brings us to SALT II.

SALT II is in fact such an interim step, albeit a modest one in light of the proposal put forth by the President. I do not need to review for this committee the advantages and disadvantages of the SALT II Treaty. When SALT began in 1969, there were no limits on either strategic offensive or defensive weapons. In 1972, President Nixon signed the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive weapons. In 1974, President Ford concluded the outlines of the so-called Vladivostok agreement, a distinct improvement on the SALT I Interim Agreement. By the end of the Ford administration, additional limitations had been achieved in the emerging SALT II agreement. Finally, in 1979, the SALT II Treaty was signed by President Carter, and it in fact was a distinct improvement over the last proposal of the Ford administration. All of these were positive steps in the deliberate step-by-step approach to arms control carried on during the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Each step fit the Joint Chiefs of Staff characterization of the SALT II Treaty—"modest but useful."

Finally, there is the freeze approach. This approach or sentiment stems from a clear popular frustration with the slow step-by-step approach of nuclear arms control efforts to date. It is also clearly at variance with the "let's start over and go for it all even if it takes many years" approach which the President has put forward. The strength of the popular support for the freeze—three out of four Americans support it, according to a recent poll—is a clear "no confidence" statement by the American public with respect to previous efforts by elected officials and technical experts to control the strategic arms competition. It rejects arcane arguments about the strategic balance, destabilizing weapons systems, windows of vulnerability, and countervailing strategy. The message is simple. It says stop the competition, do it in a verifiable manner, do it as soon as possible, and when you've done it, then let's talk about restructuring forces and the other arcane issues that seem to have been the impediment to constraining the competition.

Unfortunately, we know that the problem is not that easy since much of the effort to date has gone to halting or freezing many of the avenues of competition. In fact, the SALT II is essentially an agreement that freezes the competition in about ten different areas and slows it down in several others. The magnitude of that challenge is reflected in the pages of treaty text and the reams of testimony provided to this committee and others.

So why haven't past efforts succeeded? Why thirteen years after the effort began are we so far away from meaningful strategic arms control—and so far away from providing the citizens of this nation the security against the risk of nuclear war which they so greatly desire?

I believe the answers to these questions lie in an examination of the basic approach which we and the Soviets have taken to the problem of preventing nuclear war which I mentioned earlier—in the search for the elusive technical solution in weapons systems and arms control agreements. That effort has failed and it is time that we admitted it. The magic formula has not appeared to date and though I wish President Reagan well in his efforts to find that formula, the weight of history is clearly against him.

He's also operating in an environment of unfulfilled promises by elected officials and technical experts—not only in the national security area, but in the economics area as well. It's a tough ballpark to play in.

The American people are not likely to wait patiently while we in Washington carry on yet another quixotic search for that elusive combination of weapon-system and arms-control agreements that will make us all feel safer. They know that we simply do not have time to experiment with that hope for another generation—and then come up empty-handed in a world stocked with 50,000 more nuclear weapons. It goes against the grain of common sense. Perhaps, to paraphrase Robert Frost, this may well be the time to re-examine the path that we've been on—the strategy and methodology for success that we've been using—and consider paths not taken.

There are other approaches. Weapon-systems and arms-control agreements will clearly be necessary components of any solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war, at least for the foreseeable future. But if they are not by themselves sufficient, what additional elements or factors must be added?

To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the question of how nuclear war might occur: a bolt from the blue, escalation in a Third World conflict, or triggered by accident, false alarm or terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. To the question of what elements beyond weapon systems and arms control should be brought into the equation to prevent nuclear war, one factor stands out above all others. The prevailing U.S.-Soviet relationship must be altered.

That's right, the United States and the Soviet Union simply must begin to settle their differences, simply must make the transition from visceral enemies to friendly adversaries, as we are currently trying to do with China.

In the past, we assumed that arms control negotiations alone could carry the burden of improving the U.S.-Soviet relationship. That was clearly illusory. We must attack that problem directly—and to that end I am far more encouraged by the plans for President Reagan to meet with President Brezhnev than I am by the impending renewal of formal arms control negotiations, the renewed interest in SALT II, or any of the various freeze proposals. And from the recent Ground Zero Week experience, I believe that most Americans would agree.

The fate of the earth is not going to be decided by experts' ideas for better weapons systems or new approaches to nuclear arms control. It is going to be decided by people talking to people as fellow human beings—and the mutual recognition that we are living on a frail and increasingly dangerous planet.

And so, if you will pardon me, I will not be anxiously waiting for the latest press leak to tell me what's happening in Geneva. Instead, I will be extending to the President my hopes and wishes for a successful meeting in the fall with President Brezhnev. I hope they like each other as human beings, and I hope they spend most of their time talking about their kids, their grandchildren, and their friends, and their responsibilities to future generations, instead of all this missile stuff.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

As you know, we were unable to get SALT negotiations underway with President Johnson. And in the early part of the Nixon administration, I met at President Nixon's request with Anatoly Dobrynin to find out why we could not get SALT negotiations underway.

We were at Christmastime cross-country skiing with the principal members of the Kremlin, and we had our children and our grandchildren there. And we just sat and talked about the charges being made by the then-Secretary of Defense that the Soviet Union was going to make a first strike on the world.

And, he said, any country that has lost 20 million of the flower of its youth in a conventional war, to assume that we do not know the horrors of nuclear war, to assume that we would make a first strike on any country, knowing that there would be a strike back at us and all of our children and grandchildren would be gone, they are just not serious about arms negotiations.

And I told President Nixon that story, and in 3 weeks we were able to set them up.

He said, if you want to sell an ABM system to your people, do not sell it by trying to imply we are going to make a first strike, because we know what war is.

So I think you have perhaps caught the spirit of some of that in your comments.

I would like to turn to my colleague, Senator Warner, to start off the questioning.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We have indeed heard with this panel from the voices of experience. I have been associated with three of the panelists, and this is my first opportunity to meet Mr. Molander.

I might say that I testified earlier this morning and commended the people of the United States for taking an active role in establishing our nuclear policy. It is my hope that they will study it carefully and make their decisions based on all the facts and not just, shall we say, a dramatic breakthrough.

And that was a very poignant comment made by Mr. Warnke, that, based upon his experience and those of us who have had some experience in this area just cannot expect these dramatic breakthroughs.

I start that with you, Mr. Warnke. Do you not think a freeze is in the category of trying to drive a dramatic breakthrough?

Ambassador WARNKE. I do not, Senator Warner, because I do not believe you can get a freeze in one step. Now, I know some proponents of a freeze believe that. But in my opinion, some aspects of it are much more easily negotiated than others.

For example, there are certain very important freeze elements built into the existing constraints that have been negotiated: a freeze on the number of ICBM silos; a freeze on further fractionation of the warheads, on the missiles; subceilings on the MIRVed ICBM's; subceilings on MIRVed ballistic missiles generally.

All we need to do is to accept what has already been negotiated to have those elements of a freeze. I think we could have quite readily a freeze on further testing of nuclear explosive devices, since even during the period of time that I was involved in those negotiations the major substantive problems have been solved.

As Admiral Gayler and Senator Cranston have proposed, I think a freeze on production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes can be achieved. I think we ought to do it on a step-by-step basis because certain other elements would be much more difficult to verify. I think, for example, a freeze on production of nuclear weapons from existing fissionable materials would require a type of on-site inspection which has not as yet been worked out.

I do not think we ought to wait until we can do everything before we do anything. I think we ought to take our gains as we can get them.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. While we may have differences of view, we certainly admire you for the amount of time you have devoted to this subject over the years and your depth of knowledge.

Ambassador WARNKE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Rush, we also have had a long professional and personal association. Perhaps you would like to introduce your two colleagues who have joined you here today for the record to show their presence.

Ambassador RUSH. Yes, Senator. Ambassador Achilles is really almost one of the founders of the Atlantic Council and has had a very distinguished career as counselor to the Department of State, and as Ambassador.

And Mr. Wolff is the former minister to NATO, very active in the Atlantic Council and on the board of directors.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Rush, your experience has been very lengthy, both as a diplomat and senior official in the Department of Defense. What are your views on trying to have a freeze at this time when there is a good deal of uncertainty about the succession of the Soviet leadership?

Ambassador RUSH. I think that the freeze idea fits into the concept of allowing emotions to take over from reason. Logic and reason are the only way to deal with the Soviet Union. The concept of a freeze in a way says, let us get the subject out of the way, let us forget all about it, we now will freeze things.

But that is not the way our allies would look at it. Our allies, as the Germans have said, as the Chancellor, the Foreign Minister and other Europeans have said, are desperately scared that we will not stand up for them in time of need.

Henry Kissinger at the Brussels conference 2 years ago implied that maybe we would not risk the destruction of our country by a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. This caused a tremendous furor in Europe. At the same time the Europeans are very worried that a nuclear war will be on their soil and not on our soil. In other words, they would like to feel that the protagonists are us and the Soviet Union and that they will avoid a nuclear war.

And to a degree it is comparable to the attempt of the West to run away from the menace of Hitler. They ran and they ran, until we had World War II.

Now, you and Senator Jackson's resolution in my opinion approaches the thing in the right way. The Soviet Union's primary interest is what is in their best national interest. This is what Churchill said: the answer to the enigma of Russia is national interest. If they see it in their national interest to negotiate arms reductions, particularly in the nuclear field, they will do so.

But if they see it in their national interest not to negotiate, they will not negotiate. If we give up our bargaining tools by a voluntary freeze when we are at a distinct disadvantage as we are today, particularly in Europe, and when we are at a very distinct disadvantage in conventional forces and will not make this up, that bars negotiation for them, because why should they give up something they do not need to give up?

The essence of negotiating with the Soviets—and I negotiated the Berlin agreement, as you know—is for them to feel that they are achieving their objectives by negotiation better than they can achieve them by confrontation. We want to negotiate. You do not negotiate by giving up your tools of negotiation in advance.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, sir.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner, for joining us. We always appreciate your presence at these meetings.

Senator Warner has been a staunch supporter of this committee, even though he is on the other side. But I think Armed Services and Foreign Relations have many common interests.

You are always, always welcome here, Senator Warner.

Mr. Warnke, I wonder if you could answer this question. You have supported the resolution calling for the prompt ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Do you believe the treaty could command a two-thirds vote in the Senate at this time?

Ambassador WARNKE. Senator, I have demonstrated over the years that I am the world's worst politician. But in my opinion, if the administration were to recognize that this is in the interest of the United States and were to ask the Senate to confirm it, I cannot believe that they would lose the support of those who would have supported the treaty at the time President Carter was President.

I think, in addition to that, he would pick up some Republican senatorial votes that we could not get back in 1979 at the beginning of the Presidential campaign. I also think that President Reagan is in a unique position. I think everybody recognizes that he is not soft on the Soviets and were he to conclude that putting into effect the constraints that have been negotiated by his predecessors would advance his own objective, I am quite confident he would get two-thirds and many more.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I voted for SALT II. I felt that on balance it was in our best interests. I notice that we have had reconfirmed to us recently that the administration's attitude is to observe the various points of SALT II and that the Soviet Union is doing the same thing.

The only difference, therefore, is not having ratified it and in observing it is that under ratification the Soviets by now would have been required to have destroyed 250 nuclear weapons. That was by December 31 of last year.

Ambassador WARNKE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So we have lost that. However, as a realist I have advised the Soviet Union that in my judgment if the Reagan administration did not support it, the treaty could not and would not be ratified. But any treaty that it did support, so far as I could see, would be ratified by a two-thirds vote.

So unless it does change its attitude on that, I think it would be fruitless for us to try here to push it through. It could not get the two-thirds vote in my judgment.

Therefore, let us observe it and build on that basis and take the President at his word. He said, there is a lot in SALT II that I agree with, but there are some areas where he faults it. Let us build on that as a building block and not throw away 7 years. You do not have to start from scratch. You can build right on it.

What amendments would you see as necessary before the treaty could be approved? For example, which if any of the 23 conditions attached to the treaty by this committee in November 1979 would you still regard as worthwhile?

If you would care to answer that in detail for the record, we will keep the record open for that purpose.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would like to answer that in detail for the record, Mr. Chairman. I do think that there are a couple of updating changes and a couple of improvements that could be made, that would give it, if I could use the expression, the Reagan brand.

One thing would be to make it of indefinite duration, which would avoid the problem that Secretary of State Haig referred to yesterday of a breakout. What he was concerned about was perhaps the Soviets would be more able after 1985 to do something which was inconsistent with arms control. I think what we could do is make it of indefinite duration, like the ABM Treaty.

I think another change that could be made which would be totally consistent with the position taken by the President is to have percentage annual reductions added on. In other words, do not stop when you get down to a ceiling of 2,250, but have further reductions of between 5 and 10 percent a year for the next several years.

I think that would be consistent with the President's approach. It would further the policy that he announced last Sunday. And I think, again, it would make it distinctively his agreement. Under those circumstances, I believe that both politically and in terms of our national security interest ratification would not only be possible, but would certainly be the establishment of a firm foundation of further efforts.

[The material referred to follows:]

CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO SALT II TREATY

[SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR WARNKE]

During my testimony on May 12th, the Chairman asked that I consider the condition attached to the SALT II treaty by the Committee in November of 1979 and state which if any I would still regard as worthwhile.

With regard to the Category I conditions, I have the following comments:

1. The understanding that the phrase "maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing" includes changes in orientation remains appropriate.
2. The understanding on non-circumvention accurately reflects the substance of that provision.
3. Similarly, the understanding on transmission of telemetry is consistent with the obligation to avoid encryption of telemetry or other practices to the extent that they might impede verification.
4. The understanding concerning notification to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concerning compliance questions embodies an appropriate procedure for executive and legislative cooperation.
5. The understanding requiring Senate approval of any extension of the treaty or Protocol was unnecessary when adopted, in view of the plain language of provisions on duration clauses. It would now serve even less purpose in view of the Protocol termination and the fact that cruise missile issues are being dealt with in the current INF talks.
6. The understanding concerning Soviet military forces in Cuba was then an irrelevancy. It's now an anachronism.
7. The understanding on cooperative measures for verification by national technical means is a useful reminder to future negotiators.
8. I see no objection to the suggestion that future agreements should increase access to information.
9. Similarly, the understanding on pre-notification of ICBM tests sets a desirable goal for future negotiations.
10. The understanding on improvements in U.S. national technical means should be considered in the light of subsequent developments in U.S. intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.
11. The understanding concerning theatre nuclear systems and SALT III is presumably being implemented in the current INF talks.
12. The declaration concerning SALT III negotiations proposes a desirable goal of annual reductions in SALT II ceilings and subceilings. The standards set forth appear fully consistent with the objectives announced by the President in his Eureka College speech and provide a means of moving from SALT II to the President's proposal.
13. The specific systems included in the declaration regarding the maintenance of essential equivalence should be reviewed in the light of the current situation. The most effective way to maintain essential equivalence is by a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons systems.

With regard to the Category II items:

(1) The understanding on the limitations in increases in launch-weight and throw-weight, cruise missile range and new type ICBM reentry vehicles usefully spells out the agreements reached by the negotiating parties.

(2) The understanding on a U.S. mobile ICBM system was designed to reflect the now-discarded multiple shelter MX basing mode.

(3) The understanding on the use of anti-satellite weapons simply underscores the general prohibition against interference with national technical means of verification.

(4) The purpose of the understanding on range/payload upgrade of Backfire remains valid.

With regard to the Catgory III revisions:

1. The statement that the agreed Statement and Common Understandings are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the treaty remains worthwhile.

2. The reservation that the Soviet Backfire statement is legally binding also remains worthwhile.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask you one or two more questions, so that you can keep your deadline for leaving the committee. Then I would like to come back to Mr. Molander, who might have some ideas on modifications of the SALT II Treaty.

If the President were to announce that he would not put the treaty into effect or into force even were it approved by the Senate, would you still favor asking the Senate to go through the advice and consent process?

Ambassador WARNKE. Mr. Chairman, I have serious constitutional questions as to whether or not the Senate could do anything other than pass a sense of the Senate resolution with regard to SALT II unless the President presents it to the Senate.

I recognize that now it is technically before the Senate, and perhaps the Senate could steal a march by a very rapid ratification. But I doubt if that is politically feasible. But were the executive to withdraw the treaty from the Senate, then certainly any effort to pass the treaty would be no more than a sense of the Senate resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the various dates that are specified in the treaty and protocol to the treaty would have to be adjusted before it could be put into force? How likely is it that the Soviets would demand an extension of the SALT II protocol before they would act under their constitutional process to ratify the treaty?

Ambassador WARNKE. Basically, Mr. Chairman, the protocol deals with two items. One of them is the deployment of ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. The other is the deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's.

From the standpoint of the Soviets, I do not believe that they would insist on an extension of the deadline for deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's, because that really was not anything they pushed very heavily during the negotiations. They said they would play it either way. If we wanted that kind of ban, fine. If not, they already have, of course, the potential of a mobile ICBM, which is the SS–16. So I think extension of that deadline would be more in our interest than it would be in theirs, since we have not been able to devise any sound schemes for mobile basing of the MX.

With regard to cruise missiles, basically that is an issue which is now under negotiation in Geneva in the intermediate nuclear force talks. Our deadline, our present anticipation, is that we could not deploy ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles before the end of 1983. My own experience in the Pentagon, which perhaps Ambassador Rush might duplicate, was that any estimated operational capability is going to slip. So that there still is, in my opinion, time to deal with the cruise missile without extension of the protocol date.

The CHAIRMAN. The last question I would like to ask you deals with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, both of which were signed by Presidents, President Nixon on one side and President Ford on the other. Yet they never have been ratified by the Senate.

Do you know why, throughout the Carter administration, that administration never asked the Senate to ratify those treaties?

Ambassador **Warnke**. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Carter administration did present those treaties to the Senate. I can recall testifying, I believe in the summer of 1977, in support of both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I must say that the Senate reception was at best lukewarm, and I might say also that we were lukewarm in pushing the treaties.

At that point I believe we were quite confident that we could achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty, which, of course, would be much preferable to each of these intermediate steps.

The **Chairman**. With the candor that you always use before us, do you suppose there was possibly a little of the "not invented here" philosophy, that they were bent upon developing their own comprehensive test ban and moving to SALT II and that just to ratify or put any energy into getting treaties signed by two former Presidents ratified was not too good and might even be a diversionary effort? Could there possibly have been any of that element? That is what I had heard as one aspect of it, anyway.

Ambassador **Warnke**. I would have to say, Senator, that the record would seem to indicate that there is a tendency to feel that that which has been achieved by the previous administration can be designated and that the effort should be to do something more dramatic.

The **Chairman**. Even sometimes when it is Presidents of the same party that are involved?

Ambassador **Warnke**. That is correct.

I must say that this is perhaps a human failing, but I think in this particular field we ought to be very sure that we consolidate our gains before we go on to something that may be very time consuming.

Certainly in retrospect, Mr. Chairman, it would have made much more sense if we had tried to complete a relatively simple Vladivostok type of treaty in early 1977 and then move on. I think perhaps there was a tendency to feel, well, all that does is to endorse what our predecessors have done, and maybe we are going to be better off and the world will be better off if we move ahead and try to bypass or leapfrog that which had been done before.

That is why I am suggesting today that, while I thoroughly agree with the President's proposal as an objective, we ought to make sure that we do not lose the ground that we have already gained.

The **Chairman**. You have dealt so much directly with the Soviets. I ask the question because in my meetings in the Kremlin in November 1980 after the election of President Reagan, when he was President-elect at the time, I detected on the part of Secretary General Brezhnev a tremendous amount of frustration in dealing with American governments. They negotiate, negotiate and negotiate, he said. What are we dealing with, a government of just different groups of individuals every 4 years?

We have negotiated for 7 years a treaty and we signed it with the President. We have negotiated two other treaties that were signed by President Nixon and President Ford. We signed SALT II with

President Carter. And yet you still have not ratified a single one of those treaties.

I came back with the feeling, and reported to the President, that I felt it would be worthwhile, even though they are not great shakes and are not earthshaking, but at least one of them establishes the basis for on-site inspection, which is a principle that we are going to have to find and expand if we are really to get down to this. I think the President's proposals themselves would require some onsite inspection. That principle alone would be worthwhile having.

Ambassador WARNKE. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been unable to determine why the administration has not been able to focus long enough on that. Just give us the yes or no. We will support ratification of those two treaties. And if they did, we could get them ratified. I have just assured that to the administration. But in a year we still have not had an answer on it.

What is the opinion of the three of you on whether or not it would be worthwhile, taking everything into account, to ratify those two treaties, the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties? And I know you would say ratify SALT II as well.

Ambassador WARNKE. I would certainly favor ratification of the two treaties, Mr. Chairman, for the reasons that you have stated. They were negotiated, they were signed by the President of the United States, they certainly are not undesirable. They are not as good as they should be, but they do represent a step forward.

I think that as long as they are not presented and sold as a substitute for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, their ratification would be very much in our security interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Warnke. You are 5 minutes past your departure time. We are very happy to have had you with us.

Ambassador WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In view of the fact that my colleagues on the panel have identified the organization for which they are speaking today, might I say that I am speaking as chairman for the Committee on National Security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We are always pleased to have you before us and we will look forward to benefiting from your wise counsel and advice for many years to come.

Ambassador WARNKE. You are very generous, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I would present the same question, Ambassador Rush, to you. What would be your advice to the committee on the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty?

Ambassador RUSH. I would be very much in favor of ratifying those now. However, with regard to SALT II, I favored SALT II and felt it should be ratified. I feel now that to reopen that question would set back our forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union in a very serious way. It would reopen all of the old divisions that formed around ratification of SALT II. We would be looking backward and not forward.

In my opinion, it is too late now to ratify that agreement, and it is much better to try to get a consensus in favor of further negotiations as we continue in essence to live up to the provisions of SALT II, rather than to go back and start an old, divisive fight, which I think would result in the rejection of the treaty by the Senate and a very bad setback for further negotiations on strategic and intermediate range missiles.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Molander, I know that Ground Zero does not take specific positions on specific issues and I respect them for it, because I think your movement's ability to be a powerful educational force is improved by that posture. But the questions that I put to you, you can or cannot answer, depending upon your role, as to whether you can speak as an individual or disassociate yourself as an individual from your organization.

I would be interested in whether you have come to the conclusion that ratification of SALT II would be a desirable thing for the Senate to do and for the administration to consider.

Mr. **Molander**. Well, I think I will fall back, at least in part, as you have described. As long as I am appearing here as executive director of Ground Zero, I will maintain the posture of not taking advocacy positions.

However, I think it is quite clear from the experience we have had in Ground Zero that the American people are very anxious to have their Government join some of these issues, like in particular right now this issue of strategic arms control. In that sense, as I indicated in my statement, I think there will be a lot of impatience with the time that it will obviously take to negotiate a new agreement based on the President's START proposal as it was put forth.

In that sense, I think in some way the American people feel—and it may be presumptuous to say that—that they are owed in part a statement by their Government on the issue of strategic arms control, and perhaps in the light of not only SALT but the PNE and Threshold Test Ban Treaties as well.

And if you go beyond the beltway, people read the Constitution a little more carefully than perhaps one does on the inside. I think they feel that they are owed it and that there is a responsibility here, especially on the part of the Senate of the United States, to discharge that article and to at least take up the issue, certainly within this committee and on the floor of the Senate as well.

As to what to do about strategic arms control, what to do about the issue of limiting tests on nuclear weapons, I think the American people, in keeping with what we have tried to do and what you have tried to do on this committee, would benefit immeasurably as part of the democratic process from seeing these issues debated by their elected officials.

We clearly are in an environment where individual Americans are reasserting those rights that one has in a democracy to be a decisionmaker. In the same way that the American people really made the decision, I think in many ways, to slow down the SALT negotiations in the fall of 1979, and certainly made the decision on the MX system, they will be looking to make other decisions.

And as they do that, I think they would be better off if they were operating from a much broader and fuller basis of understanding, which I think they could gain by having this committee and the Senate take up all three of those treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. What relationship do you think the INF Geneva talks should have to new strategic talks? Should they be merged or simply coordinated, as the President certainly implied on Sunday? Ambassador Rush?

Ambassador RUSH. Well, I think, now that we have started down this course, we should carry on for a while. But inevitably the two are inseparable. For Europe, the theater nuclear forces or the intermediate range forces are the same as the strategic forces, because either can destroy them.

The talks ideally should be the overall problem of nuclear weapons and not segregated into these segments.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a comment on that, Mr. Molander?

Mr. MOLANDER. I think the thing that should be assured is that the full spectrum of weapons systems, starting say from ground-launched cruise missiles and SS-20's and SS-4's through the clear intercontinental systems, should be covered. Right now one might say there is a bit of a gap in the sense that submarine-launched cruise missiles do not appear to be likely to be in either the START negotiations or the INF negotiations.

But in the end, I think Ambassador Rush is absolutely right, there is a spectrum here. They are all part of the same thing. I think it matters less whether they show up as two pieces of paper or as one with a protocol to it or whatever. I think the most important thing is to get on with it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you discussed the freeze but did not take a firm position on it. Would you care to give your personal views on which of the various freezes you are inclined toward? Ambassador Rush has indicated he clearly favors the Jackson-Warner freeze. Do you have a leaning toward one or the other?

Mr. MOLANDER. I think I would say I view the treaties from my experience and close association with SALT II and some of my blood and sweat which is in this document. And all of the freeze proposals, such as the broad freeze that is usually voted on in town meeting proposals, and the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze and the Jackson-Warner freeze, to me all suffer from simplicity and lack of detail.

Knowing how long one has to spend on details such as what weapons systems are really going to be included, are F-4's, which are dual capable in Europe, in or out, are carrier-based aircraft, which are dual capable, in or out, and things of this character are so key to whether a proposal is a good idea, that I think that none of them really can be evaluated in a pro-con way without that level of detail.

Certainly they all are responding to the same sentiment which I addressed, which is that where the people would just as soon see something happen, because they are impatient with the bogging down of other details. There is this, stop it and let us see where we go from there attitude. But I think all of them would have to be fleshed out considerably before they can be evaluated.

But all serve a very useful purpose in helping people to come to this issue, and especially to express their concerns about the problem of preventing nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN. As an extension of that question, we have the job of marking up our legislation, taking into account 10 resolutions, taking into account that there are 26 sponsors of one, 60 sponsors of another, and in the House there are 171 sponsors of one resolution. I do not know whether the counterpart resolution, the Jackson-Warner one, has been put in over there yet.

But we have to come up with something that will be adopted as a policy of the Congress. It will not satisfy anyone and may not make anyone happy. It might make them all equally unhappy. But we have to come up with something ultimately that will be a policy, that will get a two-third vote of the Senate.

Is there anything in your constitution that would prevent us from running by you—I know there is not for Ambassador Rush—rough drafts of what we have in mind, to just get a feel from you, who have lived so deeply with this problem for so many years, to get a feel from you as to whether you sense that we are sensing not only what the Congress will adopt and can adopt as the boldest move we could make and get a two-thirds vote for it ultimately, and that would have the backing of the country, that would capture the feeling that the Congress is responding to the country?

Mr. MOLANDER. I would be pleased to do that, and I would encourage you probably to take advantage of the extraordinary experience that many of the members of the committee had in the course of reviewing SALT II to understand that the devil is in the details, and maybe fix up a few of those proposals or something to give it the kind of detail that I think people would like to see, so when one talks about a freeze or stages, whatever it might be, people could come to grips with whether it is a good or a bad idea. It is very hard for somebody to do that now.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you satisfied with the Ground Zero Week and the results you had from it?

Mr. MOLANDER. Oh, certainly. We set out to meet a need which we saw and also to help stimulate that need on the part of the American people to understand an issue which had clearly become of paramount concern. We set out to do education in sort of three different realms:

Because it is easiest to read, to write a book that people would buy and read, and with over 250,000 copies in print we are now pleased with that; then to try and bring people into a classroom format, if you will, and that was all the town meetings and things, and clearly between 1 and 2 million Americans got out of their homes and did that; and then to get the media to invoke the extraordinary assets at their disposal to be educators, and that also clearly was a success.

And we are looking to move on from that and hope to do more of the same.

The CHAIRMAN. I spent Ground Zero at Yale University, where my son is in school in management and organization and is taking a double master's, one also in foreign relations. So he arranged for me to address both classes that day. That was my contribution to Ground Zero.

I could not have been with a more stimulating group. But I took my opening statements right out of, I think it was, the Post article of the day before, probably on Saturday. Maybe I had a Sunday copy, where they described what would happen if a 1-megaton bomb hit the marker in Lafayette Park. It was just dramatic and bold.

I have been talking on this subject for years. Some of the material you have turned out is among the best I have seen. It is really a great joy to see this movement have such a spontaneous, seemingly so, response.

But also, it was extraordinarily well organized, and I commend you on it.

Mr. MOLANDER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Rush, as always, your wisdom and knowledge coming from both the industrial end and work in the foreign field, work in two great countries and the time you have spent in the executive branch here in a number of spots, gives you a perspective on which we intend to continue drawing.

I have one last question for you. Is it likely that the Soviets would, for their part, agree to put SALT II into force unless the United States agreed to extend some of the dates specified in the treaty, including the expiration date of the protocol?

Ambassador RUSH. In my opinion, if we should attempt to ratify SALT II at this point, following President Carter's action in asking that no further steps be taken in view of Afghanistan and the divisive actions we have had in this country as a result of SALT II, the Soviets would accept it under any circumstance, because it would be such a humiliation and capitulation by our country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I will close the hearing with a sentence from Winston Churchill, drawn up aboard the U.S.S. *Augusta* in Argentia Harbor, Newfoundland, August 14, 1941. He said:

> They believe that all the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force, since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten aggression outside of their frontiers. They believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential.

It is interesting, referring to the south Atlantic at least, that we hope diplomacy and reason will prevail over force of arms down there, which would be a futile effort.

I will quote next week my favorite Churchill story of the zookeeper who brought all the animals together to say, let us disarm. They put them back into their cages at the end of the argument. I hope we will be wiser than the animals when we come to the end of this argument.

Gentlemen, you have contributed immensely to this process. We thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, May 13, 1982.]

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1982

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Pressler, Pell, and Tsongas.

The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Pressler has been slightly delayed this morning. I understand that he is on the way in from the airport at this moment, so rather than hold up our witnesses, I felt I should come in to get this hearing started.

As I explained to our distinguished guests, including our opening speaker, the Honorable William E. Colby, I regretfully could not chair this hearing this morning, because I am chairing another hearing of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I serve as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes, before which I know you have appeared in the past. Oddly enough, the problem is the U.S. nonproliferation policy oversight. So it is really the other end of the spectrum. We are dealing here with ways to reduce the possibility of nuclear warfare between the superpowers, but I have always felt even greater concern about the fact that we would somehow be brought in through proliferation, and I presume by the end of this century there will be some 20 countries that have nuclear weapons capability.

In these past few months, the citizens of the United States have expressed more concerns about nuclear weapons than I have ever heard in my 15 years in the Senate. Many times people would yawn when you talked to them about this thing, as either the unthinkable—as Herman Kahn said years ago, you have to think about the unthinkable—or it just was not anything that gripped them. I can remember when Nelson Rockefeller tried to develop interest in bomb shelters, and there just was not the slightest interest in the construction of a bomb shelter in those days.

When I came to Washington 15 years ago, the first thing I did in reconstructing our home was put a bomb shelter in the basement, and I have been carefully selecting all the invited guests that I hope will never have to come in there. We have since used it almost ourselves as a storage room, and it is really not ready and equipped. I have been thinking maybe we ought to get it ready and equipped. That is at least what Ground Zero has done for our public perception.

The public outcry has mainly addressed the problems and dilemmas posed by the growing nuclear arsenals of the United States and the

Soviet Union, but in the other hearing we will be holding beginning at 10 o'clock, we will be dealing with problems other than the arms race, the spread of nuclear weapons to nations that do not now have them. That is a tremendous problem that we do face. While the United States and the Soviet Union have avoided face to face conflict since the dawn of nuclear weapons, the world as a whole has seen regional wars and revolutions aplenty over that time span.

What if India and Pakistan had the bomb when they clashed in 1971? What if the nuclear device had been in Iran during its revolution? Who would have it now? The world would be different if Colonel Qadhafi and assorted terrorists and fanatics had these weapons, or would it be?

Our inability to respond to these questions speaks eloquently to the real dangers in the spread of nuclear weapons, but the day might not be far away when we will learn the lessons to these questions the very hard way.

It is the purpose of this hearing this morning to have some very hardheaded people who have been thinking about this problem for a long time. They are not new to the field. They have been in it for a good part of their lifetimes since the development of the nuclear capability under (Meistag) Field at the University of Chicago, and we are now getting to the point where there can be and there is a great deal of public perception about the problem.

The committee is very honored indeed to have as its first witness today the Honorable William Colby, who has been Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I can well remember his testimony before us one day when I asked him the question, what percentage of your time for the 3 years that you have been director have you spent preparing for, testifying, or cleaning up after the testimony before Congress.

I think your answer was 60 percent. That is when we decided to revise everything, reorganize ourselves. We no longer have eight committees the agency has to report to. There are two committees, and I think the director has been able to devote himself to running the Intelligence Agency much more carefully, but you were instrumental in that, and I want to commend you for it, but we welcome you this morning on this most profound subject in one of the most important series of hearings the Senate has ever held.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. WILLIAM E. COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Colby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here and to see you again.

If I might precede most of my testimony, which is about verification, with just a couple of remarks about developments in the last few days, I think the President is to be commended for his address on Sunday to open negotiations on reductions in nuclear weapons. I particularly appreciate his focus on the desirability of limiting the ability of both nations to conduct a so-called first strike either today or in the future. Indeed, this is the most dangerous aspect of the present nuclear balance.

I think also, Mr. Chairman, in view of your next hearing, that the nonproliferation problem can be affected by the kind of initiatives that the President has inaugurated. You will, I am sure, recall Prime Minister Indira Ghadi's remark some years ago that she would not be lectured to by great powers about how others should not have nuclear weapons while they continued to build these weapons and arsenals willy-nilly. The example of our Nation taking the initiative in a negotiation is certainly where we should be on this subject.

Having said that, I must add a "but." This year, we are approaching the 10th anniversary of SALT I, the last major agreement on this subject. That is 10 years of negotiation which have lead today to the initiation of a new proposal. That is much too long. It is my firm recommendation, Mr. Chairman, that the Senate of the United States ratify SALT II, to at least codify the degree of progress that was made in SALT II. The executive branch has done its job, and a resolution by this committee and by the Senate asking the executive to return the treaty for ratification by the Senate could be accepted. If the Senate can develop its own budget, and the House develops its own budget, I think the Senate could propose that we undertake this ratification and not commit the administration, which of course is politically committed against the treaty by its campaign 2 years ago. Nonetheless, I think we could ratify that step of progress that SALT II represented. It wasn't the end of the world. It wasn't a great step ahead, but it was a useful step.

Second, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the freeze is a very desirable thing to have. You will note the language of the freeze says "mutual and verifiable." It calls upon us to negotiate a freeze. The problem with the President's recommendation with respect to reductions is that it leaves us open to develop new kinds of weapons within the kinds of totals that he develops. Our experience with that kind of a situation has been a steady growth of the danger of these weapons.

In SALT I, we omitted MIRV's, as we thought we were ahead, and did not want to limit those. As a result, in the ensuing years, the Soviets developed the MIRV's which have presented the major destabilizing dangerous situation that we have today. If we compare a different treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, simultaneously ratified in 1972, there has been research on this subject, but neither of us have gone ahead to put these new systems in in either of our countries. A freeze could allow us to continue experimentation if necessary, but it could prevent us from being faced with some whole new weapons system which would be just as or more dangerous than the ones we have today.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, then, talk chiefly about the subject of verification, it is essential to recognize that the United States will be monitoring developments in Soviet military forces and weaponry whether there is an agreement between these two nations or not. The intelligence services of our country are responsible for keeping us informed of this potential danger to our security. Adm. Bobby Inman, in a recent statement, said that he believes the capabilities of the United States with respect to these targets are very high.

While I do not have access to classified material at this time, I am certain that the quality that we had when I was in office and, I am sure, the improvements since then fully support his statement.

Thus, we are not talking about a new obligation for our intelligence services. They have the obligation of such monitoring today. It is equally important to recognize that monitoring Soviet forces and weaponry will be easier for us with a negotiated arrangement such as a freeze than it is at present. SALT I and SALT II both contained a number of provisions designed to ease the process of monitoring the forces and weapons covered by those agreements. Agreements on nonconcealment, specific numerical limitations, testing and notification rules, provisions for registration of forces all ease the problem of monitoring Soviet forces.

The numerical limitations limit the number of such targets that need to be identified, even though the remaining territory, of course, must be examined to determine possible violations. The whole process is easier under an agreement than in its absence.

The third important fact is that an agreement provides a vehicle for communicating with the other side about these forces, which does not exist in its absence. An agreement provides channels for requests for reassurance, clarification of ambiguities, and actual changes in Soviet behavior to comply with the agreement. In the absence of an agreement, none of these exist, and requests for reassurance can be turned off with the same cold or propagandistic response that the Soviets are so fond of giving with respect to things about which they have not agreed.

The monitoring history of SALT I has presented a number of examples of exactly such communications, which have been declassified for public knowledge. None of these would have occurred in the absence of that agreement.

A freeze might indeed require some additional intelligence coverage in order to be fully verifiable. Our intelligence today provides general estimates of such matters as the production of nuclear weapons, but a freeze might call for more precise assurances that such production fully stops.

The problems of obtaining such assurances, however, can be negotiated and additional monitoring arrangements made to provide them. Electronic sensors emplaced in appropriate places, inspection visits to suspected areas, arrangements for third party or neutral determination of questions raised, all offer possible vehicles to provide the necessary assurances. It is too easy to say that the Soviet would not agree to such arrangements, as they have dropped their oppositions to these kinds of procedures when shown the necessity for them.

In the negotiations with respect to peaceful nuclear explosions, the Soviets have accepted inspection teams. In SALT II, they agreed to report the numbers of their forces. The success of electronic sensors in the Sinai between the Egyptians and Israelis provide a case history of showing that such devices can operate to reassure and lessen suspicions.

The Soviets are never going to have the kind of open society that we have, nor will there ever be a Moscow edition of Aviation Week, but I believe that these issues are subject to negotiation, and that the Soviets have moved in the necessary direction.

An agreed freeze would place an additional pressure on the Soviets. Publicly asserting adherence to such an agreement would be known broadly within Soviet society, and in my view, would be generally accepted by the peoples of the Soviet Union for the benefits in American restraint it would bring. If the Soviets developed a secret program to violate such an agreement, they might hope and plan to escape the various sensing and other devices that we employ. They would have to run the risk, however, that such a treacherous action would arouse the opposition of a number of the Soviet individuals who would have to be involved in such a program, and these would be substantial in number.

Among these individuals rejecting the program, the Soviets would have to anticipate the potential of defection or secret communication of the fact of violation to the American side. Col. Oleg Penkovsky made contact with British and American intelligence precisely because he was appalled at the leadership which was conducting the affairs of the Soviet Union, and the threat that it presented to world peace.

The Soviets, with all their control machinery, could not be confident that among the large number of people who would have to be engaged in a substantial scenario of violation, there would not be some who would alert the world to Soviet treachery. With an agreement, any such report, of course, could be followed up with demands for specific assurance on the specific matters learned, again, a course of action which would not be available in the absence of an agreement.

As a last point, we must place the matter of verification in perspective. Even if the Soviets were able to violate an agreement in some small degree without revelation to the United States, it has to be asked whether this would have any major impact on the balance of power between us. In a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, it is hard to imagine that the secret development of a few more would change the balance of power, even though it might be a breach of contract.

The purpose of verification is not the accumulation of legal evidence for a court of law. It is to protect our Nation against Soviet forces and weaponry. If we protect our Nation against the threat of another generation of Soviet nuclear weapons through a freeze, we would be substantially ahead, even if the Soviets were to successfully cheat in a minute and marginal program. Any program which offered the prospect of strategic advantage to the Soviets by definition would have to be of a size and consequent visibility that we could identify it long before it became a direct threat, and take defensive action against it. We could also in the interim raise it through the channels of an agreed procedure for reassurance or for change in Soviet behavior.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, it is my considered view that a mutual and verifiable freeze on the development of additional nuclear weaponry by the Soviet Union and the United States would be feasible to negotiate. We do not have to nor should we trust the Russians, but we could watch them as we benefit from a freeze agreement to improve our coverage of Soviet military forces, and we could both benefit from stopping the mindless piling up of more of these terrible weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Colby's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. COLBY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak to this Committee on the subject of a nuclear freeze and particularly its verifiability. The freeze proposal of course, does not suggest unilateral American restraint but calls for negotiations with the Soviet Union to produce a "mutual and verifiable freeze." I believe that this is possible to negotiate, that it is in the interest of the United States and that it is also in the interest of the Soviet Union. We must interrupt the escalation of these weapons by both sides in a contest in which a step by one is inevitably followed by an equal or greater step by the other.

On the subject of verification, it is essential to recognize that the United States will be monitoring developments in Soviet military forces and weaponry whether there is an agreement between these two nations or not. The intelligence services of our country are responsible for keeping us informed of this potential danger to our society. Admiral Bobby Inman, in a recent statement, said that he believes the capabilities of the United States with respect to these targets are very high. While I do not have access to classified material at this time, I am certain that the quality that we had when I was in office, and I am sure the improvement since then, fully support his statement. Thus, we are not talking about a new obligation for our intelligence services; they have the obligation of such monitoring today.

It is equally important to recognize that monitoring Soviet forces and weaponry will be easier for us with a negotiated arrangement such as a freeze than it is at present. The provisions of SALT I and SALT II both contained a number of provisions designed to ease the process of monitoring the forces and weapons covered by those agreements. Agreements of non-concealment, specific numerical limitations, testing and notification rules, and provisions for registration of forces all ease the problem of monitoring Soviet forces. The numerical limitations limit the number of such targets that need to be identified, even though the remaining territory, of course, must be examined to determine possible violations. The whole process is easier under an agreement than it is in its absence.

The third important fact is that an agreement provides a vehicle for communicating with the other side about these forces, which does not exist in its absence. An agreement provides channels for requests for reassurance, clarification of ambiguities and actual changes in Soviet behavior to comply with the agreement. In the absence of an agreement, none of these exist, and the request for reassurance can be turnd off with the same cold or propagandastic response that the Soviets are so fond of giving with respect to things about which they have not agreed. The monitoring history of SALT I has presented a number of examples of exactly such communication which have been declassified for public knowledge. None of these would have occurred in the absence of that agreement.

A freeze might indeed require some additional intelligence coverage in order to be fully verifiable. Our intelligence today provides general estimates of such matters as the production of nuclear weapons, but a freeze might call for more precise assurances that such production fully stops. The problems of obtaining such assurances, however, can be negotiated and additional monitoring arrangements made to provide them. Electronic sensors implaced in appropriate places, inspection visits to suspected areas, arrangements for third party or neutral determination of questions raised, all offer possible vehicles to provide the necessary assurances. It is too easy to say that the Soviets would not agree to such arrangements as they have dropped their opposition to these kinds of procedures when shown the necessity. In the negotiations with respect to peaceful nuclear explosions, the Soviets have accepted inspection teams. In SALT II, they agreed to report the numbers of their forces. The success of electronic sensors in the Sinai between the Egyptians and Israeli provide a case history of showing that such devices can operate to reassure and lessen suspicions. The Soviets are never going to have the kind of open society that we have, nor will there be a Moscow edition of *Aviation Week*, but, I believe that these issues are subject to negotiation and that the Soviets have moved in the necessary direction.

An agreed freeze would place an additional pressure on the Soviets. Publicly asserting adherence to such an arrangement would be known broadly within Soviet society and in my view would be generally accepted by the people of the Soviet Union for the benefits in American restraint it would bring. If the Soviets developed a secret program to violate such an agreement, they might hope and plan to escape the various sensing and other devices that we employ. They would have to run the risk, however, that such a treacherous action would arouse the opposition of a number of the Soviet individuals who would have to be involved in such a program—and these would be substantial in number. Among these individuals rejecting the program, the Soviets would have to anticipate the potential of defection or secret communication of the fact of violation to the American side. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky made contact with British and American intelligence precisely because he was appalled at the leadership which was conducting the affairs of the Soviet Union and the threat that it presented to world peace. The Soviets, with all their control machinery, could not be confident that among the large number of people who have to be engaged in a substantial scenario of violation, there would not be some who would alert the world to Soviet treachery. With an agreement, any such report of course would be followed up with demands for specific assurance on the specific matters learned, again a course of action which would not be available in the absence of an agreement.

As a last point, we must place the matter of verification in perspective. Even if the Soviets were able to violate an agreement in some small degree without revelation to the United States, it has to be asked whether this would have any major impact on the balance of power between us. In a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, it is hard to imagine that the secret development of a few more would change the balance of power, even though it might be a breach of contract.

The purpose of verification is not the accumulation of legal evidence for a court of law. It is to protect our nation against Soviet forces and weaponry. If we protect our nation against the threat of another generation of Soviet nuclear weapons through a freeze, we would be substantially ahead even if the Soviets were to successfully cheat in a minute and marginal program. Any program which offered the prospect of a strategic advantage to the Soviets by definition would have to be of a size and consequent visibility that we could identify it long before it became a direct threat and take defensive action against it. We could also in the interim raise it through the channels of an agreed procedure for reassurance or for change in Soviet behavior.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, it is my considered view that a "mutual and verifiable freeze" on the development of additional nuclear weaponry by the Soviet Union or the United States would be feasible to negotiate. We do not have to, nor should we, "trust" the Russians. But we could watch them as we benefit from a freeze agreement to improve our coverage of Soviet military forces. And we could both benefit from stopping the mindless piling up of more of these terrible weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER [presiding]. Thank you.

I might say that there is a vote under way on the Senate floor, and I will ask you one or two questions before I go to vote. I will have to recess the hearing unless Senator Percy can return.

I did want to say that Newsweek magazine recently quoted one South Dakotan to the effect that public concern for arms control is no longer restricted to the "Volvo and quiche" set. This view is confirmed in the testimony I received from public witnesses in arms control field hearings in Sioux Falls, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. It is also a key dimension of recent opinion polls.

The American public has joined in a great debate on the issue of war and peace. We on this committee join with them through these current hearings. The quest for an exit to this Nation's security dilemma is vital. We have before us a number of important resolutions that offer solutions. I support this effort and look favorably upon the various ideas that seek to combine what I see as the two central ingredients of security, a secure defense structure and arms restraint.

I was pleased to hear the President's speech to the graduating class of Eureka College on Sunday. I am especially pleased that the administration has adopted a position for the START negotiations. START can now get started. Having the administration's views in hand during these hearings will assist our review of the resolutions offered to this committee.

I have not as yet fully reviewed the implications of the President's proposal. I do, however, note one important thing. The President conceded that negotiating reductions is a long-term proposition. I wonder whether there are some small steps that can be taken in the interim. I am also very interested in the ratification of a Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties as one possible path that is open to the Senate. These two agreements were signed in 1974 and 1976. These agreements would improve our ability to monitor nuclear weapons tests at reduced explosive levels. The PNE accord provides for on-site inspection. The TTB requires the exchange of test-related data. Both accords would entail the very type of cooperation on verification that would be necessary for reaching agreement on either a freeze or on deep weapons reductions. I join with our distinguished chairman, Senator Percy, in calling for movement in this area.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, will you indulge me for an opening statement that is very short?

Senator PRESSLER. Certainly I will. I did not see my friend come in. I am sorry.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I will be here for some of the testimony, though not all of it. I would ask the witnesses, if they would, to please address three issues for the record.

Senator PRESSLER. May I ask one question of my colleague? Have you voted yet?

Senator TSONGAS. No; I have not.

Senator PRESSLER. I was going to say I would go vote and you could proceed. Would that be agreeable to you? If you have to recess the hearing to make the vote, please do so, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS [presiding]. The three issues are, one, if you read the paper or heard the news this morning, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says that he is leaning toward ratification of SALT II. That leaning parallels the rather remarkable switch in attitude among some members who were opposed to SALT II previously and who have now suggested that they would be supportive. So my first question is, do you think we ought to ratify SALT II? There are two ways of doing that. One is to bring it to the Senate floor, and have the knock-down, drag-out fights over it. The second would be a sense-of-Congress resolution a la what has been suggested by Senator Mathias which says we will abide by SALT II as long as the Soviets do, without the ratification process being formalized.

The second question is, what do you think of the President's START proposal? People to whom I have spoken have been surprised by it.

In essence it demonstrates the ascendency of the Burt approach over the Perle approach. Would you comment on that?

Third, I think the greatest problem with START is not the proposal but its viability within an administration split between a START proposal and the throw-weight proposal that a Perle, Weinberger, Rostow contingency would argue for. Also, whether indeed there is a danger, as I think there is, of internal sabotage within the administration of the START proposal.

I see I am going to have to vote, but I will be right back. I wonder if you would hold up your answers to those questions, and respond to the chairman, until I return.

Mr. COLBY. Certainly.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I will only be able to bridge the gap for a couple of minutes, but I did have a chance to finish reading your testimony on the trolley car going over. I intend to send a copy of it to the President.

Mr. COLBY. I am sorry. I did not hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. I intend to send a copy of it to the President. I think it is very important testimony. I notice that Henry Kissinger this morning in the Post took a position where he joined those of us who have been calling for ratification of SALT II. I put questions yesterday to Mr. Burt, questioning him, as long as we are adhering to the treaty, are we really not just losing by not ratifying, because we are bound but the Soviets have not yet destroyed 250 nuclear warheads, which would be the beginning of that process? I think it is terribly important that we begin the process of onsite inspection.

You had mentioned that in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which we have been considering together with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, two treaties signed by Presidents Ford and Nixon, as to whether or not those should be ratified. I have been unable to get an answer on that for a year from the administration. I wonder if you would give us your judgment on the ratification of one or both of those treaties along with SALT II, as to whether it would be in the best interests of the United States to ratify those treaties and the Senate to ratify them.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Tsongas mentioned the Kissinger position, and there were two other questions that he had. He asked me if I would hold my answer on that until he came back, so if I may speak to the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties first, I think these have been very complicated treaties. They are well worked out, and they certainly should be ratified. I think it is very important to maintain a momentum of control of these weapons and not allow them to run free on the deck like a loose cannon.

I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, that we may look back on this decade as the good old days of Leonid Brezhnev rather than the more dangerous times which we may face ahead. Mr. Brezhnev has, I believe, stretched himself to try to reach agreement on various things. He has his problems and his hard-liners as well. I think it is important that we take up, ratify, and fix these treaties and not leave them open to whatever demagogue might succeed him in some bid for power, in some crisis.

The Soviets generally have complied with specific treaties which they have adopted. They have not abided by generalized treaties, and they certainly have not abided by things they have not agreed to, but I think there is ground for saying that if we ratified these, they would become fixed and would be binding upon a successor Soviet leadership. I think it is an important point to take at this point and get as much as we can under our belt as we head into the uncertain days of the Soviet succession.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is your judgment, based on all of the knowledge that you have, that the ratification by the Senate of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty and SALT II is in the best national security interests of the United States of America?

Mr. COLBY. Extremely so. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I very much feel that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am gratified to have that comment. I voted for SALT II. I felt at the time they were needed, but I feel from a practical standpoint, with the Afghanistan invasion at that time, the mood in the country was such that it was impossible to ratify. We could not carry on a rational discussion at that point. I still feel strongly about Afghanistan. I think in the Soviet interest they should withdraw their forces, and we should help them find a way to get out of the dilemma they are in there. It does not serve their interest or the world interest, and it has destroyed their credibility in the Third World, but that is their problem.

Our problem is to see that we implement treaties that are now standing and binding, and not to use force, and they have used force in contravention of the U.N. treaty. We have to work that out with them, but I still think the nuclear problem is so important that we ought to go on a separate track on that. The climate would be right, I think, for ratification of these treaties. I have no doubt the two treaties I mentioned signed by Presidents Ford and Nixon would be ratified quickly if the administration would simply say, we think they are in our best interest.

Virtually every witness we have had before us has made his mind up and come to that conclusion. I do not know why this happened. Maybe there is just too big a bureaucracy, too many people they have to go through. When you talk individually to people, they say, it is all right with me, but I do not know who the nameless, faceless people are who are holding up this thing. This is too important for the bureaucracy to sit on over there. If they do not get off the dime on this, I am just going to have to see the President and directly face him and confront him with the fact. Here is a list of people, including President Ford, who wrote me months ago about this, that these are to be ratified. We have given them a long enough time to make a decision on it. Otherwise, I will just have to bring them up before the committee.

Yesterday, Mr. Warnke said he supported SALT II ratification, but he also stated that this could only be successful if the President supported ratification. My conclusion has been, if the President supported it, we would still have a little struggle, because there would have to be some people who would have to look twice again at it in the present circumstances, but it still could be ratified.

I have no doubt that any treaty signed by President Reagan with President Brezhnev or with the Soviet Union would be ratified if he were solidly behind it. I think we would ratify SALT II if he were behind it.

Do you think it would be essential, because of the divisive debate we would carry on, that it may well interfere with the START talks, so it would be essential to try to get the administration's support for ratification of SALT II?

Mr. Colby. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that you might get away with less than the administration's support. I supported SALT II. I went around the country and debated some of my old friends who were against it. I had the impression, quite frankly, that I could win every single battle in that debate about verification, about imbalance, favoritism, and all the rest of it. I could not win the war. The reason I could not was because the American people had felt that we had let ourselves drop too far in our post-Vietnam slump, and therefore SALT II became a symbol of that slump, and a casualty of it, I might say.

Now, the coincidence of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and so forth, of course, added to that, but I think the key really is that the President did run his campaign against SALT II, calling it fatally flawed. I think we have to accept that he is committed to that position in his campaign. Therefore, I would not ask him to reverse that campaign position. I would only ask that the President take a position of neutrality, that this treaty was negotiated and signed by a President. It was submitted to the Senate, and the Senate is free at this point to ratify it.

Now, there are some procedural things about getting it back onto the floor, but I think the President could respond to a resolution by this committee or the Senate as a whole that asks that the matter be returned for ratification as a step toward ratification of the President's own program for reduction from the levels set in SALT II.

The Chairman. I regret that I must once again recess these hearings. I have an Under Secretary of State waiting for me. I have to open another hearing. I am sure another Senator will return shortly. My apologies.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Senator Tsongas [presiding]. As you were saying, Mr. Colby.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. I did partly answer some of the first question you asked, Senator, but I will redo my answer a little bit. I certainly welcome Mr. Kissinger's view of leaning toward ratification. In answer to your particular question, I certainly am for ratification. I think that the Senate could at this point make a resolution which requests that the SALT II Treaty be returned by the executive to the Senate for ratification.

Senator Tsongas. It is already here.

Mr. Colby. Is it? I thought the President withdrew it a year or so ago.

Senator Tsongas. My understanding is that it is before the committee. I believe it is on the committee calendar.

Mr. Colby. If it is on the committee calendar, then so much the better. The chairman asked me whether I thought it was necessary that the President support the ratification, and I said I did not think so. A President signed it and sent it up here. The Senate is entitled to ratify it. There are a number of treaties resting on the calendar that the Senate can ratify at this point without this administration taking any position. Of course, it would be easier if the President would support it, and I think he should, but I realize the difficulty of the President reversing his camaign position against the treaty.

Therefore, I think the Senate could ask him only to adopt a position of neutrality and let the Senate go ahead and ratify it. I do not believe, Senator, that the sense of Congress resolution that we abide by the treaty if the Soviets do is enough. Mr. Brezhnev has a considerable amount of his prestige tied up in this relationship. As I mentioned to the chairman, the problem is that we may look back on this last decade as the good old days of Leonid Brezhnev. I think it important that this be ratified at this point, formally ratified, to hold the Soviets to a commitment that was laboriously negotiated over many years, and that they have agreed to. If we did anything less than that in a formal sense, would not have acted on it. We both have been sort of tiptoeing around the problem, but I think if we took any formal step other than ratification, either Mr. Brezhnev or a successor, and we have to anticipate one some time in the reasonably near future, could take it as a rejection.

All it needs, Senator, is for one bright day for our electronic sensing machinery to report to us that an SS–18 just launched on a test, and spilled out a number of warheads other than the 10 it is presently limited to. The SALT II Treaty limited the Soviets by more warheads than the President's proposal. The SALT II Treaty limits the SS–18 to a limit of 10 warheads on that particular missile.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me interrupt you for a moment, because I think we are all pretty well familiar with the details. I have two comments. The fact that the President will not reverse himself because of his campaign merely suggests that there is nothing above politics. Even holocaust is secondary to one's political posture, which is a rather disheartening note. But secondly, let us talk about some of the political realities here. I support your position, and I would like to see SALT II ratified. What has happened since 1979 is that you have had the defeat of a number of pro-SALT Senators, and the coming to the Senate of a number who campaigned against SALT II.

Now, if the issue is passage of SALT II versus nonpassage of SALT II, that is pretty easy to answer. What happens if you are in a situation where: First, SALT II would not be ratified, where you could not get the 67 votes; or, second, it would be ratified only by the inclusion of some reservations put on by the conservatives, in essence, in an attempt to sabotage SALT II?

If that is the political reality that one faces, it seems to me the only way you could ratify SALT II in any way that made any sense would be for the President to say, look, conditions have changed, I now support SALT II as a way of getting to START. Our concern is not so much that ratification does not make a great deal of sense. Our concern is that: First, it may not get passed, which I think would be a dreadful outcome. Second, we are concerned about the passage of some reasonably foreseeable yahoo reservations that would be a slap in the face to the Soviets. Given the mood around here, with everybody skittish as can be, it really is a kind of riverboat gamble, to use Senator Baker's term. That is why some of us would prefer a kind of Mathias approach, on the theory that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Would you care to comment?

Mr. **Colby**. I respect your point that politics is the art of the possible. There is no question about it. But I really think that anything less than a ratification will be considered a nonratification by the Soviets. I think that a sense of the Congress that we abide as long as they abide leaves the thing still wide open, unfortunately. There is no way of setting up many of the procedures in SALT II without ratification, the committee, the relationships, the commitments, and all the rest of it.

We do not have the machinery to set those up in the formal way that a treaty provides.

Senator **Tsongas**. We had a meeting yesterday among some of the Democrats, and I was just trying to get a handle on where we ought to be going. I must say, we are very split. If you were faced with these two alternatives, and you can pretty well judge this by a vote count, SALT II, brought before the committee, probably would pass the committee. The committee tends to be more rational than the Senate as a whole [General laughter.]

Brought to the Senate floor, it would be defeated. That would be one option. Or passed, with the reservations that could only be an irritant. Or, the Mathias sense of Congress, we abide while they abide. If that is your de facto choice, where would you come down?

Mr. **Colby**. I think I would take No. 2, Senator. I would take ratification with the reservations, because I think the Soviets would reject the reservations, and yet the treaty would be in process. We would say that only certain elements of the treaty apply, and they would say no, the whole thing. You would have an area of nonagreement in there, but we have had those areas of nonagreement in SALT I, unilateral understandings, and that sort of thing that we had in SALT I. At least you would have the treaty fixed and not subject to a whole wide open change.

Of course, facing certain defeat, I certainly would probably give a few more of those elements in order to try to avoid the certain defeat.

Senator **Tsongas**. Does the difference between 50 and 67 loom large to the Soviet?

Mr. **Colby**. I think the formal aspect of it looms large to the Soviets, Senator. They think that we are responsible for our constitutional systems and they are responsible for their constitutional systems. They are looking for an agreement with the United States of America. How we reach that agreement is our internal business. How they reach their agreement is their internal business. I do not think they are making an agreement with 50 percent of the U.S. Senate. They are making an agreement with the United States of America.

Senator **Tsongas**. I hate to prolong this, but what would you do if you were in our situation and you did a vote count which showed that you would get, say, 57 votes for ratification?

Mr. **Colby**. I think I would find eight more votes by some kind of reservation.

Senator **Tsongas**. That would still leave you two short.

Mr. **Colby**. I am sorry. I meant 10 more.

Senator **Tsongas**. By a reservation. And if you could not?

Mr. **Colby**. If you could not, then I would let it sit where it is, quite frankly, rather than have a formal vote on it, which was less than a ratification.

Senator **Tsongas**. OK. If you could not, and the alternative was the Mathias approach, what would you do?

Mr. **Colby**. If I were the administration, I would consult with the Russians as to what their reaction would be. I would find out from them what the reaction would be, rather than our guessing what that reaction would be, and if I were in the committee here, I would ask the administration to consult with the Russians as to what their reactions would be, and to inform the committee what the Soviet reactions would be.

Senator **Tsongas**. I appreciate that. We are very much at a loss, I must say, about which direction to go in.

Mr. **Colby**. It is a tough subject. I am not concealing that.

Senator **Tsongas**. On the other two questions, what do you think of the Eureka speech, and what about the internal bickering that may sabotage it?

Mr. **Colby**. Well, on the speech, I said earlier, before you got here, Senator, that I think the President is to be commended for taking this initiative. Second, I think he is to be commended for focusing on the most dangerous problem, which is the first strike problem, because that is the dangerous and hair trigger problem that we are facing in the years ahead. At the same time, I have to say, that the proposal, while better than what might have come otherwise, merely starts an agonizingly long period of negotiation with the Soviet Union. We are approaching the 10th anniversary of SALT I, and we have been negotiating for 10 years trying to get a successor to SALT I. This extends it for some indeterminate period which cannot be less than a couple of years, I would guess, in terms of the complexity of the things that are involved.

Therefore, my conclusion to that is that the President should take SALT II and ratify it as a step toward his proposal. Second, I have not analyzed the specifics. I certainly am relieved that it did not go into the throw-weight problem, because that is all skewed, and I believe it is a very dangerous argument to raise. If we chose to make small missiles 10 and 15 years ago, it is hard to complain about the fact that they chose to make larger ones, when we decided that larger ones were insignificant then.

Senator **Pressler** [presiding]. If my colleague would yield, I have just been handed a note that we will run out of time for other witnesses here. Indeed. you can proceed with your questions. Perhaps you could submit some for the record.

Senator **Tsongas**. I do appreciate the gentle way the chairman phrased that. I would like to hear the other witnesses, Mr. Chairman. I would only point out that staff indicates that even if we consent to ratification, the President must ratify as well. Is that right?

Mr. **Colby**. The President has to sign, but it could be a ministerial function. Obviously, the President could sign a treaty which was negotiated 10 or 15 years ago, signed by another President, and say he is performing a ministerial act.

Senator TSONGAS. But the problem I have is that the President does not want to be faced with the choice.

Mr. COLBY. I know, and I am trying to offer him neutrality. If we would all agree that we would accept it as a neutral action, it would at least get us through this problem. He would have to consent to do the ministerial act because he has a choice.

Senator TSONGAS. If he does not want to yield, the best thing for him to do would be to kill it in the Senate.

Mr. COLBY. Probably.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PRESSLER. Let me ask you one question, and I will submit the rest of my questions for the record. I feel strongly that Ronald Reagan is in a unique position to enter into arms control, because, as Richard Nixon could go to China, he is trusted by the conservative wing, and he can perhaps enter into arms control agreements. I think we are moving in that direction. It is my understanding that SALT II is being observed by both sides presently. I know that that agreement had a lot of controversy that surrounded it, and people make political commitments, rightly or wrongly. SALT II has become, in essence, a political and emotional issue, making it difficult to consider it merits and demerits in a rational way.

So, I just wanted to make the observation and get your response, that if both sides are observing it and probably will continue to, maybe the President should move on to his new agreements, or to getting the PNE and Threshold Test Ban Treaties ratified. Would that be an acceptable course for you?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think certainly he should get the PNE and Threshold Treaties ratified. I think he should also get SALT II ratified, because time is running out on the arrangement under which we will abide by it but not admit we are doing so. The technology is moving. It moves every day, automatically, mindlessly, and if there is no agreement limiting its further growth, somebody is going to invent new things that throw the whole thing off. Somebody is going to run a test of some gadget that is in contravention to SALT II, and then somebody is going to get mad about it. There is going to be a failure of notification. There are going to be questions that are not satisfactorily answered through the coordination committee. All those kinds of questions are very dangerous. They can tip the balance and end tacit agreement to abide by SALT II. That is why a formal treaty agreement is required.

Senator PRESSLER. I noticed in this morning's Evans and Novak column that three people are being considered to be the front runners to succeed Brezhnev. Of course, I do not live and die by that column, but I have heard this reported elsewhere. I wonder if it would make any difference in arms control which of those three it was. One of them mentioned was Chernenkov, and I probably mispronounced that. The other mention was the current head of the KGB. The third mentioned was someone I had not heard about before, a 51-year-old member of the Politburo who is in charge of agriculture, although their agriculture has not been very strong. Would we have a change of policy on arms control with any of those three?

Mr. **Colby**. I do not think we would have much with Chernenkov, but I think the succession process in the Soviet Union would probably go through an interim stage of 2, 3, or 4 years where they talk about collegial leadership. That is what happened after Lenin, after Stalin, not so much after Khrushchev, though, because he was fired. Out of that process someone will rise. He will probably not be of the same generation of Brezhnev which eliminates people like Kirilenko and to a degree Chernenkov, because he is about 70, if I recall. They will drop down somewhere. Mr. Andropov no longer is the head of the KGB. He just quit about 2 or 3 weeks ago, to take over Suslov's job as the ideological purist. He would have a chance, although the previous attempt by an intelligence officer to seize power ended rather bloodily when Beria was eliminated, to the great relief of everybody.

The most logical relationship would be somebody coming out of the party bureaucracy, like the agricultural man whose name I do not know offhand. But I think you are really going into uncharted waters if SALT II is not ratified. If it is ratified, then I think it will be accepted and we will have continuity. If it is not ratified, then I think the chances of it being part of the play, part of the struggle for succession, and the hard-liners, soft-liners, and so forth using it as part of their negotiation and struggle, is very likely. This would open up the subject which you thought was fairly firmly fixed.

Senator **Tsongas**. Mr. Chairman, did Evans and Novack give Jack Kemp's opinion on who should succeed? [General laughter.]

Senator **Pressler**. I am not sure whose opinion it was.

My final question is this. We are having a groundswell of support, apparently, for nuclear disarmament in the United States. There is some debate as to how much of it is media hype and how much of it is real. I believe it is real. In the Soviet Union, if there were to be a similar groundswell, how would it express itself: In votes in the Supreme Soviet, either in the Nationalities Chamber or the Republics Chamber?

Mr. **Colby**. Not by a long shot. Assuming that there were a real groundswell, it would express itself in quiet meetings of party secretaries discussing that there is something going on here that we have to be aware of and responsive to. Part of the response would be to arrest the ones who are particularly vocal, but part of the response would be adoption of some propagandistic policy which seemed to relate to it. Some of the programs of the Soviet Union do come out of a desire by the people for some indication of a peaceful direction, more consumer goods, and things of this nature. So, there is a responsiveness, but it is totally foreign to our experience. I assure you, there is no Evans and Novack in the Soviet Union.

Senator **Tsongas**. If you read the paper today, there is not even a George Will.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Colby**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Pressler**. We will now hear from the rest of our witnesses as a panel. I would ask them to please come forward to the witness table. The witnesses are Herbert Scoville, Jr., who was a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Science and Technology; Dr. Hans Bethe, a Nobel Laureate in physics, he was a key figure in the Manhattan Project, that produced the first atomic bomb. Dr. Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists; Mr. Jerome Grossman of the Council for a Livable World; and Mr. Randall Kehler of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, of St. Louis, Mo.

We shall have five witnesses. Under the time constraints that we have, perhaps we could hear a statement from each of you first. Would that be agreeable

Senator TSONGAS. I would just reaffirm the question on SALT, because that will be the first decision this committee makes, and this committee is in a dither about what to do about it. We would appreciate some guidance.

Senator PRESSLER. And also, any comments on the two treaties, the PNE and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, would be useful. I wonder if we could have a 5- to 7-minute informal rule for our witnesses. I would ask you to summarize as much as possible. That would give us time to ask several questions before we go to other commitments.

I shall call on Mr. Scoville first.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR., PRESIDENT, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SCOVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In order to save as much time as possible and in light of the interests of those who are here, I will deal primarily with the SALT II problem and President Reagan's proposal, and ignore some of the others. Also a little bit on the freeze, because that is obviously an important part of this. I will do it as quickly as I can.

Let me say first that I appreciate very much the invitation of this committee to testify on behalf of the Arms Control Association. But because of the complexity of the subject and the composition of our board, I cannot provide an agreed, formal association position on all of the various ideas that have been put forward.

However, I am the President of the organization and I believe that this personal testimony is not inconsistent with the views that have been expressed by many of the Board in the past.

I will go specifically to President Reagan's May 9 START proposal and deal with that, and the rest I assume can be put into the record.

President Reagan has now proposed that strategic arms reduction talks [START], start at the end of June, and has dropped any linkage of the beginning of these negotiations with other political events around the world. He now recognizes that controlling nuclear weapons is of such overriding importance that Soviet actions in other areas should no longer be allowed to defer actions on this subject. We welcome this new move.

The opening position for START proposed by President Reagan on May 9 called for a ballistic missile warhead reduction to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels. To enhance stability, no more than one-half of these warheads would be land based. The concentration of attention on limiting the dangerous modern, accurate, land-based MIRVed ICBM's which provide incentives for initiating a nuclear attack is commendable.

It is also appropriate that he did not elaborate with details of how these reductions would be taken, since this could freeze the United States into a position that would be politically difficult to change as a result of the negotiation. In this connection, the President said we will carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union.

I would hope that in the course of the negotiations, we would not drop consideration of cruise missiles and bombers which were taken to consideration in SALT II. I would hope that the Soviet Union would carefully study this proposal and then make a serious offer. Only by such negotiations, and not by public rhetoric, will the process of meaningful nuclear arms control be promoted.

Negotiations alone are not enough. We must have concrete results to slow and stop the arms race at an early date. Therefore, it is disturbing that, as President Reagan visualizes, these negotiations will probably take many years, during which he proposes that the U.S. proceed with all of its new weapons programs. Furthermore, many of these programs call for the procurement of destabilizing weapons of the type that he feels must be eliminated in START. Administration officials, in explaining the new proposal, even mentioned that the United States would include 200 MX missiles with 2,000 warheads and a large number of counter ICBM Trident II missiles in its ceilings. Thus, it would appear that the United States was planning to use this proposal as a means of building up its destabilizing counter ICBM capability.

If the goal of a more stable balance that President Reagan claims he seeks is to be negotiated, then any treaty must provide enhanced security to both sides. If not, the negotiations will only be a means of accelerating the arms race to higher, more dangerous levels.

At this point, I would like to insert an addendum to my written statement, which was previously distributed and I think it has been passed to all of you, because I think this is particularly important in looking at the President's proposal.

A more detailed analysis of the security implications of the new START proposals based on official explanations leads to the conclusion that they would not improve the stability of the deterrent of either nation—the key goal of President Reagan's program. If the United States were to deploy 200 MX ICBM's and 12 Trident submarines with Trident II missiles carrying 10 warheads each, then we would have 4,800 warheads just within the new ceiling of 5,000.

However, this program would leave only 200 ICBM launch points while the Soviets would be allowed 2,500 ICBM warheads: a ratio of better than 12 to 1. Since the Soviets now have only about 4,000 warheads with 6,000 allowed under SALT II, and the United States has 1,000 Minuteman launch points—a ratio of 4 or 6 to 1—any U.S. ICBM "window of vulnerability" will have been opened, not closed, by the new START proposal.

Furthermore, the U.S. deterrent as a whole would have been seriously compromised, since the United States could only have 12 Trident submarines, of which at best eight would be at sea at any one time. This would greatly decrease the survivability of the submarine leg of the deterrent to Soviet anti-submarine warfare, since we now always keep more than 20 at sea. Thus, the effectiveness of two legs of the U.S. deterrent would have been seriously decreased over that existing if we stopped our programs where they are today, or adopted SALT II ceilings. The U.S. position would be much safer if it did not use up its quota by the deployment of the MX's.

The survivability of the Soviet deterrent could be similarly decreased. If they chose to keep only their SS–18's, 250 would be allowed; then the United States would have an ICBM warhead-to-launch point ratio of 10 to 1, or a total countersilo capability, ICBM's and Trident II, warhead ratio of 20 to 1. Their position would be safer if they—— I am sorry, I guess my time is up.

Senator Pressler. Why don't you summarize?

Mr. Scoville. Let me just say in conclusion if you do not do something about limiting the numbers of warheads and numbers of MIRVed missiles that are involved in these ceilings that President Reagan proposes, then it will not increase stability; it will actually decrease stability.

As far as the SALT II Treaty, very briefly I will say that the Arms Control Association, has in the past, supported SALT II and believes it was very much in our interest. We think it has a lot of provisions in it that should be taken into consideration at this time and not lost. If they can be put into formal effect, this would be very worthwhile.

As far as the freeze is concerned, we believe this concept is a very useful concept, although it may be very difficult to negotiate. But if we are really to get the dangers of destabilizing new weapons development under control, we just have to stop these programs where they are today.

Therefore, the freeze basically is a sound concept. Thank you.

[Mr. Scoville's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Herbert Scoville, Jr.[*]

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the invitation of this Committee to testify on behalf of the Arms Control Association in these hearings dealing with various proposals for curbing the nuclear arms race. Because of the very complexity of the subject and the composition of its Board, I cannot provide an agreed formal Association position on all of the various ideas that have been put forward. I am, however, President of the Arms Control Association, and I believe that this personal testimony is not inconsistent with views that have been expressed by many of the Board in the past.

I believe that these hearings are particularly timely since the nuclear arms race is escalating daily to new and more dangerous levels. The world must move beyond rhetoric to concrete actions if the catastrophe of a nuclear war is to be avoided. These hearings together with the subsequent committee and Senate actions could be a very useful step in this direction.

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[*] The Arms Control Association is a non-partisan, non-profit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of arms control and its contribution to national security. The A.C.A. Board of Directors are: Marjorie Benton; Barry E. Carter; Joseph S. Clark; William T. Coleman, Jr.; Lloyd Cutler; Sidney Drell; Adrian Fisher; Randall Forsberg; Donald M. Fraser; William C. Foster; Noel Gayler; Benjamin Huberman; Thomas L. Hughes; Henry Kendall; Betty Lall; Joseph Martin, Jr.; Robert S. McNamara; Saul H. Mendlovitz; Edward P. Morgan; John B. Rhinelander; Herbert Scoville, Jr. (President); Marshall Shulman; Gerard C. Smith (Chairman); Barbara Stuhler; Paul C. Warnke.

Nuclear weapons serve only one purpose—to deter the use of nuclear weapons by any other nation. They have no practical military war-fighting function since their use even on a limited scale would create a totally unacceptable risk of widespread destruction not only in Europe, if that is the region in which they are first exploded, but also in the United States and the Soviet Union as well.

Since both the United States and the U.S.S.R. now have such large quantities of weapons, making modest cuts in the numbers would have little significance. The key requirement for reducing the risks of the arms race is to curb dangerous technological advances. Both in our weapons programs and in our arms control positions, and the United States should carefully evaluate whether a given action increases or decreases the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. It must neither depend on using these weapons first nor provide incentives for the Soviet Union to launch an initial nuclear attack against the West.

RELATIVE U.S.-U.S.S.R. STRENGTH

A critical argument in the current debate over the appropriate measures for reducing the risk of nuclear war has been whether the United States is inferior, equal to, or superior to the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear capabilities. The numbers or yield of nuclear weapons have little meaning in this context since both sides have such large stockpiles capable of such widespread destruction. The fact that the United States has more than 9,000 strategic warheads compared to the Soviet Union's slightly more than 7,000 does not present the United States with any advantage that can be used for military or political purposes. The fact that the Soviet Union has more ICBMs with greater throw-weight and larger yield warheads likewise gives them no military advantage and should not give them a political one unless we misrepresent our strength.

The key characteristics that determine the effectiveness of a strategic deterrent force is the obvious ability of this force to survive any attack by the other nation and of its warheads to be able to penetrate to designated targets in a retaliatory attack. The ABM Treaty of 1972 has assured the needed penetration capability so that attention should be focused on the survivability of the overall strategic force.

Although both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have a survivable strategic deterrent, there is no question that in this critical characteristic the United States is far better off than is the Soviet Union. As the land-based missile systems of both countries became theoretically vulnerable to a countersilo attack, survivability depends more and more on the capabilities of the ballistic missile submarines, supplemented by intercontinental bombers. The United States in the 1960s and 1970s made the proper decision and placed only about 25 percent of its warheads on land-based ICBMs, while the Soviet Union placed approximately 75 percent of its deterrent on them.

The United States has approximately 3,000 warheads at sea on invulnerable submarines at all times, while the Soviet Union, according to testimony by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are only able to maintain 10 to 15 percent of their submarines at sea at one time. Since the Soviet Union has a total of less than 2,000 submarine ballistic missile warheads, this would mean that they had only 200 to 300 warheads (1/10 of the U.S. number) available for retaliation. Furthermore, American submarines are far less vulnerable than Soviet ones; theirs are noiser and far more susceptible to antisubmarine warfare measures.

Finally, there is no question that the United States has a far superior intercontinental bomber force than does the Soviet Union. We have more and better long-range bombers and bases from which to operate them. Thus it is plainly misleading, and in fact does our security a disservice, to preach that the United States has an inferior strategic force and a questionable capability to retaliate after a Soviet attack. The United States has a strong, survivable overall deterrent force.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MAY 9 START PROPOSAL

President Reagan has now proposed that Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) start at the end of June and has dropped any linkage of the beginning of these negotiations with other political events around the world. He now recognizes that controlling nuclear weapons is of such overriding importance that Soviet actions in other areas should no longer be allowed to defer actions on this subject. We welcome this new move.

The opening position for START proposed by President Reagan on May 9 called for a warhead reduction to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels. To enhance stability, no more than one-half of these warheads would be land-based. The concentration of attention on limiting the dangerous modern, accurate, land-based ICBMs, which provide incentives for initiating a nuclear attack, is commendable. It is also appropriate that he did not elaborate with details of how these reductions would be taken since this could freeze the United States into a position that would be politically difficult to change as a result of negotiation. In this connection the President said we will carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. I would hope that he would consider limitations on all types of cruise missiles and on bombers as well as ballistic missiles. I would also hope that the Soviet Union would carefully study this proposal and then make a serious counter-offer. Only by such negotiations and not by public rhetoric will the process of meaningful nuclear arms control be promoted.

Negotiations alone are not enough: we need concrete measures to slow and stop the arms race at an early date. Therefore, it is disturbing that, as President Reagan visualizes, these negotiations will probably take many years during which he proposes that the U.S. proceed with all of its new programs. Furthermore, many of these programs call for the procurement of destabilizing weapons of the type that he feels must be eliminated in START. Adminisration officials in explaining the new proposal, even mentioned that the United States would include 200 MX missiles with 2,000 warheads and a large number of counter ICBM Trident II missiles in its ceilings. Thus, it would appear that the United States were planning to use this proposal as a means of building up its destabilizing counter ICBM capability. If the goal of a more stable balance that President Reagan claims he seeks is to be negotiated, then any Treaty must provide enhanced security to both sides. If not the negotiations will only be a means of accelerating the arms race to higher, more dangerous levels.

STRATEGIC STABILITY UNDER START PROPOSAL

A more detailed analysis of the security implications of the new START proposals based on official explanations leads to the conclusion that they would not improve the stability of the deterrent of either nation, the key goal of President Reagan's program. If the United States were to deploy 200 MX ICBMs and 12 Trident submarines with Trident II missiles carrying 10 warheads each, then we would have 4,880 warheads, just within the new ceilings of 5,000. However, this program would leave only 200 ICBM launch points while the Soviets would be allowed 2,500 ICBM warheads, a ratio of better than 12 to 1. Since the Soviets now have only about 4,000 warheads with 6,000 allowed under SALT II and the United States has 1,000 Minuteman launch points (a ratio of 4 or 6 to 1), any U.S. ICBM "window of vulnerability" will have been opened wider by the new START proposal.

Furthermore, the U.S. deterrent as a whole would have been seriously compromised, since the United States could only have 12 Trident submarines of which at best eight would be at sea at any one time. This would greatly decrease the vulnerability of the submarine leg of the deterrent to Soviet antisubmarine warfare since we now always keep more than 20 at sea. Thus, the effectiveness of two legs of the U.S. deterrent would have been seriously decreased over that existing if we stopped our programs where they are today or adopted the SALT II ceilings. The U.S. position would be much safer if it did not use up its quota by the deployment of the MXs.

The survivability of the Soviet deterrent could be similarly decreased. If they chose to keep only their SS–18s (250 would be allowed), then the United States would have an ICBM warhead to launchpoint ratio of 10 to 1 or a total countersilo (ICBM and Trident II) warhead ratio of 20 to 1. Their position would be safer if they scrapped their SS–18s and kept only SS–19s and SS–17s, but the ratios would still be 4 to 1 and 8 to 1. Thus, in the regime of the new START proposal the deterrents of both sides would be compromised from that now existing and the stability of the strategic balance very seriously upset. The START proposal will not achieve the President's goal of improved stability but will instead increase the likelihood of a first strike. The security of both countries would be improved if there were also restrictions on the number of MIRVed missiles allowed within the quotas, particularly those with large numbers of warheads.

SALT II

In 1979, the Board of the Arms Control Association strongly supported the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. We believed that it would have enhanced U.S. security, would have constituted important first steps in reducing the levels of offensive nuclear weapons and in curbing dangerous new technologies, and would have improved our ability to evaluate the nature of the Soviet strategic threat. We believed that the Treaty contained many useful arrangements for dealing with modern weapons systems and for verifying compliance. At that time we warned that the failure to ban all new generation ICBMs, which could provide a destabilizing countersilo capability, was a serious loophole in the Treaty and could lead to an increased risk of nuclear war. Despite this shortcoming in the SALT II Treaty, it is still a useful agreement and it would be unfortunate to lose the ground gained in its negotiation.

We are therefore very pleased that the Governments of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have informally agreed not to take actions that were inconsistent with the prohibitions in SALT II, and that President Reagan in his new strategic program announced on October 2, 1981, did not include any weapons developments that would have been banned by the SALT II Treaty. His May 9, 1982 proposal is an extension of SALT II, and does not contravene any of the provisions of the basic Treaty. We would hope that this policy of not undercutting the Treaty will continue until a new agreement is reached.

Three years have passed since the SALT II Treaty was signed, and therefore some of the provisions will clearly require updating. For example, the Protocol, which had temporary restrictions on mobile ICBMs and sea and ground-based cruise missiles, expired in December 1981, so new arrangements must be included in any updated treaty to deal with these weapons. Similarly, the Soviet Union would have had to scrap by December 1981, approximately 250 delivery vehicles in order to meet the overall 2,250 ceiling. They cannot be expected to take such an action in the absence of a ratified treaty, so the date for this or deeper reductions will have to be renegotiated. Furthermore the SALT II Treaty would have expired in 1985, and any new treaty should extend at least beyond the end of this decade.

I would hope that in the process of any possible future negotiations, now known as START, that the loophole left for the development of one new type of ICBM would be closed. The difficulties that the United States is having in finding any way of deploying the MX missile so that it would be invulnerable to a Soviet attack, should eliminate the U.S. requirement of keeping this open option to deploy a new MIRVed ICBM. At the same time arrangements should be worked out for lowering the ceilings on MIRVed SS–18s. In summary, we believe that the SALT II Treaty is a useful starting point for START, and hope that instead of scrapping its many useful provisions, these be used as a basis for moving toward even more significant limitations on new strategic weapons systems.

FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS

The general concept of a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, is not a new one. Back in 1964 the United States made similar proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In 1969 the idea of stopping strategic nuclear weapons programs where they were was given serious consideration by the U.S. Government as an opening position for the SALT negotiations. Thus, one should not look at the various proposals which have been made around the country and incorporated in resolutions for Senate consideration as radical departures from previous arms control positions. The basic concept of halting the arms race where it is today is certainly sound, and one that has already proved invaluable in providing a framework for the American public to express its concerns over the policies of reliance on more new dangerous nuclear weapons while largely ignoring actions to control such weapons. It is recognized, however, that the negotiation and implementation of any specific freeze proposal could be very difficult, and that it would be wrong to be optimistic that any across the board version could be put into effect on short notice. In practice it may be necessary to freeze certain critical elements of the programs first and deal with others on a less rapid time schedule. However, in such negotiations the advantage of stopping a wide range of programs where they are today should not be sacrificed lightly.

A major benefit of a mutual freeze is that it would bring to a halt the incorporation of dangerous new weapons technologies into the strategic forces of both countries. Developments that could threaten the mutual deterrent balance would be stopped. Since these are the most important factors leading to the increased risk of a nuclear war, a freeze would be a major step forward. It is important, however, that if this goal is to be achieved any freeze take effect at an early date, for nothing would be accomplished if it were delayed to the point where both the U.S.S.R. and the United States already had first strike capabilities against the others land-based deterrent force. Allowing both sides to acquire a multitude of new weapons systems before a freeze took effect would defeat its very purpose.

A mutual freeze would provide a solid base for future reductions in the force levels of both sides. One of the difficulties in the previous SALT negotiations has been that new weapons were being developed and deployed while the detailed negotiations were inching along. As a consequence the negotiators were always dealing with moving targets. If the weapons systems could be frozen at current levels and technologies, this difficulty could be alleviated, and reductions more easily accomplised. Since there is a mutual deterrent posture today, it makes no sense to procure a wide variety of new weapons at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars in order to achieve reductions below the levels now existing. We have other uses, both military and civilian, for our dollars and scarce resources. Furthermore, experience in arms control negotiations has shown that it is far easier to stop a weapons program before it is started than it is to get rid of weapons which have already been procured. In practice if we continue the arms race unchecked and both countries acquire the new weapons in their current programs, then we would be very fortunate if we could ever agree to reducing weapons to as low as the levels that exist today. Instead of trying to get reductions now while we build up and then freeze later, we should freeze now and then initiate a continuing process of reductions until we have significantly lowered the risk of a nuclear conflict.

The main argument that has been raised against a freeze at current levels is that it, in the words of Secretary of State Haig, "would perpetuate an unstable and unequal military balance." For the reasons that I have already stated we do not believe that the current strategic balance is unstable or to the U.S. disadvantage. One can always select a single type of weapon or a certain weapons characteristic in order to claim that one side or the other is inferior. There are inevitable asymmetries in the U.S. and the Soviet strategic forces. If each side were to claim that it must rectify any individual imbalance before agreeing to a freeze or to reductions, then we have only a prescription for a continuing arms race to higher and more dangerous levels. We must look at the deterrent posture as a whole. At the present time both sides have a secure deterrent—if anything the United States is better off. The West placed its major reliance both for European and U.S. strategic forces in invaluable submarine-based missiles instead of potentially vulnerable land-based systems. The present strategic balance cannot be used as a Western excuse for not accepting a freeze and moving on to significant reductions.

The second argument, that a mutual freeze now would remove Soviet incentives for reductions, is just another version to blackmail the Soviets into halting their programs. It is an effective way of ensuring that weapons stockpiles increase; but it has proven ineffective in persuading the Soviets to exercise restraint.

A classic example of the failure of this policy is the deployment of MIRVs, the multiple warheads put on single missiles beginning in the early 1970's. The United States was about five years ahead of the Soviets in this technology, and rather than attempt to negotiate a halt to MIRV programs, the United States decided to move ahead without any limitations. It was argued that this program was necessary to get the Soviets to back out of a MIRV race.

As might have been expected, the opposite occurred. The Soviets followed in our MIRV footsteps, first with tests, then with deployment of first-generation types and finally with sophisticated guidance systems. Now we see these as a major threat to our ICBMs. President Reagan has become alarmed over a "window of vulnerability" brought on by Soviet MIRVs, proposes to spend hundreds of billions of dollars as a response to this threat, and now says we can't freeze our nuclear programs until this imagined Soviet superiority is eliminated.

VERIFICATION

Verification is the one issue that applies to all alternatives: President Reagan's START proposal, SALT II, a freeze at current levels, reductions and even continued arms buildups without arms control. Can we verify the size and characteristics of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces and can we be sure that reductions are actually being made?

First, it should be understood that satisfactory verification of any agreement to set ceilings, freeze or reduce nuclear weapons does not require that any violations, no matter how insignificant, has to have a high probability of detection as some who wish to foreclose any arms limitation would like the public to believe. When the United States has 2,000 strategic delivery vehicles, the secret Soviet production of a small number of missiles is not a security risk. President Reagan's INF negotiator, Paul Nitze, has in the past testified before this Committee that verification capabilities should be tailored to the security significance of any violation.

In 1979, the Arms Control Association testified that it believed that the SALT II Treaty could be satisfactorily verified. This conclusion is even more supportable today. Since a freeze would mean a stop to *all* activities in any weapons program, the detection of even one missile or bomber would be evidence of a violation. This greatly simplifies verification over that required for monitoring a ceiling such as was agreed to in SALT II. For example, a ceiling on small, mobile, land or sea-based cruise missiles would be hard to verify because one could never be sure whether a specific missile was in the allowed quota or not. A total ban on testing, production and deployment could be checked with high confidence since the chances would be high of detecting a single missile out of any significant deployment.

In a freeze, certain elements would have a higher probability of detection than others. Thus, although the production of new missiles is difficult to monitor, particularly small ones that can be confused with other types of hardware, testing and deployment would be much easier to verify by the use of technical intelligence. Therefore, since all three are required to generate a new threat, some uncertainty on production can be compensated for by information on the other two phases of the weapons cycle.

Most recent public attention has been focused on missiles and bombers, but if the freeze were to include nuclear testing and the production of fissionable material for more warheads, this too can be verified. The Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations have already worked out the essential verification arrangements, which include unmanned seismic stations in the Soviet Union and the principle of on-site inspections to clarify the nature of ambiguous events. Satisfactory verification of a freeze on additional fissionable material production is eased by the existence on both sides of hundreds of thousands of pounds of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. It would be virtually impossible for secret diversion from nuclear power plants or new clandestine production facilities to provide significant additions to these stockpiles without detection by our intelligence.

Reductions in strategic arms can also be verified without intrusive inspection. There now exist procedures under SALT I for monitoring by our intelligence agencies the destruction of strategic delivery systems. In addition, procedures were worked out and actually tested in the United States in the 1960's for withdrawing nuclear weapons from stockpiles and transferring the fissionable material in them to peaceful programs.

In sum, verification cannot be used as an excuse for failing to proceed now with SALT II, a freeze at current levels, or significant reductions. The United States doesn't need to build up its stockpiles to achieve parity first. It can reduce and be confident that the existing strategic deterrent balance is maintained. A mutual and verifiable freeze at current levels is a sound concept for starting the process of reducing nuclear arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The control of nuclear weapons is not restricted to limitations on the size and characteristics of weapons stockpiles and to limitations on their testing, production, and deployment. Declaratory strategies for how and when such weapons can be used are very important aspects of any arms control program. Ever since nuclear weapons were first deployed in Europe in the early 1950's, it has been NATO policy to declare that they might be used first in response to aggression with conventional weapons by the Soviet Union. However, in Latin America the United States in acceding to Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin American Free Zone Treaty) undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to that Treaty.

Recently the issue of a declaratory no first use policy in the European context has been raised in an article in *Foreign Affairs* by two members of the Arms Control Association's Board, Gerard Smith, Chairman, and Robert S. McNamara together with McGeorge Bundy and George F. Kennan. They believed that the time was right for a serious re-evaluation of this policy in light of the risks that the use of nuclear weapons would present to our NATO allies and to the whole world. They strongly affirmed that the right way to maintain the record of the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 "is to recognize that in the age of massive thermonuclear overkill it no longer makes sense—if it ever did—to hold these weapons for any other purpose than the prevention of their use."

Nuclear weapons cannot be relied on to solve military problems, such as to repel a tank attack, since if they were ever used for that purpose they would invite an unparalleled disaster in Europe and probably elsewhere. Nuclear weapons should not be used as a crutch to avoid facing up to the difficult political and military decisions necessary to providing the West with a conventional capability to deter possible Soviet conventional attacks. Although a decision to change this declaratory policy cannot be quickly made, it is high time that it become a subject of serious discussion.

SUMMARY

The United States is not in an inferior strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and has a strong survivable deterrent.

President Reagan's recent proposal is a welcome move toward early resumption of negotiations to control intercontinental weapons systems. The focus on destabilizing, land-based, ballistic missiles is appropriate but, if concrete results are to be negotiated, the reductions must truly improve the stability of the mutual strategic balance. The postponement of any limitations on bombers and cruise missiles is also unfortunate.

The SALT II Treaty still offers a sound basis for future arms control agreements and I urge that as many of its benefits as possible, together with further restrictions on the nuclear arms race, be incorporated in START.

Although there will be many practical problems in achieving a freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it is a useful concept which can end the technological arms race and lead to significant reductions. A freeze at current levels would not be inimical to U.S. security but would instead improve it. It should be possible to work out verification arrangements which ensure that the United States could detect significant violations.

The United States in consultation with its allies should give serious consideration to a no first use of nuclear weapons policy throughout the world and develop means of coping with potential Soviet aggression with conventional weapons by non-nuclear means.

Senator Pressler. Thank you.

Next, we will hear from Dr. Hans Bethe.

STATEMENT OF HANS A. BETHE, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Bethe. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to be able to testify to you. I would like first to talk about something different from SALT because I think it is very important. Namely, several members of the Government have stated repeatedly that we are inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic weapons and that we need to build up our weapons. In my opinion, there is no such inferiority. We have more nuclear warheads than the Russians, and I consider this to be the most important measure of relative strength.

We are told that there is a window of vulnerability because the Russians might use their large ICBM's to destroy our land-based ICBM's. Leaving the question of technical feasibility aside, I claim that such a first strike would give no significant military advantage to the Russians.

The reason is that ICBM's make up only one-quarter of our strategic nuclear forces, as measured by the number of warheads. One-half of our force is on invulnerable nuclear-powered submarines, and another one-quarter is on bombers, many of which can take off from their widely dispersed airfields in case of an alert. We would therefore have ample striking force left even if all our ICBM's were destroyed.

It is also often stated that while the Russians have introduced many new weapons, we have stood still. In fact, our envelope, the envelopes of our missiles, have remained the same but we have progressed from Minuteman 1 to 2 to 3, and in the latter, we have introduced MIRV, a development which was greatly to the advantage of the Russians because with their greater throw-weight they could imitate MIRV and thereby get their present great striking capability.

In summary, we have progressed from Polaris to Poseidon, and then to Trident I. The latter represents very significant progress. The range of Trident I is 4,000 miles, compared to about 2,000 for Poeidon. This permits our submarines to operate over most of the North Atlantic and to still hit Russia. Submarines are very difficult to find. Now that they can roam over such a vast area of ocean, they are far more elusive. This greatly enhances their invulnerability. The United States has not stood still in nuclear weapons deployment.

The most important addition to our arsenal is the cruise missile which is deployed on our B–52's. The cruise missile can penetrate into the Soviet Union. No defense system against it exists. The elaborate and costly Russian air defense system has been obsolete by the cruise missile, 3,000 of which are to be installed on our bombers.

Because of this, we do not need the new bomber, the B–1, and even less, its followup, the Stealth. Perhaps the B–52 will eventually have to be replaced, but I cannot see why this replacement should have elaborate electronic equipment to penetrate into Russia; equipment which accounts for the enormous cost of B–1 and Stealth. Penetration can be achieved much more effectively and cheaply by the cruise missile.

We are not inferior to the Russians in strategic armaments, but we, the Russians and western Europe are severely threatened by the possibility that the enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons on both sides may some day be used. Our only hope lies in substantial reduction of these armaments. A good first step would be the ratification of the SALT II agreement by the Senate. The advantages of doing so have been persuasively demonstrated by Senator Hart in the New York Times of May 2.

Among other things, if SALT II had been ratified in 1980, the Russians would now have 250 fewer strategic missiles than they actually have, and they could not continue their buildup. Obviously, we must do more.

I was happy to see that President Reagan has now proposed a plan for negotiating arms reductions with the Soviet Union. The first phase of this plan calls for a reduction in the number of warheads on each side from about 7,500 to about 5,000, and a significant but apparently not specified reduction in the number of missiles. This seems to me a reasonable and equitable plan.

The proposed second phase, to equalize the throw-weight of the missiles, may be very difficult to negotiate. In any case, there will be counter-proposals by the Soviets and it will be vitally important to choose an American negotiator who combines flexibility with firmness and is devoted to the goal of arms reduction and reaching an agreement with the Soviets.

Negotiations with the Russians are difficult and lengthy, in any case. SALT II took nearly 7 years to negotiate. We cannot wait that long. We must stop the arms race by measures which are not subject to such long delay.

I find most attractive the proposal by George Kennan, the famous expert on the Soviet Union which has been modified by various people. The plan calls for similar reductions by both superpowers, let us assume by 5 percent of the existing force per year. Dr. Stone will continue on this in his own testimony. Each side would choose the weapons it wants to retire and compliance could easily be verified by our satellites.

This plan is so simple that it might be agreed on with very brief negotiation like the limited test ban in 1963, but it would, in fact, not require any agreement. We could make such a reduction and challenge the Russians to do the same. If they do so, we would make another similar reduction the following year, and so on.

To summarize, our strategic forces are, if anything, superior to the Soviets'. Our national security and that of our allies is most threatened by the grotesque size and continuing growth of both nuclear arsenals. Thank you.

[Dr. Bethe's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS A. BETHE

My name is Hans A. Bethe. I have been a Professor of Physics at Cornell University since 1935. In 1967 I was awarded the Nobel Prize for studies of nuclear reactions in the stars. I was Leader of the Theoretical Division of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory from 1943 to 1945 when that Laboratory developed the first atomic bomb. I have consulted for the Laboratory at least once a year. I was a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1957 to 1960, and remained a member of its Strategic Military Panel until 1969 when the Panel was dissolved. In 1958 I participated in the Experts Conference in Geneva which discussed the certification of a ban on weapons tests, and led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. I am testifying on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists of Cambridge, Massachusetts, but the ideas expressed in my testimony are my own.

Several members of the government have stated repeatedly that we are inferior to the Soviet Union in strategic weapons, and that we need to build up our weapons. In my opinion there is no such inferiority. We have more nuclear warheads than the Russians, and I consider this to be the most important measure of relative strength. In addition, as Dr. Kissinger stressed many years ago, at the present level of strategic armaments superiority in numbers or megatons has no meaning.

We are told that there is a window of vulnerability because the Russians might use their large ICBMs to destroy our land-based ICBMs. It is generally agreed that this is not possible now, but with the improving accuracy of Russian missiles it might become possible in a few years. Leaving the question of the technical feasibility aside, I claim that such a first strike would give no significant military advantage to the Russians.

The reason is that ICBMs make up only one-fourth of our strategic nuclear forces, as measured by the number of warheads. One-half of our force is on invulnerable nuclear-powered submarines, and another one-fourth is on bombers, many of which can take off from their widely dispersed airfields in case of an alert. We would therefore have ample striking force left even if all our ICBMs were destroyed.

An attack on our ICBMs would surely arouse the will to fight in the American people. The fallout from such an attack would kill millions of Americans. This would have an even more profound psychological effect than Pearl Harbor, but would have less military consequences than Pearl Harbor did.

It is sometimes argued that our submarine-based nuclear missiles do not have sufficient accuracy. However, if a Russian attack on our ICBMs is to make any sense at all, it would be accompanied by a massive invasion of Western Europe. The military installations for such an attack (airfields, munitions and fuel storage depots), and the staging areas for an invasion, are all soft targets for which our submarine-based missiles would have plenty of accuracy. Therefore, a hypothetical first-strike against our ICBMs would have practically no effect on our war-fighting capability. Therefore the window of vulnerability does not exist.

It is also often claimed that the Russians have introduced many new weapons of great power, such as the SS-18, -19, and -20, while we have done nothing. The latter statement is not true. While the outer envelope of our Minuteman ICBM has remained the same, we have progressed from Minuteman-1 to 2 to 3, and in the latter we have introduced MIRV, a development which the Russians imitated, and which led them to their great striking capability. More important, on our submarines we have progressed from the Polaris warhead to the Poseidon, and then to Trident I. The latter represents very significant progress: The range of Trident I is 4,000 miles, compared to about 2,000 for Poseidon. This permits our submarines to operate over most of the North Atlantic, and to still hit Russia. Submarines at sea are very difficult to find. Now that they can roam over such a vast area of ocean, they are far more elusive. This greatly enhances their invulnerability. The United States has not stood still in nuclear weapons deployment.

The most important addition to our arsenal is the cruise missile, which is being deployed on our B-52 bombers. The cruise missile can penetrate into the Soviet Union: No defense system against it exists. The elaborate and costly Russian air defense system has been made obsolete by the cruise missile, 3,000 of which are to be installed on our bombers. In short we have, and will continue to have into the foreseeable future, two completely independent and essentially invulnerable strategic forces.

Because the cruise missile can penetrate the Soviet Union as no bomber can, and because it has extreme accuracy, we do not need a new bomber, the B-1, and even less its follow-up, the STEALTH. Perhaps the B-52 will eventually have to be replaced, but I cannot see why this replacement should have elaborate electronic equipment to penetrate into Russia, equipment which accounts for the enormous cost of B-1 and STEALTH. Penetration can be achieved much more effectively and cheaply by the cruise missile.

The Government has stated that we need parity in strategic forces in every category. If this means that we need parity also in ICBMs, I disagree. With the increasing accuracy of missiles, on both sides, all land-based weapons will become vulnerable. I cannot think of any deployment on land which will be secure, and in my opinion the deployment of MX is a futile expenditure of money. We should maintain the emphasis on submarine and bomber forces; this makes our forces largely invulnerable, and thereby superior to those of the Soviets. If anyone has a window of vulnerability, it is the Soviet Union.

As I have said, several of our weapons programs are unnecessary: the B-1, the STEALTH, and the MX. But the submarine program deserves our full support, especially the further improvement of secure communication links to our submarines, as has been rightly emphasized by this Administration. Also, if we wish to decrease our dependence on nuclear weapons in Europe, a goal which I strongly support, our conventional forces must be built up, especially by exploiting our available high-technology in anti-tank weapons.

We are not inferior to the Russians in strategic armaments. But we, the Russians, and Western Europe, are severely threatened by the possibility that the enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons on both sides may some day be used. Our only hope lies in substantial reduction of these armaments. A good first step would be the ratification of the SALT II agreement by the Senate. The advantages of doing so have been persuasively demonstrated by Senator Hart in the New York Times of May 2. Among other things, if SALT II had been ratified in 1980, the Russians would now have 250 fewer strategic missiles than they actually have, and they could not continue their buildup.

Obviously, we must do more. I was happy to see that President Reagan has now proposed a plan for negotiating arms reductions with the Soviet Union. The first phase of this plan calls for a reduction of the number of warheads on each side from about 7,500 to about 5,000, and a significant (but apparently not specified) reduction in the number of missiles. This seems to me a reasonable and equitable plan. The proposed second phase, to equalize the throw-weight of the missiles, may be very difficult to negotiate. It will be vitally important to choose an American negotiator who combines flexibility with firmness, and is devoted to the goal of arms reduction and reaching an agreement with the Soviets.

Negotiations with the Russians are difficult and lengthy in any case. The SALT II treaty took 6 years to negotiate. We cannot wait that long. We must stop the arms race by measures which are not subject to such long delay. I find most attractive the proposal by George Kennan, the famous expert on the Soviet Union, which has recently been revived by Admiral Gayler in the New York Times Magazine of April 25. The plan calls for similar reductions by both superpowers, let's assume by 5 percent of the existing force per year. Each side would choose the weapons it wants to retire, and compliance could easily be verified by our satellites. This plan is so simple that it might be agreed on with very brief negotiation, like the Limited Test Ban in 1963. But it would, in fact, not require any agreement: we could make such a reduction, and challenge the Russians to do the same. If they do so, we would make another similar reduction the following year, and so on. This would not require any treaty, and it would enhance our security.

Such mutual reductions could not replace a negotiated treaty, which has a permanence far beyond the bilateral reductions which I just proposed. Furthermore, a treaty could optimize the balance and invulnerability of the two strategic forces. This would remove the threat of pre-emptive strikes, and the current hair-trigger readiness that could lead to nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

To summarize:

Our strategic forces are, if anything, superior to the Soviet's;

Our national security, and that of our allies, is most threatened by the grotesque size and continuing growth of both nuclear arsenals.

These are the basic facts. Once they are recognized, the essential features of a sound national security policy become apparent.

[The following letter was subsequently supplied for the record:]

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
FLOYD R. NEWMAN LABORATORY OF NUCLEAR STUDIES,
Ithaca, N.Y., May 14, 1982.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: During the hearings yesterday, May 13, and particularly while listening to the testimony of Dr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the following additional points occurred to me. Perhaps some of them might be useful to the Committee when making its policy decision on May 20. In any case, I would appreciate it if you add these collections to my testimony of yesterday.

1. Mr. Rostow appeared to be obsessed with the danger to our land-based ICBM. As I showed in my main testimony, the land-based ICBM is not really important. Even if it were completely destroyed, we would still retain the main part of our strategic forces, about 75 percent of our warheads. Because the Soviets know this perfectly well, it is absurd that they attempt to knock out our ICBM in a first-strike.

2. President Reagan's announced plan of limiting land-based nuclear warheads to 2,500 on each side will not remove the danger to our ICBM. What remains

will still be ample to destroy our ICBM, if the Soviets were to attempt this insane strategy.

3. It was also very disturbing to hear Mr. Rostow's statement that there can be no firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. This is exactly where the big firebreak ought to be.

4. The arithmetic of Dr. Jeremy Stone, of the Federation of American Scientists, seems to me very important: It shows that SALT II, coupled with a 33 percent reduction of forces on each side, would arrive at the goals of President Reagan, including substantial reduction of the heaviest Soviet missiles. It would not quite accomplish the President's goal of having a limit of 2,500 ICBM's for the Soviets, but this limit may not be negotiable in any case.

5. SALT II has the very important provision that neither side is permitted to dig new holes for ICBM's, or increase the size of existing holes except by a small fraction. This is a very important provision for the purpose of limiting Russian increase of their ICBM force. Cancellation of SALT II would permit the Soviets to add as many large ICBM's as they want.

Incidentally, the same stipulation of SALT II would prevent the implementations of the present scheme of the Air Force called "Dense Pack," in which ICBM's would be placed very close together, in a new area.

6. Speedy reduction of the arsenals on both sides is essential. As was pointed out by Mr. Kehler in the hearings yesterday morning, the large number of Americans endorsing the Freeze will not wait for years. Only by building on SALT II and combining this with a 33-percent reduction on each side can there be any hope to achieve significant arms control quickly.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Yours sincerely,

HANS A. BETHE.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you. Dr. Stone?

STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE, DIRECTOR, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. STONE. Mr. Chairman, if I may have my testimony submitted in the record in its entirety, I would then respond orally.

Senator PRESSLER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STONE. I would like to address Senator Tsongas' questions, which indeed, my testimony is directed toward in any case.

I think, Senator Tsongas, that my testimony has the solution to the problem you have posed: How to quickly design a treaty or arrangement that would bring together President Reagan's proposal and the SALT II Treaty so that the administration would be captured by having been brought in. The SALT II dilemma that you assert would be solved by having his support for the ratification of the resulting treaty.

Now, there is a mathematical fact which is at the heart of my testimony, which gives a way to do that. As this committee knows, in 1979, it proposed that, after the SALT II Treaty was ratified, you would like to shrink the levels and sublevels of SALT II by a small percentage each year. I remember this very clearly, Mr. Chairman, because I testified in support of this. This was called the McGovern-Chafee resolution.

Indeed, it was revealed, last week, that President Carter proposed this method to Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979, in June, and asked Mr. Brezhnev if, during the period of the SALT II Treaty, Mr. Brezhnev would agree to reduce the limits and sublimits of SALT II by 5 percent each year, during the course of the treaty.

Now, this was proposed to Mr. Brezhnev only because, of course, the Defense Department had agreed to it, and the administration had staffed it out through its agencies. I know this well because indeed, there was interest in it in the military bureaucracies. They saw the advantages of lowering the limit steadily by 5 percent each year.

Now, the mathematical fact which is at the heart of my testimony links these propositions of the Carter administration to the desire of the Reagan administration. The mathematical fact is this: If you do shrink the limits and sublevels of SALT II by one-third over a period of time, you will force the Soviet Union to a 30 percent—that is, a virtually one-third reduction in their ballistic missile warheads, which is the heart of President Reagan's plan.

In other words, if you take these already staffed-out proposals from the last administration—SALT II on the one hand and percentage reductions at the levels and sublevels of SALT II—if you take those two propositions and ask that the limits and sublimits of SALT II be reduced by one-third—the same number that President Reagan referred to—you will force the Soviet Union to a one-third reduction in ballistic missile warheads. You will not force the United States to a one-third reduction of ballistic warheads, but you will permit such a reduction. Therefore, Mr. Reagan could say that he had quickly put into place this one-third reduction in warheads desired, and you might, therefore, get him to accept the SALT II Treaty as a context in which his reduction would go forward.

In the absence, Senator Tsongas, of some context, his reduction is, in any case, meaningless because so many other things can continue. My testimony dilates on the advantages of this mechanism. Let me concede that even if you do shrink the levels and sublevels of SALT II by one-third and force the Soviet Union to a one-third reduction in its warheads, you would not force the Soviet Union to get below the 2,500 warheads on land, a secondary condition that Mr. Reagan stated. But that secondary condition provides us with nothing whatsoever that we have to do, since we have only 2,150 warheads on land, therefore, it cannot be imagined that the Soviet Union would accept that secondary position in its entirety.

My proposal, however, would move the Soviet Union 50 percent of the way, at least, toward the second condition—surely, as far as they could be expected to go. Therefore, I think this proposal should capture the support of the Reagan administration.

But let me say, Senator Tsongas, in response to your second question, that the Reagan administration is not clear on what, in fact, it wants to propose. And the surest sign of this was that, between the time of the New York Times article saying it wanted 50 percent reduction in missiles and the time the President gave his speech, a period of only a few days, the Reagan administration evidently changed its position. It decided to include throw-weight in the second phase of negotiations and to talk about only "significant" reductions in missiles, rather than 50 percent reductions in missiles.

Background briefings said 15 percent was what "significant" might mean. So in other words, you are right. The Reagan administration has not decided what its proposal will be. This seems to me all the more reason to think that it might be captured by the idea of using the SALT II Treaty as the context for its reductions. Under this method, after all, the heavy missiles would have to go down by a third. The SS-70's and SS-19's would have to go down also. And the Russians would get limits on cruise missiles on bombers limited because of the treaty. There would be many advantages on both sides to maintaining this context. In any case, the administration will have to find some context.

So to summarize, Mr. Chairman, the solution to your problem, it seems to me, is to link Mr. Reagan's proposal to the SALT II Treaty, thus getting support for the SALT II Treaty, and then having this approved in one fashion or another as a package.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Stone's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEREMY J. STONE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a special pleasure to be able to provide this testimony to the Committee, containing as it does so much reference to the splendid and very relevant work of the Committee in 1970 and in 1979.

Five days ago, President Reagan proposed that "ballistic missile warheads be reduced to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels." He said that he "would ask that no more than half of those warheads be land-based." These two objectives were, however, put forward in the complete absence of any context for these reductions or any method for achieving them. Some kind of overall context of limits or freeze is obviously necessary to make his proposal meaningful.

The main purpose of this testimony is to point out to the Committee that it—and the previous Administration—had endorsed two measures which when combined would achieve the President's goal:

THE SALT II TREATY AND THE METHOD OF PERCENTAGE REDUCTION APPLIED TO THE LEVELS AND SUBLEVELS OF SALT II

We ask the Committee to invite the Administration to comment on the above observation.

We believe the Soviets would be more likely to accept the President's one-third cut in warheads if it were applied to the limits of SALT II as well as to warheads and if, of course, the President moved to ratify the SALT II Treaty as part of the agreement. This could be a quick solution to the impasse. (They might, however, also propose that the President's interest in reducing ballistic missile warheads by a third be matched by their interest in having ballistic missile launchers simultaneously reduced by a third.)

We recognize that, two days ago, Secretary of State Alexander Haig advised the Committee that we have "passed beyond" SALT II, that "we consider SALT II to be dead", and that we have "so advised the Soviet Union." On the other hand, it is evident that the Administration intends to abide by the SALT II limits, and that this position has strong, even consensus support, in the Congress and may even shortly be formally endorsed by the Congress!

Under these circumstances, it is obviously relevant to investigate how the SALT II structure, being thus maintained, would lend itself to reductions since, if nothing else works, this might. Moreover, the use of the SALT II structure as a context for disarmament does not, in any way, shape or form, require the Administration to abandon any further conditions, or negotiating objectives, which it might have. Indeed, this investigation is an effort to facilitate the Administrations goal of reducing missile warheads by a third, by means of the SALT II context.

Finally, this method of reducing the SALT II limits is so obvious and natural that it might be taken up by a subsequent Administration, if not by this one if, as is entirely possible, this Administration is still negotiating its agreement when its term of office ends.

The Committee will recall that, in addition to its endorsement of the SALT II Treaty, it unanimously approved on November 1, 1979, the McGovern-Chafee resolution urging the President:

"At the earliest possible moment during the SALT III negotiations, on the basis of mutuality, to pursue continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the Treaty so as to take advantage of the Treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms which promotes strategic equivalence under conditions of strategic stability."

The underlying notion was to have the two sides agree to a simple percentage, e.g., 5 percent, and to reduce each of the levels and sublevels of SALT II (including the limits on heavy missiles) by 5 percent each year.

Indeed, just last week, former President Jimmy Carter revealed at Stockholm that he had proposed to Mr. Brezhnev at Vienna, in June, 1979, that "we have through the five year period in which SALT III would be effective, ending in 1985, a 5 percent reductions in limits each year . . ." (New York Times, May 7, 1982, pg. A12). (This article is attached.)

As a consequence, we know, in particular, that the previous Administration had staffed out the proposal of 5 percent cuts on the limits and sublimits of SALT II and that it, like the Committee, saw this method of percentage reductions as feasible. (Indeed, many Committee members will remember that, during its debate in the Fall of 1979, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, wrote Senator McGovern a letter endorsing such a method and even the particular percentage: "5 percent".)

We do not know, of course, why Mr. Brezhnev did not take President Carter up on his proposal. For all we know, he considered it premature until SALT II was ratified and, in any case, conditions have changed.

Accordingly, we propose that the Committee review this method—which it has already proposed for linking SALT II to reductions—with an eye to seeing whether this combination of a negotiated treaty and a reduction method can fill the President's desires.

Under the method of percentage reductions, applied to the SALT II limits, the one-third cut in warheads desired by the President would be secured by looking toward a one-third (or greater) cut in the overall limits and sublimits of SALT II.

The SALT II limits presently are:

	Heavy missiles	Land-based MIRVed missiles	Land and sea-based MIRVed missiles	Land and sea-based MIRVed missiles and bombers with cruise missiles	Total strategy delivery vehicles
Existing limits	308	820	1,200	1,320	2,250
Approximately 33-percent cut	200	550	800	884	1,500

Would this reduction in limits and sublimits require a one-third reduction in warheads on the Soviet side, and would it permit one on our side? The answer is that a one-third reduction in SALT limits would require the Soviet Union to reduce its warheads by 30 percent at least. And while the reduction of SALT limits on the U.S. side would not require a one-third reduction in warheads, it would permit one.[1]

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[1] On the Soviet side, we can reason as follows. A required reduction of 100 heavy missiles would reduce warheads by about 1.000 (using the SALT II method of accounting). Reducing Soviet land-based MIRVed missiles to 550 (from the about 760 existing today) would require further reductions in SS–17s and SS–19s of another 100 missiles which would involve approximately another 500 warheads. Now, the Soviet Union has 2.400 missiles total on land and sea. To reduce this overall total to 1,500 would require an overall dismantling of 900 missiles. Of these we have already mandated dismantling 200 land-based MIRVed missiles, and so an additional 700 missiles would have to be reduced. These would have, of course, at least 700 warheads (even if all were chosen to be unMIRVed, single-warhead missiles and none were sea-based MIRV or other land-based MIRV). Accordingly, this 33 percent reduction in limits would already require 1.000 + 500 + 700 = 2,200 warheads being reduced. Since the Soviets have, according to Administration officials, 7.400 ballistic missile warheads today, this is 30 percent and almost all of the 33 percent required to secure the one-third reduction in warheads.

On the U.S. side, there are no heavy missiles, and U.S. land-based Minuteman III missiles are already 550 in number—precisely at the new level of 550 so no reductions in MIRVed missiles on land would be required. But meeting the new 800 limit on land and sea-based MIRV would require some combination of reductions in the 3-warheaded Minuteman III missiles, and the Poseidon and Trident MIRVed missiles at sea. The reductions in the 1,320 limit to 884 and the overall limit reductions to 1.500 would also, obviously, have to be considered. But we need not show that these reductions would force the one-third cut in missile warheads which the Administration desires. [they would not] since they certainly permit it. The Administration could, after all eliminate whatever one-third of its ballistic missile warheads it wished consistent with the reduction in overall limits.

The President expressed the further desire to have the one-third reduction take place with no more than half of the remaining warheads land-based. This remaining number would be about 2,500, or half of 5,000, so the Soviet Union would have to eliminate about 3,000 warheads from the 5,500 which the Administration says the U.S.S.R. has on land presently.

By the above calculations, one-half of this total 3,000 would be eliminated through required reductions in heavy missiles (1,000) and in SS-17s and SS-19s (500). Some additional would come from meeting the one-third cut in total launchers to the extent that this requirement was met with land-based missiles. For the rest, it may or may not be true that the Soviet Union would be willing to meet, in any circumstance, what is after all, the President's opening bargaining position.

After all, this requirement of keeping land-based warheads below 2,500 requires the United States to do absolutely nothing since we have only 2,200 such warheads now, nor does it prevent the U.S.S.R. from threatening our land-based missile force, and hence it is a fairly arbitrary number.

In sum, the method of shrinking SALT II by 33 percent would require the Soviet Union to reduce its warheads by 30 percent at least, and would encourage and permit us to do so as well; moreover, it would move the Soviet more than 50 percent toward the President's second condition on land-based missiles.

Now why should the two sides prefer to have the reductions go forward in the context of SALT II, and of percentage reductions, rather than in some much less structured fashion, as in the President's original proposal?

Consider the American side first:

The Administration is probably assuming anyway that the SALT II limits will continue to be maintained even if ratification does not take place; unfortunately, without ratification, no one can be sure.

SALT II prevents the Soviet Union from building several new missiles, and limits them to one.

SALT II prevents the Soviet Union from building large numbers of single warheaded missiles (with a view to meeting the one-third cut requirement in warheads) while expanding its lead in numbers of ballistic missiles (2,400 to 1,700).

Percentage reductions give the United States considerable predictability concerning the shape the Soviet force will take after the reductions. In particular, it ensures that the Soviet's overall force structure is basically shrunk with heavy missiles sure to be reduced significantly, and overall numbers of missiles being reduced.

In sum, using SALT II and the method of percentage reductions virtually achieves the President's main goal of 33 percent cut in warheads, and half of his secondary goal, while precluding any unpleasant surprises.

For the Soviet Union, there is reason to prefer SALT II plus percentage reductions because:

SALT II includes limits on U.S. cruise missiles on bombers, weapons the Administration has simply left out of its proposal.

SALT II includes limits on numbers of bombers, and limits the United States to one new light ICBM.

Percentage reductions gives the Soviets, as with ourselves, greater predictability over what the reductions will include.

In sum, the Soviet Union might well prefer the President's desire for a one-third cut if it included the President recommending the SALT II Treaty to Congress with a one-third cut in all its limits.

Finally, for both sides, percentage reductions has the still further advantage that the percentage reductions of 5 percent a year could be extrapolated well beyond the 33 percent cut without much further negotiations; in short, if the method were working well, it just could be continued.

Using 5 percent a year, it would take 8 years to achieve a 33 percent cut since the 5 percent is applied to ever smaller numbers. At 10 percent, it would take about 4 years.

While the Soviet Union would surely prefer the President's one-third cut in warheads if it came in the context of the SALT II treaty, they might well want to be sure that both sides dismantled one-third of their missile launchers. This is because the above agreement requires the Soviet Union to dismantle about 900 of its 2,400 delivery vehicles—which is over 35 percent of its entire force of launchers with strategic bombers. The United States, by contrast, could eliminate one-third of its warheads and comply with the SALT II limits with a reduction of about 20 percent of its launchers. Thus, in the end, the two sides might agree to a one-third, one-third, one-third agreement in which warheads, launchers, and SALT II limits were all reduced by 33 percent.

II. CONCERNING THE FREEZE

Senators should know that neither the Administration's proposal, nor its being conjoined with reductions in SALT limits, will importantly assist the program of land-based missile vulnerability.

Indeed, the President's proposal would fail to do an extraordinary number of things. It would not prevent the United States from recouping its cut in warheads with a 5,000 increase in cruise missile warheads based on bombers (in the absence of SALT limits). It would not prevent the United States from achieving far more counterforce capability with ballistic missiles on both land (MX) and sea (Trident II), and likewise with Soviet improvements in hard-target kill capability. It would not, of course, prevent a new Soviet or U.S. strategic bomber or Soviet or U.S. modern sea-launched cruise missiles and so on.

For all these things and others, a more general freeze is required. Happily, the Committee on Foreign Relations is also on record, already, in support of the desirability of a general freeze of the arms race. On March 24, 1970, the Committee voted, by a vote of 10–0, language which the full Senate approved by 73–6:

"That the President of the United States should propose to the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate."

This resolution does, I believe, put the Senate on record as believing that the problem with a freeze is not really a technical one. Some Senators may assert that the present balance ought not be frozen. But in 1982, as in 1970, it still makes sense if one wants to halt the arms race in a comprehensive way, to try with general instructions of this kind.

Indeed, at that time, the Democratic Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield, and the present Chairman of this Committee, Senator Charles Percy, had called for opening the talks with simultaneous declarations calling for an interim moratorium on further deployment of all strategic weapons!

Again, according to President Carter, President Brezhnev was asked about the freeze in Vienna in 1979; again, we do not know the circumstances or the reasoning of his declining to act on it which may have been simply that U.S. ratification was the next order of business. (Perhaps the Committee could inquire of the Executive Branch what is known about the Soviet reaction to both the Freeze and Percentage Reductions as a consequence of President Carter's demarche.)

Today, this approach to the arms race, that of a freeze, is embodied in the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, calling on the two sides to determine "when and how" to achieve such a halt.

In our Federation's opinion, it is entirely appropriate and desirable that the U.S. be on record, continually or periodically, with its willingness to freeze, stop where we are, or otherwise call an end to the arms race in so far as that can be verified.

We do, therefore, support the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution and believe that each Administration should be urged to propose a freeze and subsequent reductions to the Soviet Union—even while and though the Administration may be making other proposals as well.

III. INDUCING NEW IDEAS

The Committee should encourage the two sides to constitute a new official forum to which interested citizens could present their ideas for halting the arms race.

As the Committee's roster shows, and as it knows, there are more and more persons familiar with the details of the arms race, and who have perceptive ideas about how to control and reverse it. The ideas, at present, have no particular forum ready to hear them. Instead, they are presented in op ed pieces, or pushed by Congressmen or interested organizations. But the incentives to develop the ideas are limited by the demand. We therefore propose a kind of demand-side economics for the production of arms control proposals. A U.S.-Soviet committee willing to hear presentations of relevant ideas, from technically proficient persons in both superpowers (and elsewhere), would create that demand. Alternatively, the Committee could be an American institution only.

If I may close on a personal note that indicates the value of such a group. The fact noted earlier, that President Carter had urged the simple notion of percentage reductions of SALT II limits to Mr. Brezhnev at Geneva in June, 1979, was especially gratifying. The Federation advocated percentage reductions to the President in an open letter of December 13, 1978, printed in our January, 1979 publication and in a Washington Post article of December 31. We then urged it on his various Defense Department staffs, as applied to all the SALT II limits. But this method would never have seized my imagination had I not been invited to testify before the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on November 9, 1978, and accordingly, been motivated to think about what would be, for that group, sensible advice.

There are certainly many, many people who could come up with comparably simple and interesting ideas if comparably provoked but who may not do so otherwise, and who are not normally so encouraged. Some kind of official body interested in hearing them is all the encouragement they need. As public involvement in the arms race increases, we are all going to want, and to need, more public fora.

[From the New York Times, May 7, 1982]

CARTER DISCLOSES HE OFFERED FREEZE IN ATOMIC ARMS TO BREZHNEV IN '79

(By John Vinocur)

STOCKHOLM, May 6.—Former President Jimmy Carter said here today that he had proposed a freeze on deployment and production of nuclear weapons to Leonid I. Brezhnev three years ago, but that the suggestion had been turned down by the Soviet leader.

Mr. Brezhnev also rejected a proposal at a meeting in Vienna in June 1979 for both countries to renounce the use of force in Europe, Mr. Carter said.

Mr. Carter is here on a European tour to speak at a seminar sponsored by Svenska Dagbladet, a daily paper.

Many of his remarks in a news conference touched on his talks with Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna, where the two leaders signed a treaty that ended the second round of strategic arms limitation talks. The accord set limits on strategic, or long-range, nuclear weapons on both sides. However, Soviet-American relations cooled after Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, and the treaty was not ratified.

DETAILS ON VIENNA TALKS OFFERED

In Vienna, Mr. Carter said, he proposed that the two sides undertake "a mutual pledge of nonfirst use of military force in Europe, plus a freeze at that time on the production and deployment of all nuclear weapons."

"Brezhnev refused both proposals," Mr. Carter said, "and insisted on the completion of the deployment of the very formidable SS-20 missile."

In December 1979, the Atlantic alliance decided to counter the SS-20 by deploying its own advanced medium-range missiles, the Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles. The deployment is to begin in late 1983 unless talks under way in Geneva succeed in reducing the number of missiles.

In Vienna, Mr. Carter went on, he also suggested that "we have through the five-year period in which SALT II would be effective, ending in 1985, a 5 percent reduction in limits each year which would be compounded annually to a more than 25 percent reduction over the five-year period."

But, Mr. Carter added, the Soviet leader "was not prepared to do that."

In discussing the rough terms of a third arms limitation treaty, Mr. Carter said, "we both believed that we might conclude a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arsenals on both sides even below the SALT II levels."

This is the outcome he would like to see from any eventual discussion between President Reagan and Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Carter said.

"My belief is that the present Administration would be glad to agree with the Soviet Union that there should be no military force used in Europe, from either side, conventional or nuclear," Mr. Carter said. "I believe we have rough equivalency between us and the Soviet Union now in overall nuclear capability. The Soviets have an advantage in the intermediate range."

On other issues, Mr. Carter said he felt that, if the Russians had not become bogged down in Afghanistan, they would have moved against Poland "much earlier." He was apparently alluding to the 1981 proclamation of martial law, which is widely thought to have been imposed with Soviet approval.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1982.

Senator CLAIBORNE PELL,
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PELL: On May 13, the day I testified to the Committee, the President enlarged upon his proposed arms control plan to include reductions of missile launchers on both sides to 850—a 50 percent cut of our levels—in addition to the previously announced goal of cutting ballistic missile warheads "to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels."

Accordingly, I request that I be permitted to submit this supplemental testimony amending and perfecting my suggestion that shrinkage of SALT II limits is a plausible and desirable method of achieving the President's objectives.

In light of this new announcement, this supplemental testimony investigates the utility of a 50 percent cut in SALT II limits, rather than a 33 percent cut in those limits, as the indicated degree of SALT II shrinkage. With the shift, and with some further collateral restraints to prevent warhead buildup under some SALT II permitted scenarios, the suggestion to shrink SALT II still seems a good one. Indeed, the 50 percent cut in launchers makes it easier to maintain the 33 percent cut in deployed missile warheads.

I am sending this request to you because of your previous kind assistance in this project, in requiring of the Administration that it comment on my testimony.

The supplemental testimony is enclosed.

Sincerely,

JEREMY J. STONE.

P.S.—I believe that this supplemental testimony also has the virtue of responding fully to the objections of ACDA and shows that even treaties that do not directly constrain warheads per se can reduce them effectively.

Enclosure.

SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF JEREMY J. STONE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, on May 13, the day I testified to the Committee, the President enlarged upon his proposed arms control plan to include reductions of missile launchers on both sides to 850—a 50 percent cut of our levels—in addition to previously announced goals of cutting ballistic missile warheads "to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels".[1]

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[1] On May 9th, at Eureka College, the President said: "At the end of the first phase of the START reductions I expect ballistic missile warheads—the most serious threat we face—to be reduced to equal ceilings at least a third below current levels. To enhance stability, I would ask that no more than half of those warheads be land-based. I hope that these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in missiles themselves, could be achieved as rapidly as possible. (Background briefings had interpreted "significant" (sic!) as meaning about 15 percent.) However, on May 13, at the White House, he said: "Today, the United States and the Soviet Union each have about 7,500 nuclear warheads poised on missiles that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. In the first phase of negotiations, we want to focus on lessening this imminent threat. We seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads to about 5,000—one-third less than today's levels; limit the number of warheads on land-based missiles to half that number and cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level—about one-half that of the current U.S. level.'

Consider, first of all, the rough outlines of a 50 percent cut in SALT II limits: Using the form indicated earlier, we have:

	Heavy missiles	Land-based MIRVed missiles	Land and sea-based MIRVed missiles	Land and sea-based MIRVed missiles and bombers with cruise missiles	Total strategy delivery vehicles
Existing limits	308	820	1, 200	1, 320	2, 250
Approximately 50 percent cut	150	410	600	660	1, 125

Clearly there is no sublimit mandating equal ballistic missile ceilings of 850 but, equally clearly, the reduction is roughly appropriate leaving room, on each side, for 275 strategic bombers. (The United States presently counts about 380 such bombers including 60 FB–111s and the Soviet Union 150 such bombers). Therefore our first observation is:

I. A 50 percent reduction is SALT II limits would nicely accommodate equal levels of missile launchers at the level of 850, as desired by the President. Indeed, such a cut would, in any case, leave the two sides with numbers of missile launchers that were quite close, and whose differences were compensated for by differences in numbers of strategic bombers maintained.

Even assuming that the Soviet Union did not procure a new strategic bomber and kept only its 150 strategic bombers, it would maintain, under this 50 percent cut, only 975 ballistic missile launchers. This is only a 15 percent increase over the 850 desired by the President and would be, in any case, compensated for by the greater number of U.S. bombers that could fit under the 1,125 limit (on bombers plus missiles combined). It should be easy to negotiate any greater parallelism of forces than this, if necessary, and it is quite unclear why it should be necessary! At worst, the United States could buildup to 975 strategic missiles and cut down our bomber force to 150 if we felt so strongly that the forces had to be equal.

Next, consider the question of the one-third cut in missile warheads desired by the President. In a footnote below, we calculate the number of warheads, using SALT II counting rules, that might be eliminated from current levels if this reduction took place tomorrow. These include 1,000 warheads from heavy missiles, 840 warheads from SS–19s (40) and SS–17s (150) and 935 warheads from single warheaded missiles. This totals 3,275 warheads and exceeds one-third of current Soviet ballistic missile warheads, which the Administration describes as being 7,500 in number.[3]

Needless to say, Soviet missile warhead numbers are growing and can grow further under SALT II limits. Under some abstract but totally implausible situation, they could grow to more than 12,000 warheads (e.g. if all land-based missiles were turned in for sea-based missiles and given the top warhead per missile limit permitted of 14.)

Accordingly, the two sides would need to negotiate certain side conditions to ensure that, under SALT II reduced limits, these reductions from current numbers were not offset by permitted improvements. What would these conditions look like on the Soviet side?

The Soviet Union has the right, under SALT II to build a single new (light) ICBM, which is to say, an ICBM smaller or equal in throw-weight and launch weight to that of the SS–19; this missile can have up to 10 warheads. It has often been both rumored and presumed that the Soviet Union would use this option to produce a new single warhead ICBM to replace the SS–11. If this rumor were correct—or if this decision not to use the option for a MIRVed missile were mandated—then the reduced Soviet force would turn out to be below the 5,000 warhead limit desired by President Reagan assuming that the Soviet submarine MIRVed missile averaged less than 8 warheads each as seems wholly likely.

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[3] The Soviet Union would likely meet these limits by:

(a) Eliminating 150 heavy missiles for a reduction of about 1,500 warheads:

(b) Keeping $410-150=260$ SS–19s to fill out its land-based MIRV limit of 410; hence it would dismantle 40 SS–19s (240 warheads) and 150 SS–17s (600 warheads) for a total of 840 warheads dismantled;

(c) Having thus eliminated $150+190=340$ launchers it would be required to eliminate $2{,}400-340-1{,}125=935$ launchers with, of course, at least 935 warheads;

(d) In sum, this would suggest a reduction of $1{,}500+840+935=3{,}275$ warheads, from current levels if there were no off-setting buildups, and this is in excess of one-third of current Soviet ballistic missile warheads.

In sum, in that case, the Soviet force would look like this:

Launchers and missiles:	*Warheads*
150 heavy missiles with 10 warheads each	1,500
260 SS-19's with 6 warheads each	1,560
190 submarine-launched missiles with up to 8 warheads each [1]	1,520
375 SS-11's or other single-warheaded missiles	375
150 bombers	0
1,125 missile and bomber launchers satisfying all of the SALT II reduced limits	4,955

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[1] It is unlikely that the Soviet submarine launched force would utilize the 14 warhead limit negotiated at SALT (the limit was set at 14 to accommodate our Poseidon) since no submarine launched missile tests have been announced thus far with more than 7.

The Soviet agreement to limit its option for a new light ICBM to an unMIRVed one could come about in these ways:

(1) It could be planning to do so anyway;

(2) It could be willing to do so for other general reasons;

(3) It could agree to give up any new missile if the United States gave up its option for a new missile (MX) which the United States might well do since it is unsure how to base the MX! (Option 3 was proposed by SALT II negotiator Paul C. Warnke in his April 14, 1982 National Press Club speech).

Other alternatives which would permit the Soviet force to stay below the 5,000 warhead required limit include:

(1) The new ICBM would be MIRVed but, as a replacement for the SS-19, might have no more than the six warheads of that missile—not using the full 10-warhead quota available, a quota designed to cover the original U.S. MX design.

(2) The two sides could agree to reduce the 10-warhead quota to, for example, eight; indeed, the United States is planning on eight, rather than ten, warheads on its new light missile (MX) according to recent reports. In this case, Soviet submarine launched MIRVed missiles could still average five to six warheads while maintaining a Soviet force of approximately 5,000 warheads.

Therefore, we reach this conclusion:

II. A 50-percent reduction in SALT II limits would be wholly consistent with a 5,000 warhead total on Soviet ballistic missile launchers and could be secured with side-conditions that might be easily and variously achieved. Of these restrictions, the most important turn on the Soviet option for a new 10-warheaded ICBM. If the negotiated limit is 6,000 warheads, even this side-condition is unnecessary.

Finally, there is the question of the 2,500 side condition limiting land-based ballistic missile warheads to 2,500. This condition does not require any reductions whatsoever on the U.S. side and hence cannot be expected to be completely negotiated on the Soviet side. However, the above table shows that the Soviet force would be moved two-thirds of the way toward the 2,500 limit from the 5,500 total of today by the 50-percent reduction—with the above understandings. This is probably as much success as one can expect.

Since the Thursday testimony, a further article has reached our attention with regard to President Carter's interview in Stockholm. The attached article from the International Herald Tribune shows that the President said that he and Mr. Brezhnev "both believed that we might conclude a 50-percent reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides even below the SALT II levels." In sum, the notion of a 50-percent reduction in these levels seems to have been well understood on both sides even 3 years ago.

[From the International Herald Tribune, May 8–9, 1982]

CARTER SAYS BREZHNEV REJECTED NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSALS IN 1979

(By John Vinocur)

STOCKHOLM.—Former President Jimmy Carter said that he had proposed a freeze on deployment and production of nuclear weapons to Leonid I. Brezhnev three years ago, but that the suggestion was turned down by the Soviet leader.

Mr. Brezhnev also rejected a proposal at a meeting in Vienna in June, 1979, for both countries to renounce the use of force in Europe Mr. Carter said Thursday.

Mr. Carter is in Stockholm on a European tour to speak at a seminar sponsored by Svenska Dagbladet, a daily newspaper.

Many of his remarks in a news conference touched on his talks with Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna, where the two leaders signed a treaty that ended the second round of strategic arms talks. The accord set limits on strategic, or long-range, nuclear weapons on both sides. However, Soviet-U.S. relations cooled after Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979, and the treaty was not ratified.

In Vienna, Mr. Carter said, he proposed that the two sides undertake "a mutual pledge of non-first use of military force in Europe, plus a freeze at that time on the production and deployment of all nuclear weapons."

"Brezhnev refused both proposals," Mr. Carter said, "and insisted on the completion of the deployment of the very formidable SS-20 missile."

In December, 1979, the Atlantic alliance decided to counter the SS-20 by deploying its own advanced medium-range missiles, the Pershing-2 and ground-launched Cruise missiles. The deployment is to begin in late 1983 unless talks under way in Geneva succeed in reducing the number of missiles.

In Vienna, Mr. Carter went on, he also suggested that "we have through the five-year period in which SALT-2 would be effective, ending in 1985, a 5-percent reduction in limits each year which would be compounded annually to a more than 25-percent reduction over the five-year period." But, he added, the Soviet leader was not prepared to do that.

In discussing the rough terms of a third arms limitation treaty, Mr. Carter said, "we both believed that we might conclude a 50-percent reduction in nuclear arsenals on both sides even below the SALT-2 levels."

This is the outcome he would like to see from any eventual discussion between President Reagan and Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Carter said.

"My belief is that the present administration would be glad to agree with the Soviet Union that there should be no military force used in Europe, from either side, conventional or nuclear," he said. "I believe we have rough equivalency between us and the Soviet Union now in overall nuclear capability. The Soviets have an advantage in the intermediate range."

On other issues, he said he felt that, if the Russians had not become bogged down in Afghanistan, they would have moved against Poland much earlier. He was apparently alluding to the proclamation of martial law there, which is widely thought to have been imposed with Soviet approval.

Mr. Carter said that, when the Soviet Union appeared to threaten intervention in Poland in late 1980 after the rise of the independent Solidarity labor movement, he sent Mr. Brezhnev a message concerning Poland that was "the most stern message I ever sent him" and "the only one to which he never replied."

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you. Next we will hear from Mr. Grossman.

STATEMENT OF JEROME GROSSMAN, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. **Grossman**. Mr. Chairman, before I begin my formal presentation, I would like to acknowledge your remark about the possibility that what is going on in the country with regard to the indignation about the existence and possible use of nuclear weapons is the result of media hype.

I would like to respectfully call to your attention that it does not——

Senator **Pressler**. Wait just a moment, please. Let me be sure that you understood my statement. I said that I thought the movement was very real. I did not say that it was media hype.

Mr. **Grossman** [continuing]. Thank you.

I wanted to tell you about some meetings that took place in North Dakota about 6 weeks ago where a chapter of a lawyers group against nuclear war was organized. Educators against nuclear war was also organized in North Dakota. There is a businessman's chapter in formation in North Dakota. I would be happy to send you the complete details of that. I think you would find it very interesting, sir.

Senator **Pressler**. Fine. And I would be happy to send you an article that I wrote in the New York Times saying what a broad base of support that this had. I am surprised at your comment because it is the opposite of what I said.

Mr. **Grossman**. Thank you. I am very happy to be corrected, sir.

Senator **Tsongas**. It might be more helpful, Jerry, if you sent him information about what is going on in South Dakota. [General laughter.]

Mr. **Grossman**. Touché.

Senator Tsongas, in response to your question, my statement indicates that we do believe SALT II should be ratified, and with regard to the presidential START position, while we welcome the change in the rhetoric, we believe that this is a minimum response to what is going on in the country, and we fear that the beginning of these negotiations institute a process which might take 7 to 10 years.

We feel there is a crisis situation, that we cannot wait. We are sorry that the President did not address the problem of new weapons, of cruise missiles, of bombers and submarines and the rampant arms technology.

The Council for a Livable World was founded in 1962, and the year 1962 stands out as the previous high of public indignation at the threat of nuclear war. In 1982 that constituency has grown by the millions. In 1982 these millions have moved past the inhibitions of denial of the gruesome situation to specific demands for immediate and purposeful action by its representatives and by all the governments of the Earth.

From my vantage points as president and director of the Council for a Livable World, I have seen our 60,000 member supporters move out of denial into five separate stages. I think it might be useful to recount this experience.

The first is the accumulation of information about the nature of the threat to human life posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. The medical, social, economic, and political effects are generally understood. No longer is the citizen content to leave matters to the expert.

The second stage flows from the first. With the awful information comes fear, but a fear that no longer paralyzes. This terror has stimulated our instinct for survival, the search for a way out.

The third stage is one of moral outrage: anger wedded to our sense of right and wrong. For many it has a religious base, that man has no right to kill himself and other mammals, that it is sacriligious to destroy the planet he did not create, to make it uninhabitable to birds and other animals, to interrupt the chain of life, to turn the Earth over to the cockroaches.

The fourth stage and the most important stage of all is the dawning of hope and optimism grounded in faith in man and his spirit. What man has wrought, man can undo. Man is adaptable. He is not necessarily condemned to a future devoted to satisfying his worst impulses. Man can bring man under control, and public opinion has the power to bring about these changes, not only under Western liberalism but even under despotic conditions.

Now, the fifth stage, which is the one I am going to talk about in some detail, encompasses demands for action from those in power. These demands that I am finding around the country are not utopian. We know that the knowledge of the nuclear chain reactors can never be erased from the human brain, but we have the right to demand that every conceivable procedure be adopted to minimize the threat.

Who are these people making demands of you? The experience of the council tells us that they live in 50 States, they are Republican, Democratic, Independent, or politically indifferent. They are not concentrated on the east and west coast but also in the South and the Midwest and the Southwest and the Rocky Mountains. They are of all faiths and creeds.

They are not campus based. They are your neighbors, your little league coaches, the people you work with, the shoppers at your local supermarket. They are in this struggle for the long haul and they will be heard.

Specifically what can the U.S. Senate under the leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee do to satisfy these demands?

First, endorse the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze.

Second, ratify the SALT II Treaty.

Third, begin to negotiate with the Soviet Union a SALT III Treaty, call it START if you like, designed to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Fourth, take special steps to minimize the chances of accidental war.

Fifth, make a declaratory statement promising not to use nuclear weapons first but asserting the right of nuclear response to nuclear attack. While this no-first-use policy has special application to Europe, it should be applied worldwide.

Sixth, negotiate with all countries possessing nuclear weapons the elimination of first-strike capability. This would include Soviet supermissiles like the SS–18 as well as our own MX. Improved accuracy of missiles would be barred. The payoff for surprise attacks must be made as small as possible.

Seventh, prevent arms technology from outrunning arms control systems.

In sum, we call upon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for leadership. You cannot allow the current situation to continue. It transcends big power rivalry. Its resolution cannot be hostage to party politics or presidential aspirations. There is a mass movement burgeoning in our country and, indeed, among all the peoples of Earth that brooks no delay.

New and drastic ideas must be developed to solve the crisis of nuclear weapons. The times demand it, the people demand it, and this movement, I reiterate to you, is a permanent feature of our political life and will be with us as long as the problem will be with us, and that will be forever.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[Mr. Grossman's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEROME GROSSMAN

The Council for a Livable World was founded in 1962 by the eminent nuclear physicist Dr. Leo Szilard to combat the menace of nuclear war and strengthen national security through rational arms control.

The Council continues to pursue its objectives by blending the resources of its knowledgeable scientists with the skills of practical politics, and by concentrating its efforts on the U.S. Senate which has unique advise and consent powers in foreign affairs. The Council is led by such experts as Dr. George Kistiakowsky, chief science advisor to President Eisenhower, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, chief science advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Professor Bernard Feld of MIT, and Professor Edward Purcell, Nobel Laureate in Physics.

The year 1962 stands out as the previous high point of public indignation at the threat of nuclear war. In 1982 that constituency has grown by the millions. In 1982 these millions have moved past the inhibitions of denial of the gruesome situation to specific demands for immediate and purposeful action by its representatives, and by all the governments of the earth.

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The second stage flows from the first. With the awful information comes fear, but a fear that no longer paralyzes. This terror has stimulated our instinct for survival, the search for a way out.

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The fifth stage encompasses demands for action from those in power. These demands are not utopian. We know that the knowledge of the nuclear chain reaction can never be erased from the human brain. But we have the right to demand that every conceivable procedure be adopted to minimize the threat.

Who are the people making these demands of you? The experience of the Council for a Livable World tells us that they live in 50 states, that they are Republican and Democratic and Independent or politically indifferent. They are not concentrated on the East and West Coasts but also in the South and the Mid-West and the Southwest and the Rocky Mountains. They are of all faiths and creeds. They are not campus based. They are your neighbors, your little-league coaches, the people you work with, the shoppers at your local supermarket. They are in this struggle for the long haul. And they will be heard.

What can the United States Senate under the leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee do to satisfy these demands?

First, endorse the so-called "Freeze": a mutual nuclear weapons moratorium by which the United States and the Soviet Union will agree to halt immediately the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear warheads, missiles and delivery systems with verification safeguards satisfactory to both countries.

The three most important words are "mutual," "verification," and "freeze."

"Mutual" makes it clear that the nuclear weapons moratorium applies equally to the United States and the Soviet Union.

"Verification" of the actions of both countries is essential to the Freeze. There is no question of the U.S.A. trusting the Russians, or the Soviet Union trusting the Americans. Safeguards satisfactory to both countries must be agreed upon. Means of verification now exist. They include satellites in the sky and electronic instruments on the borders of each state. Additional tools for verification are on-site inspections of suspicious actions or signals. These inspections have been agreed to in principle by the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States in the still unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. Perhaps additional verification steps can be negotiated.

While the "Freeze" does not include any steps for immediate reductions in nuclear arms, it is a necessary first stage in checking the runaway nuclear arms race.

Second, ratify the SALT II Treaty as an interim step in codifying certain limits and procedures on strategic nuclear arms.

Third, begin to negotiate with the Soviet Union a SALT III Treaty—call it START if you like—designed to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Fourth, take special steps to minimize the chances of accidental war.

In the terrible rivalry between the superpowers, the threat of nuclear war by sheer accident looms greater every day. There have been hundreds of false alarms which have led the U.S. Strategic Air Command to perceive a Soviet nuclear attack. Our weapons have several times gone on full alert. Such mechanical failures are serious on both sides because the time for reaction has grown intolerably short—and is growing shorter.

There was a time when Soviet and American strategists thought they had hours to evaluate a nuclear threat. Now land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach their targets in 30 minutes. Even that time has been cut. The new U.S. Trident II missile will be able to hit Moscow in 10 minutes from the Western Atlantic. The new U.S. Pershing II missiles which are to be installed in West Germany will reach Russian objectives in only 4–6 minutes. A Soviet submarine off the U.S. Atlantic coast could hit Washington in a few minutes.

While both sides have elaborate "fail-safe" procedures against accident or unauthorized firings, there is widespread fear that command, control and communication lines from national headquarters can be interrupted by sabotage or a nuclear explosion far above the earth. In a crisis the "fail-safe" procedures are likely to be weakened in the interests of giving local commanders the ability to fire. Imagine a submarine commander with nuclear weapons permanently out of communication with Washington. . . .

There are several ways to guard against such dangerous situations.

Both sides could agree to position their nuclear weapons to allow maximum time for delivery, thus avoiding spasm reactions. There should be a permanent standing commission composed of U.S. and Soviet officials meeting 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, to guard against misunderstandings and to explain accidents. The U.S.-Soviet hotline mechanism should be improved.

Above all there must be far fewer nuclear weapons on both sides. Only a fraction of the 50,000 in present arsenals are necessary for defense. One thousand in the hands of each superpower could wreak unbelievable havoc. And a dramatic reduction would greatly diminish the probability of holocaust by error or miscalculation or accident.

Fifth, make a declaratory statement promising not to use nuclear weapons first but asserting the right of nuclear response to nuclear attack. While this "No First Use" policy has special application to Europe, it should be applied worldwide.

Sixth, negotiate with all countries possessing nuclear weapons the elimination of first strike capability. This would include Soviet super missiles like the SS–18 as well as our own MX. Improved accuracy of missiles would be barred. The payoff for surprise attacks must be made as small as possible.

Seventh, prevent arms technology from outrunning arms control systems. Accommodation and negotiation, even between friendly powers, is much slower than the time frame for new technological developments. It is not inconceivable to shut down the weapons laboratories or, failing that, to open them to international monitoring. Of course, a successful freeze on testing, production and deployment would minimize the need for any weapons work.

In sum we call upon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for leadership. You cannot allow the current situation to continue. It transcends big power rivalry. Its resolution cannot be hostage to party politics or presidential aspirations. There is a mass movement burgeoning in our country and indeed among all the peoples of earth that brooks no delay. New and drastic ideas must be developed to solve the crisis of nuclear weapons. The times demand it. The people demand it. This movement is a permanent feature of our political life and will be with us as long as the problem will be with us—forever.

Senator **Pressler**. The last member of our panel is Mr. Randall Kehler of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.

STATEMENT OF RANDALL KEHLER, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE CAMPAIGN, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. **Kehler**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to request that my written statement in its entirety be submitted for the record, and I will confine myself to an oral statement at this time in the interest of saving time if that is agreeable.

Senator **Pressler**. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. **Kehler**. Let me say a few words about what the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign is. My position as national coordinator is one which entails trying to monitor and to some extent coordinate what is very much a locally based and spontaneously growing campaign movement, if you will, of groups of every conceivable description all over the country in community after community, from coast to coast, including people from all kinds of political persuasions, all kinds of backgrounds, ages and so forth.

The Freeze Campaign is not, as some might believe, a centrally directed organization that has somehow put out word to people all over the country through mass direct mail solicitations to get behind this proposal and so forth. We are merely an association of these very autonomous and, as I said, spontaneously growing, independently oriented groups who on their own have discovered the freeze idea, and, in fact, long before the media discovered it, I might add, and even long before most people in Congress took an interest in this idea, who seized upon it because of genuine fear and concern about the arms race.

We have a national clearing house in St. Louis for this Freeze Campaign. I must say it is one of the most exciting places to be that I can imagine right now in our history. We get telephone calls every day from all over the country, from what some people might think are the most unlikely places.

Just a couple of days ago, somebody excitedly called from Yates County, N.Y., which I am not familiar with myself, but I am told it is one of the most conservative counties of New York State, where the county board of supervisors is completely dominated by very conservative Republicans, all of whom voted for a freeze resolution just the other day.

Similar stories like this come in constantly. We feel this is not a movement which is about to disappear overnight, no matter what happens in Congress in the next few months or on the part of the administration.

The goal of the Freeze Campaign, I think, is very simple. People all over the country look at the nuclear arms race and say we want it stopped. What stopping means for us is no more testing, no more production, no more deployment. It is a very clear and simple proposal, and yet a proposal that we feel is very practical.

The Freeze Campaign's national committee has gone on record very strongly in support of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution in this regard, and similarly has gone on record very strongly opposing what we might call in our view certain counterfeit freeze proposals, such as that proposed by Senators Jackson and Warner.

I think freeze supporters around the country are using a very simple yardstick with which to measure the now many competing arms control proposals, and that yardstick is will this proposal stop the nuclear arms race. Clearly, if this yardstick is used to measure the President's recent proposal made this past Sunday, I think it is clear that the proposal fails drastically; that in no way is the arms race going to be stopped even if the Soviets were to agree, which is not likely given certain imbalances implicit in the proposal, even if they were to agree to that proposal, because it does not forestall, as other witnesses have said, the dangerous new round of destabilizing weapons which are going to occur on both sides.

The campaign categorically rejects the assumption that the Soviets are ahead in the arms race. I think one of the great virtues of the American people, because they are not experts, by and large, or politicians, is that they really can see the forest for the trees in this regard and they look at the arsenal as a whole and the advantages and disadvantages on both sides in particular areas and say that is parity enough for us, the whole thing has to stop in its tracks.

It is not as though freeze supporters are saying we are opposed to reductions. Far from it. I think the important point is those reductions have to be preceded by a comprehensive, bilateral freeze or there will be no genuine reductions.

I think the American people can see that the freeze proposal and only the freeze proposal, of all the proposals that we see now, is capable of breaking this vicious cycle of escalation that we have seen now for years and years and years. Reduction proposals are not new on either side, and they will simply fail to break that cycle and bring the whole thing to a halt.

Finally, let me just say on a sort of political note, and I am speaking here for myself and in my capacity as national coordinator. From my observations of what is going on around the country, I think people have concluded that it is past the time to simply ask elected representatives to somehow work out a proposal for us in this regard. People are saying governments have perhaps forfeited their right to lead the way to disarmament and perhaps governments are not capable of disarming themselves, but indeed, people must disarm the governments.

In that regard, people are saying this is the policy we want, we want the arms race stopped, no more testing, production and deployment. And if there is to be unity between the President and the people of the United States, the principle of unity must be freeze first, then reduce. Then we can all go forward together united and put all the pressure we can on the Soviets to agree to that kind of proposal.

Thank you.

[Mr, Kehler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDALL KEHLER

Good morning. I very much appreciate this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. At the same time, I am sorry that this hearing could not also take place in Prichard, Alabama, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in Spokane, Washington, in Youngstown, Ohio, and in Yates County, New

York, where the nearly all-Republican Board of Commissioners three days ago unanimously passed a resolution in favor of a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Freeze Campaign itself is now active in all 50 states of this country and in a majority of Congressional districts. American citizens from all walks of life and from every political persuasion are becoming aware of the enormous risks posed by the continuing nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. These millions of citizens are voicing one very simple, straightforward demand. That demand is, Stop the nuclear arms race! No more testing, no more production, no more deployment. Enough is enough!

The day has passed when Americans simply ask their elected representatives to do something about this problem. History clearly shows that experts and government officials have forfeited their right to lead the way to nuclear disarmament and thus to national and international security. Thus far, this elite corps of decision-makers has lead us only to greater rounds of dangerous nuclear escalation. Perhaps it is true that governments are not capable of disarming themselves and that people must disarm governments. Thus, we have reached a point where the American people are now taking the initiative on their own. Instead of waiting for the government to come up with effective policy, they are now telling their elected representatives what that policy should be.

If those millions of Americans who support a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze could be here today to evaluate, themselves, the various arms control proposals that have been discussed during the course of these hearings, they would have no trouble doing so. There is one very simple yardstick that they would use: Will this proposal stop the nuclear arms race? It is with this question in mind that the National Committee of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign strongly endorsed the Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution, which is, by far, the clearest expression of the Freeze Campaign's goal. Similarly, our National Committee has gone on record opposing the Jackson-Warner Resolution, which is nothing more than an endorsement of the Administration's plans to build more weapons.

The same yardstick must be applied to the President's START proposal, which was announced this past Sunday at Eureka College, in Illinois. The fact is, the President's proposal falls far short of stopping the nuclear arms race. Even if the Soviets agree to negotiate on the basis of the Preisdent's proposal, which is not likely, given the imbalances implicit in the proposal itself, the result would be a dangerous new round of destabilizing weapons, built and deployed on both sides while the negotiations are taking place. Does the START proposal call for a halt to the MX missile? The new Trident II missile? The Cruise or Pershing missiles? Or the B-1 bomber? No, it does not. All of these weapons, according to the President's proposal, would be built. Rather than providing the Soviets with an incentive to reduce their own weapons, these new weapons on the U.S. side will certainly provide the Soviets with an incentive to build their own new generation of weapons.

To call for negotiations on reductions while going ahead full steam with a massive weapons build-up is pure folly. Trying to reduce nuclear arsenals without first halting their growth is like trying to go on a diet before you quit overeating. The inevitable result is escalation.

The Administration's approach is not helpful or constructive because it is based on several faulty assumptions. First, it is not true that the Soviet Union enjoys an advantage over the United States in terms of overall nuclear forces. While preoccupied with the question of land-based ICBMs, particularly those of intermediate range, based in Europe, the Administration chooses to ignore the decisive U.S. advantages with regard to submarines and bombers. If this Administration is so concerned about achieving parity, are they willing to allow the Soviets to catch up in these two areas? Are the American people supposed to believe that Secretary of Defense Brown, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a number of other high officials were somehow misinformed, or else lying, when they stated less than a year and a half ago that United States and Soviet nuclear forces were roughly equal? Or are we supposed to believe that the situation has suddenly changed within that short period, when it is well-known that it takes not months but many years to develop and deploy nuclear weapons systems.

Equally faulty are the Administration's various nuclear war scenarios, which would have us believe that a disarming Soviet first-strike is plausible. What

Soviet leader would possibly risk the devastation of his entire country and all its inhabitants when the uncertainties of any kind of nuclear exchange are so great?

The Administration also talks about the potential for Soviet "blackmail" as a result of alleged Soviet advantages with regard to particular weapons systems. This kind of talk rests on the faulty assumption that advantages in nuclear weapons produce corresponding political advantages. Historically, this is simply not the case. How many concessions was the United States able to extract from the Soviets during the past 30 years when we enjoyed a clear advantage in nuclear weapons? Did our nuclear advantage prevent the Soviet Union from invading Hungary in 1954? Or Czechoslovakia in 1968?

Finally, the President's START proposal rests on the misguided assumption, as stated by senior Administration officials, that arms control proposals can be used to deflect the public's concern about nuclear weapons. To do so is not only to cheapen any given proposal, but also to offend the principles of democracy upon which this country is based.

Fortunately, the millions of people across the country who support the Freeze will not be diverted by such proposals—proposals which make no pretense of halting the nuclear arms race and thus of limiting or reducing the risk of nuclear war.

In contrast, the proposal for a bilateral freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union is a genuine proposal for halting the nuclear arms race. Its principal virtue is that it would break the vicious cycle of escalation that we have seen over the past 30 years, an escalation scarcely hampered by proposals for reductions that have come from both sides. Because most Americans are not experts and are not politicians, they have the splendid capacity to see the forest for the trees. They can clearly see that the risks of freezing the nuclear arms race, whatever they may be, are far less than the risks of continuing it. They can also see that there is far more logic in moving from a freeze to major reductions than trying to move from a massive build-up to major reductions. Furthermore, they see no sense in wasting vast amounts of our resources in building new weapons when the stated purpose of this build-up is to reduce the total number of weapons.

Because it is not possible for Freeze supporters from around the country to be here today, I want to share with you some of their feelings about the nuclear arms race. New Mexico State Representative Max Coll, a Republican from Santa Fe, in vowing to work for the passage of a freeze resolution in his state legislature, said, "It's a local issue and a school board issue. If we don't do something about this issue, we might as well forget the rest of the issues."

Captain Douglas Menikheim, Commander of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Michigan, said, "I'm not a radical. I'm comfortable being in the Navy. But the situation we find ourselves in is unavailable. There would be nothing left of us after a nuclear exchange. We are further and further from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and we are being desensitized."

Penny Rockhill, a communications worker from Lafayette, Indiana, put it this way: "We're supposed to share the earth with all of God's creatures—it can't be right to risk destroying the world to defend any political or economic system. If we have a nuclear war, what will be accomplished as opposed to what will be lost."

Albin and Olga Nyberg, of St. Petersburg, Florida, wrote in to their local newspaper, "We are aged 92 and 85. It makes very little difference to us what happens, but for the young people, we would like to see this crazy arms race stop."

Clinton Gardner, a business executive from Norwich, Vermont, said, "As an artillery officer in World War II, I have come to realize that nuclear 'bombs' are not weapons at all. They are simply instruments of genocide, like the Auschwitz Extermination Camp."

Jeanette Alfred, of Annandale, Virginia, was collecting signatures on petitions on behalf of her local Freeze Campaign, and said, "This is a pretty middle-class neighborhood. It's not a political neighborhood. But I've gotten a lot of support for the Freeze from my immediate neighbors. Only 2 of 50 people refused to sign."

David Hayes, Director of Radiation at two New London, Connecticut, hospitals, testified at a meeting of the New London City Council: "Let us send a message to Washington, the Pentagon, and Congress that enough is enough." And, incidentally, a New London City Council passed a Freeze resolution that night, 5 to 1.

State Senator Barbara A. Gill, Republican, of South Portland, called the Freeze resolution, "The ultimate form of preventive medicine." "Anyone who has a reverence for life," she said, "should vote for it."

And Lyle Alvstad, a 62-year old farmer and county commissioner, from Ashby, Minnesota, said, when he read about Minnesota's Freeze Campaign, "I believed in it strongly, and I sent 'em a little money . . . If they paraded around Minnesota with nuclear weapons mounted on tanks, you'd have the biggest demonstration this state has ever seen."

These voices must not only be heard, but they must also be heeded. Do these voices represent a small minority of opinion? Hardly. Every major national poll during the past few months has indicated that the great majority of Americans favor a bilateral freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the Yankelovich Poll of March, 1982, this majority includes 66 percent of those who consider themselves Republicans and 65 percent of those who voted for President Reagan in 1980.

You should know, however, that support for a comprehensive, bilateral Freeze amounts to more than a number of opinion polls. There are now more than 80 city councils across the nation which have publicly endorsed the Freeze, including Philadelphia, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Des Moines, Baltimore, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Chicago. Three hundred fifteen towns in New England have also passed Freeze resolutions. One or more branches of the state legislatures in 11 states from Maine to Oregon have passed Freeze resolutions. Campaigns are now underway to put the Freeze on the ballot statewide in Michigan, New Jersey, Delaware, Arizona, Oregon, Wisconsin, and California.

One hundred thirty-five Catholic bishops have endorsed the Freeze, along with representatives of every major religious denomination in this country. Sixty-nine national and international organizations have also endorsed the Freeze, including the YWCA of the USA, the U.S. Conference of Black Mayors, and the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, the largest affiliate of the AFL–CIO.

All of this support, by millions of American citizens, is rooted in a deep-seated fear and, in many cases, in an outrage over the situation we are in. It is also based on a growing understanding that there is only one way to stop the nuclear arms race and that is to stop it. It is not that people who support the Freeze are opposed to reductions. Far from it. It is simply that we are convinced that there will be no genuine reductions unless first preceded by a comprehensive bilateral Freeze.

If the President and the American people are to be united on the question of arms control, the principle of unity must be: Freeze first, then reduce.

In this country, we are very fortunate to have a remarkable degree of political democracy. People can and do speak their minds on important issues of the day. And there can be no more important issue than stopping the nuclear arms race. This situation provides the current Administration and current leaders in Congress a great opportunity to go down in history as the men and women who finally brought the nuclear arms race to a halt. Doing so will require great courage and compassion. If you who are in Government now cannot bring yourselves to act in this way, then the only recourse of the American people is to elect new leaders who can.

Thank you.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

I would like to address some general questions to the panel. Specifically, we have heard your views on SALT, and some of you gave your views regarding the negotiating proposal the President outlined on Sunday, but others left that in a rather general form.

Do you believe that the President's proposal is an adequate step forward at this time? Would anyone volunteer?

Mr. **Grossman**. I have spoken to that and have nothing to add except this one thought. Earlier testimony from Mr. Colby indicated that the President had made in his campaign a denunciation of the SALT II Treaty, and by introducing that political factor, I just wanted to make the comment that President Reagan would not be the first President nor the last President to violate a campaign pledge.

I certainly hope that he will not be hamstrung by that. I have the feeling that the country will forgive him if he adopts new initiatives in light of the new situation. I have every confidence that they will see it that way.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Scoville, in your testimony you pointed out that certain types of weapons are not included. You mentioned that you would hope he would consider limitations on all types of cruise missiles and bombers as well as on ballistic missiles. You stated in your statement:

> Furthermore, many of these proposals call for procurement of destabilizing weapons of the type that he feels must be eliminated in START. Administration officials in explaining the new proposal even mention that the U.S. would include 200 MX missiles with 2,000 warheads and a large number of counter-ICBM Trident II misisles in its ceilings.

If we were to ratify SALT, we would still need another agreement to address these; would that not be correct?

Mr. SCOVILLE. The problem that arises from the proposal which President Reagan has made is that he is cutting the number of launch points or possible targets for a potential first strike by the other side. In particular, for example, if we put the 200 MX's and actually deploy them as a part of our quota, that would mean that we would only have 200 launchers which would be under possible threat from the Soviet Union.

So actually, with the quota allowed the Soviet Union under the Reagan proposal, they would have more than 12 warheads that they could assign to each one of those launch points, and that is a much higher number of warheads that they could assign to those launch points than they could at the present time if we just stopped where we were today.

So unless you put some restrictions on the total number of warheads that are allowed per missile so that the ratio between warheads and launch points decreases, you are moving in the wrong direction. I think the idea in his proposal is very commendable, but you have to go further and limit what kinds of weapons can be included within the various quotas that he has established.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Scoville, staff informs me that you previously opposed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Why did you oppose these treaties and do you continue to question the need to ratify these treaties?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Yes. When they first came up, the Arms Control Association testified against these two treaties. We did not feel that they were significant steps toward controlling the testing of nuclear weapons. Establishing a ceiling at 150 kilotons, when everyone agreed at that time that we could verify down to much lower levels—you could argue whether it was 1 or 5 or 10 kilotons—broke down the long-established U.S. position that we were in favor of a test ban as long as it could be adequately verified.

We felt that this would look to the rest of the world as just a further validation of continued weapons testing by the Soviet Union and the United States and would be conuter-productive from that point of view. We were also worried about the PNE Treaty because at that time, much more so than now—this is no longer as active an issue as it was at that time—but that this would legitimize the idea that you somehow might be able to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions.

We had already had the experience of India claiming it was carrying out a peaceful nuclear explosion and ignoring the very fundamental fact that there is no difference between a peaceful explosive and a military explosive.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you. Dr. Bethe, did you have a comment?

Dr. **Bethe**. Yes. You asked about President Reagan's proposal. It seems to me that its main difficulty is that it may not be easily negotiable as it stands. It seems to me there are two difficulties. One is the special ceiling on land-based missiles, which I consider a very good thing. I hope very much that we can get it, but surely it is something that the Russians would find hard to agree to.

The other is this. In the present proposal, bombers are left out completely. This is a deviation from previous arms control agreements, and an important one because we are extremely superior in bombers and especially so after we have put the cruise missiles on our bombers.

Therefore, again it seems to me that it is difficult for the Russians to agree with this. Therefore, I believe that Dr. Stone's suggestion is a very good one: Namely, that SALT II would be a very good start for START because this is something which has been negotiated, the Russians have agreed to it, and reducing from there proportionately would seem to be something that they would find much easier to accept, and it would lead to the same result as President Reagan wants in his proposal.

I think it would be important to make clear to the President that this is so, and therefore, ratification by the Senate of SALT II might be a very constructive start for START.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I gather we are all very much on the same wavelength here. All of you support the continuation of abiding by SALT, a freeze, and deep reductions. Am I correct in saying nobody would disagree with that thesis?

Mr. **Kehler**. Excuse me, Senator, but just for the record I want to say that the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign has no official position on the SALT Treaty, for or against.

Senator **Pell**. I appreciate knowing that.

How many of you would agree with the thesis that was in a Foreign Affairs magazine article written by McGeorge Bundy and others proposing a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons? Would all of you agree with that thesis? I know Mr. Grossman did. Would anybody disagree with that?

Mr. **Scoville**. My written testimony addresses that as well. I think it is high time we start seriously considering a revision of our first-use policy which we now have because it is a policy which is based on a basic fallacy. If we use nuclear weapons first to try to solve some military problems such as stopping a tank attack, what we are doing is running a very, very high risk, in fact almost a certainty that Europe would be devastated.

Using nuclear weapons first is not the way to solve military problems in Europe. We ought to face up to that reality and try to deal with conventional aggression in Europe by conventional means. We will never do it as long as we use the crutch of a first-use nuclear policy.

Senator Pell. Does anybody disagree with that thesis? Dr. Stone?

Mr. Stone. Our newsletter, this past month, presented our support of a somewhat different idea, which I would like to summarize very briefly. I think long before America ever espouses a no-first-use doctrine directly, and forswears all possible options of using nuclear weapons first, long before we do that, we will diffuse and spread the responsibility for that first-use decision further than the single man, the President, that now holds it.

Since first use does not require instant action the way retaliatory use does—because since no conventional war is lost in a few hours or minutes—it is a great anomaly in our posture that we give to the President the right to turn a conventional war that risks our sons into a nuclear war that risks the entire country, without any consultation whatsoever, except with his subordinates.

Therefore, our newsletter repeated, Senator Pell, comments we made to this committee 10 years ago. At that time, you may remember, Senator Fulbright suggested in the committee report that we were right in arguing that "nuclear" war powers should have been part of the War Powers Act and that the President should be required in some way to consult with senior Members of Congress before he would have the right to move from conventional hostilities to starting nuclear hostilities.

This is, of course, completely in the tradition of the Constitution, which says that the President may not move from repelling attacks to declaring war, a clear escalation, without touching base with the Congress and getting a declaration of war.

Well, if one doesn't think that it is feasible to get the President to share responsibility for this great act with the Congress, one can still see throughout the world other ways of espousing this principle.

For example, Senator Pell, the President can use nuclear weapons first in Germany without the approval of the German Government, as I understand it, under certain contingencies in NATO. It seems to me one way of diffusing this responsibility quite well and very fairly is to say to the German Government that, under all circumstances, you will have a veto over our first-use use.

The point I am making about these way stations to no first use, Senator Pell, is that these way stations are much easier to achieve than a no-first-use policy precisely because they do not change the degree of our commitment to our allies. They only say that our constitutional processes for acting out that commitment—or our responsibilities to you, our allies, for acting out that commitment—are such that we will not take this act without this consulation.

So in the spirit of political practicality, I am just pointing out that long before our country actually says we will never use nuclear weapons first, I believe that we will adopt a policy of saying we will never use them first without the following consultations. These methods are the ones, I think, that the committee should be most emphasizing.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Dr. Bethe.

Dr. BETHE. I agree very much with Dr. Scoville. I want to remind the committee of the way the article's argument was phrased by Mr. Bundy and his colleagues; namely, that the United States should consider the no-first-use policy. We are certainly not ready to put it into effect today.

And one of the important steps we have to take is to increase the conventional strength of ourselves and NATO in Europe. We are always told that NATO is inferior to the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength. There are many people who dispute this and who think that we have enough antitank weapons to stop a Russian attack.

However, we have to concentrate on increasing our conventional strength in Europe before we adopt the no-first-use. But if we put the no-first-use as a goal and thereby reduce the importance of keeping up the nuclear strength in Europe, then we can concentrate more on the conventional strength.

And this will also give a completely different spirit to our NATO allies in particular; namely, they will be defending their countries and not be in the just monstrous danger of being killed by nuclear weapons in the course of that defense.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I was very struck by Dr. Grossman's testimony where he was referring to denial in one of the five stages. It reminded me of Dr. Kubler-Ross' theory about the denial of death in the various stages one goes through before the final acceptance of death. I presume your point was taken from that and is a very sensible extension of it.

I would like to say a word of congratulations to all of you because the work you are doing is very important and very necessary. We are a democracy, and I think we really do reflect in the end the general will of the people.

I saw this in the Vietnam war, where the people rose up and really turned the Government around. I think our committee played a role in that by making sure that the word "negotiate peace" were not considered dirty words and that you are not struck by a bolt of lightning if you decided to do that. Senator Fulbright deserves great credit for those hearings.

But even more important was then the Mall was black with people, thousands upon thousands upon thousands of people, and that is what really turned the Government around. My own view is that we would still be in Vietnam if these actions had not taken place. And what is needed is for movements like yours to do even more and to get even more people aroused. I think it is only by doing that that we will be diverted from this course in the end.

I realize my time has expired, but I had just one further thought. As I say, it takes two to tango or two to tangle, and you should do something also, if you possibly can, about organizing counterparts, not only in other parts of the world but behind the Curtain, because so far there has been really very little sign of equal concern in the countries behind the Curtain.

I realize it is much harder, having lived behind the Curtain myself, to organize a demonstration there. But still there has been almost virtually nothing except Government-sponsored use of the material more or less as an anti-American device. And perhaps you could move in.

So what I am really saying is keep up the work you are doing, do more of it, and try to be in touch with your opposite numbers behind the Curtain.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have exceeded my time.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Let me raise a comment and then ask a question on SALT. Does anyone believe that you can negotiate a START treaty within this President's first term?

[Pause.]

Mr. **Grossman**. It seems to me if popular pressure continues to demand it and to grow geometrically, exponentially, it can be done. I see no reason why this administration cannot do it.

But I for one do not expect this administration to take the initiative. I think it is wholly proper and consistent with our form of government that the initiative come from below. I have no great expectations for any political leaders, because I realize that it is our responsibility at the grass roots to make demands. And it is their responsibility to answer them as best they can.

I do not see any reason why it cannot be done in the first administration. The first administration implies that there might be a second, which is open to some question.

Senator **Tsongas**. I meant no implication.

Mr. **Scoville**. I might comment briefly. I think there is no technical reason why you could not achieve that in this time, although I think the President's proposal as it is would have to be modified considerably to be a negotiable proposal, as I have already testified.

The second thing is, one must remember that as a result of the SALT negotiation, there already is available a wide variety of mechanisms for implementing these treaties, like how they would be verified and so on. If they adopt those things that are in the SALT II Treaty—and I do not care whether they call that START or SALT II—then the actual negotiating process does not have to be that long, as long as there is some willingness to recognize that any negotiation has to be to the benefit of both sides if it is ever going to succeed.

Dr. **Bethe**. I agree with Dr. Scoville that there is no technical reason. It is a matter of will. Do we want to agree? And if we want to agree, instructions have to be given to our negotiator that agreement is desired by our Government.

Also, it seems to me—and I want to repeat what I said in my testimony—that the negotiator himself must be devoted to having agreement, to achieving agreement.

Senator **Tsongas**. Could I ask you to hold that, because that is my third question.

Mr. **Kehler**. I want to respond to that and also to what Mr. Grossman said. I think that the overwhelming support which is growing in this country for halting the arms race is not necessarily translatable into a groundswell of grass-roots support for SALT, quite frankly. I think one of the problems with SALT all along was that it was not something the American people, No. 1, could easily understand, and No. 2, felt was going to be very effective.

I think a lot of us certainly did not want to oppose it, but it was very hard to spend much energy working for its passage. I think particularly now, if there is a movement to really push SALT that looks to many people around the country as though it will take energy away from a more drastic measure like the freeze for absolutely halting the race, people will not support the SALT effort.

I do not think they will oppose it, but I do not think you can count on their support.

Senator TSONGAS. I would hope that we would make a decision on SALT based on its merits, irrespective of what is out there.

Let me just pose a problem. I think START is time-limited, one, because of Brezhnev's health; and second, because I am not really sure this administration is committed to arms control. I think parts of it are and parts of it are not. This is the situation that I think we face.

Passage of SALT II in its pure form is unlikely. I do not think we will get two-thirds. If you accept that as a given—and we could argue that, but let us, for the sake of the discussion, accept it as a given—there are three choices: Defeat of SALT II in its pure form but probably getting 50 votes, though not 67; passage of SALT II with crippling reservations; or, three, the pursuit of the sense-of-the Senate resolution that Senator Mathias has proposed that says we will live with SALT so long as the Soviets do.

If that is your Hobson's choice, where do you come down? That, in fact, is the decision we have to make in the next couple of weeks.

[Pause.]

Senator TSONGAS. There seems to be a lack of joyous enthusiasm about the prospects.

Mr. STONE. Senator Tsongas, it is not clear to me that this is a Hobson's choice. I mean defeat is clearly undesirable, and crippling resolutions are undesirable too. Clearly, we would all prefer a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to those other two choices. But the real choice of this matter is a clear time-honored political practice, which is to give the administration the credit for whatever happens. This is the time-honored necessary method. They have to make the SALT II Treaty their own, in some fashion, or they will not support it and you will not get ratification of it.

So I repeat, if my own proposal is not the right one—of shrinking the levels and sublevels of SALT I by a third and letting the Reagan administration call it the Reagan Plan——

Senator TSONGAS [continuing]. And I think that is a very attractive notion, I must say.

Mr. STONE. But if that is not the right one, then some other method of that kind has to be put forward so that they can say they got a quick victory and got real reductions. There was unanimity in this committee in September of 1979 that reductions had to follow the SALT II Treaty. So I think you must figure out some way to move reductions, together with SALT, and to let the administration get the credit for it.

I think your other question about whether it could be done in 2 years is answered in this way: They will be able to do it in 2 years if, but only if, they use most of the SALT II apparatus that is already in place. So if it is to be done in this first term of the administration, it almost has to be done in the fashion that I am suggesting, by taking the structure that already exists and shrinking it until it meets their initial requirements.

Mr. **Scoville.** If I might add to that. I agree with the end of what Dr. Stone was saying. I think another alternative to linking it just to the reduction process is to link it to the freeze.

In other words, I believe Senator Glenn's proposal to some extent calls for using the ceilings that were established in SALT and the mechanism of the SALT II Treaty and using those as starting points for a freeze rather than having to negotiate, what would be quite a long process at best, exactly what you are going to freeze when you talk about all these other weapons systems.

That might be a way of taking advantage of what has been accomplished in SALT and move on to what I think is extremely important.

I agree that the important thing about the freeze is that it stops the qualitative arms race. I think you might be able to take advantage of those two concepts and put them together in a package which could be negotiated relatively rapidly.

Mr. **Grossman.** One of the problems that I have in answering the question is that new ideas have often developed which are not necessarily addressed by SALT II, and I was a fervent supporter of SALT II when it was before the Senate. Mr. Kehler has referred to the concept of the "freeze," and so has Mr. Scoville.

It would seem that whatever is done about SALT II has to take that into account and has to make a clear statement about stopping new arms technology, which, to my way of thinking, is the most important part of the "freeze," so that we do not have a runaway technological race. It seems to me that you can build a coalition using SALT as one of the building blocks, and also freezing runaway technology as another block.

But then there is another block that can be used, and that is Senator Nunn's idea for measures to prevent accidental war. I do not know if anybody is against that. The idea of permanent consultations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and improving the hotline could also be put into the package to take into account the changed situation and the changed atmosphere with regard to the current danger.

Senator **Tsongas.** Let me say to Senator Pell, who was in the discussion we had yesterday, I think this issue is going to have to be addressed in some fashion. I think the great danger at this point is breakout. If that happens, all bets are off. I think you are going to find a very poisoned atmosphere, one that I think Mr. Colby referred to was the Densepack proposal by Secretary Weinberger, which as I understand it, would be a violation of SALT II.

Mr. **Scoville.** Of SALT I, I believe, also, and the ABM Treaty.

Senator **Tsongas.** All you need is one event like that to take place, and then I think we would really slide backwards dramatically.

So I think this committee has a responsibility to address not only the issue of a freeze, which obviously most of us support, but the danger that we may be on a kind of quicksand right now and that we should shore up the foundation somehow.

There may or may not be a great deal of enthusiasm about SALT, but I suspect there is a great deal of lack of enthusiasm about breakout. Frankly, I am beginning to be concerned about that. That issue may be getting away from us. What the answer is, I do not know. But it is one by which I am increasingly troubled.

Given the publication of the Densepack proposal, I am afraid it is going to get away from us if we do not address it. Frankly, I do not see any other forum to address that except this committee.

The other question I was going to ask is whether in pursuit of Dr. Bethe's analysis, given the fact that there was a fight in the administration in which Mr. Rostow and General Rowny lost, can you expect them to negotiate a treaty with which they disagreed in its proposal? That is the old analogy of the fox in the chicken coop.

Dr. **Bethe**. Senator, I did not quite understand the question.

Senator **Tsongas**. Well, my understanding about what happened with START is that Richard Burt convinced Secretary Haig, and they brought along the Joint Chiefs. They succeeded over the combination of Richard Perle, Secretary Weinberger, Eugene Rostow and, I believe, General Rowny as well. So the first group, in essence, won the President's nod. And now you have given the responsibility for negotiations to the second group, which lost the internal battle. Is there an inconsistency there? Can Mr. Rostow and General Rowny honestly negotiate a treaty which they were in opposition to or at least were, conceptually?

Dr. **Bethe**. I have my doubts.

Senator **Tsongas**. So do I.

Dr. **Bethe**. I think it would be possible to choose a negotiator who would still have the confidence of the President and who would be more devoted to actually reaching agreement than Mr. Rowny. I do not know if I answered your question.

Senator **Tsongas**. You sure did.

Mr. **Stone**. If I may say, Senator Tsongas, it is a further reason why this administration needs to negotiate the next SALT-related treaty out of the ingredients that are already at hand. If, in fact, as I argued, the Carter administration staffed out the military implications in great detail in classified studies of the shrinkage of the SALT II limits, and since obviously they studied SALT II in great detail, these are probably the only ingredients lying around already on the landscape which could be just cemented together over the opposition of Mr. Rostow and Mr. Rowny so as to get a quick result.

What I am proposing is not a question of negotiation, it is just a question of studying the implications of something that already exists, and seeing if the Soviet Union would agree to it.

Mr. **Scoville**. I would comment just briefly to the effect that I think if President Reagan really wishes to convince the public of the United States that he is serious about trying to get his proposal put forward and to get real controls on these dangerous nuclear weapons, then he must demonstrate that he puts people in charge of these tasks who believe in them.

Mr. Grossman. I would not want to comment on the intrigues of the Reagan administration or any other administration. I regard the bureaucrats as servants of the persons who are in political charge, and I regard those in political charge as susceptible to pressure from the masses of the people. That is where I come from, and that, I think, is the way to change things.

I think the people who are in charge of the desks are relatively unimportant. They can be told what to do, what to change. I do not think that sends as much of a signal as the kind of activity that Senator Pell was talking about or the kind of activity, the frantic, frenetic activity that is going on all over the country that Randy Kehler and I are seeing.

Senator **Tsongas.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Pell** [presiding]. I have a couple of further questions which I would like to ask. First, I think you would all agree that we want to lower the nuclear arsenal and our dependence upon the nuclear umbrella. Presumably, that would mean increased conventional strength. Do any of you support the draft?

Dr. **Bethe.** I would. I would support the draft because it certainly would upgrade the quality of our Army. It would at the same time indicate that the United States is serious about conventional defense of Europe. I think this is a very important part of improving conventional defense.

Now, it is true that our allies have the draft, and our allies provide most of the manpower in Europe or much of the manpower. But if we had the draft also, it would certainly help the spirit of cooperation.

Senator **Pell.** Do any of your colleagues agree or disagree?

Mr. **Scoville.** I am not against the draft, but for somewhat different reasons that Dr. Bethe's reasons. I think the advantage of a draft is it gives the people of the United States a direct participation and therefore an interest in seeing that our military establishment is effective and efficient as it possibly can be. If the people are divorced from the manpower that are involved in that military structure, then they will not play such an active part.

I do not think, however, that I would agree with Dr. Bethe that we need the draft in order to improve the conventional capabilities in Europe. I think the problem in many respects, as far as our manpower is concerned—and the manpower is an important problem—is retention of the qualified people who have been trained in handling, maintaining, and using the new technological weapons that we have.

I do not see how the draft reduces that. In fact, I would think that would make it worse. The tendency would be more for people to take their draft tour and get out. I think what you have to do is retain the people who have volunteered and who have a real interest in it so that they will be there more than just the initial 2 years of their having signed up.

I do not think that in order to deal with improved conventional capabilities that that necessarily means any significant increases in our forces. I think it involves very important changes in our strategies and our doctrines for how we will fight in Europe and how we would repel a Soviet conventional aggression. And that applies to other parts of the world as well.

But I think we have to face up to those rather difficult political decisions. After all, I do not think we can allow the world to go up in flames just because we refuse to face up to a difficult political decision on how we should defend Europe conventionally.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Dr. Stone.

Mr. **Stone**. Senator, I am afraid that the last two interventions may confuse the committee's record in a very important regard. I do not think any of the witnesses here today thinks that any of these arms control treaties we are talking about, including the freeze which we support, will require the draft or even directly require improved conventional forces in Europe.

It is true that for a no-first-use policy it is incumbent upon the country to look carefully at its conventional forces. But we would not want the country to think that the limits on overkill that we are talking about today on SALT, even reducing SALT by 50 percent, have any effect upon the conventional struggle in Europe.

The overkill we are talking about does not improve our chances to resist a conventional attack in Europe and reducing it does not undermine our chances to defend against such an attack.

I think Dr. Scoville and Dr. Bethe agree with that.

Mr. **Bethe**. Entirely.

Mr. **Scoville**. Of course.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Mr. Grossman.

Mr. **Grossman**. I agree with that position. If it were necessary, however, to improve conventional capabilities in order to get a real handle on nuclear weapons, I would be for it. But I do not think it is necessary, from all of the opinions that I have heard.

Yesterday we had a major symposium at George Washington University, and Adm. Noel Gayler, in charge of all U.S. Forces in the Pacific until recently, made that point, that even for the defense of Western Europe it is not necessary to dramatically increase our conventional capability.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Kehler**. If I might add for the record, speaking only for myself on this, I would categorically oppose any resumption of the draft, and feel that it is incumbent upon the Government to make a case for people who voluntarily agree to fight in support of their country, if that is the situation.

My only concern about the way the thing works now is the obvious inequities with who does end up serving, particularly with minority and poor people. I think there are other ways to address that problem than to impose compulsory conscription.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you. I have not reached a position myself either. I am an enthusiastic cosponsor of Senator Tsongas' national service bill. I think that has very real merit, and I hope it moves ahead.

But I would agree, I do not think the draft is an imminent question, and I have not reached a position in my own mind on that.

Going back to my earlier question to you, what more do each of you see that can be done to further arouse the populace to the dangerous path, the collision course upon which we are embarked?

And also, what could any of you do with your opposite numbers in other countries, whether on this side or the other side of the Iron Curtain? I would be interested in your reply. Just go down the line, please.

Senator **Tsongas**. If the Senator would yield, I would make just one statement first.

Senator **Pell**. Of course.

Senator **Tsongas**. I would like the record to reflect a prediction that I think the administration, by coming out with a proposal that talks about serious arms reduction and coupling that with Secretary Haig's statement that SALT II is dead, has raised the stakes of arms control. It is doing that for reasons that are political, that is, the demise of SALT II, sort of the sense of who owns what treaty, the START as opposed to SALT approach.

The administration is now in a position where it has to produce a treaty. I would simply like to say for the record, because I want this in the record for future reference, if the administration does not produce a treaty or if the administration is perceived, because of their negotiators, as in essence not serious about bringing about a treaty, then I think you will unleash in this country, forces not only of a desire for arms control, but a repugnance at being betrayed, which I think cannot be overestimated.

I think they have created this dynamic, and hopefully they will resolve it to the satisfaction of the people in this country. If they do not, for the reasons I describe, I think you are going to see a political tidal wave that will make the freeze movement seem a very mild reaction indeed, because you are going to combine the two forces, which together I think could be something we have not seen the likes of in this country for a very long period of time, including the anti-Vietnam war sentiment.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much, Senator Tsongas.

Mr. Grossman?

Mr. **Grossman**. Senator Pell, in answer to your question let me state first of all that the Council for a Livable World does not have formal or informal relations with any groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, we know about the activities of the International Physicians Group and the meeting that they recently had in Cambridge, England, which was attended by prominent Soviet doctors and some people in political power.

I have seen the record of television, radio and print reports of the meeting that was held in Virginia, a year ago April, and was impressed with the amount of reportage that the Soviet Government in its controlled press allowed about the medical consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The reports of the conference in volume seem to be at least as much as was shown in this country at that time.

There are continuing programs, I am told, on Soviet television about the effects of nuclear war. I would like to call to your attention the recent experience of the Reverend Billy Graham in the Soviet Union. I would also like to call to your attention the fact that there has been a good deal of church activity in East Germany, in Poland and in Czechoslovakia on this issue.

The institutions of the Soviet Union, of course, do not parallel ours, and I am not trying to compare them in any way. Whatever happens in the Soviet Union will be government-inspired. We have no way that I know of of affecting that.

Senator **Pell**. What more can be done here? I want to encourage you and support you. What can we do to help you do a better job and get more people excited?

Mr. **Grossman**. I think you have to consider a wider range of options. I am unhappy that we are still talking about SALT II when there are other problems, when the situation has become even more critical.

I would like to see this committee talk about accidental war and the control of technology, the control of new systems, in the Soviet Union and in the United States. It seems to me that that is where the action is. This committee has to be on the frontier. It has to do something. It cannot be platitudinous. It cannot come up with something "mushy," as one of my associates in the Council for a Livable World described it.

It would have to be very specific stuff and deal with the issues and the systems that are coming up, in an effort to forestall them on both sides.

Senator **Pell**. Well, you do an excellent job. But as you know, most of the Senators who were defeated in the 1980 election were friends of SALT II. Most of the people who succeeded them—many of them came to office as opponents of SALT II. So it would seem the country does not reflect that wish.

But it seems as though you are starting to change the country a bit. I know you do that through political action, and I congratulate you on that. I know in the end that is the way to achieve results. So I am here to give you all a tremendous cheer and to say I wish you could do more work.

Mr. **Grossman**. If I could make one last comment. I think in 1982 you will see a different set of political results partly due to the indignation about nuclear weapons which is sweeping the country.

Senator **Pell**. As you know, the interest is not as keen as it should be. Without the attraction of those nice television cameras, you can see the committee is not as well attended as it might be. I think public attention has to be kept on this subject very much.

Mr. Scoville.

Mr. **Scoville**. I would agree with the latter point that you are making. One must be very careful. Having now aroused the public and gotten them to understand the dangers, one now has to give the public something concrete to get behind and to push for.

That is one of the great advantages of the freeze campaign. It is a concrete proposal which the public can understand and can get behind. But there are going to be lots of problems with the freeze and with all of these proposals as we go into the future, as you try to translate them into concrete actions.

I think one of the very important functions which I think the Senate has and which we, as those who work with the public, have in terms of education is to try to sort out what are real, practical and useful arms control proposals as opposed to those which are rhetoric and designed to mislead the public and not really further arms control. In that respect, I think one has to recognize that arms control does not start with negotiations. It starts with the actual decisions we make on the procurement of our weapons.

Just as we have to look at an arms controls agreement to see whether it increases the stability of the strategic balance, as President Reagan said he felt very strongly was the purpose of his proposal, we have to look at whether the decisions on procuring this or that weapons system meet the same objectives: Do they improve the stability of the strategic balance or do they not?

Far too often they do not. We are then setting a climate which only makes it more difficult to get these things under control. So arms control is a much broader thing than just negotiations and agreements. I think it is terribly important that we all work together. I think hearings like this are extremely useful as a mechanism of getting word to the public, and I would hope that, as much as possible, what goes on in these hearings does get spread out in one form or another.

I think all of us who have organizations will do our best to do so. There are a lot of very useful things that have been said here just this morning and I think probably in previous sessions.

Senator Pell. But then, when you look at the press table you realize there is not as much reportage as there should be.

Mr. Scoville. I agree, but the press is a lot better than it was a year ago, when it was not paying any attention to the subject. In fact, they are spending an awful lot of attention and it is hard to get any sleep sometimes these days.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Dr. Bethe.

Dr. Bethe. Well, as usual, I agree with my neighbor that arms control includes both negotiations and our own weapons systems.

I would like at this point to say something about the freeze. I very much support the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, and the part of my testimony which I did not read—I suppose all the testimony will go into the record—that part was mainly concerned with specific arguments why a freeze would indeed be possible and would not lose us anything, because the weapons which we mostly debate about, like the B-1 and MX, are not necessary and are also not going to improve our strategic position in any essential way.

Now, as far as Mr. Grossman's statement goes, I wish we could control technology. But it seems to me that this is far more difficult than controlling the actually deployed weapons. There is one way in which we could stop technology which I think is feasible, and that is to stop testing of missiles.

I think this has been repeatedly proposed and I believe this would indeed contribute to a freeze, a qualitative freeze of the level of technology. It would be a very good addition to the proposals that we have made. It is not new, but it is feasible.

Another point, with regard to Mr. Goldsmith's testimony, you asked not only about this country but also about the Soviet Union and what can we do to influence their actions. Soviet doctors were mentioned, and this is a very important link between the two sides. The doctors are active in pointing out the dangers of nuclear war.

But there is also another contract; namely, the Academies of Science. There is contact every half-year between the Soviet Academy of Science and the American National Academy of Science. Both of them have groups which are devoted to arms control. I have been informed that in the first meeting last January there was very close agreement and the Russian academicians were very much devoted to the idea of arms control and arms reduction.

I think this is a contract also which we very much have to foster.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Mr. Stone.

Mr. **Stone**. Senator Pell, I think the spirit of your question was to make a proposal that supports arms control, but perhaps is a little outside of arms control. My proposal would be something that I think might be very dear to your heart. I would propose that the Congress urge that the next summit, which is now in process, be a "summit in depth," a summit not just of a very old Soviet leader in transition, with our President, but a summit at which the leading Senators, especially from this committee and the Armed Services Committee, try to make acquaintance with leading Politburo members, who will be the ones that you will be dealing with in future years.

You will recall, Senator Pell, that in 1971 this committee held hearings on the fact that only 40 U.S. Senators had ever even been to the Soviet Union, less than a majority, and only 20 percent of the Congressmen had ever been there, and at that time only 20 percent of the Politburo had ever been here.

Now, this gross anomaly that the arms race should be on for a third of a century and still have the leading political bodies of the two sides not having visited the country of the other, still pertains. The percentages I just stated, Senator Pell, are the same today as they were then. The percentage of Senators visiting there had gone up to 50 percent, but after the election it is back again to 40 percent.

So the leading political bodies of the two sides do not have the foggiest idea what the nature of the society is with which they are dealing. And I believe that these visits, and these contracts, would change their underlying subliminal perceptions to such an extent that they would be more supportive of arms control.

There is a great deal of history to support this. Much of it was in the testimony before the committee in 1971, to which the committee could refer and some of which we would be happy to supply.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Obviously, as a Senator, I like the idea very much, indeed. However, basically it would be the executive branch because the Politburo runs things in the Soviet Union. There is no legislative branch whatsoever in the Soviet Union in substance. But it would be a nice idea, but I think unlikely.

I know I was the one who moved to have Senate advisers to the SALT negotiations and was the first adviser sent. I am not sure that this administration, like the Nixon administration before, is enthusiastic about having Senate participation in these meetings.

Mr. STONE. I might say that I have in mind more of a get-together than any substantive discussions. Obviously, the administration would do the negotiating and so on. As things stand now, about the only U.S. citizens who seem to have met other than one or two Politburo members are financiers, as for example partners in Lazard Freres who deal with financing Soviet projects. Until there is a little more contact between the political leaderships of the two sides, either at the summit in depth—or if the committee would return to the proposal it approved in 1971—I think the arms race will continue.

That proposal, Senator Pell, in 1971, just to remind you in the hope that you might adopt it again today—its main sponsor is no longer in the Senate now—that proposal was that every Senator and every Congressman who had not been to the Soviet Union who were obviously voting so often on things that involved his knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union should go there for at least one 2-week visit beginning some time in his tenure.

I think that could well be raised again.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kehler.

Mr. KEHLER. On the question of what is going on on the other side of the Iron Curtain, certainly far less in terms of public visible demonstrations for disarmament. But I am reminded that last fall, when there were numerous large rallies involving hundreds of thousands of people in Western European capitals, in fact, there were also some more limited, but nevertheless in various cases very large, actions on the other side in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany and, if I recall correctly, in Albania, where they had very large demonstrations. And not just, as one might expect, calling on the United States somehow to do something alone, but calling on the Soviet Union and the United States.

I am also reminded that recently the chairperson of our national advisory board, Randall Forsberg, who was invited to speak before the Soviet Peace Council, actually challenged them, you might be interested to know, to a peace race in which they would collect signatures from all over the Soviet Union, just as we are in the United States, toward a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze.

But you know, I do think that in some ways one of the exciting things about the freeze is there are already indications, with or without massive protests from the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, indications that the Soviet Government would seriously consider a freeze.

One took place just recently at the Cambridge, England, meeting that Mr. Grossman just referred to of the international physicians, where the Soviet delegation, led by the president of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, signed on to the letter that was unanimously endorsed by all the physicians there to Presidents Brezhnev and Reagan, calling upon them to adopt the freeze on the testing, production and deployment of these weapons. That I think is some signal.

More recently, just this past week I think a delegation of world parliamentarians, including former President of Mexico Echevaria and some others from around the world, got back from talks with Vice President Kuznetsov in the Soviet Union, during which he indicated that the Soviet Union would give serious consideration to a freeze proposal. So I think that is a sign of hope that we should not lose sight of.

Finally, I think there is one other very specific thing that you and Congress could do to help keep this subject alive and help people become aware of the dangers of nuclear war, and that is, instead of only holding hearings here, if you would be willing to sponsor hearings in every State in this country, in every congressional district, and go to the people and say, we want to hear your views, and the whole range of views, not just on the freeze, this would stimulate great discussion and interest all over the country. People are really calling for this.

Senator PELL. Well, Senator Pressler deserves great congratulations in this area, because he already has held hearings in California and in South Dakota. And we are contemplating holding some more hearings outside Washington.

Let me say that I thank all of you for your being here today. I encourage you and wish you well.

The committee will stand in recess until 1 o'clock, when Mr. Rostow will be with us.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator PERCY [presiding]. The committee is convened this afternoon for the last hearing on nuclear arms reductions proposals prior to its markup on Thursday of next week. I have just completed a hearing with Senator Glenn of the Governmental Affairs Committee, its Non-Proliferation Subcommittee, all morning on the nonproliferation aspects. So this really winds things up.

Our anchor man is Dr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We look forward to exploring with you, Dr. Rostow, some of the innovative proposals which you have put to the committee in the course of these very important hearings.

Senator Pell, do you have any comments?

Senator PELL. No, except to joining you in welcoming Dr. Rostow to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We are happy to have your statement now, Dr. Rostow.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY [ACDA], ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH D. LEHMAN, PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIVISION, ACDA, AND THOMAS GRAHAM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, ACDA

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Pell. It is both an honor and a pleasure for me to appear before you once again to discuss the present phase of the struggle against nuclear war. As I have said many times in this room and in other rooms, it is my conviction that in order to outlaw nuclear war, we must outlaw all aggressive war, since it is impossible to build a firebreak between nuclear and conventional war. But I promise, Mr. Chairman, not to preach that sermon today. I shall confine my testimony this time to the President's proposals for nuclear arms reduction and the principal ideas before you on the same subject.

Soon after I assumed my present position, ACDA undertook a review of our policies toward nuclear arms control agreements and sought to engage the other agencies with responsibilities in this field in a searching conversation about the contribution such agreements could make to our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

One of the important conclusions to emerge from this discussion, as I remarked as early as my confirmation hearings nearly a year ago, was to highlight the increasing importance of the Soviet lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles, and especially in large ICBM's, which has emerged so sharply in recent years.

Analyzing the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare and in world politics, a consensus emerged in the executive branch. It is that the most serious foreign policy problem we face is the threat of nuclear coercion based on a credible Soviet capacity to improve its military and political position through a first strike against our ICBM force, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground.

The menace of nuclear imbalance in this sense is being translated into political currents of great power, as we have seen during the last few years. The deployment of vast numbers of SS-20's and Soviet ICBM's is designed to make our flesh crawl and to induce acute political anxiety in Europe and in other countries at a time when the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty is being questioned.

Henry Kissinger deepened that anxiety a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers did not commit suicide in behalf of their allies. But political anxieties about the nuclear question would have existed even if Dr. Kissinger had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called "subliminal" emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. They are there.

The pressures of Soviet nuclear mobilization have other effects. There has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Americans who are seriously advocating an American return to neutrality and isolation, as if that approach to foreign policy were an available option for the United States. Such American voices have their inevitable echo in Europe, Japan, and in other parts of the world dependent upon American protection. The chorus advocating American isolation and American accommodation to Soviet power is answered abroad by advocates of neutrality on the one hand and of nuclear armament on the other.

Reviewing these studies and discussions, President Reagan therefore decided to make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles the first goal of our arms control effort, and the first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union.

These weapons are swift, accurate, destructive, and numerous. No defenses qualify their capacity to destroy and no American weapon compares in destructive power to the heavy Soviet missiles. We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on deployed ICBM's in 1972. In 1982, the Soviets have a lead in this crucial area of approximately 3 to 1. Until this Soviet budget in nuclear power is eliminated, either by arms control or by American modernization efforts, it will not be possible to restore political stability.

The New York Times recently put the issue in an editorial entitled, "How Much Is Enough?" The task of arms control diplomacy, the Times said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history, and to forbid the weapons which defy deterrence. . . . That done, the arms race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough.

This view of the matter is the basis for our approach both to the INF talks now going on in Geneva and the START talks the President proposed on Sunday. What we are seeking in these talks, which are, of course, closely related in subject matter, is to achieve stability at equal and much lower levels of force—a posture on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy would allow deterrence by the threat of retaliation, but deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on its looming superiority in ground-based intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In the INF talks, as you know, we have proposed that all the Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles be dismantled. In exchange, we would not deploy our 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe, pursuant to the NATO decision of 1979.

The Soviet Union has bitterly attacked our INF proposal as unfair in that it would require the Soviets to make a larger reduction than we would be called upon to make. This is hardly the case, since the sacrifice of future weapons is not really different in kind from dismantling existing arsenals. But even if it were true, it would be irrelevant. Arms control negotiations are not bargains among peasants haggling over the price of potatoes. The Soviet Union and the United States, the two leading nuclear powers, are trustees for humanity, and should do whatever is necessary to help lift the cloud of war from the horizon of the future.

I am glad to note that 6 months after President Reagan's speech of November 18, on the intermediate range missiles, European and American opinion and opinion throughout the Western World solidly supports the principle of our proposals as altogether fair and equitable. After all, no state has a right we must acknowledge to build a military force which could be used only for purposes of aggression.

The President's proposals for the START negotiations are equally sound and equitable. They propose equal ceilings at much lower levels of force; ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBM's. Coupled with the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles, such a result would genuinely reduce the risk of war, while maintaining an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security and meet our commitments to allies and other friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, two-stage approach to strategic arms reductions. Our START plans is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal, both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. I will quote from the President's speech at Eureka College. "The focus of our efforts will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems--ballistic missiles—the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential."

The United States will propose that at the end of the first stage of these negotiations, ballistic missile warheads be reduced to equal levels, at least one-third below current numbers. Furthermore, to enhance stability, we will propose that no more than half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw-weight.

Our proposal will call for these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of United States and Soviet strategic forces including equal limits on ballistic throw weight at less than current American levels.

In both phases of the START talks, we will insist on verification measures capable of assuring compliance. In the case of provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, we will propose cooperative measures, data exchanges and collateral constraints that could provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has already assured us—and Mr. Brezhnev has said publicly—that it will accept reasonable verification procedures of this kind to supplement national technical means of verification.

The broad principles outlined by the President at Eureka College provide a sound and promising basis for the negotiations ahead.

They give priority to the acute threat to peace and stability posed by the massive buildup of Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly its ICBM capabilities.

They are fair and balanced; they are based on the principle of equality and they are aimed at insuring that each side will have an equal capacity for deterrence. Surely, both sides have a powerful incentive to achieve greater stability at equal and substantially reduced force levels.

The President's approach to phasing is practical and realistic. The task of reducing and restructuring United States and Soviet forces in order to achieve a more stable balance will take a substantial period of time.

We look forward to the START negotiations and hope the talks can begin by the end of June.

We also look forward to the second round of the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces which begins next week in Geneva. The first round was devoted to details and serious discussions aimed at gaining a clearer understanding of each side's point of view. In this respect, the round was useful, although we cannot yet say that there has been progress in reconciling what are still sharply divergent approaches. But given the pattern of Soviet negotiating practice, there is nothing remarkable in this state of affairs at this point in the negotiating cycle.

The United States and its NATO allies remain firmly committed to the proposal advanced by the President on November 18 for the complete elimination of long-range INF missiles. I remain hopeful that with continued NATO unity and allegiance to the dual track approach, together with greater realism and flexibility on the part of the Soviet side, we can begin to achieve concrete progress in the INF negotiations as the START negotiations proceed.

President Reagan's proposals in START and INF are central elements of the administration's approach to promoting a more peaceful and secure world. We are fully aware, of course, that alternative approaches to strategic arms control have been advanced in various parts of the country, and by several Members of the Congress.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the administration opposes the idea of a nuclear freeze at current force levels in all its forms. By halting our current modernization efforts, such a freeze would perpetuate serious vulnerabilities that have developed in our deterrent posture, and therefore freeze a situation of considerable instability. It would remove any incentive the Soviet might have to accept the substantial reductions we are seeking both in START and INF.

And a freeze would constitute, in effect, a unilateral American renunciation of the joint NATO decision of 1979 to modernize western intermediate range forces. It would therefore adversely affect allied confidence in American leadership and steadfastness.

What I say about a freeze at current levels applies a fortiori to proposals to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, even if Soviet tanks were rolling across the German plains toward the English channel.

The American pledge to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend our allies against Soviet aggression has been the basis for the recovery and the cultural renaissance of Western Europe, Japan, and many other parts of the world since 1945. For 35 years, it has been the counterweight to Soviet superiority in manpower, tanks, and other conventional arms. The policy recommended by Mr. McNamara and his colleagues would deprive NATO of much of its essential credibility, and it would give a new and terrifying impetus to the process of nuclear weapons proliferation.

We are also aware of the interest of some Members of Congress in resurrecting the SALT II Treaty. Advocates of this approach point out that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is currently acting in a way which would undermine or undercut existing agreements, and they recommend that this situation be formalized.

It is true that both sides are refraining from actions that would undercut SALT II. It is normal practice not to rock the boat unduly during negotiations; and for the time being, it is in the U.S. interest to maintain those mutual constraints. But the ratification of SALT II would be an altogether different matter.

For the remainder of the treaty's duration, ratification would legitimize critical Soviet advantages, particularly the buildup in hard-target ICBM capabilities allowed by SALT II. For that reason alone, it would make it impossible for the United States to solve its most urgent security problem. On the contrary, ratification of SALT II would make that problem worse.

Having SALT II formally in effect would provide a convenient excuse for the Soviets not to negotiate seriously and expeditiously on an agreement actually reducing strategic capabilities to equal levels.

Formalizing SALT II would be portrayed by the Soviet Union as this administration's endorsement of the idea that the treaty's framework and basic concepts provide for equality, but they do not. That is why we are proposing new units of limitation in START, based primarily on the number of weapons and their destructive capacity.

If we ratified SALT II, we should be in a much weaker position to seek a more equitable framework for START. Those who advocate applying a few quick fixes to SALT II and calling it START are not advancing the national interest.

For these reasons, as well as our continuing fundamental objections to other key elements of the treaty itself, we opposed ratification of SALT II. SALT II is behind us; we must look ahead. We should focus our energies on achieving real reductions. A prolonged debate on SALT II would only frustrate this objective.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I am hopeful that we now have an historic opportunity to make substantial progress toward reducing Soviet and American nuclear capabilities in a balanced and verifiable way. But if we are going to seize this opportunity, we must proceed with determination down two mutually reinforcing paths: We must continue our efforts to make our deterrent forces more secure and credible, while at the same time negotiating vigorously and imaginatively to achieve agreements that, for the first time, would promote real stability at levels much lower than those which exist today.

There has been much talk in the press and in Congress about the acceptability or negotiability of the principles and guidelines President Reagan has just proposed. Predicting Soviet behavior is not easy, and I am not the seventh son of a seventh son. On this subject, I admire people who can tell us with such assurance exactly what the Soviet Union will and will not accept. On this slippery and elusive subject, I think it is safe, however, for me to risk two propositions.

First, our proposal is fair. What we seek is in the common interest of mankind. No state can claim the right to coerce another.

Second, the Soviet Union did not achieve its advantage in ground-launched ballistic missiles in a fit of absence of mind. It spent years of effort and billions of dollars in doing so. And it will give this advantage up only when it is convinced that the alternatives are worse.

That is why we say that arms control agreements can only be understood in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. The President's speech at Eureka College offered the Soviet Union a far-reaching and permanent program of cooperation, as his Christmas broadcast did a few months ago. It also announced our unshakable determination to defend our interests, and to insist on the fundamental principle, pacta sunt servanda, agreements must be kept, as the bedrock on which peaceful international society is built.

Without the effective implementation of this policy, the essence of our national interest in world politics, we may make agreements, but there will be no peace. This is a truth often forgotten by those among us who believe that even a bad agreement with the Soviet Union is better than not having an agreement. For some who take this pernicious view, the situation is hopeless, and making a nuclear arms agreement is simply an act of submission to Soviet supremacy, an acceptance of vassalage on the best terms we can get.

For others of this persuasion, perspectives are different. They share the illusion which Senator Muskie expressed on March 18—that negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control is in itself, "a restraining influence" on Soviet behavior. This view is wishful thinking and nothing more. But it is powerful and pervasive. We negotiated about arms control with the Soviet Union throughout the seventies. It was a difficult period of the cold war, not only in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and African, but in the development and deployment of many new and improved Soviet weapons systems.

Of course, we are in favor of negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control and every other aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, we are doing so now in Geneva about intermediate range nuclear weapons, but we must not confuse hope with reality, and we must not fall into the treaty trap. Treaties alone do not keep the peace.

But the American people and their leaders are not going to lose their nerve or bend their knees. The threat we face can be countered by the methods of steady diplomacy backed by the calm deployment of deterrent force. We shall pursue arms control agreements with the Soviet Union based on the principle of equal deterrence—agreements which eliminate the destabilizing influence of the most threatening Soviet first strike forces.

But as Secretary Haig commented the other day, it must be understood that nuclear arms control agreements are of no use if they make the world safe for conventional agression.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very kindly, Dr. Rostow. In your opening statement you said that the limitations established in SALT II would make the problem of U.S. silo vulnerability worse. Is it not true that SALT II, as it is currently being respected by the Soviet Union on a de facto basis, prevents them from vastly increasing the number of warheads on the ICBM's? If so, how does this make our situation actually worse?

Mr. ROSTOW. There is no question about that, Mr. Chairman. If you look at SALT II as a whole, there are advantages and liabilities for us in the treaty. The advantages are the ones you mentioned: the obligation to destroy submarines as others are deployed, the limit on the number of MIRVed missiles, the ceilings on fractionization, which have both advantages and disadvantages. They limit the number, but at the same time, they encourage MIRVing and the making of very large missiles.

The liabilities, however, are fundamental. In the first place, if we ratified SALT II, it would inevitably constitute the base line for the START negotiations. We would be starting with the wrong unit of account: Deployed launchers, and not with a unit which measured the number and destructive power of weapons and encouraged or moved toward smaller and less ominous weapons. Second, it would not reduce our ICBM vulnerability at all.

I fully agree with what Senator Jackson said to you yesterday that legitimizing the nuclear armament status quo, in his phrase, would be a profound mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, who were you quoting there?

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Jackson in his testimony yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROSTOW. There are many lesser problems for SALT II: The Backfire problem, telemetry, the asymmetry of rights with respect to the heavy ICBM's. But my basic objection--and I think in itself it is a fatal objection—is that there is no way of accepting SALT II without accepting an ominous Soviet advantage in ICBMs, the most serious problem in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. I was interested in the article this morning by Michael Getler in the Post on the Henry Kissinger speech yesterday in The Netherlands. He points out the fact that whereas START is on the right track, they are very far-reaching proposals and will take a long time, an enormous amount of time, to negotiate. He concluded that because of this, he would lean toward ratification of the earlier strategic arms limitation treaty called SALT, as an interim agreement, pending some modifications of that treaty.

The administration certainly has indicated its intention to observe SALT II in a de facto way, providing the Soviet Union does. If we are observing it on our part and exercising all of the restraints necessarily placed on us, and they are observing their restraints, and ours is conditioned upon theirs, but the only thing they have not done is destroyed 250 nuclear systems which they would have been required to destroy as of December 31, 1981. Even though 250 sounds small compared to the total number of systems available, 250 systems is still a lot. The principle is even more important. They literally would have destroyed nuclear warheads.

So why aren't we better off with a ratified treaty, one which could be ratified if the Reagan administration would simply say it is in our best interest to do it, let us not let it interfere or be divisive. It will be a continuing part of this. After all, Governor Reagan, as candidate, said there is much in SALT II with which he could agree. But then he said it is fatally flawed. Well, if it is fatally flawed and we are observing it on our side, and the only thing that is lacking is the destruction of 250 weapons which they would have to implement, what is wrong with it, then?

A number of people have testified before us on this particular issue. We had testimony this morning from the former Director of CIA, William Colby, who has had a lot of time to think about it. He said definitely, it is to our advantage and to the national security interest of the United States that we ratify SALT II. He ought to know.

Henry Kissinger is coming to that conclusion. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, reaches that conclusion, as well as James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA. He reaches that conclusion, too, and he served under Republican administrations. Gen. George Seignious has reached that conclusion, Paul

Warnke has, Ambassador Tom Watson, former Secretary of State, Cy Vance. They have all reached that conclusion.

What is to prevent us from just going ahead and ratifying it? As I say, if the administration would say it is for it, I think it could be done without a lot of fuss and feathers. I think we could get it ratified.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I shall try again, Mr. Chairman. I have great respect for many of the people——

The CHAIRMAN. You quoted the authority of Senator Jackson. I have a high regard for Senator Jackson but I have disagreed with him on an awful lot of conclusions over the past 15 years.

Mr. ROSTOW. I have disagreed, I guess, with almost everybody on your list in one way or another on more than one topic. All I can do is present my own views and those of the administration. I will try to do so again.

I went through what I thought were the advantages of SALT in the short term, and its liabilities over a longer term in my previous answer. Now I will try to sum them up in response to your question, and a comment on Henry Kissinger's complaint that he cannot understand why the administration objects to the ratification of SALT II.

There are some short-term advantages for us in SALT II, as I said in my prepared statement. For the time being, it is in the interest of the United States that the SALT limits on deployment be observed. I mentioned, too, what they were. The submarine provisions, the 820 limits, and the limit on not more than one new type. We know that the Soviet Union is working on many more than one new type, but they cannot test or deploy those systems so long as the SALT limits are respected.

But the fundamental longer run objections outweigh the advantages you and I have just mentioned. I think I have mentioned a longer list than you did, a longer list of advantages in SALT II. One fundamental disadvantage is that if we ratified SALT II it would inevitably be the base line for any START negotiations. We would start from SALT II rather than taking a fresh look at the problem. That would mean we should have to start by legitimizing the present Soviet advantage in ICBM's.

The present Soviet ballistic missile advantage is the source of the profoundly destabilizing tide which is causing so much turbulence in world politics around the world today. SALT II would not reduce this Soviet ICBM advantage; indeed, it could not do so. It does not touch the heavy ICBM's and it could not reduce the vulnerability of our ICBM force. But, the proposals the President outlined would at once begin to reduce the vulnerability of our ICBM force, and of our other strategic weapons, so that it would take a larger and larger fraction of the Soviet arsenal to attempt to destroy our forces. That is the heart of the problem. If it took not a third of their arsenal but two-thirds or four-fifths, the instability of world politics would be dramatically reduced. And that, we think, is the major goal of our arms control proposals.

If we start from the base of SALT II and the concepts and approaches of SALT II where we would be measuring the wrong thing altogether, launchers rather than destructive capacity, then we would minimize our chances of accomplishing that goal. And we would correspondingly reduce the incentives for the Soviet Union to respond to our lead.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I am just stupid.

Mr. ROSTOW. Oh, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But I want to go back over it again. If we are willing to observe it and we say it is in our national interest to observe it, knowing that they can breach it at any time they wish—if it is in our national interest to observe it now, why not just go through the formality? That does not imply that that trend is going to continue on. But it would seem to me ratification would bring us one step closer to reducing—I repeat, reducing—the number of nuclear missiles they have by 250. Isn't that true?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. They would have to destroy 250. What would we have to destroy?

Mr. ROSTOW. They could build more new ones, of course, under the SALT II limits, but that is not the point.

The CHAIRMAN. But I am not saying that. Do you think honestly, we are going to sit here next year and have START I ready for ratification by the Senate? That is going to take a long time, isn't it? I will admit if you could do this, that you have proposed, and they would accept it we would be better off. But you do not expect them to really accept it, do you? Seriously?

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, that is exactly——

The CHAIRMAN. From the noises we have had so far, it does not look like they are saying yes. I do not see them nodding their heads this way.

Mr. ROSTOW [continuing]. Of course they are not nodding their heads. As I said at the end of my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union have spent years of effort and billions of dollars in building their ICBM advantage. This was not done in a fit of absence of mind; it was a deliberate policy designed to achieve a position through which they could paralyze our deterrent, split us from Europe and our other allies, and proceed to expand indefinitely. This is a serious problem. It is not going to be cured by arms control negotiations alone.

If we take the view that we must have a quick agreement and we must accommodate and transform our proposals in order to achieve an agreement——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not saying even that quickly; I am just saying in our lifetime.

Mr. ROSTOW [continuing]. Oh, in our lifetime. Certainly, I thought you said "next year." Thank you, I wish you the same, with enthusiasm.

But I thought you said "next year." Are you going to have a START proposal for us next year. The answer to that is I do not think so, but it is not up to us; it is up to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is deadly serious about these programs. They are going to respond. I think there are many forces in world politics which should lead them rationally to want a period of stability in their relations with us: For example, their economic plight, the cost of their military program, and above all, the situation in Poland and what it represents throughout Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union. Beyond all that, they too should understand the menace of the nuclear weapon.

There ought to be many chances for reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union, if we look at this not as a chess game involving nuclear weapons, but as part of the process of politics. But I am against the notion that we must have an agreement for the sake of having an agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just saying a bird in the hand is probably better than this futuristic program we are off on. As you know, I supported the Eureka speech.

Mr. ROSTOW. I know.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it was well done. And I think it was particularly well done because it offered a chance for the Soviets to come back, and the President forthrightly said we will consider any proposal that you want to make in contravention of ours. But is it reasonable for us to expect that our current unofficial restraint policy can really withstand the strains which will inevitably occur during the years it takes to complete START. Aren't we taking a terrific risk of breaching this informal agreement, and what assurance do we have that the Soviets will not increase their strategic offensive forces substantially, substantially, a year from now, 2 years from now, 3 years from now while we are still conducting START negotiations?

Mr. ROSTOW. But they have been doing that all along.

I forgot to say in response to your comment before that of course, we are planning to use a good deal of the language and many of the concepts of the SALT II Treaty. We are not trying to reinvent the wheel. Now that we have defined the concepts that are going to be the basis of our effort, we will use a considerable part of that work in shaping the new proposals.

But we do know and we must recognize that SALT cannot and is not whittling away the Soviet advantage in the heavy destructive, destabilizing warheads. On the contrary, that situation is getting worse and worse, day by day. And there is nothing in the treaty which can tackle it.

There is another factor to be thought of, Mr. Chairman. Many people are saying ah, we can nail something down quickly: a bird in hand, as you say. Do not forget that if we open up SALT II for amendment—and that is what Henry Kissinger and others have proposed—the Soviets will have some ideas about amendment, and we will spend a considerable period of time, perhaps as much time as it would take to negotiate START, in revising, amending and reaching agreement on a treaty which is unsatisfactory in its fundamental conceptual framework.

One of my colleagues said—and I think it was a very good statement—that SALT II was an ideal solution for the nuclear problem of the late sixties. It is not an ideal solution for the nuclear problem we face today. It would permit a considerable increase in the total number of warheads because it restrains only launchers, and that is the wrong way to go about it at the stage we have reached.

So I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that we are going to have to agree to disagree, although I am happy to sit here and argue with you all afternoon about it.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have been doing that all year. [General laughter.]

Ever since your confirmation hearing.

Let me go to a real simple problem that I hope we can resolve very quickly, and that will be my last question in this round. In your confirmation hearing last year, we agreed on one thing. We agreed—and it was just about a year ago—you stated that you personally endorsed ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty signed by Presidents Nixon and Ford.

At that time, I asked if you could move forward to get a position from the administration, and with your strong voice, your articulate voice, your powerful voice, have ACDA be used to influence a decision then, favorably to that. Not that I proclaim these to be any great shakes, but just simply because I was impressed with the fact, as I have said before, that Secretary General Brezhnev constantly kept talking to me about—with whom are we dealing; what are we dealing with? We have a government over here; we are all here on our side. And I look over there and Gromyko has been there for 25 years, Ustinov has been in charge of the Defense Ministry since 1941. He said to me, though, that they are dealing with different people who come into Washington; they sign treaties but nothing ever happens. They are not ratified.

Here we have three treaties that are unratified, and now we are starting with a new administration. How long is it going to take? What will we end up with? It is a question in their minds as to whether it is really worth their while to go through all of these years of negotiation.

Now here we have two treaties. They are not a great shake. They have a threshold of 150 kilotons. But one of them provides for the principle of on-site inspection which is going to be very important in START. In SALT II, national verification means are adequate. We have enough adequate verification means to verify that treaty. That is the advantage of launchers versus warheads and so forth. START will require some on-site inspection, but the principle for the first time was accepted by the Soviets but never ratified by us.

It is now a year later. Everyday I know you have been talking with the administration. When are we going to get a decision on this? We just cannot get a decision. I could not get a decision from Mr. Burt yesterday; I have not been able to get a decision from anyone on this. What do we have to do? Just ask for a meeting with the President; have him focus on this? Does he have a paper up there giving him a yes or no recommendation? Even a no would be better than just indecision or maybes or "we are studying it".

Mr. ROSTOW. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. I put that question to every witness that we have had up here. I put it to Mr. Colby this morning, I put it to every one of the others. They gave an instantaneous yes. In fact, we had a "no" from one witness, and I have forgotten just who it was. But one public interest group felt 150 kilotons was too big, but every other witness to whom we put the question said yes, it is in our interest to ratify those. Why can't we get a decision on those?

Mr. Rostow. The situation you describe represents a fundamental problem of our Government. We carry pluralism and autonomy nearly to the edge of paralysis. I do not agree, of course, with the comments that Mr. Brezhnev made to you, and I do not believe he was really serious about them.

The Chairman. Well, I did not accept them at all.

Mr. Rostow. I understand that. I do not think he was really serious. I think he was pulling our leg, and fairly enough. But I have been trying very hard, Mr. Chairman, and I have been altogether faithful to my promises to you. I have run into a stone wall which is difficult to deal with. It could be solved if we insisted on taking the issue to the President, which we have not yet done.

The stone wall is the feeling in many parts of the Government that given the uncertainty of the nuclear balance and the need for new weapons and modernization either in the existing pattern or in new patterns dictated by changes in policy, we are going to need testing and perhaps even testing above the 150 kiloton limit for a long time to come.

It is impossibly hard for civilians to challenge military judgments of that sort. While we have not given up and we continue to pursue the matter, we have faced a literal—well, I will not say stone wall, but—strong defensive positions; an array of defense positions on that set of issues. We are almost ready to take the issues to the President. I am reluctant to do so, but it may be necessary to do so.

Until we do that, I am afraid we are not going to be able to reach an agreement.

The Chairman. Would you identify not by name but by position these people? Are these Cabinet or sub-Cabinet people, or are they bureaucrats or someone down below, who is stonewalling all of these?

Mr. Rostow. It is whole phalanxes and battalions, going all the way up.

The Chairman. In other words, we are like the Argentine Government. Do you mean the people up at the top? Secretary Haig can get an answer out of the top people in Argentina, but then the Foreign Minister rushes to the airport and says oh, no, the corps commander, the division commander, have vetoed this. I thought we had a government in which someone could say yes. Maybe that is why I am saying perhaps we ought just go to the President on this.

Mr. Rostow. Well, we may have to.

The Chairman. It is not that big a deal, but it is just frustrating not to be able to get an answer.

My concern has been the principle. We have heard rumors that there are people in the administration who favor dropping these treaties because they want to go ahead and resume high yield testing above 150 kilotons [illegible] there substance to those rumors? Is there now a serious consideration that we are going to go to a much larger testing program?

Mr. Rostow. There are people who make such recommendations, yes. The answers depended on a new round of tests which I guess came out of your insistence at my confirmation hearings and the conversations and exchanges we had at that time. But we ran into a series of skirmishes, and I should say even battles beyond skirmishes, on this set of issues. I am sorry that we have not been able to get an answer within this period of time. We ought to have been able to do it, and I hope we will get there soon. But I am not giving you the standard "the matter is under study" response.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, who would come out ahead? If we tested above those levels—and so far as I know, the Soviets are not; they have acted with restraint, they have observed that—would we be better off, would it be in our interest or in their interest if testing by the two superpowers above 150 kilotons was resumed?

Mr. ROSTOW. They are much freer than we, of course, to make larger tests. And there are grave doubts about the testing procedures. That is one of the fundamental difficulties: the ambiguity and uncertainty of testing methods.

We have had great trouble being confident that the testing measures give you more than approximate confidence in the outcome. But as far as I am concerned, I think the answer has to be that the Soviets are in a much better position than we are to use greater testing freedom for larger tests. It is obvious.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope you will excuse my frustration. I have tried in private meetings, as you know, to get an answer to this. I just have not been able to get it.

Mr. ROSTOW. I not only excuse our frustration; I share it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, once again, we agree on this particular point, then. I will see what I can do to help you get an answer to that question.

Mr. ROSTOW. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, I have taken a great deal of time. You take an equal amount of time, and Senator Tsongas as well.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I say I share your views and your frustration as well, and hope you do get an answer.

Just for the sake of accuracy, I think you said that the SALT Treaty does not control the number of warheads. My recollection is that it does; that there is a limit of 10 on land-based missiles and 14 on submarine-launched missiles. Am I correct?

Mr. ROSTOW. Excuse me. I did not hear your question. My staff was busy talking to me.

Senator PELL. I said for accuracy of the record, I believe earlier you said that SALT II did not control the number of warheads. My recollection was that it limits it to 10 on land-based and 14 on submarine-based. Am I correct in my recollection?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes. But more than that, it had an indirect approach to controlling the number of warheads; no more than 4 on the SS–17, no more than 6 on the SS–19, as I recall, no more than 10 on the SS–18. So there were limits of that sort but no total and overall limit on the number of warheads, as I recall it. And Soviet warhead totals have, in fact, increased during this period.

Senator PELL. Right. But there are limits on the warheads on individual launchers.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is correct.

Senator PELL. To follow up Senator Percy's question, he asked you whether the United States would have to destroy any weapon systems under SALT II. I do not think you answered that directly. Would they or would they not?

Mr. ROSTOW. They certainly would have to destroy weapon systems as new ones come online.

Senator PELL. No, today, would we have to destroy any weapon systems?

Mr. ROSTOW. Today? Well, there are 37 mothballed B-52's that I think would come under the ban.

Senator PELL. Well, those are mothballed. But from the viewpoint of missiles——

Mr. ROSTOW. But all of our mothballed B-52's count in the SALT II counting system.

Senator PELL. But from the viewpoint of actual missiles, my recollection is the Soviets would have to reduce by about 250 they would have to destroy, wouldn't they?

Mr. ROSTOW. I have forgotten what the figures are. I think that is about right.

Senator PELL. I think that is correct.

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; they are higher than we are, of course.

Senator PELL. And by the same token, except for the mothballed B-52's which do not contain nuclear matter, we would not have to destroy anything. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, from where we stand now with submarine-launched missiles, I know that there are problems of that sort. But I think that is right.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

This morning we heard testimony that a one-third reduction in the limits and supplements of SALT II would, in fact, force the Soviet Union to reduce its warheads by a factor of one-third, which is really the primary goal of President Reagan's START proposal. The newspaper reports have stated that the previous administration staffed out and supported the notion of just such a reduction in the levels and sublevels of SALT II carried out 5 percent a year over a number of years.

As you said earlier, you do not want to rediscover the wheel, and some of these studies are still pertinent. My question then is: Could we perhaps formally lock in SALT II with President Reagan's proposal of a one-third reduction in warheads, by using the already staffed-out notion, going to exactly the same objective as President Reagan wishes to, as being an easier and quicker way of achieving the goal that you and I are after—the ratification of START?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, every possible scheme and certainly, every aspect of our previous experience in SALT I and SALT II is vividly on the table before us. We have chosen, after a good deal of effort, these particular procedures in the interest of simplicity and ease; ease of understanding and directness in achieving the results. But we will certainly take another look at the set of suggestions that you have in mind.

Senator PELL. Good. Just like we dust off old battleships, we could also dust off ideas if they have merit.

Mr. ROSTOW. Absolutely.

Senator PELL. In that regard, I am wondering if you could perhaps study the proposals set forth by Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists and give us perhaps an answer back in writing by the beginning of the week, before we get to our markup.

Mr. Rostow. With very great pleasure.

[The information referred to follows:]

At the hearing before your Committee last week you asked me to review the approach suggested by Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists. I have studied his proposal, and I find that it falls well short of the approach announced by the President last week. For example, Mr. Stone claims that his approach—cutting all the ceilings in the SALT II Agreement by one-third—would result in a one-third cut in ballistic missile warheads, as proposed by President Reagan. This is not in fact correct. SALT II did not limit the total number of warheads directly. Instead it limited deployed missile launchers in several categories, and the number of warheads per missile.

Reductions in the number of launchers would not necessarily result in a proportional decrease in the number of warheads. In particular, even if the Soviets reduced their missile totals by one-third in all the SALT II categories, they could retain more than 4,000 ICBM RVs on permitted SS-18's and SS-19's, or more than 5,000 ICBM RVs if they deployed their permitted new type ICBM. They could also deploy several thousand additional RVs on SLBMs. These levels are much higher than would be permitted under the President's proposal, which would set an equal ceiling on ballistic missile RVs well below current levels. The Stone proposal would actually permit an increase in such missile warheads above current levels. This example indicates how important it is to choose the correct unit of account in constructing limits on strategic forces, and the drawbacks of attempting to limit warhead numbers indirectly through constraints on deployed launchers.

Stone pointed out in his testimony that his approach would not focus the reductions on Soviet ICBM warheads. In fact, his approach would permit the Soviets more than twice as many ICBM warheads as the President's proposal. I believe it is essential that the U.S. position focus on the most destabilizing forces—the Soviet ICBMs.

Mr. Stone's suggestion of periodic reductions has merit. Such reductions should result in equality in missile warheads and destructive power at substantially reduced levels. The approach proposed by the President will achieve this goal, reductions in the SALT II ceilings would not.

Senator Pell. Thank you. To go to another subject, Time magazine says here, referring to you and quoting Helmut Schmidt, he says:

> Someone of importance in the U.S. (Arms Control Agency Director Eugene Rostow) made a speech recently telling his audience that Americans should not delude themselves in thinking they are living in a postwar period. They should accept the fact they are living in a prewar period.

Was that a correct quotation from you?

Mr. Rostow. No, that was not. I came back from Ottawa 10 days or so ago and found that on the desk, and I have been busy communicating with the German Government and with Time to try to find out what on earth they had in mind. I made no such statement, certainly recently, no such statement during the period of my service as director of ACDA.

I can recall only one statement that even comes close to it, which was in a letter to a friend back in 1976. And that letter, along with some other letters, was purloined from my files by a rather extreme political group. And they gave that letter, among others, to the Washington Post, which printed the story in 1976.

Now, if that is conceivably the source of the comment, and if it has been circulating lately in the German press, we are trying to get on top of it. And I will issue, of course, a public statement or a letter to Time to correct the record, and write also to the Chancellor.

But I want to emphasize what you emphasized as you read it, which is that my name is mentioned in that story in brackets. It was not Chancellor Schmidt who used my name.

Senator PELL. Correct. I am delighted that it is not correct. I cannot resist following up one of your thoughts there by asking who is this "radical political group" that had purloined your papers?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I do not know whether they purloined them. Somebody purloined them, and they had them. It was the group led by a man named Lyndon Larouche, and at that time it was called, I think, the American Labor Party.

Senator PELL. And again, forgive the curiosity, but I am always interested in security, were you in the Government at the time?

Mr. ROSTOW. No. I was a professor at Yale, and these disappeared from my office in New Haven.

Senator PELL. You mean these things happen at Yale? [Laughter.]

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator PELL. I am not surprised.

Mr. ROSTOW. The brief answer to your question is yes.

Senator PELL. I am not surprised. [Laughter.]

Mr. ROSTOW. Now, you must be broadminded.

Senator PELL. Next I would like to come to another point here, and that is, our committee, as you know, is a pretty strong supporter of ACDA. And on Tuesday we voted out unanimously a bill that authorizes $19.9 million, almost $20 million, for ACDA in 1983, an increase of $1.6 million over fiscal year 1982. Yet I believe the administration plans still further reductions in ACDA spending from $16.7 million this year to $15.2 million next year.

In other words, the committee wants it to go up and you want it to go down. Your manpower is being slashed. You may close down your computer operation. You may have to shut your library. And I am wondering what the effect of this will be? Will you have enough resources to pay for the negotiations on which you hope to start?

Mr. ROSTOW. I am very much in your debt, Senator, as I told you the other day, for having called my attention to the astonishing fact that the Department of State is immune from "Stockmanization" while ACDA is subject to "Stockmanization." I intend to use that piece of information which you provided me in the next round of budget talks.

I think we can live with the cuts which we have made, but on a very bare-bones basis. And I hate to cut, of course, the library and even to think about cutting computer operations. But can we sustain ourselves and can we sustain those talks? I think with your help and with the help of the committee, which has increased the budget, there is no question but that we can.

Senator PELL. But why is ACDA the only agency in the whole sort of sphere of security agencies that is being cut back.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is just what I am going to ask Mr. Stockman. I have no idea. I did not know that the Department of State was exempt. I thought Stockmanization was the law of the Medes and the Persians.

Senator PELL. Well, what will be your specific responsibilities in the START negotiations? Because obviously, the expense is going to be tremendous as you get underway there.

Mr. Rostow. We provide a great deal of the manpower and a great deal of the basing expenses, yes.

Senator Pell. And if this goes through, would you not agree with me that your ability to properly support these negotiations will be hamstrung? That does not mean killed. Hamstrung means hamstrung.

Mr. Rostow. Well, hamstrung may be a little severe. But we will be thin.

Senator Pell. Getting close?

Mr. Rostow. Yes.

Senator Pell. I am always struck, too, at the way taxpayers, as reflected by the Congress and the President, judge the Department of Defense's support of bands. As you know, I am a great culture fan.

But I am struck by the fact that while ACDA has 165 people and $16.7 million is what they will be asking for, military bands have 5,300 people that are asking for $90 million, or better than five times as much. I guess this is where our country puts the priorities. I regret these priorities and wish you luck in getting more money, and I hope you will fight hard for it.

Mr. Rostow. Thank you.

Senator Pell. Thank you

Senator Tsongas.

Senator Tsongas. $90 million? Really?

Senator Pell. Yes. $90.8 million. [Laughter.]

Senator Tsongas. And to think I gave up the flute at a young age when it could have been very helpful to me.

Senator Pell. Excuse me. Just one more odd fact. There are 100 bands. That means that there is almost three-quarters of a band for every single individual in ACDA. [Laughter.]

Mr. Rostow. I might add, Senator Pell, that I often describe my ambition as the director of ACDA as the abolition of all military forces, total and complete disarmament except for military bands. But not 100.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

Senator Tsongas. Well, it helps if you know how to play the dirge, because it may come to that.

Mr. Rostow, I was troubled by the piece in the Washington Post that described an alleged memorandum to the assistant to the President for national security affairs that came out of your office. The title of the piece is "The Anti-Anti-Nuclear Battle Plan." Do you know about that memorandum?

Mr. Rostow. Surely, I know about it. The White House organized an interagency group to contemplate what we could and should do by way of protecting the administration's outlook and recommendations in the field of arms control during a period of very active discussion and demonstration planned on a countrywide basis.

As you know, the President said on several occasions that he welcomes these demonstrations of active public interest in arms control problems and nuclear problems, and I have said that frequently in many speeches and public statements.

At the same time, ACDA has an obligation, a statutory obligation, a natural obligation, to try to respond by making this a civil and searching and useful dialog. So the administration was considering what it ought to do. And ACDA, among other agencies involved in these matters, provided some input for the interagency committee.

That memorandum which found its way in a plain wrapper to the Washington Post was simply a staff contribution to the discussion by interested Government bodies about what should be done, how we should respond, what our contribution ought to be to the series of public discussions, public activities designed to focus attention on these matters.

Senator TSONGAS. So that this was a staff memo? You were not aware of it; is that right–

Mr. ROSTOW. I was aware of it. I transmitted it to Judge Clark.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, let me go into it because——

Mr. ROSTOW. I did not write it, but I looked it over, and it went in. It was one of a great many staff papers that were considered by that group.

Senator TSONGAS [continuing]. It refers to "the growing stridency and hysteria of the anti-nuclear weapons movement." And let me just read some of the recommendations in the anti-anti-nuclear battle plan.

> **On Saturday, April 17, a photo opportunity with the President and Mrs. Reagan at Camp David, spring flowers, atmosphere of calm. On the next day, a photo opportunity again with the President; he returns to the White House, exits helicopter with brief case.**
>
> **On Tuesday, April 20, the American Security Council holds press conference assailing both Kennedy, Hatfield, and Jackson-Warner.**

I wonder how Jackson and Warner feel about that.

> **Thursday, April 22, the Wall Street Journal does an editorial about hysteria and policy development.**

So much for the Wall Street Journal.

> **Friday, April 23, photo opportunity, President or Secretary of State to visit Arlington National Cemetery (sobering backdrop of war's consequences).**
>
> **Saturday, April 24, photo opportunity, President working, meeting Cabinet members; no President-at-play, contrasting with earnest protesters.**
>
> **Sunday, April 25, President invites small group of Ground Zero Week leaders, thoroughly screened, to the Oval Office for discussion; no White-House-under-siege-a-la-Nixon.**

I think this is an embarrassment.

You referred in your testimony to a "chorus advocating American isolation and accommodation to Soviet power." Who were you talking about?

Mr. ROSTOW. There have been a number of articles and books and statements in the recent past which advocate such policies directly. And there has been a number of statements which advocate policies which have that consequence, even though they do not use those words.

Senator TSONGAS. Can you name me one elected official that you know about?

Mr. ROSTOW. Elected? I did not say anything about elected officials, did I?

Senator TSONGAS. Well, if you are raising the specter of this chorus and assuming they are not in the Army band, I am curious, who constitutes the chorus?

Mr. ROSTOW. There was a very influential article or series of articles written by a man named Lawrence Beilenson and Samuel Cohen. They appeared in the New York Times, and Samuel Cohen had an article in Newsweek.

Senator **Tsongas**. Is that a chorus?

Mr. **Rostow**. But I have not begun.

Senator **Tsongas**. I never heard of them.

Mr. **Rostow**. Sam Cohen is the fellow who is behind the neutron bomb development. He is a man with great expertise in this field. Mr. Beilenson has written a good deal in this field. I think the proposals of Messrs. McNamara and Bundy and Gerard Smith in the article in Foreign Affairs, by reducing the credibility of our guarantee to NATO and other countries under our nuclear umbrella, would have the inevitable effect of isolation, forcing us back.

Senator **Tsongas**. Are they accommodationists?

Mr. **Rostow**. Well, some are, and some are not. I think those who say we must make the best deal we can——

Senator **Tsongas**. The poor people who wrote the article, are they accommodationists?

[Pause.]

Mr. **Rostow**. I think their views are somewhat different. I was just trying to think of Gerard Smith's views on the more general aspects of foreign policy as compared to those of George Kennan, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. McNamara, which I know very well. I think George Kennan would certainly justify that term; he is a strong advocate of a very limited American commitment beyond the borders of the United States.

I think, on the whole, the use of the same term is justified both for Mr. Bundy and Mr. McNamara, yes.

Senator **Tsongas**. You certainly do not equivocate.

Mr. **Rostow**. You have known me a long time.

Senator **Tsongas**. I know. I must say I did not expect that answer. I thought you would dance around it.

You were cochairman of the Committee on the Clear and Present Danger, which campaigned against SALT II. So I do not think there is any way you could rationally be expected to argue for SALT II. Yet, in your statement you said, "It is in the U.S. interest to maintain those mutual constraints."

Mr. **Rostow**. For the time being.

Senator **Tsongas**. Well, let us talk about Densepack. Do you subscribe to the Weinberger proposal on Densepack?

Mr. **Rostow**. First of all, so far as I know, Mr. Weinberger has not made a proposal yet. Second, my job is arms control and disarmament, and for me to take public positions or even private positions on defense proposals would be unseemly and might get me into unnecessary trouble. So I would respectfully suggest that you allow me not to answer that question, not on grounds of the fifth amendment, but on ordinary respect for the limits of bureaucratic territory.

Senator **Tsongas**. I always find it difficult to be confrontational with my dean.

Mr. **Rostow**. Thank you.

Senator **Tsongas**. Let me ask you this, not about whether you would recommend Densepack or not, but the consensus seems to be that Densepack would violate SALT provisions and would therefore constitute so-called breakout.

Mr. ROSTOW. I had not heard that about Densepack, though I have heard a good many other things about it. Violate them in what respect, Senator?

Senator TSONGAS. Well, I will call your attention to the article of Saturday in the Washington Post:

> In closed-door debates over Densepack, some Air Force leaders emerged as the champions of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, SALT II, negotiated by the Carter Administration, assailed by Reagan and Weinberger. The Air Force backers of SALT II said it has helped keep the lid on the number of deployed Soviet warheads. Opting for Densepack might pry off that lid, they warned.

Article IV of SALT II, which was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, but was not ratified by the U.S. Senate, states that, "Each party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers or relocate fixed ICBM launchers."

So, according to some Air Force leaders, they feel that Densepack does indeed violate SALT II and, thus, we have achieved so-called breakout.

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I shall have to study that. Of course, that is a genuine issue under the treaty, and we would have to study it. Comparable issues arose before in the consideration of the multiple-vertical-shelter solution for the MX and the Minuteman. And there were in the Carter administration, as you know, two views about whether such additional holes, silos, in effect, would violate the treaty.

I am not prepared at the moment to answer that question, but I shall be glad to get a considered answer for you, if you wish.

Senator TSONGAS. I would prefer that you give the answer to the President.

Mr. ROSTOW. All right.

Senator TSONGAS. I mean, I would like to have it, but my power is more than reasonably limited in these situations.

Just a final concern that I have. My understanding is that there was quite a remarkable internal struggle over what would be said at Eureka, similar to Yale Law School faculty discussions, I would imagine, in that there are basically two factions.

There was, if you will, the Burt and the Perle groups, with the Burt group arguing for warheads and missiles, and the Perle group arguing basically for megatonnage throw weight as the units of account. What it came down to was Mr. Burt convincing Secretary Haig, with the subsequent acquiescence of the Joint Chiefs and subsequent approval by the President. On the other side was yourself, Mr. Perle, and Secretary Weinberger.

And the obvious question is, if that was a reasonable facsimile as to what happened internally, you now have a situation where those who lost the internal debate are called upon to negotiate that same agreement.

Do you think that you can, as a lawyer, forget your internal debate and argue for something that you internally disagreed with?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, Senator, in the first place, if you will remember, as I am sure you do, the immortal phrase of Chief Justice Marshall in *Marbury* v. *Madison* about the secrets of the Cabinet, the whole doctrine of executive privilege springing from that phrase, I must draw the curtain over those newspaper stories about what did and did not happen in the discussion of these matters because I am constitutionally bound.

As for the second question, I should say that the matter is not yet fully decided. There are many aspects of our approach to these talks which are yet to be settled. And the issue which you raise, a perfectly legitimate issue, has not yet matured.

I would like to ask permission to go back and comment on your comment about the story in the Washington Post, when you said it was embarrassing, that you said you found that story embarrassing, I did not realize that you were going on to another question. I should like to make the record clear that I regarded that staff memorandum as one of a continuous stream of contributions we were making and making properly to the deliberations of an interagency group concerned with a perfectly legitimate governmental activity in the field of public information.

The language of the experts in public affairs and their planning of photography and impressions and images and that sort of thing is not a field in which I am an expert or indeed a field in which I have any confidence whatever in my own judgment.

But I am not embarrassed by that paper. You, of course, are entitled to your judgment. I found it a perfectly normal activity in the language of public relations, public affairs experts.

Senator TSONGAS. Is it that easy to get the Wall Street Journal to do an editorial about hysteria? I cannot get them to do an editorial on anything.

Mr. ROSTOW. I have never succeeded in that myself. But that was the enthusiasm of the proposal. Lots of things did not happen according to that plan, and indeed I do not know how much influence that plan had in the deliberations of the committee. But it did result in my writing a lengthy speech from which I borrowed in my presentation today examining all the proposals we could think of that were then before the public and trying to discuss them one by one.

Senator TSONGAS. Do you think the person who arranged for the memorandum would have been upset if the President exited the helicopter without a briefcase on April 18?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that that is exactly how those straight public relations experts go about creating images. I am always amazed. Remember that Churchill always appeared in public with a cigar.

Senator TSONGAS. Let me just end with a comment. I think that we are in the following situation, and I said this earlier this morning. I would just repeat it.

The administration is in a position where it responded to the desire in the country for arms control. In the country, as you know from the public opinion polls, has embraced the freeze notion. And you could argue the technical details of that. But from a purely public populace position, the fact is that most people in the country think that is not such a bad idea.

Now, the administration, having, in essence, rode the anti-SALT II tide, is in a very difficult position to reverse itself. And yet, reality has its own weight. And so therefore you have the fact of living with SALT II.

The Eureka speech raises expectations. I think it will have a certain effect on the freeze movement, temporarily. But let me say that I think the administration runs risks, by taking a very hard-line approach, in being insensitive to the issue of arms control. But I think you can pretty well calculate those. I think by the Eureka speech and the Haig statement yesterday on SALT II, that, in essence, you have entered into a totally different sphere. And that is the sphere in which you not only have the commitment by the country to arms control for whatever reason, but you also have now a series of expectations. And I would suggest that the one thing about all that you would want to avoid is the country coming to the conclusion eventually that the demise of SALT II and START were, in essence, frauds.

Mr. Rostow. Were in essence——

Senator Tsongas. Frauds. That there was indeed no commitment; it was simply a way of, in essence, providing the firebreak to a growing movement. Because if you add to the desire for arms control a deep-rooted sense of betrayal on this, the ultimate issue, I think what you experienced in the Vietnam war that you spoke to us about in the committee will be child's play. And I would say that nothing in my political career, in my lifetime, will come close to the emotional dynamic that will be unleashed by that.

I think you are in a position where you have to produce a SALT proposal. And if you do not do it within this term, I think by the time 1984 comes around, those emotions will be running rampant. They will be a function of having killed SALT II for reasons having to do with prior public positions and the approach of START, in essence, the non-delivery of that.

I say that as someone who is just trying to be an observer of where I think things are going. And I just throw that out for your observation.

Mr. Rostow. Well, it is a very important and searching set of observations, and I appreciate them. And I would like to respond briefly to them. I well remember our exchange at the earlier hearing on these subjects. I agree with you about the profundity of the emotions and the feelings that are involved, fully.

I would like to correct you in one minor regard. The President's speech at Eureka College was not a response to the concern about nuclear weapons that has been so manifest in the last 4 or 5 months. It is the natural culmination of the process of work and study upon which we embarked immediately upon my appointment about a year ago. Indeed, the announcements were scheduled and expected last January, and they were put off because of the events in Poland. If they had been made in January, the course of political concern during the spring might well have been different.

There is no question about the fact that we shall come forward with serious proposals for negotiating a START treaty, exactly as we came forward with serious proposals in the field of INF. I do not think we can be charged in any way in either field with activities that would constitute or be considered by fair-minded persons as frauds.

I quite agree, however, that if the people of the United States or the people of the Western world should think that we are playing with this issue, they would be justified in every way in being extremely angry.

One of your colleagues told me the other day that what his constituents are telling him is something every politician understands, namely, "Do something." They were not saying, "Do this, or do that. Go in for a freeze or a no-first-use pledge or anything else." They are saying, "Do whatever is sensible, whatever is prudent, whatever is right to protect the interests of the country and to eliminate the risk of nuclear war."

And in that, I think, as always, the people were absolutely right. And I think that is the way we look at this movement. Nobody in the administration has said a word of criticism of these movements of protest and argument. We have tried, of course, to respond to them. And we should.

Now, what I think is wrong with your consideration of the problem is the feeling that the Congress of the United States and the President of the United States can somehow or other achieve the result we all want. It takes two to achieve that result. That is why I said what I said at the end of my prepared statement.

The Soviet Union has reached this position with respect to ICBM's, and SS-20's which is so destabilizing and has such far-reaching and profound political effects throughout the world, deliberately and for a real purpose. The Soviet leaders are serious people, seriously devoted to their cause. They are not going to give their advantage up lightly. I hope they will.

We will exercise all the imagination and all the energy we have in negotiating with them, in proposing plans and programs to them. The President has just made a most conciliatory speech in Illinois, as he did Christmas time. We will follow up those offers and proposals.

We want to make it attractive to the Soviet Union to cooperate. But the Soviet process of expansion is not an illusion, it is a reality. And we cannot be blamed, we certainly cannot be accused of fraud, if the Soviet Union should turn down proposals which seem to us, which seem to all of us, which seem to you, which seem to the American people, to be fair and equitable and addressed to advancing the interests not only of the two countries but of the rest of humanity.

That is the reason I put so much stress on the proposals that were made in November. They, too, were criticized by the Soviets on exactly these grounds. And yet, public opinion has held steady and firm in respecting those proposals as fair to both sides.

Senator TSONGAS. Would you be offended if I made a personal observation?

Mr. ROSTOW. My dear Senator Tsongas, I would not be offended at all.

Senator TSONGAS. As someone who was your student and saw you in a different context and learned to respect you deeply in that context—and I think the agreement is that you are an unusually gifted human being, with a rather remarkable career—I think it would be most unfortunate if that career were to be capped by cochairing a group that killed SALT II and then presiding over the miscarriage of START.

I am sure that must weigh on you as well.

Mr. Rostow. I thank you for the goodwill of that statement. I hope it will not be true.

Senator Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Percy [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Tsongas. I have just a couple of questions.

This afternoon Senator Cochran will introduce an amendment to the fiscal year 1983 defense authorization bill calling on the United States to actively pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on a chemical weapons ban. What would ACDA's position be on this proposal?

Mr. Rostow. So long as the problem of verification shows any signs of solution, we will pursue those bilateral approaches with enthusiasm, so long as the Soviet Union seems even disposed to go forward on the compliance problems. We will not ask for prior commitments, but the President has recently approved of a very far reaching and active proposal for seeking a comprehensive chemical test ban.

But of course, the problem of verification of compliance is fundamental. We are now pursuing these matters at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

The Chairman. From what I see, the Soviet Union has reasonably complied with treaties that are verifiable, where it would be embarrassing if they were, say, caught cheating on a treaty and the damage would probably be far greater than the gain they would get by doing it.

But in instances where we do have treaties with them on, say, the production of chemical warfare and biological warfare materials, the evidence seems to be mounting that they have violated those treaties, and, in fact, without any question we know that the verification provisions of the treaty that we have with the Soviet Union in that regard calling for, following a demarche, inspection of facilities has absolutely been denied to us despite fairly conclusive circumstantial evidence that there has been violation of that treaty.

So the position of the administration would be to oppose Senator Cochran's amendment, is that right? Do you know if they have taken a position on the amendment itself?

Mr. Rostow. My colleague tells me that the administration has taken no official position. I think we should be disposed to support it if it is not too rigid, that is, to pursue these bilateral approaches when it is appropriate or when it seems promising, not, however, to force us into bilateral approaches at a time when we are pursuing a very active diplomatic effort with the Soviet Union, trying to break through precisely the issues that you have identified.

The Chairman. The anthrax instance is a case. We certainly have taken that to the highest levels. I discussed it with the Soviets. The administration has formally made presentations on it.

To date have we gotten any satisfaction on that at all?

Mr. Rostow. No; but by no means have we given up. There are lots of things going on in that area, which I cannot discuss in an open session. but which are not without hope. We would not think it be helpful for the Senate to move to short-circuit those and press toward immediate negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Haig told the committee on Tuesday—and I will just quote from what he said to us—"We have begun to participate in efforts within the 40-member Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a total ban on chemical weapons."

Would you elaborate on that effort? What do you see as prospects for an earlier achievement within the foreseeable future?

Mr. ROSTOW. That is the effort to which I referred in my answer a few moments ago. Yes, we have had a full review of policy. That has matured. The President has instructed us to proceed with the most comprehensive approach to the problem of banning chemical warfare and its use.

Of course, there again the possibility of success depends upon the possibility of verification, which in that area does certainly require either international or other forms of on-site inspection.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much for your appearance.

Senator Pell, do you have any further questions.

Senator PELL. I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Will you, Mr. Director, chair or participate in the senior working groups establishing policy and developing issues, negotiating issues in the Government?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes; in all arms control matters, certainly.

Senator PELL. Chair, I said, not participate.

Mr. ROSTOW. Chair?

Senator PELL. Chair.

Mr. ROSTOW. Ah, that is an interesting question.

Senator PELL. I said participate, you're right. I said chair or participate.

Will you chair—let me be more specific—these groups?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, that again is an interesting, controversial matter under consideration within the Government, and I had better not comment on it if you will give me permission not to.

Senator PELL. What was your role and that of your agency in developing the new proposal?

Mr. ROSTOW. Active, full.

Senator PELL. And fully supportive of it? You fully support the new proposals?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

Senator PELL. As you know, SALT ratification or adherence, the freeze and reductions, all have many supporters on the Hill. Like the prongs of a trident, they have three points here. The President's proposal deals just with the reductions.

In view of the fact that so many of us are interested in the freeze and in SALT, do you see any way, in order to get a broad bipartisan consensus, that the administration might move to some accommodation with those of us who at least would like to see through a back door, if not a front door, acceptance of SALT and the freeze concept?

Mr. ROSTOW. I do not think I am authorized to predict what the President would deem wise in parliamentary circumstances that might or might not arise later. At the present time, the policy positions of the administration are firm and clear on these matters, and I have tried to sum them up and discuss them as candidly as I possibly could.

I have commented, I think, on the main issues in the controversy, and I think as for the future all I can do is to recall what the President said both on November 18 and now, last Sunday at Eureka College: We will negotiate in good faith and we will consider any proposals which the other side puts forward.

Senator PELL. Maybe they will put up an idea for SALT adherence or freeze, and then you might consider it, hopefully so.

Mr. ROSTOW. I will draw the curtain so far as I am concerned.

Senator PELL. On that note, I will conclude my questioning.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I think that is all the questioning that we have. We appreciate again very much indeed, Dr. Rostow, your appearance here today. It has been most helpful.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Additional question and answer follows:]

MR. SCOVILLE'S RESPONSE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PRESSLER

Question. In your testimony to the committee you indicated your reasons for opposing the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties in 1977. Do you continue to oppose ratification of these accords?

Answer. In 1977 I testified that the Arms Control Association was opposed to the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) Treaties. The Association has taken no new position on those Treaties since that time, but I personally still oppose the treaties.

I am opposed to the Threshold Treaty because the threshold of 150 kt is too high and has no relationship to our ability to detect significant violations. The United States has over and over again since President Eisenhower's administration had a stated policy of being prepared to halt all tests that could be verified and this threshold would be a step backward from that policy. It would be looked on by non-nuclear nations as a means of legitimizing nuclear testing by the United States and Soviet Union and as an excuse for postponing action on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a Treaty which could and should be agreed upon now and no justification for delay on this Treaty should be provided.

I do, however, commend President Reagan for his statement on the 31st of May, 1982 that the United States will refrain from actions that will undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. This should mean that without the TTB being ratified, the United States will not test above the threshold of 150 kt as long as the Soviets follow suit.

Although the PNE Treaty is no longer as important since few if any countries are truly interested in using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, I am personally also opposed to the PNE Treaty ratification at this time. It would only give revived credence to the false theory that peaceful explosives can be differentiated from military ones. For example, it would make it easier for Pakistan to claim its secret nuclear explosive program is peaceful not military as the Indian Government did in 1974.

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF L. C. CARPENTER, BETHESDA, MD.

EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC MILITARY FORCE BALANCE AND RESULTANT PERSPECTIVES ON ARMS CONTROL ALTERNATIVES

During the past 30 years as a voluntary DOD consultant my objective has been to enhance the capabilities of our strategic weapon systems and understand the relative strength of United States and U.S.S.R. strategic military forces.

My most recent study, "Evolution and Capabilities of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Strategic Military Forces, 1975–2000(U)" was completed under Air Force Invitational Orders in August 1980. The unclassified aspects of this study are reported in the Senate hearings before the Committee on Appropriations; MX Missile Basing Mode Alternatives, Fiscal Year 1982, pp. 211–232. Due to the findings of this report, I have subsequently worked as a private citizen with DOD, the intelligence community and the congressional staffs regarding the imminence of an overwhelming Soviet strategic threat, the need to completely revise MX basing in the CONUS, and related weapon system developments.

My analysis has been evaluated and generally verified by seven major DOD commands and organizations. I have provided this report and/or briefing to the DOD Transition Teams, 28 DOD agencies, OJCS, NSC, the Townes Committee, several Congressmen and congressional staffs, OTA, the Library of Congress, ACDA, the State Department and four Senate and House of Representatives committees.

Considering the foregoing activity, this study represents a thoroughly tested, independent evaluation of the United States and Soviet strategic military forces. My synthesis of the postulated Soviet threat was reverified in February 1982 and is currently being used as a basis for Air Force long-range force structure planning studies.

The principal unclassified conclusions of this study were most recently presented and justified in my testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, March 1, 1982:

1. Soviet strategic military superiority is now well established and will prevail into the 1990's. This is verified in all traditional measurements and especially, prompt countermilitary potential.
2. The Soviet ICBM threat to the entire CONUS counterforce and countervalue target structure is imminent and overwhelming. The Soviets can now eliminate essentially all U.S. strategic military targets and all industrial/urban targets in less than one hour. They need only use their on-line ICBMs and currently on-station SLBMs. This could be accomplished without committing their long range aircraft.
3. The United States cannot afford to prosecute a balanced counterforce attack and then execute a countervalue strategy against the U.S.S.R. under present policies and alert status. This aspect of Presidential Directive No. 59 is meaningless for the next several years.
4. The M–X/Multiple Protective Shelter and various more recent alternative deployment schemes are futile and fundamentally inadequate. However, the MX in an interim silo basing configuration is vital to our future strategic force posture as a CONUS-based prompt CF weapon system and bargaining factor for new arms control negotiations—possibly collocated with Minuteman and partially defended by Safeguard.
5. Enduring survivability of CONUS ICBM's can only be achieved by a small road-mobile force.
6. SALT II is uniformly disadvantageous to the United States and intrinsically inconsequential to either adversary.

This prior analysis indicates the overall validity of President Reagan's new initiatives to rebuild our strategic forces, reject the unratified SALT II Treaty, and propose significant arms reductions for the START negotiations. The six fundamental factors listed above and the attendant implications are subsequently discussed in support of these initiatives by this Administration.

Evolution of the strategic force balance

Due to their massive SS–9 and SS–11 ICBM deployments of the late 1960's, the Soviets established essential strategic military parity in 1970. Although deterred by their own common sense and the immense, surviving retaliatory potential of the United States; their forces could have inflicted 150 million U.S. casualties at any time during the past 12 years.

Having achieved strategic military parity, the Soviets continued their immense program for qualitative improvement of their ICBM forces throughout the 1970's. They concentrated on achieving the accuracy, weapon yields, reliability and sufficient numbers to destroy our six Minuteman ICBM fields. Consequently, their 308 SS–18's and 300 SS–19's represent the most powerful and effective military force elements ever conceived and deployed by mankind.

A few months into this Administration, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Soviet ICBM forces would soon have the capability to destroy more than 90 percent of our Minuteman silos in a first strike. A year later, President Reagan announced that the Soviets had established strategic military superiority.

Although our overall deterrence remains adequate, the Soviets have achieved a potentially significant military advantage. The Soviet hardened counterforce target structure is about 50 percent more numerous and variously twice as hardened as our counterforce installations. Consequently, our Minuteman ICBM force would need six times the current prompt countermilitary potential to effect comparable destruction on the Soviet counterforce target structure.

Establishing essential parity

The "Window of Vulnerability" caused by conditional Soviet strategic military superiority currently exists and will endure into the 1990's. As the newly established "Second among equals" we must solve the problem by three responses:

1. Greater existing strategic and conventional force readiness for interim deterrence during the 1980's.
2. Renewal of our Triad to achieve and maintain full strategic military parity by the early 1990's.
3. START negotiations to seriously reduce strategic armaments. First priority must be given to eliminating the most effective and destabilizing force elements; all of the U.S. and Soviet silo-based ICBMs. Should START fail, the United States must eventually deploy more than 300 MX ICBM's to achieve parity in prompt countermilitary potential.

Enhanced interim deterrence

Soviet conditional strategic military superiority must be countered by several steps that ensure their clear perception of our deterrence during the next several particularly dangerous years.

1. Since our non-alert bombers and submarines in port could be destroyed within 20 minutes, we must place a larger percentage of these forces on alert and at-sea status at all times. This will be especially necessary in times of crisis and during the Fall season of each year. Historically, and due to enduring operational circumstances, the most serious Soviet aggressive initiatives occur in the Fall.
2. The newly announced plan for improved, redundant and enduring early warning systems and similar improvements in C^3 is the first-priority task needed to ensure the detection and timely response to a possible Soviet attack. This will provide the secure technical means to ensure timely commitment of the alert bomber force, launching of any threatened portion of our ICBM forces prior to destruction of the silos, and reliable communication with our missile-launching submarines for retaliatory attack against the Soviet industrial/urban targets.

These actions should adequately reinforce the Soviet perception of our nuclear deterrent, providing the time needed to reestablish strategic military parity through our rearmament program and/or realistic and successful START negotiations. As Mr. Paul Nitze has observed, "The Soviets do not want war, they want the world."

Other arms limitation proposals

Two major alternatives to START have been prominent in the recent public dialogue; nuclear weapon freeze at present levels and SALT II Treaty ratification.

Nuclear Freeze.—The Soviet Union has proposed that current strategic force levels be maintained by both the United States and U.S.S.R. Having established strategic military superiority, they are understandably interested in stopping President Reagan's strategic armaments modernization program to regain parity during the next decade.

Well-intended citizens and organizations of the Free World are campaigning variously for a nuclear weapons freeze and mutual or unilateral arms reductions. Their motivations include religious beliefs, economic and social costs, and the inherent danger to our civilization.

Unless we "arm to parley," the Soviets are not likely to respond to the START initiative. They have paid a high price for their strategic military superiority and should not be expected to relinquish their substantive position for mere international good will. A comparable situation currently exists in Europe. Actual Pershing II and GLCM deployments will probably be necessary before the Soviets will significantly reduce their existing force of SS–4's, SS–5's and SS–20's.

SALT II.—The SALT I, Vladivostok and SALT II agreements were carefully crafted by the Soviets to be consistent with their technology, production capabilities and force structure planning. Consequently, they established strategic military superiority within these intrinsically inconsequential limitations. Our forces could have similarly modernized, but we did not make the necessary economic sacrifices.

Since the Soviets can now obliterate all of the important military and industrial/urban targets in the United States within an hour, they have little basic need for quantitatively larger strategic forces. Their improvements will continue to be qualitative and generally consistent with the unratified SALT II Treaty. Accordingly, there is little to be gained from formal ratification by the U.S. Senate. Further dialogue in the SALT II framework would merely delay any serious START negotiations.

START.—The President's proposed Strategic Arms Reducation Talks will involve very difficult and prolonged negotiations. The limitations he offered on May 9, 1982 are an excellent basis for genuine arms reduction. His ambitious and pragmatic START proposal is deserving of your further support for at least the following reasons:

1. This is about the largest realistic reduction we could propose.
2. ICBMs are given first priority with possible further delineation of SLBM forces.
3. The very complex and less urgent issues of strategic aircraft, cruise missiles and throw-weight are deferred to Phase II.
4. These quantities permit Soviet retention of the conditional strategic military superiority which they are not likely to relinquish.
5. If negotiated and ratified in the mid-1980's these limitations would allow the United States to regain prompt countermilitary potential parity with the Soviets many years earlier and at much lower mutual force levels.
6. These reductions would provide the basis for eliminating all of the destabilizing silo-based ICBM's late in the 1990's.

A less realistic proposal

During the tedious and lengthy START negotiations an imaginative, but less realistic, variant might be useful. If there is a gradual change in attitudes away from the historical aggressiveness and malevolence of our powerful adversary; we could suggest a broader, less dangerous and more constructive approach to arms control.

Given that: (1) More than a few hundred United States and U.S.S.R. ICBM's are destabilizing, needed only for counterforce warfare, unnecessary for rational deterrence, and wasteful of our mutual resources; (2) Soviet agricultural productivity is inadequate for their population; (3) Many U.S. grain farmers are facing bankruptcy due to excess production capacity and low prices; and (4) Our fundamental objective is mutual equitable arms reduction to parity by whatever secure means; then we might propose to:

1. Continue the rapid development and flight testing of MX, establish the MX production facilities, and modify many of the deep Minuteman silos for interim basing—all as insurance against failure in negotiations.

2. Annually defer MX production and deployment, saving the United States $2 billion or more in annual defense expenditures.

3. Provide the U.S.S.R. with the equivalent dollar amount of free grain from the United States, thereby improving the living standards of both countries.

In return, the Soviets must:

1. Permanently phase out and disassemble 50 or more SS-18's and silos per year until the force is eliminated.

2. Similarly and subsequently phase-out 80 or more SS-19's and silos annually down to essential parity with our Minuteman forces.

3. Continue equal and mutual phase-out of ICBM's and silos to a purely retaliatory level or preferably, entirely eliminate the remainder of such deployments.

The Soviet Union has historically lacked the humanistic concerns necessary to negotiate in the foregoing value system. Modernization of our strategic missile forces to capabilities that command their respect and then negotiating progressively lower force levels—a process that is fundamentally wasteful—is probably the only realizable approach to arms reduction.

Summary

President Reagan has proposed a constructive and realistic arms reduction program for initial START negotiations with the Soviet Union. His approach should not be compromised by undue consideration of nuclear freeze proposals or the unratified SALT II Treaty. Our negotiators will face a patient, determined and militarily superior adversary for many years of complex and difficult bargaining. They will have a great need for your guidance and enduring support.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE WEIGEL, THE INSTITUTE ON RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

I am grateful for the opportunity to present my views to you, although I regret that I have been unable to do so in person.

For the past five years, as Scholar-in-Residence at the World Without War Council of Greater Seattle, I have been professionally involved in the public debate over war/peace issues: both as a civic educator, seeking to create a public dialogue that gathers agreement within our country on its right role in world affairs, and as a participant in the strategic debate, trying to define other-than-military initiative acts that would blunt the present curve of Soviet power, defend democratic values, and bring our adversaries into agreement with us on a decent world agenda. During this time, I have been particularly interested in the shape of the national security argument within the American religious community, one of the primary teaching sectors of our society; this interest has been sharpened in the past year as I have helped launch, and now serve on the Executive Committee of, the Institute on Religion and Democracy. With this professional background and organizational experience, it will be of little surprise to you that I have followed the current wave of peace activism with great interest.

What may be of surprise to you is that I have followed it with great concern, bordering on great worry, as well.

We can all be grateful that the issue of war and peace—the central moral and political problem we face—has been put squarely at the top of the public agenda, where it belongs. But how has it been put there? What analysis of the causes of the arms race inform the main currents in today's activist community? What prescriptions for getting out of our present dangers are being proposed, overtly and, perhaps more importantly, subliminally?

On each of these counts, I think there is reason for serious concern.

Fear has been the dominant emotional current in much of today's peace activism. Organizations have seemingly competed with each other to see which could paint the most gruesome scenario of nuclear holocaust. No one doubts that these fears are real. No one doubts that they are warranted; indeed, we should fear the man or woman who does not understand the precariousness of our position. But a politics of fear is something else entirely: for the politics of fear will inevitably become the politics of hate, with the object of the hatred being public authority in this country. If the politics of fear comes to define the emotional and psychological climate for our necessary national security debate, then we will be in for a season of social disarray all too familiar to those of us who lived through the period 1968–1972. Marrying its passionate concern for avoiding nuclear war to a body of thought capable of actually reversing the arms race is an absolute pre-requisite to a peace effort (and a public policy) that is proof against the hysteria and Armageddon-mongering that has marred recent months.

The analysis of the causes of the arms race that moves (usually) beneath the surface of today's peace activism also needs to be challenged. It is an analysis typical of New Left currents of thought, and proceeds through three steps: American "intervention" almost inevitably causes damage and evil in the world; this is not accidental, but is a reflection of the way power is organized in American society, particularly in the impact of the corporate sector on public policy; therefore, the best that America can do for the world is to get out of it. That America's security policy serves any honorable purpose is a premise largely missing from today's activism. In its most virulent form, this analysis goes on to conclude that public authorities are "mad" or "insane" and that their toppling is the pre-condition to peace. In short, much of today's peace activism sees the policies of the United States Government as the principle obstacle to a world less threatened by nuclear war.

This analysis leads, in many cases, and by a very short line of argument, to essentially unilateralist prescriptions for how America should respond to the global arms race, and particularly to strategic nuclear weapons competition with the Soviet Union. For, while some in today's peace activism have made a serious, genuine effort to be balanced ("bilateral," if you will) in their prescriptions, the dominant current in the activist world continues to be a resistance to military programs whose effect is only on the United States.

These worrisome developments have come to a kind of head in the current "Nuclear Freeze Campaign." Writing recently in my column in the Catholic Northwest Progress, I raised six questions that freeze proponents must, in my view, be able to answer more satisfactorily than they have done to date, if we are to see the "instant" freeze as but one more expression (with dubious strategic effects) of anxiety and fear. To cite the column directly:

The question of goal: Why should a peace movement (or a Congressional resolution) advocate a position that is actually worse, by the movement's own standards, than the Administration's stated intention of pursuing arms reductions?

The question of reciprocation: How does an American freeze result in a reciprocal freeze from the Soviet Union? During the period 1972–1980, when the U.S. did not develop any new nuclear delivery systems, the Soviets greatly expanded their strategic arsenal; why should they be expected to act differently now? And what if the Soviets don't reciprocate a U.S. freeze? What actions are freeze advocates prepared to endorse to induce or force Soviet reciprocation? Or is the fundamental current among freeze advocates an effectively exclusive concern over the U.S. role in the nuclear arms race?

The question of focus: Does it make sense to freeze one of ten major aspects of the arms race today? Won't the underlying political conflict which fuels the arms race simply result in funds, research, and personnel being rechannelled into other areas of weapons competition (and particularly into cutting-edge systems such as laser and particle beam weapons, and chemical and biological weapons) * * * ?

The question of verification: For the freeze to be effective, both sides would need to know just what was being frozen—and that requires both a standardized accounting system and some degree of on-site inspection, especially of weapons like independently-targetable warheads that are not easily detected by reconnaissance satellites. Is the freeze truly verifiable?

The question of parity: The freeze proposal claims that there is an "existing nuclear parity" between the United States and the Soviet Union. While that may be arguable (given different indices and standards) in the strategic nuclear competition, it is certainly not the case in Europe, where asymmetries in nuclear and conventional forces are creating great tensions within the Atlantic alliance, tensions that are to the political advantage of the Soviet Union. Would the freeze ratify these imbalances, and the instability that results from them? Is the freeze based on assumptions about overkill ("Why bounce the rubble 26 times over?") that ignore the political leverage gained from perceived military superiority?

The question of alternatives: Given that there are real conflicts in the world a successful peace effort (and a successful U.S. peace strategy) must replace the functions that military systems now perform with other means of conflict-resolution. What are the freeze's alternatives? Does the freeze set the ground for erecting legal and political alternatives to war? Or does the freeze imply a heightened reliance on conventional arms (now much more destructive than they were in World War II)?

I would be happy to hear satisfactory answers to these questions from the leaders of the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, and from the proponents of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution. But such answers seem to me unlikely, given the very nature of the "instant freeze" proposal.

So where are we? The public is clearly aroused, and should be: we must create an American peace strategy that meets both the demands of our national security and moves us away from a world in which "security" means little beyond gravely-threatened survival. Creating such a peace strategy requires a cold, hard assessment of the obstacles that now block the way to a world that resolves conflict without mass violence, particularly the obstacle of the Soviet Union and its allies and clients. But can we not focus, for a change, on the relevant question of how our country can act to change the present curve of Soviet power, rather than on the typical, sterile, irrelevant question of "are Soviet intentions malign?" The question is irrelevant in the sense that one wonders how much more empirical evidence is required before the obvious answer becomes clear to some people. But the point now is not to multiply horror stories and demonologies; it is to acknowledge the dangers we face from armed totalitarian power, and then get about the task of devising initiative acts that our country could take, prior to agreement with the Soviets, that would put pressure on them to reciprocate in kind. Such acts (whose most pertinent model was President Kennedy's independent nuclear testing moratorium which helped secure the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty), carefully designed for maximum impact on Soviet decision-makers and linked across a wide range of bilateral issues, would begin to constitute an American peace strategy worthy of the name.

They would also, in my judgment, provide the means for making the Jackson-Warner "freeze" resolution, with its call for a freeze when "parity" is reached between the two sides, all the more attractive—for it would answer the question of how we get to "parity" from today's asymmetries in ways that do not further exacerbate nuclear weapons competition.

The anxieties and concerns that motor today's anti-nuclear activism are the result of multiple currents that have moved through American political culture over the past generation. In some cases, the themes that dominate peace activism must be challenged, as, for example, when they regularly ignore the question of gaining reciprocal restraint and reductions from the Soviet Union. But in other cases, we—both those in the civic arena and those in public authority—must respond with a better peace strategy for America. We cannot, in short, simply wish this new activism away. It won't happen. It will be effectively met, and its best elements channelled into more appropriate and constructive directions, when the opinion leadership of this country and the country's elected representatives have offered a more credible, more effective, more morally sound peace strategy. Such a strategy cannot consist only in pledges of good will, or in negotiating positions. It must involve concrete acts, perhaps small at first, that demonstrate to our own country and to the world that we are intent on pursuing alternative means of resolving international conflict; that we will pursue that intention without naivete; but that we will pursue it to its necessary end, which is a changed policy on the part of our adversaries.

Devising such an American peace strategy, or what Senator Jackson called a great "American peace offensive" in a letter to President Reagan, ought to be a primary task of the United States Congress, rather than spending inordinate time debating resolutions whose effect is to reduce a complex debate to a slogan. Would the Congress, and particularly the Senate, take such a lead, there are many who would be eager to follow.

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